Motivational profiles Spanish students of Compulsory Secondary Education: Differential analysis of academic self-attributions

Academic goals and academic self-attributions are relevant variables in school settings. The objective of this study is to identify whether there are combinations of multiple goals that lead to different motivational profiles and to determine whether there are significant differences between the groups obtained regarding causal attributions of success and failure (ability, effort, or external causes) in Mathematics and Language and Literature, and in overall academic performance. The Goal Achievement Tendencies Questionnaire (AGTQ) and the Sydney Attribution Scale (SAS) were administered to a sample of 2022 students of compulsory secondary education, ranging in age from 12 to 16 years (M = 13.81, SD = 1.35). Cluster analysis identified four motivational profiles: a group of students with a high generalized motivation profile, a group of students with low generalized motivation profile, a group of students with predominance of learning goals and achievement goals, and a final group of students with predominance of social reinforcement goals. Results revealed statistically significant differences between the profiles obtained in academic self-attributions.

The Ontario-Manitoba Boundary Dispute

The powers of the General Government are so much greater than those of the United States in its relations with the Local Governments, that the central power must win. The next quarter century was marked by struggle, or rather a series of struggles, between the Dominion Government and those of the various provinces with as a general rule contrary to Macdonal's expectations, the latter proving successful. Ontario was the most consistent opponent of centralizing tendencies; her most notably victory was scored in what is known as the Ontario-Manitoba Boundary Dispute. It is out intention to deal with this question primarily as a phase of post-Confederation politics.

Stress Inversion Using LiDAR Tunnel Deformation Measurements

Far-field stresses are those present in a volume of rock prior to excavations being created. Estimates of the orientation and magnitude of far-field stresses, often used in mine design, are generally obtained by single-point measurements of stress, or large-scale, regional trends. Point measurements can be a poor representation of far-field stresses as a result of excavation-induced stresses and geological structures. For these reasons, far-field stress estimates can be associated with high levels of uncertainty. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the practical feasibility, applications, and limitations of calibrating far-field stress estimates through tunnel deformation measurements captured using LiDAR imaging. A method that estimates the orientation and magnitude of excavation-induced principal stress changes through back-analysis of deformation measurements from LiDAR imaged tunnels was developed and tested using synthetic data. If excavation-induced stress change orientations and magnitudes can be accurately estimated, they can be used in the calibration of far-field stress input to numerical models. LiDAR point clouds have been proven to have a number of underground applications, thus it is desired to explore their use in numerical model calibration. The back-analysis method is founded on the superposition of stresses and requires a two-dimensional numerical model of the deforming tunnel. Principal stress changes of known orientation and magnitude are applied to the model to create calibration curves. Estimation can then be performed by minimizing squared differences between the measured tunnel and sets of calibration curve deformations. In addition to the back-analysis estimation method, a procedure consisting of previously existing techniques to measure tunnel deformation using LiDAR imaging was documented. Under ideal conditions, the back-analysis method estimated principal stress change orientations within ±5° and magnitudes within ±2 MPa. Results were comparable for four different tunnel profile shapes. Preliminary testing using plastic deformation, a rough tunnel profile, and profile occlusions suggests that the method can work under more realistic conditions. The results from this thesis set the groundwork for the continued development of a new, inexpensive, and efficient far-field stress estimate calibration method.

Interpolação projetual : explorando o espaço de possibilidades entre a menor complexidade e o maior desempenho

Tese de doutoramento, Belas-Artes (Design de Equipamento), Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Belas-Artes, 2016

A intimidade afetiva e sexual na imprensa em Portugal (1968-1978)

Tese de doutoramento, Sociologia (Sociologia da Cultura, Comunicação, e Estilos de Vida), Universidade de Lisboa, Instituto de Ciências Sociais, 2016

O direito administrativo na sociedade : a dimensão societal do direito administrativo entre a autopoiese dos sistemas sociais e a função intersistémica do sistema jurídico

Tese de doutoramento, Direito (Ciências Jurídico-Políticas, vertente de Direito Administrativo), Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Direito, 2016

Proximité à distance : les fonctions critiques de la mimêsis dans la pensée de Theodor W. Adorno

