Structural transformation and specialization patterns in the product space: assessing China and India

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Lean management implementation: a decision making framework

Submitted to the graduate faculty Universidade Nova de Lisboa – Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master in Industrial Engineering

Internationalization process of Água das Pedras to China

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Renova black toilet paper: The creation of a glocal market space

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

GuestCentric Systems and its internationalization to Brazil

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

The international expansion strategy of Striyah in Poland

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Collateral, default penalties and infinite horizon equilibrium

Pascoa and Seghir (2009) noticed that when collateralized promises become subject to utility penalties on default, Ponzi schemes may occur. However, equilibrium exists in some interesting cases. Under low penalties, equilibrium exists if the collateral does not yield utility (for example, when it is a productive asset or a security). Equilibrium exists also under more severe penalties and collateral utility gains, when the promise or the collateral are nominal assets and the margin requirements are endogenous: relative inflation rates and margin coefficients can make the income effects dominate the penalty effects. An equilibrium refinement avoids no-trade equilibria with unduly repayment beliefs. Our refinement differs from the one used by Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (2005) as it does not eliminate no trade equilibria whose low delivery rates are consistent with the propensity to default of agents that are on the verge of selling.

Corporate strategy development: International distance model for the Brazilian market

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Corruption and Education: Empirical evidence from cross-country micro-data

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Promoting Portuguese exports to Germany: A hand-on approach for the machinery and equipment sector

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Internationalization strategy of Quinta dos Termos to the U.S.A.

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Spiteful Strategies. The ontogeny and the practice of spite in human interaction: an experimental game theory approach and empirical applications

As estratégias de malevolência implicam que um indivíduo pague um custo para infligir um custo superior a um oponente. Como um dos comportamentos fundamentais da sociobiologia, a malevolência tem recebido menos atenção que os seus pares o egoísmo e a cooperação. Contudo, foi estabelecido que a malevolência é uma estratégia viável em populações pequenas quando usada contra indivíduos negativamente geneticamente relacionados pois este comportamento pode i) ser eliminado naturalmente, ou ii) manter-se em equilíbrio com estratégias cooperativas devido à disponibilidade da parte de indivíduos malevolentes de pagar um custo para punir. Esta tese propõe compreender se a propensão para a malevolência nos humanos é inerente ou se esta se desenvolve com a idade. Para esse efeito, considerei duas experiências de teoria de jogos em crianças em ambiente escolar com idades entre os 6 e os 22 anos. A primeira, um jogo 2x2 foi testada com duas variantes: 1) um prémio foi atribuído a ambos os jogadores, proporcionalmente aos pontos acumulados; 2), um prémio foi atribuído ao jogador com mais pontos. O jogo foi desenhado com o intuito de causar o seguinte dilema a cada jogador: i) maximizar o seu ganho e arriscar ter menos pontos que o adversário; ou ii) decidir não maximizar o seu ganho, garantindo que este não era inferior ao do seu adversário. A segunda experiência consistia num jogo do ditador com duas opções: uma escolha egoísta/altruísta (A), onde o ditador recebia mais ganho, mas o seu recipiente recebia mais que ele e uma escolha malevolente (B) que oferecia menos ganhos ao ditador que a A mas mais ganhos que o recipiente. O dilema era que se as crianças se comportassem de maneira egoísta, obtinham mais ganho para si, ao mesmo tempo que aumentavam o ganho do seu colega. Se fossem malevolentes, então prefeririam ter mais ganho que o seu colega ao mesmo tempo que tinham menos para eles próprios. As experiências foram efetuadas em escolas de duas áreas distintas de Portugal (continente e Açores) para perceber se as preferências malevolentes aumentavam ou diminuíam com a idade. Os resultados na primeira experiência sugerem que (1) os alunos compreenderam a primeira variante como um jogo de coordenação e comportaram-se como maximizadores, copiando as jogadas anteriores dos seus adversários; (2) que os alunos repetentes se comportaram preferencialmente como malevolentes, mais frequentemente que como maximizadores, com especial ênfase para os alunos de 14 anos; (3) maioria dos alunos comportou-se reciprocamente desde os 12 até aos 16 anos de idade, após os quais começaram a desenvolver uma maior tolerância às escolhas dos seus parceiros. Os resultados da segunda experiência sugerem que (1) as estratégias egoístas eram prevalentes até aos 6 anos de idade, (2) as tendências altruístas emergiram até aos 8 anos de idade e (3) as estratégias de malevolência começaram a emergir a partir dos 8 anos de idade. Estes resultados complementam a literatura relativamente escassa sobre malevolência e sugerem que este comportamento está intimamente ligado a preferências de consideração sobre os outros, o paroquialismo e os estágios de desenvolvimento das crianças.************************************************************Spite is defined as an act that causes loss of payoff to an opponent at a cost to the actor. As one of the four fundamental behaviours in sociobiology, it has received far less attention than its counterparts selfishness and cooperation. It has however been established as a viable strategy in small populations when used against negatively related individuals. Because of this, spite can either i) disappear or ii) remain at equilibrium with cooperative strategies due to the willingness of spiteful individuals to pay a cost in order to punish. This thesis sets out to understand whether propensity for spiteful behaviour is inherent or if it develops with age. For that effect, two game-theoretical experiments were performed with schoolboys and schoolgirls aged 6 to 22. The first, a 2 x 2 game, was tested in two variants: 1) a prize was awarded to both players, proportional to accumulated points; 2), a prize was given to the player with most points. Each player faced the following dilemma: i) to maximise pay-off risking a lower pay-off than the opponent; or ii) not to maximise pay-off in order to cut down the opponent below their own. The second game was a dictator experiment with two choices, (A) a selfish/altruistic choice affording more payoff to the donor than B, but more to the recipient than to the donor, and (B) a spiteful choice that afforded less payoff to the donor than A, but even lower payoff to the recipient. The dilemma here was that if subjects behaved selfishly, they obtained more payoff for themselves, while at the same time increasing their opponent payoff. If they were spiteful, they would rather have more payoff than their colleague, at the cost of less for themselves. Experiments were run in schools in two different areas in Portugal (mainland and Azores) to understand whether spiteful preferences varied with age. Results in the first experiment suggested that (1) students understood the first variant as a coordination game and engaged in maximising behaviour by copying their opponent’s plays; (2) repeating students preferentially engaged in spiteful behaviour more often than maximising behaviour, with special emphasis on 14 year-olds; (3) most students engaged in reciprocal behaviour from ages 12 to 16, as they began developing higher tolerance for their opponent choices. Results for the second experiment suggested that (1) selfish strategies were prevalent until the age of 6, (2) altruistic tendencies emerged since then, and (3) spiteful strategies began being chosen more often by 8 year-olds. These results add to the relatively scarce body of literature on spite and suggest that this type of behaviour is closely tied with other-regarding preferences, parochialism and the children’s stages of development.

