Impactos da política fiscal e tributária no crescimento econômico

Utilizando uma adaptação do modelo de Telles e Mussolini (2014), o presente trabalho busca discutir as caracterizações da matriz tributária, discutindo como as variações na matriz tributária podem impactar na política fiscal. Discute-se com base na diferenciação dos impostos em cinco grupos, a saber: impostos sobre salários, impostos sobre investimentos, impostos sobre consumo, impostos sobre renda e riqueza, e impostos sobre comércio internacional, a partir dos quais argumenta-se quais seus impactos para a política fiscal, para a interação das variáveis econômicas e a evolução destas variáveis, assim como a relação entre a preferência por uma determinada estrutura tributária e o endividamento de um país. Após a discussão teórica, faz-se uma análise descritiva da evolução destas variáveis tributárias para cada categoria de tributo, relacionando a sua evolução no tempo para um grupo de 64 países, tomados a partir do trabalho de Telles e Mussolini (2014), assim como relacionando a sua evolução intertemporal. Por fim, faz-se uma análise da estrutura tributária destes países, discutindo, na análise dos dados em painel, os resultados para as estimativas em modelos de efeitos fixos e efeitos aleatórios, os resultados da estimação pelo modelo Arellano-Bond, e utilizando-se a abordagem instrumental pelo Método Generalizado dos Momentos, onde se conclui que a taxação sobre a riqueza e a taxação sobre o comércio internacional com fins de financiar o excesso de gastos do governo impacta de forma negativa na trajetória de crescimento, entre outros resultados.

Terms of trade, macroeconomic dynamics and default decisions

A evidência empírica aponta que Termos de Troca é uma variável relevante tanto para dinâmica macroeconômica como para o risco de default em países emergentes. No entanto, a literatura de dívida soberana baseada nos trabalhos de Eaton e Gerzovitz (1981) e Arellano (2008) ainda não explorou de forma adequada as conecções entre a dinâmica de termos de troca e incentivos ao default. Nós contribuímos nessa área, introduzindo volatilidade de Termos de Troca no modelo proposto por Mendoza e Yue (2012), no qual as decisões de dívida soberana são vinculadas à um modelo de equilíbrio geral para a economia doméstica. Nós encontramos que uma economia exposta à volatilidade dos termos de troca consegue produzir uma variabilidade do consumo que supera significativamente a variabilidade do produto, característica que constitui um fato estilizado chave de business cycles de países emergentes. Nossos exercícios também mostram que decisões de default são geradas por mudanças bruscas nos termos de troca, mas não necessariamente estão vinculados à estados ruins da economia.

Características e determinantes da primeira emissão de debêntures

As decisões de financiamento com dívida têm impacto na estrutura de capital através da alteração da alavancagem, da titularidade e da maturidade da dívida. As teorias mais populares sobre a composição da dívida, preveem um efeito negativo nas ações quando uma empresa emite debêntures. Os meus resultados não confirmam esse efeito, pelo menos diretamente. Contudo os determinantes da emissão são consistentes com as previsões, com algumas particularidades da economia Brasileira.

Essays on corporate restructuring

Esta tese tem por objetivo examinar as características do processo de decisão em que credores optam pela recuperação judicial ou liquidação da empresa em dificuldade financeira. O trabalho está dividido em quatro capítulos. No segundo capítulo, apresenta-se, de forma sistematizada, referencial teórico e evidências empíricas para apontar resultados importantes sobre estudos desenvolvidos nas áreas de recuperação de empresas e falência. O capítulo também apresenta três estudos de caso com o propósito de mostrar a complexidade de cada caso no que diz respeito à concentração de recursos, conflito de interesse entre as classes de credores e a decisão final sobre a aprovação ou rejeição do plano de recuperação judicial. No terceiro capítulo, analisam-se os determinantes do atraso pertinente à votação do plano de recuperação judicial. O trabalho propõe um estudo empírico dos atrasos entre 2005 e 2014. Os resultados sugerem que: (i) maior concentração da dívida entre as classes de credores possui relação com atrasos menores; (ii) maior quantidade de bancos para votar o plano de recuperação judicial possui relação com maiores atrasos; (iii) o atraso médio na votação diminui quando apenas uma classe de credores participa da votação do plano; (iv) credores trabalhistas e com garantia real atrasam a votação quando o valor dos ativos para garantir a dívida em caso de liquidação é maior; (v) o atraso médio na votação é maior em casos de pior desempenho do setor de atuação do devedor, sendo solicitado pelas classes quirografária e com garantia real; e (vi) a proposta de venda de ativos é o principal tópico discutido nas reuniões de votação do plano nos casos em que o atraso na votação é maior. Por fim, no quarto capítulo, apresenta-se evidência sobre a votação dos credores e a probabilidade de aprovação do plano de recuperação judicial. Os resultados sugerem que: (i) credores trabalhistas estão propensos a aprovar o plano de recuperação mesmo quando o plano é rejeitado pelas demais classes; (ii) planos com propostas de pagamento mais heterogêneas para as três classes de credores possuem menor chance de serem aceitos; (iii) a chance de aprovação do plano diminui nos casos em que mais credores quirografários participam da recuperação; e (iv) planos com proposta de venda de ativos possuem maior chance de serem aprovados. Finalmente, maior concentração da dívida na classe com garantia real diminui a chance de aprovação do plano, e o contrário ocorre na classe quirografária.

The influence of macroeconomic factors on primary issues in the Brazilian market

This research analyses the influence of the macroeconomic factors on the primary issue of stocks and debentures in the Brazilian market. Previous studies have agreed on the importance of aspects of the economic situation on a company’s capital structure, but have not established a relationship between the macroeconomic variables and the level of aggregate debt; we can mention Procianoy and Caselani (1997) and Terra (2003) as examples of this. According to Leal (2000), the limitations of the Brazilian capital market suggest that management takes advantage of moments of euphoria in the market - whether caused by a reduction in the rate of interest or by the return being offered by the equity market - to raise funds at rates that are more advantageous to the company. This characterizes the first evidence we have of opportunistic behavior influencing a company’s financing decisions. Eid Jr. (1996) provides us with the first evidence of this opportunistic behavior in his research in which 47% of those interviewed said that they chose fund sources that are economically more advantageous.

Avaliação do impacto da lei de aviso recebimento sobre o mercado de crédito

No Brasil, diversos bureaux de crédito têm o papel de proporcionar a troca de informações de inadimplência dos consumidores para o mercado financeiro. Tal troca beneficia o mercado no sentido de reduzir a assimetria de informação entre tomadores de empréstimo e instituições financeiras. Recentemente as leis 15.659/15 e 10.272/15 de dois estados brasileiros passaram a proteger o consumidor no sentido de impedir inclusão de informação negativa dos mesmos em bureaux caso desconhecessem suas dívidas. O consumidor poderia apropriar-se de seus benefícios para deixar de honrar suas dívidas e consequentemente o mercado poderia sofrer uma retração no crédito. Diante disso, este trabalho propõe desenvolver uma estratégia empírica para verificar se há aumento de seleção adversa e risco moral para os estados em que a lei foi aplicada. Concluímos que o efeito tem sinal consistente com o esperado no sentido de aumento de inadimplência, mas não apresentou significância estatística.

Europe’s financial crisis: the Euro’s flawed design and the consequences of lack of a government banker

This paper argues the euro zone requires a government banker that manages the bond market and helps finance country budget deficits. The euro solved Europe’s problem of exchange rate speculation by creating a unified currency managed by a single central bank, but in doing so it replaced the exchange rate speculation problem with bond market speculation. Remedying this requires a central bank that acts as government banker and maintains bond interest rates at sustainable levels. Because the euro is a monetary union, this must be done in a way that both avoids favoring individual countries and avoids creating incentives for irresponsible country fiscal policy that leads to “bail-outs”. The paper argues this can be accomplished via a European Public Finance Authority (EPFA) that issues public debt which the European Central Bank (ECB) is allowed to trade. The debate over the euro’s financial architecture has significant political implications. The current neoliberal inspired architecture, which imposes a complete separation between the central bank and public finances, puts governments under continuous financial pressures. That will make it difficult to maintain the European social democratic welfare state. This gives a political reason for reforming the euro and creating an EPFA that supplements the economic case for reform.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

Why has productivity growth stagnated in most Latin American countries since the neo-liberal reforms?

Latin America’s economic performance since the beginning of neo-liberal reforms has been poor; this not only contrasts with its own performance pre-1980, but also with what has happened in Asia since 1980. I shall argue that the weakness of the region’s new paradigm is rooted as much in its intrinsic flaws as in the particular way it has been implemented. Latin America’s economic reforms were undertaken primarily as a result of the perceived economic weaknesses of the region — i.e., there was an attitude of ‘throwing in the towel’ vis-à-vis the previous state-led import substituting industrialisation strategy, because most politicians and economists interpreted the 1982 debt crisis as conclusive evidence that it had led the region into a cul-de-sac. As Hirschman has argued, policymaking has a strong component of ‘path-dependency’; as a result, people often stick with policies after they have achieved their aims, and those policies have become counterproductive. This leads to such frustration and disappointment with existing policies and institutions that is not uncommon to experience a ‘rebound effect’. An extreme example of this phenomenon is post-1982 Latin America, where the core of the discourse of the economic reforms that followed ended up simply emphasising the need to reverse as many aspects of the previous development (and political) strategies as possible. This helps to explain the peculiar set of priorities, the rigidity and the messianic attitude with which the reforms were implemented in Latin America, as well as their poor outcome. Something very different happened in Asia, where economic reforms were often intended (rightly or wrongly) as a more targeted and pragmatic mechanism to overcome specific economic and financial constraints. Instead of implementing reforms as a mechanism to reverse existing industrialisation strategies, in Asia they were put into practice in order to continue and strengthen ambitious processes of industrialisation.

The economics of wage-led recovery: analysis and policy recommendations

The financial crisis and Great Recession have been followed by a jobs shortage crisis that most forecasts predict will persist for years given current policies. This paper argues for a wage-led recovery and growth program which is the only way to remedy the deep causes of the crisis and escape the jobs crisis. Such a program is the polar opposite of the current policy orthodoxy, showing how much is at stake. Winning the argument for wage-led recovery will require winning the war of ideas about economics that has its roots going back to Keynes’ challenge of classical macroeconomics in the 1920s and 1930s. That will involve showing how the financial crisis and Great Recession were the ultimate result of three decades of neoliberal policy, which produced wage stagnation by severing the wage productivity growth link and made asset price inflation and debt the engine of demand growth in place of wages; showing how wage-led policy resolves the current problem of global demand shortage without pricing out labor; and developing a detailed set of policy proposals that flow from these understandings. The essence of a wage-led policy approach is to rebuild the link between wages and productivity growth, combined with expansionary macroeconomic policy that fills the current demand shortfall so as to push the economy on to a recovery path. Both sets of measures are necessary. Expansionary macro policy (i.e. fiscal stimulus and easy monetary policy) without rebuilding the wage mechanism will not produce sustainable recovery and may end in fiscal crisis. Rebuilding the wage mechanism without expansionary macro policy is likely to leave the economy stuck in the orbit of stagnation.

The spenders-hoarders theory of capital accumulations, wealth distribution and fiscal policy

This paper proposes a simple OLG model which is consistent with the essential facts about consumer behavior, capital accumulation and wealth distribution, and yields some new and surprising conclusions about fiscal policy. By considering a society in which individuais are distinguished according to two characteristics, altruism and wealth preference, we show that those who in the long run hold the bulk of private capital are not so rnuch motivated by dynastic altruism as by preference for wealth. Two types of social segmentation can result with different wcalth distribution. To a large extcnt our results seem to fit reality better than those obtained with standard optimal growth models in which dynastic altruism ( or r ate o f impatience) is the only source of heterogeneity: overaccumulation can appear, public debt and unfunded pensions are not neutra!, estate taxation can improve the welfare of the top wealthy.

The impact of corruption on the performance of state-owned companies: case of Petrobras Brasil

As empresas estatais são freqüentemente consideradas como componentes cruciais da economia de um país. Eles são responsáveis pela criação de vários postos de trabalho e proveem serviços essenciais que exigem um grande investimento de capital. Porém, em países com instituições fracas, onde a responsabilidade dos políticos é limitada e a gestão dos recursos financeiros das empresas estatais sofre pouco controle, os funcionários são muitas vezes tentados pela corrupção. Enormes quantidades de fundos públicos são facilmente desviados, e dinheiro que deveria ter sido investido nas despesas de capital, no pagamento de dívida da empresa ou no aumento do retorno para os acionistas, é usado para aumentar a riqueza privada de indivíduos ou para financiar ilegalmente partidos políticos. O desempenho da empresa sofre com essas alienações visto que parte dos lucros da empresa não são reinvestidos na empresa e dado que incentivos dos gestores estão desalinhados com os interesses dos acionistas. Petrobras, a maior empresa da América Latina em termos de ativos e receitas anuais, sofreu em 2014 e 2015 um escândalo de corrupção imenso, cujo impacto económico foi considerável, levando ao enfraquecimento da confiança de muitos investidores no Brasil após o evento. O escândalo expôs um extenso esquema de corrupção através do qual os contratantes foram conspirando para aumentar os preços de contratos de construção, com a aprovação da administração da Petrobras que pediu em troca ganhos pessoais ou fundos para o Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT). A exposição do escândalo na imprensa brasileira teve um grande impacto sobre a credibilidade da Petrobras: as contas da empresa estavam escondendo imensas irregularidades dado que a empresa tinha pago demais para os contratos de construção que não foram precificados no valor do mercado. Ao longo deste estudo, usamos o exemplo da Petrobras para ilustrar como a corrupção dentro empresas estatais prejudica o desempenho da empresa e como ela afeta as várias partes interessadas da empresa.