Constructions and situations : a constructivist reading of Hegel's System

The object of this work is Hegel's Logic, which comprises the first third of his philosophical System that also includes the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Spirit. The work is divided into two parts, where the first part investigates Hegel s Logic in itself or without an explicit reference to rest of Hegel's System. It is argued in the first part that Hegel's Logic contains a methodology for constructing examples of basic ontological categories. The starting point on which this construction is based is a structure Hegel calls Nothing, which I argue to be identical with an empty situation, that is, a situation with no objects in it. Examples of further categories are constructed, firstly, by making previous structures objects of new situations. This rule makes it possible for Hegel to introduce examples of ontological structures that contain objects as constituents. Secondly, Hegel takes also the very constructions he uses as constituents of further structures: thus, he is able to exemplify ontological categories involving causal relations. The final result of Hegel's Logic should then be a model of Hegel s Logic itself, or at least of its basic methods. The second part of the work focuses on the relation of Hegel's Logic to the other parts of Hegel's System. My interpretation tries to avoid, firstly, the extreme of taking Hegel's System as a grand metaphysical attempt to deduce what exists through abstract thinking, and secondly, the extreme of seeing Hegel's System as mere diluted Kantianism or a second-order investigation of theories concerning objects instead of actual objects. I suggest a third manner of reading Hegel's System, based on extending the constructivism of Hegel's Logic to the whole of his philosophical System. According to this interpretation, transitions between parts of Hegel's System should not be understood as proofs of any sort, but as constructions of one structure or its model from another structure. Hence, these transitions involve at least, and especially within the Philosophy of Nature, modelling of one type of object or phenomenon through characteristics of an object or phenomenon of another type, and in the best case, and especially within the Philosophy of Spirit, transformations of an object or phenomenon of one type into an object or phenomenon of another type. Thus, the transitions and descriptions within Hegel's System concern actual objects and not mere theories, but they still involve no fallacious deductions.

Individuals' Responsibility in Corporations

I discuss role responsibly, individual responsibility and collective responsibility in corporate multinational setting. My case study is about minerals used in electronics that come from the Democratic Republic of Congo. What I try to show throughout the thesis is how many things need to be taken into consideration when we discuss the responsibility of individuals in corporations. No easy and simple answers are available. Instead, we must keep in mind the complexity of the situation at all times, judging cases on individual basis, emphasizing the importance of individual judgement and virtue, as well as the responsibility we all share as members of groups and the wider society. I begin by discussing the demands that are placed on us as employees. There is always a potential for a conflict between our different roles and also the wider demands placed on us. Role demands are usually much more specific than the wider question of how we should act as human beings. The terminology of roles can also be misleading as it can create illusions about our work selves being somehow radically separated from our everyday, true selves. The nature of collective decision-making and its implications for responsibility is important too. When discussing the moral responsibility of an employee in a corporate setting, one must take into account arguments from individual and collective responsibility, as well as role ethics. Individual responsibility is not a separate or competing notion from that of collective responsibility. Rather, the two are interlinked. Individuals' responsibilities in collective settings combine both individual responsibility and collective responsibility (which is different from aggregate individual responsibility). In the majority of cases, both will apply in various degrees. Some members might have individual responsibility in addition to the collective responsibility, while others just the collective responsibility. There are also times when no-one bears individual moral responsibility but the members are still responsible for the collective part. My intuition is that collective moral responsibility is strongly linked to the way the collective setting affects individual judgements and moulds the decisions, and how the individuals use the collective setting to further their own ends. Individuals remain the moral agents but responsibility is collective if the actions in question are collective in character. I also explore the impacts of bureaucratic ethic and its influence on the individual. Bureaucracies can compartmentalize work to such a degree that individual human action is reduced to mere behaviour. Responsibility is diffused and the people working in the bureaucracy can come to view their actions to be outside the normal human realm where they would be responsible for what they do. Language games and rules, anonymity, internal power struggles, and the fragmentation of information are just some of the reasons responsibility and morality can get blurry in big institutional settings. Throughout the thesis I defend the following theses: ● People act differently depending on their roles. This is necessary for our society to function, but the more specific role demands should always be kept in check by the wider requirements of being a good human being. ● Acts in corporations (and other large collectives) are not reducible to individual actions, and cannot be explained fully by the behaviour of individual employees. ● Individuals are responsible for the actions that they undertake in the collective as role occupiers and are very rarely off the hook. Hiding behind role demands is usually only an excuse and shows a lack of virtue. ● Individuals in roles can be responsible even when the collective is not. This depends on if the act they performed was corporate in nature or not. ● Bureaucratic structure affects individual thinking and is not always a healthy environment to work in. ● Individual members can share responsibility with the collective and our share of the collective responsibility is strongly linked to our relations. ● Corporations and other collectives can be responsible for harm even when no individual is at fault. The structure and the policies of the collective are crucial. ● Socialization plays an important role in our morality at both work and outside it. We are all responsible for the kind of moral context we create. ● When accepting a role or a position in a collective, we are attaching ourselves with the values of that collective. ● Ethical theories should put more emphasis on good judgement and decision-making instead of vague generalisations. My conclusion is that the individual person is always in the centre when it comes to responsibility, and not so easily off the hook as we sometimes think. What we do, and especially who we choose to associate ourselves with, does matter and we should be more careful when we choose who we work for. Individuals within corporations are responsible for choosing that the corporation they associate with is one that they can ascribe to morally, if not fully, then at least for the most part. Individuals are also inclusively responsible to a varying degree for the collective activities they contribute to, even in overdetermined contexts. We all are responsible for the kind of corporations we choose to support through our actions as consumers, investors and citizens.