The role of income inequality on fiscal multipliers

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Double Degree in Economics from the Nova School of Business and Economics and University of Maastricht

The graduate: Spillovers from the entry of the first worker with a college degree in a firm

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Double Degree in Economics from NOVA School of Business and Economics and Maastricht School of Business and Economics

Spatio-temporal patterns of tuberculosis incidence in Ribeirão Preto, State of São Paulo, southeast Brazil, and their relationship with social vulnerability: a Bayesian analysis

INTRODUCTION: The purpose of this ecological study was to evaluate the urban spatial and temporal distribution of tuberculosis (TB) in Ribeirão Preto, State of São Paulo, southeast Brazil, between 2006 and 2009 and to evaluate its relationship with factors of social vulnerability such as income and education level. METHODS: We evaluated data from TBWeb, an electronic notification system for TB cases. Measures of social vulnerability were obtained from the SEADE Foundation, and information about the number of inhabitants, education and income of the households were obtained from Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics. Statistical analyses were conducted by a Bayesian regression model assuming a Poisson distribution for the observed new cases of TB in each area. A conditional autoregressive structure was used for the spatial covariance structure. RESULTS: The Bayesian model confirmed the spatial heterogeneity of TB distribution in Ribeirão Preto, identifying areas with elevated risk and the effects of social vulnerability on the disease. We demonstrated that the rate of TB was correlated with the measures of income, education and social vulnerability. However, we observed areas with low vulnerability and high education and income, but with high estimated TB rates. CONCLUSIONS: The study identified areas with different risks for TB, given that the public health system deals with the characteristics of each region individually and prioritizes those that present a higher propensity to risk of TB. Complex relationships may exist between TB incidence and a wide range of environmental and intrinsic factors, which need to be studied in future research.