La présente thèse entend donner sens à un concept qui occupe une place centrale au sein de la pensée de Theodor W. Adorno mais qui, parce que notoirement difficile à définir, n’a pas reçu l’attention qu’il mérite : la mimêsis (Mimesis). Il s’agira, plus exactement, de comprendre la mimêsis comme un point nodal de la critique adornienne, qui nous permet de comprendre au nom et en vue de quoi elle se déploie. Car sous toutes ses acceptions – et nous verrons qu’elles sont fort variées – la mimêsis adornienne est toujours invoquée dans le but de contrecarrer les tendances hétéronomes (c’est-à-dire : déshumanisantes) propres aux sociétés capitalistes avancées. Surtout, elle est constamment présentée comme un correctif matérialiste au type de rationalité abstraite qui sous-tend ces sociétés. Cette tâche s’avère d’autant plus lourde que, malgré son important poids normatif, la mimêsis ne fait pas l’objet, chez Adorno, d’une théorisation explicite. Il nous faudra pallier cette indétermination, en identifiant d’abord les assises normatives les plus premières de la critique adornienne (0.0. Introduction : les fondements normatifs de la critique adornienne), pour ensuite rendre compte des fonctions particulières qu’occupe la mimêsis au sein de cette critique (1.0. Les fonctions critiques de la mimêsis adornienne). Ce travail de débroussaillage exégétique et interprétatif nous permettra de constater que la mimêsis adornienne recèle trois types de potentiels critiques distincts. D’abord, en ce qu’elle est présentée – dans les travaux des années 1930 et 1940 surtout – comme une impulsion psychosomatique à même de trahir, l’instant d’une brève résistance, la violence infligée à la nature intérieure et extérieure de l’homme par les forces réificatrices de la rationalité instrumentale (Instrumentelle Vernunft), la mimêsis adornienne peut être comprise comme un mimétisme (Mimikry) bioanthropologique dont la valeur est principalement expressive (2.O. Mimikry : le potentiel bioanthropologique de la mimêsis). Ensuite, lorsqu’elle sera pensée – à partir de la fin des années 50 surtout – comme une compétence proprement épistémique qui permet au sujet connaissant de rencontrer à nouveau puis de redéterminer les objets de son expérience, la mimêsis adornienne peut être comprise comme un correctif critique à la logique appropriative de la pensée identifiante (identifizierendes Denken) (3.O. Affinität et Entäusserung : le potentiel épistémique de la mimêsis). Enfin, dans la mesure où elle informe le modus operandi de l’oeuvre d’art d’avant-garde telle que défendue par Adorno dans la Théorie esthétique, et qui consiste à détourner, en les retournant contre elles-mêmes, les contraintes imposées par le monde totalement administré (total verwaltete Welt), la mimêsis peut être comprise comme une Methexis subversive, c’est-à-dire comme une stratégie séditieuse à même de conjurer l’hétéronomie sociale en l’anticipant et en l’incorporant (4.0. Methexis subversive : le potentiel stratégique de la mimêsis). Ainsi, tout en voulant rendre justice à la très grande polysémie du concept, nous aimerions démontrer que la mimêsis adornienne pointe constamment vers une forme ou une autre de résistance : comme expression, comme extériorisation ou comme subversion.

Unity stronger than divisions. Ukraine's internal diversity. OSW Point of View Number 40, March 2014

Ukraine is deeply divided internally, although as a result of the changes that have taken place since its independence, the country’s internal divisions now have less and less to do with territorial divides, and the split into historical ‘sub-Ukraines’ has become less pronounced, especially for the younger generation. Ukraine is not a country of two competing regional identities, one in the west, the other in the east. The western identity, in which the unity of Ukraine is a key value, coexists with the multiple and diverse local patriotisms of the different regions in the east and the south of the country. The present protest movement has consolidated the country’s sense of unity. Its opponents have also been championing the indivisibility of Ukraine, even while they demanded a thorough decentralisation of the country, which was often mistaken for separatism. Russia has been stirring up separatist tendencies in Ukraine, but with little success. Crimea is an exception here, because in most respects it has remained unaffected by the dynamics of the social processes transforming mainland Ukraine – separatist tendencies are indeed deeply rooted in the peninsula.

