On ignoring scientific evidence: The bumpy road to enlightenment


Autoria(s): Hogarth, Robin
Contribuinte(s)

Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa

Data(s)

15/01/2007

Resumo

It is well accepted that people resist evidence that contradicts their beliefs.Moreover, despite their training, many scientists reject results that are inconsistent withtheir theories. This phenomenon is discussed in relation to the field of judgment anddecision making by describing four case studies. These concern findings that clinical judgment is less predictive than actuarial models; simple methods have proven superiorto more theoretically correct methods in times series forecasting; equal weighting ofvariables is often more accurate than using differential weights; and decisions cansometimes be improved by discarding relevant information. All findings relate to theapparently difficult-to-accept idea that simple models can predict complex phenomenabetter than complex ones. It is true that there is a scientific market place for ideas.However, like its economic counterpart, it is subject to inefficiencies (e.g., thinness,asymmetric information, and speculative bubbles). Unfortunately, the market is only correct in the long-run. The road to enlightenment is bumpy.

Identificador

http://hdl.handle.net/10230/1034

Idioma(s)

eng

Direitos

L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons

info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

<a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/</a>

Palavras-Chave #Behavioral and Experimental Economics #decision making #judgment #forecasting #linear models #heuristics
Tipo

info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper