Disrupting the new orthodoxy : emergency intervention and Indigenous social policy

This article develops a critical analysis of the ideological framework that informed the Australian Federal government’s 2007 intervention into Northern Territory Indigenous communities (ostensibly to address the problem of child sexual abuse). Continued by recently elected Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, the NT ‘emergency response’ has aroused considerable public debate and scholarly inquiry. In addressing what amounts to a broad bi-partisan approach to Indigenous issues we highlight the way in which Indigenous communities are problematised and therefore subject to interventionist regimes that override differentiated Indigenous voices and intensify an internalised sense of rage occasioned by disempowering interventionist projects. We further argue that in rushing through the emergency legislation and suspending parts of the Racial Discrimination Act, the Howard and Rudd governments have in various ways perpetuated racialised and neo-colonial forms of intervention that override the rights of Indigenous people. Such policy approaches require critical understanding on the part of professions involved most directly in community practice, particularly when it comes to mounting effective opposition campaigns. The article offers a contribution to this end.

Binjiang urban centre and transport interchange

This project is the result of a collaborative design process involving QUT School of Design, and AREN Consulting and ZIAD (Zheijiang Provincial Institute of Architectural Design and Research). This major urban initiative explores new standards for multi-function urban centres. The sophisticated integration of transit interchange with retail, commercial and residential functions provides a dramatic mix of social activities. The large site is formed into a raised and terraced urban garden, with the transit centre and retail shopping precinct housed below this landscaped roof. Towering above this ‘hill’ are five building blocks housing the commercial and residential accommodations. These environmentally low-impact buildings are topped with a high-tech greenhouse roof or photovoltaic cells.

Managing a portfolio of corporate venture units : challenges in achieving within-unit focus and between-unit coordination

Principal Topic: There is increasing recognition that the organizational configurations of corporate venture units should depend on the types of ventures the unit seeks to develop (Burgelman, 1984; Hill and Birkinshaw, 2008). Distinction have been made between internal and external as well as exploitative versus explorative ventures (Hill and Birkinshaw, 2008; Narayan et al., 2009; Schildt et al., 2005). Assuming that firms do not want to limit themselves to a single type of venture, but rather employ a portfolio of ventures, the logical consequence is that firms should employ multiple corporate venture units. Each venture unit tailor-made for the type of venture it seeks to develop. Surprisingly, there is limited attention in the literature for the challenges of managing multiple corporate venture units in a single firm. Maintaining multiple venture units within one firm provides easier access to funding for new ideas (Hamel, 1999). It allows for freedom and flexibility to tie the organizational systems (Rice et al., 2000), autonomy (Hill and Rothaermel, 2003), and involvement of management (Day, 1994; Wadwha and Kotha, 2006) to the requirements of the individual ventures. Yet, the strategic objectives of a venture may change when uncertainty around the venture is resolved (Burgelman, 1984). For example, firms may decide to spin-in external ventures (Chesbrough, 2002) or spun-out ventures that prove strategically unimportant (Burgelman, 1984). This suggests that ventures might need to be transferred between venture units, e.g. from a more internally-driven corporate venture division to a corporate venture capital unit. Several studies suggested that ventures require different managerial skills across their phase of development (Desouza et al., 2007; O'Connor and Ayers, 2005; Kazanjian and Drazin, 1990; Westerman et al., 2006). To facilitate effective transfer between venture units and manage the overall venturing process, it is important that firms set up and manage integrative linkages. Integrative linkages provide synergies and coordination between differentiated units (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). Prior findings pointed to the important role of senior management (Westerman et al., 2006; Gilbert, 2006) and a shared organizational vision (Burgers et al., 2009) to coordinate venture units with mainstream businesses. We will draw on these literatures to investigate the key question of how to integratively manage multiple venture units. ---------- Methodology/Key Propositions: In order to seek an answer to the research question, we employ a case study approach that provides unique insights into how firms can break up their venturing process. We selected three Fortune 500 companies that employ multiple venturing units, IBM, Royal Dutch/ Shell and Nokia, and investigated and compared their approaches. It was important that the case companies somewhat differed in the type of venture units they employed as well as the way they integrate and coordinate their venture units. The data are based on extensive interviews and a variety of internal and external company documents to triangulate our findings (Eisenhardt, 1989). The key proposition of the article is that firms can best manage their multiple venture units through an ambidextrous design of loosely coupled units. This provides venture units with sufficient flexibility to employ organizational configurations that best support the type of venture they seek to develop, as well as provides sufficient integration to facilitate smooth transfer of ventures between venture units. Based on the case findings, we develop a generic framework for a new way of managing the venturing process through multiple corporate venture units. ---------- Results and Implications: One of our main findings is that these firms tend to organize their venture units according to phases in the venture development process. That is, they tend to have venture units aimed at incubation of venture ideas as well as units aimed more at the commercialization of ventures into a new business unit for the firm or a start-up. The companies in our case studies tended to coordinate venture units through integrative management skills or a coordinative venture unit that spanned multiple phases. We believe this paper makes two significant contributions. First, we extend prior venturing literature by addressing how firms manage a portfolio of venture units, each achieving different strategic objectives. Second, our framework provides recommendations on how firms should manage such an approach towards venturing. This helps to increase the likelihood of success of their venturing programs.

Micro-family-owned business : transitory survival mechanism or long term wealth creator?