Chasing globalisation: Germany's economic relations with the BRIC countries. OSW Report, November 2013

The Eurozone crisis has forced German exporters to speed up their expansion onto the emerging markets, in particular Brazil, Russia, India and China. The development observed in those countries has become an important substitute for the consequences of the economic slowdown in Europe.To illustrate the scale of cooperation between Germany and the BRIC countries, it is enough to quote figures concerning Germany’s trade. Between 2000-2011 the share of trade with the BRIC states in the entire German trade exchange rose from 5.5% to 13.3%. In the same period opposite tendencies were observed in the figures relating to trade with the USA, whose share in German trade fell from 9.6% to 6.2%. The report discusses the major tendencies present in Germany’s cooperation with the BRIC countries, and examines how the German state supports German companies in their business activities on these markets. The main method used to investigate these processes is the economic analysis of trade and capital flows between Germany and the BRIC countries, supplemented by conclusions drawn from discussions with German experts. The main issue discussed in the text is the role of the state in stimulating the expansion of German companies onto the BRIC markets. In the context of these activities, political relations and the proper use of export and investment guarantees and development aid are of major importance.

The tug of war. Russia's response to changes on the European gas market. OSW Study 50/2014

Russia, being aware of the evolution of the EU gas market and the fluctuations in trends that accompany it, and in an attempt to maintain its position on the European gas market, is sticking to a dichotomous strategy. On the one hand, Moscow has taken an offensive approach: it continues its traditionally critical rhetoric with regard to the legal and institutional changes; by negating the legitimacy of the new rules, it has been making efforts to undermine them by employing legal and political measures; Russia has used such traditional economic means as investments in assets and pushing through the implementation of new gas pipeline construction projects. On the other hand, the evolution of the EU gas market has forced Russia to take steps to adapt to a certain extent: partial changes in the operation of the internal gas sector; promises to further curb Gazprom’s dominant position; the concessions made in trade negotiations with European partners; partial adjustments to the EU’s so called third energy package regulations. Hoping that the unfolding situation on the gas markets will contribute to slowing down the recent liberalisation tendencies in the EU and that EU member states won’t make progress in decreasing their dependence on Russian gas, Moscow is thus preparing itself for the ‘long game’ in gas with its European partners.

Svodboda party - the new phenomenon on the Ukrainian right-wing scene. OSW Commentary No. 56, 2011-07-04

Even though the national-level political scene in Ukraine is dominated by the Party of Regions, the west of the country has seen a progressing increase in the activity of the Svoboda (Freedom) party, a group that combines participation in the democratically elected local government of Eastern Galicia with street actions, characteristic of anti-system groups. This party has brought a new quality to the Ukrainian nationalist movement, as it refers to the rhetoric of European anti-liberal and neo-nationalist movements, and its emergence is a clear response to public demand for a group of this sort. The increase in its popularity plays into the hands of the Party of Regions, which is seeking to weaken the more moderate opposition parties (mainly the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc). However, Svoboda retains its independence from the ruling camp. This party, in all likelihood, will become a permanent and important player in Ukrainian political life, although its influence may be restricted to Eastern Galicia. Svoboda is determined to fight the tendencies in Ukrainian politics and the social sphere which it considers pro-Russian. Its attitude towards Russia and Russians, furthermore, is unambiguously hostile. In the case of Poland, it reduces mutual relations almost exclusively to the historical aspects, strongly criticising the commemoration of the victims of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army’s (UPA) crimes. This may cause tension in Polish-Ukrainian relations, where they are affected by decisions made by local governments controlled by the Svoboda Party.

'The power gained, we will never surrender': Russian ruling elite versus the succession and economic crisis. OSW Point of View (Policy Brief), October 2009

Even though the economic crisis proved harmful to the Russian economy and people's living standards, it has nonetheless failed to make the elite revise its policy. Despite some problems, the government has managed to sustain economic and political stability, thanks to the reserves it amassed in the times of prosperity, and to the propaganda campaign that protected it, above all Vladimir Putin. The crisis failed to force the elite to implement deeper structural and political reforms. Moreover, it has actually reinforced existing tendencies, such as state control over the economy and its oil-oriented character, the elite's economic expansion at the expense of private businesses, and the preservation of political power. Thus, the crisis has so far failed to dismantle Putinism, indeed quite the reverse - it has in fact contributed to its becoming 'set in stone'.