Proofs, Paradoxes, and Probabilities : The Logical Turn of Philosophy in Finland

This monograph describes the emergence of independent research on logic in Finland. The emphasis is placed on three well-known students of Eino Kaila: Georg Henrik von Wright (1916-2003), Erik Stenius (1911-1990), and Oiva Ketonen (1913-2000), and their research between the early 1930s and the early 1950s. The early academic work of these scholars laid the foundations for today's strong tradition in logic in Finland and also became internationally recognized. However, due attention has not been given to these works later, nor have they been comprehensively presented together. Each chapter of the book focuses on the life and work of one of Kaila's aforementioned students, with a fourth chapter discussing works on logic by authors who would later become known within other disciplines. Through an extensive use of correspondence and other archived material, some insight has been gained into the persons behind the academic personae. Unique and unpublished biographical material has been available for this task. The chapter on Oiva Ketonen focuses primarily on his work on what is today known as proof theory, especially on his proof theoretical system with invertible rules that permits a terminating root-first proof search. The independency of the parallel postulate is proved as an example of the strength of root-first proof search. Ketonen was to our knowledge Gerhard Gentzen's (the 'father' of proof theory) only student. Correspondence and a hitherto unavailable autobiographic manuscript, in addition to an unpublished article on the relationship between logic and epistemology, is presented. The chapter on Erik Stenius discusses his work on paradoxes and set theory, more specifically on how a rigid theory of definitions is employed to avoid these paradoxes. A presentation by Paul Bernays on Stenius' attempt at a proof of the consistency of arithmetic is reconstructed based on Bernays' lecture notes. Stenius correspondence with Paul Bernays, Evert Beth, and Georg Kreisel is discussed. The chapter on Georg Henrik von Wright presents his early work on probability and epistemology, along with his later work on modal logic that made him internationally famous. Correspondence from various archives (especially with Kaila and Charlie Dunbar Broad) further discusses his academic achievements and his experiences during the challenging circumstances of the 1940s.