Principal Topic: Entrepreneurship is key to employment, innovation and growth (Acs & Mueller, 2008), and as such, has been the subject of tremendous research in both the economic and management literatures since Solow (1957), Schumpeter (1934, 1943), and Penrose (1959). The presence of entrepreneurs in the economy is a key factor in the success or failure of countries to grow (Audretsch and Thurik, 2001; Dejardin, 2001). Further studies focus on the conditions of existence of entrepreneurship, influential factors invoked are historical, cultural, social, institutional, or purely economic (North, 1997; Thurik 1996 & 1999). Of particular interest, beyond the reasons behind the existence of entrepreneurship, are entrepreneurial survival and good ''performance'' factors. Using cross-country firm data analysis, La Porta & Schleifer (2008) confirm that informal micro-businesses provide on average half of all economic activity in developing countries. They find that these are utterly unproductive compared to formal firms, and conclude that the informal sector serves as a social security net ''keep[ing] millions of people alive, but disappearing over time'' (abstract). Robison (1986), Hill (1996, 1997) posit that the Indonesian government under Suharto always pointed to the lack of indigenous entrepreneurship , thereby motivating the nationalisation of all industries. Furthermore, the same literature also points to the fact that small businesses were mostly left out of development programmes because they were supposed less productive and having less productivity potential than larger ones. Vial (2008) challenges this view and shows that small firms represent about 70% of firms, 12% of total output, but contribute to 25% of total factor productivity growth on average over the period 1975-94 in the industrial sector (Table 10, p.316). ---------- Methodology/Key Propositions: A review of the empirical literature points at several under-researched questions. Firstly, we assess whether there is, evidence of small family-business entrepreneurship in Indonesia. Secondly, we examine and present the characteristics of these enterprises, along with the size of the sector, and its dynamics. Thirdly, we study whether these enterprises underperform compared to the larger scale industrial sector, as it is suggested in the literature. We reconsider performance measurements for micro-family owned businesses. We suggest that, beside productivity measures, performance could be appraised by both the survival probability of the firm, and by the amount of household assets formation. We compare micro-family-owned and larger industrial firms' survival probabilities after the 1997 crisis, their capital productivity, then compare household assets of families involved in business with those who do not. Finally, we examine human and social capital as moderators of enterprises' performance. In particular, we assess whether a higher level of education and community participation have an effect on the likelihood of running a family business, and whether it has an impact on households' assets level. We use the IFLS database compiled and published by RAND Corporation. The data is a rich community, households, and individuals panel dataset in four waves: 1993, 1997, 2000, 2007. We now focus on the waves 1997 and 2000 in order to investigate entrepreneurship behaviours in turbulent times, i.e. the 1997 Asian crisis. We use aggregate individual data, and focus on households data in order to study micro-family-owned businesses. IFLS data covers roughly 7,600 households in 1997 and over 10,000 households in 2000, with about 95% of 1997 households re-interviewed in 2000. Households were interviewed in 13 of the 27 provinces as defined before 2001. Those 13 provinces were targeted because accounting for 83% of the population. A full description of the data is provided in Frankenberg and Thomas (2000), and Strauss et alii (2004). We deflate all monetary values in Rupiah with the World Development Indicators Consumer Price Index base 100 in 2000. ---------- Results and Implications: We find that in Indonesia, entrepreneurship is widespread and two thirds of households hold one or several family businesses. In rural areas, in 2000, 75% of households run one or several businesses. The proportion of households holding both a farm and a non farm business is higher in rural areas, underlining the reliance of rural households on self-employment, especially after the crisis. Those businesses come in various sizes from very small to larger ones. The median business production value represents less than the annual national minimum wage. Figures show that at least 75% of farm businesses produce less than the annual minimum wage, with non farm businesses being more numerous to produce the minimum wage. However, this is only one part of the story, as production is not the only ''output'' or effect of the business. We show that the survival rate of those businesses ranks between 70 and 82% after the 1997 crisis, which contrasts with the 67% survival rate for the formal industrial sector (Ter Wengel & Rodriguez, 2006). Micro Family Owned Businesses might be relatively small in terms of production, they also provide stability in times of crisis. For those businesses that provide business assets figures, we show that capital productivity is fairly high, with rates that are ten times higher for non farm businesses. Results show that households running a business have larger family assets, and households are better off in urban areas. We run a panel logit model in order to test the effect of human and social capital on the existence of businesses among households. We find that non farm businesses are more likely to appear in households with higher human and social capital situated in urban areas. Farm businesses are more likely to appear in lower human capital and rural contexts, while still being supported by community participation. The estimation of our panel data model confirm that households are more likely to have higher family assets if situated in urban area, the higher the education level, the larger the assets, and running a business increase the likelihood of having larger assets. This is especially true for non farm businesses that have a clearly larger and more significant effect on assets than farm businesses. Finally, social capital in the form of community participation also has a positive effect on assets. Those results confirm the existence of a strong entrepreneurship culture among Indonesian households. Investigating survival rates also shows that those businesses are quite stable, even in the face of a violent crisis such as the 1997 one, and as a result, can provide a safety net. Finally, considering household assets - the returns of business to the household, rather than profit or productivity - the returns of business to itself, shows that households running a business are better off. While we demonstrate that uman and social capital are key to business existence, survival and performance, those results open avenues for further research regarding the factors that could hamper growth of those businesses in terms of output and employment.