North Caucasus: the Russian Gordian knot. The key problems and conflicts in the region and the effect thereof on the future of Russia; Putin after re-election: The Kremlin's policy in Vladimir Putin's second term. OSW Study 16/2004

North Caucasus: North Caucasus is the most instable part of the Russian Federation: since the early 90's, there has been going on the military conflict in Chechnya, which is gradually spilling over into the other republics of the region, terrorism seems to have occupied its regular position in the political life of Caucasus, organized crime is flourishing, the tension persists there and military incidents and attacks are breaking out every now and again. During the recent year, the destabilization of the region, which affects many fields of Russian political and social life, has grown to an alarming size. Putin after re-election: Vladimir Putin's first term as President was a period of submitting political, regional and economic lobbies to the Kremlin. The actions Putin has taken since being re-elected are aimed at consolidating the Kremlin's control over the political, economic and social spheres. Further liquidation of political and informational pluralism, an increase of the ruling group's control over state and private property, and an intensification of state propaganda aimed at generating social support for the Kremlin's initiatives have all proceeded apace. These processes reinforce authoritarian tendencies and strengthen the emerging monocentric political system, with the President's strong domination over political, economic and social life.

Gazprom's position on the Russian gas market weakening. OSW Commentary No. 70, 2012-02-23

As the difficulties Gazprom has faced in recent years on the European market have multiplied1, so more and more symptoms have appeared which may suggest that the company’s dominant position is deteriorating. The decision made by the Russian government in June 2011 to double the tax Gazprom has to pay on the extraction of gas, which was later approved by parliament, was the first time in many years when the company’s fiscal privileges were withdrawn. The process of Gazprom’s assets being taken over by private companies and business partners from within Vladimir Putin’s closest circle is underway. More and more frequently attempts are being made to challenge the company’s monopoly in areas of key importance for the functioning of the entire gas sector, such as Gazprom’s exclusive right to dispose of the Russian gas transportation system and its exports monopoly. Competition from independent gas producers on the domestic market is growing, and Gazprom is gradually being pushed out of some of that market’s most profitable segments (industrial clients). The emerging tendencies in the Russian gas sector derive from a number of factors – from the situation on the European gas market, through difficulties hampering the development of the sector in Russia itself, to the private interests of the current ruling class and its business partners. The plans for a structural reform of the monopoly (including isolating gas transportation system from Gazprom), presented since 2000 by the Ministry for Economic Development and since 2003 by the Russian Association of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP), suggest a direction for the changes necessary to stimulate the sector’s development and improve the efficiency of Gazprom itself. However, the monopolist’s current business model gives the government full control over this strategic enterprise, which is a core of Putin’s concept for developing Russia as a global energy power. Despite Putin’s recent statement that he “does not rule out privatising Gazprom in the future” (made at a meeting with political scientists in Moscow on 6 February this year), any structural reform of Gazprom (and consequently, a weakening of the state’s control over it) seems unlikely in the foreseeable future. Still, the developments on the domestic market – growing pressure from other gas companies (oil corporations and independent producers) and changes on the European market2 – may result in the weakening of Gazprom’s monopoly privileges and a gradual deterioration of its special status within Russia.

Euro 2012 – Ukraine’s wasted opportunity? OSW Commentary 80, 2012-06.08

Ukraine saw hosting the European Football Championship as an important project in terms of image-building and modernisation from the very beginning. The country’s government assumed, during the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych alike, that Euro 2012 would provide a major impulse for economic development and show that the young Ukrainian state was capable of successfully preparing one of the most important sport tournaments in the world. Although UEFA’s decision raised eyebrows both in the West and in Ukraine, after initial delays the work gained momentum and, shortly before the championship, Ukraine’s progress could be evaluated as being satisfactory at the least. As part of the preparations, four stadiums were built or modernised, four airports in the host cities were developed and 1,600 km of roads were repaired or built from the ground up. The investments have doubtlessly contributed to an improvement of the infrastructure in Ukraine, but it would be rather inaccurate to say that Euro 2012 has brought about a real modernisation of the country. The funds allocated for the preparations were relatively modest, and part of them was spent in a non-transparent way, which gives rise to suspicions of corruption. The chance to improve Ukraine’s perception in the West has been to a great extent lost due to the trial of the former prime minister, Yulia Tymoshenko, who was sentenced to seven years in prison in October 2011. Over the past few weeks, Euro 2012 as a sports event has been overshadowed by discussions among Western politicians and in the Western media about rising authoritarian tendencies in Ukraine. In turn, football is currently treated as a minor issue in Ukraine’s internal politics. The government has so far not used Euro 2012 to improve its popularity although hosting it is supported by a clear majority of the Ukrainian public. It is still an open question as to whether the Ukrainian government will try to capitalise politically on this sports event; this is especially significant as parliamentary elections are approaching.