Tarvitaanko demokratiassa keskustelua? Julkinen alue demokraattisen legitimiteetin tuottajana

Pyrin Pro gradu -tutkielmassani hahmottamaan ne tekijät, jotka konstituoivat julkista aluetta demokraattista legitimiteettiä tuottavana poliittisena foorumina. Työni keskiössä on deliberatiivisen demokratian teorian ydinajatus, että ihmiset ja ihmisryhmät kykenevät muodostamaan mielipiteensä ja tuomaan sen esille julkisissa keskusteluissa. Hyvin argumentoitu vaade ryhmän oikeuksien puolesta kerää julkista kannatusta muualtakin kuin asianomaisen ryhmän sisältä. Tämä puolestaan saa aikaan poliittisia muutoksia. Ryhmä, jota yhdistää epäoikeudenmukaisuuden kokemus, tuo agendansa julkisuuteen ja pyrkii vaikuttamaan yleiseen mielipiteeseen ja sitä kautta poliittiseen päätöksentekoon. Oleellinen kysymys tässä kontekstissa on, kuinka paljon yleisen mielipiteen tulisi vaikuttaa poliittiseen päätöksentekoon ja minkälaisiin aiheisiin poliittisesti vaikuttava yleinen mielipide on rajattu. Keskustelun julkisen alueen demokraattistra legitimiteettiä tuottavasta voimasta käynnisti Jürgen Habermasin teos Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit vuonna 1962. Olen käyttänyt kyseisen teoksen lisäksi lähteinäni Habermasin myöhäisempää tuotantoa. Habermasin pääasiallisina kommentaattoreina työssäni toimivat John Rawls, Nancy Fraser, Chantal Mouffe ja Seyla Benhabib. Tarkastelutapani on systemaattinen. Pyrin selventämään julkisen alueen käsitettä sekä liittyen julkiselle alueelle postuloituihin funktioihin, episteemiseen asemaan, sosiaaliseen ontologiaan, ekstensioon ja sitä konstituoiviin periaatteisiin. Käyn läpi deliberatiivisen demokratian teorian, poliittisen liberalismin ja agonistisen politiikan teorian käsitykset politiikan ja julkisen alueen luonteesta. Pyrin puolustamaan deliberatiivisen demokratian mukaista näkemystä julkisen alueen funktiosta. Käyn tutkielmassani läpi myös niitä ongelmia, jotka nousevat viime vuosikymmenien aikana demokraattisen päätöksenteon kannalta oleellisissa instituutionaalisissa rakanteissa tapahtuneista muutoksista. Keskeinen kysymys on, kykeneekö habermasilainen teoria vielä säilyttämään deskriptiivisen ja normatiivisen arvonsa globalisoituneessa maailmassa. Tutkimuksessani selvisi, että demokraattinen legitimiteetti vaatii tuekseen julkisen alueen mielipiteenmuodostusta. Julkista aluetta ei kuitenkaan ole tarkoituksenmukaista hahmottaa yhtenä laajana diskursiivisena areenana vaan useiden kommunikatiivisten alueiden verkostona, joista jotkut alueet ovat kattavampia kuin toiset.

'Luonto' ympäristöarvojen tastalla

Tutkielman tavoitteena on selvittää sanan ‘luonto’ merkitystä ja käyttöä ympäristöfilosofisessa keskustelussa. Mielenkiinnon kohteena on erityisesti se, voidaanko tällä käsitteellä perustella ympäristöarvoja ja voidaanko näillä arvoilla katsoa olevan moraalista velvoittavaa voimaa. Sanalle ‘luonto’ löytyy kaksi kilpailevaa määritelmää, joita käytetään ympäristöfilosofisissa teorioissa rinnakkain tai niistä valitaan toinen. Näiden luonto-käsitteen määritelmien voidaan katsoa olevan läpikäydyn aineiston perusteella yleisesti hyväksyttyjä. Niitä ei kuitenkaan perustella huolella, vaan tyydytään vallitsevaan käsitykseen sitä kyseenalaistamatta. Tästä syystä tämän tutkielman kysymyksenasettelulle on ympäristöfilosofiassa tarvetta. Tutkielma on luonteeltaan analyyttinen. Lähdeaineistoksi on valittu historiallisten auktoriteettien lisäksi modernin ympäristöfilosofian puhutuimpia ja kiistellyimpiä näkökulmia. Historiallisten auktoriteettien tärkein ominaisuus tämän tutkielman kannalta on niiden riippumattomuus modernista ympäristöajattelusta, jolla on omat ennakkokäsityksensä ja asenteensa painolastinaan. Keskeisinä lähteinä ovat: John O’Neillin, Alan Hollandin ja Andrew Lightin Environmental Values; John Stuart Millin On Nature ja Robert Elliotin Faking Nature. J. S. Millin On Nature -essee, jossa luonto-käsitteelle löydetään ympäristöfilosofiassa yhä käytettävät kaksi määritelmää. Näitä ‘luonnon’ määritelmiä syvennetään modernien ympäristöfilosofien ajatuksilla. O.Neill ym. teoksesta on tähän tutkielmaan otettu rakenne sen esittämän kysymyksenasettelun mukaisesti. Lisäksi se tarjoaa tutkielman esittämään ympäristöarvojen moraalisen velvoittavuuden ongelmaan yhden ratkaisun. Elliotin artikkeli on tälle työlle keskeinen kahdesta syystä: ensinnäkin se toimii argumentaation kehityksen vastinparina, sillä sen sisältö on tämän tutkielman näkökulmasta ristiriitainen. Toiseksi, se onnistuu kuvaamaan ympäristöön liitettävien arvojen luonteen vahvalla intuitiivisella vertauksella taiteeseen. Näiden taidevertausten ansioista Elliotin artikkeli on kiistatta yksi modernin ympäristöfilosofian lainatuimmista ja kiistellyimmistä. Elliotin argumentaatiolinjaa jatkavat ajattelijat syventävät näitä käsityksiä entisestään ja myös O’Neill ym. saavat siitä vaikutteita omaan ajatteluunsa. Tämän tutkielman aineiston valossa voidaan todeta, että luonnolle löydetään kaksi eriävää määritelmää. Ensinnäkin ‘luonto’ määritellään tieteellisesti luonnonlaeiksi. Toisessa määritelmässään ‘luonto’ ymmärretään ei-inhimilliseksi ympäristöksi. Näiden määritelmien voidaan sanoa eroavan ensisijaisesti siinä, että jälkimmäisen määritelmän mukaisella luonnolla voidaan katsoa olevan arvoa. Tämä arvo on luonteeltaan joko välillistä tai välitöntä riippuen siitä, arvostetaanko sitä jonkin toisen arvon saavuttamisen välineenä vai sen itsensä tähden itseisarvoisesti. Näiden erilaisten ympäristöarvon lajien tunnistaminen on niiden moraalisen velvoittavuuden kannalta keskeinen tekijä. Osa ympäristöfilosofisista teorioista lähtee siitä, että luonnolla olisi objektiivinen arvonsa silloinkin kun inhimillinen moraalisubjekti ei sitä ole arvostamassa. Toisen tärkeänä huomiona on, että mikäli ‘luonto’ määritellään ei-inhimilliseksi ympäristöksi, kaikki inhimilliset luonnonsuojelutoimet osoittautuvat mahdottomiksi. Ne muuttaisivat tuon ei-inhimillisen ympäristön osaksi inhimillistä ympäristöä. Jotta moraaliselle toimijalle ympäristöarvoilla olisi merkitystä, niiden olisi oltava tämän agentin tunnistettavissa. Tutkielman aineiston valossa voidaan todeta, että vaikka ei-inhimillisellä ympäristöllä tällaista arvoa olisikin, ei se voisi ohjata moraalista toimintaamme. Lisäksi voidaan todeta, ettei tässä työssä esitetyt ympäristöfilosofiset teoriat tätä luonnonsuojelun paradoksi onnistu kiertämään. Tämän työn tärkein johtopäätös on, ettei luontoa voida suojella. Ympäristöfilosofia Etiikka

An Analysis of the Concept of Citizenship: Legal, Political and Social Dimensions

The thesis aims at analyzing concept of citizenship in political philosophy. The concept of citizenship is a complex one: it does not have a definitive explication, but it nevertheless is a very important category in contemporary world. Citizenship is a powerful ideal, and often the way a person is treated depends on whether he or she has the status of a citizen. Citizenship includes protection of a person’s rights both at home and abroad. It entails legal, political and social dimension: the legal status as a full member of society, the recognition of that status by fellow citizens and acting as a member of society. The thesis discusses these three dimensions. Its objective is to show how all of them, despite being insufficient in some aspects, reach something important about the concept. The main sources of the thesis are Civic Republicanism by Iseult Honohan (Routledge 2002), Republicanism by Philip Pettit (Clarendon Press 1997), and Taking Rights Seriously by Ronald Dworkin (1997). In addition, the historical part of the thesis relies mainly on the works of Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, Adam Smith, Quentin Skinner, James Pocock and James Tully. The writings of Will Kymlicka, John Rawls, Chantal Mouffe, and Shane Phelan are referred to in the presentation and critique of the liberal tradition of thought. Hannah Arendt and Seyla Benhabib’s analysis of Arendt’s philosophy both address the problematic relations between human rights and nation-states as the main guarantors of rights. The chapter on group rights relies on Peter Jones’ account of corporate and collective rights, after which I continue to Seumas Miller’s essay on the (liberal) account of group rights and their relation to the concept of citizenship. Republicanism and Political Theory (2002) edited by Cécile Laborde and John Maynor is also references. David Miller and Maurizio Viroli represent the more “rooted” version of republicanism. The thesis argues that the full concept of citizenship should be seen as containing legal, political and social dimensions. The concept can be viewed from all of these three angles. The first means that citizenship is connected with certain rights, like the right to vote or stand for election, the right to property and so on. In most societies, the law guarantees these rights to every citizen. Then there is also the social dimension, which can be said to be as important as the legal one: the recognition of equality and identities of others. Finally, there is the political dimension, meaning the importance of citizens’ participation in the society, which is discussed in connection with the contemporary account of republicanism. All these issues are discussed from the point of view of groups demanding for group-specific rights and equal recognition. The challenge with these three aspects of citizenship is, however, that they are difficult to discuss under one heading. Different theories or discourses of citizenship each approach the subject from different starting points, which make reconciling them sometimes hard. The fundamental questions theories try to answer may differ radically depending on the theory. Nevertheless, in order to get the whole image of what the citizenship discourses are about all the aspects deserve to be taken into account.

Tiempo kairológico y tradición oculta: la recepción de Walter Benjamin por parte de Hannah Arendt

Introducción: "La investigación titulada Tiempo kairológico y tradición oculta. La recepción del pensamiento de Walter Benjamin por parte de Hannah Arendt propone el esclarecimiento de las cuestiones y de las actitudes teóricas que Hannah Arendt tomó, selectivamente, de Walter Benjamin. Ambos comparten la conciencia del colapso moral y político de la Europa de entreguerras, no menos que la desconfianza ante las categorías de juicio transmitidas por una tradición, a la que no juzgaban vinculante. Discuten los mecanismos compulsivos de la lógica y los juzgan estériles e impropios para comprender y valorar. Impugnan un concepto de historia al que consideran obsoleto e indebido para discernir el significado de las acciones e inadecuado para dar cuenta de la novedad y el acontecimiento. En consecuencia, ambos recalan en “el fragmento y la ruina”, y enaltecen eventos olvidados y des-asidos del contexto referencial habitual. Así, presentan una historiografía fragmentada, compatible con una concepción del tiempo como origen y acontecimiento o, también, como disrupción de la linealidad cronológica. A esta noción llamamos tiempo kairológico..."

La filosofía educativa de Juan Luis Vives

Juan Luis Vives como hombre de las letras, la filosofía, las humanidades y la educación en el Renacimiento, fue inspirador del presente trabajo de conclusión de la etapa formativa de la Licenciatura de Filosofía, pues sus ideas, sus escritos y sobre todo su vida son un modelo integral de pensamiento y de comportamiento que sigue actualmente vigente y puede brindar aportes al hombre del siglo XXI. El tema de estudio del presente trabajo es la filosofía educativa del valenciano, en el contexto de su pensamiento humanista y de las corrientes que conformaron la época renacentista.

Teología, 1966, Tomo IV/1 nº 8 (número completo)

La Comunión de vida con Dios en la Iglesia (Capítulos V, VII y VIII) / Rafael A. Tello -- La Jerarquía: una potestad al servicio de la Iglesia (Capítulo III) / Carmelo J. Giaquinta -- El Laicado en la Iglesia (capítulo IV) / Pedro Geltman -- La vida religiosa en la Constitución “Lumen Gentium” (Capítulo VI) / Domingo Basso -- Crónica de la Facultad (enero-marzo 1966) -- Bibliografía

Impossibilità di pensare Dio non esistente : il Proslogion di Anselmo d'Aosta come applicazione implicita dei moderni procedimenti di logica aletica

Resumen: La vera intenzione teologica di Anselmo d’Aosta nello scrivere il Proslogion e il vero significato del suo celebre unum argumentum vanno visti nella funzione che la ragione svolge necessariamente all’interno della vita di fede del cristiano. Anselmo, come Tommaso d’Aquino, non sostiene che l’esistenza di Dio sia un “articulus fidei” ma piuttosto uno dei “praeambula fidei”. La ragione naturale ha la certezza che Dio esiste, ancora prima della dimostrazione metafisica, e questo non fa che confermare l’assurdità di pensare che non esista il fondamento reale di tutte le cose esistenti.

Actitud natural y actitud fenomenológica

Resumen: La fenomenología de Husserl toma como punto de partida el problema del conocimiento con el fin de reformular la idea de una filosofía como ciencia estricta que aspira en última instancia a establecer una vida éticamente buena sobre bases racionales. Tiene que enfrentarse para ello con las cuestiones del comienzo de la filosofía y de su método. Ambas exigen tener en cuenta la distinción entre la actitud natural y la actitud propiamente filosófica porque la epojé que abre el camino a la reducción fenomenológica requiere advertir, tematizar y suspender la validez de la actitud natural. En la primera sección del artículo se deslindan los rasgos esenciales de las actitudes y se distinguen tipos generales de actitudes. A continuación se muestra, en la segunda sección, a la actitud natural como el fondo o suelo de todas las actitudes especiales y se delinean sus caracteres más sobresalientes. En la tercera sección, por último, se contrasta esta actitud natural básica con la actitud fenomenológica en conexión con el modo como Descartes comprende las cuestiones del comienzo y del método. Con ello se retorna al planteo de la filosofía como conocimiento en vistas a una renovación ética de la vida espiritual a fin de precisar por qué el paso de la actitud natural a la actitud fenomenológica es la condición necesaria para poder abandonar la instalación ingenua sobre el suelo incuestionado del mundo.

Sapientia, 1997, Vol. LII, nº 201 (número completo)

Contenido: El aristotelismo y el tomismo frente al egoísmo psicológico / María L. Lukac de Stier – El deseo natural de ver a Dios en la Summa contra Gentiles / Guillermo Jorge Cambiasso – La creación como encuentro del ser y de la nada en la teología del maestro Eckhart de Hochheim O.P. (1260-1327) / Brian J. Farrelly – Malebranche y el libertinage érudit / Francisco Leocata – The problem of person and Jean Mouroux / John M. McDermott ; Glenn J. Comandini – Los fundamentos de la Bioética de H. Tristram Engelhardt / Jorge Martínez Barrera – Cuando las contradictorias son verdaderas / Marisa Villalba de Tablón – Examen del escepticismo moral y del relativismo moral / Camilo Tale – Saint Thomas et le mystère de la création : une réponse aux interrogations de l’homme d’aujourd’hui / Marie-Dominique Philippe – La finalidad de la naturaleza humana : alcance y actualidad de la cuestión / Beatriz Eugenia Reyes Oribe – La providencia y el gobierno del mundo / Alberto Caturelli – Saint Thomas et le problème de la possibilité d’un univers créé éternel / Alain-Marie de Lassus – La causalidad material de los elementos en la generación de los cuerpos mixtos / Mario Enrique Sacchi -- Bibliografía