Anonymous Single-Profile Welfarism

This note reexamines the single-profile approach to social-choice theory. If an alternative is interpreted as a social state of affairs or a history of the world, it can be argued that a multi-profile approach is inappropriate because the information profile is determined by the set of alternatives. However, single-profile approaches are criticized because of the limitations they impose on the possibility of formulating properties such as anonymity. We suggest an alternative definition of anonymity that applies in a single-profile setting and characterize anonymous single-profile welfarism under a richness assumption.

Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being

This paper, which is to be published as a chapter in the Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, provides an introduction to social-choice theory with interpersonal comparisons of well-being. We argue that the most promising route of escape from the negative conclusion of Arrow’s theorem is to use a richer informational environment than ordinal measurability and the absence of interpersonal comparability of well-being. We discuss welfarist social evaluation (which requires that the levels of individual well-being in two alternatives are the only determinants of their social ranking) and present characterizations of some important social-evaluation orderings.

Aumann-Shapley Pricing : A Reconsideration of the Discrete Case

We reconsider the following cost-sharing problem: agent i = 1,...,n demands a quantity xi of good i; the corresponding total cost C(x1,...,xn) must be shared among the n agents. The Aumann-Shapley prices (p1,...,pn) are given by the Shapley value of the game where each unit of each good is regarded as a distinct player. The Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method assigns the cost share pixi to agent i. When goods come in indivisible units, we show that this method is characterized by the two standard axioms of Additivity and Dummy, and the property of No Merging or Splitting: agents never find it profitable to split or merge their demands.

The Possibility of Ordering Infinite Utility Streams

This paper revisits Diamond’s classical impossibility result regarding the ordering of infinite utility streams. We show that if no representability condition is imposed, there do exist strongly Paretian and finitely anonymous orderings of intertemporal utility streams with attractive additional properties. We extend a possibility theorem due to Svensson to a characterization theorem and we provide characterizations of all strongly Paretian and finitely anonymous rankings satisfying the strict transfer principle. In addition, infinite horizon extensions of leximin and of utilitarianism are characterized by adding an equity preference axiom and finite translation-scale measurability, respectively, to strong Pareto and finite anonymity.

Reference Groups and Individual Deprivation

We provide an axiomatization of Yitzhaki’s index of individual deprivation. Our result differs from an earlier characterization due to Ebert and Moyes in the way the reference group of an individual is represented in the model. Ebert and Moyes require the index to be defined for all logically possible reference groups, whereas we employ the standard definition of the reference group as the set of all agents in a society. As a consequence of this modification, some of the axioms used by Ebert and Moyes can no longer be applied and we provide alternative formulations.

The Progressivity of Equalization Payments in Federations

We investigate the conditions under which an inequality averse and additively separable welfarist constitution maker would always choose to set up a progressive equalization payments scheme in a federation with local public goods. A progressive equalization payments scheme is defined as a list of per capita net (possibly negative) subsidies - one such net subsidy for every jurisdiction - that are decreasing with respect to jurisdictions per capita wealth. We examine these questions in a setting in which the case for progressivity is a priori the strongest, namely, all citizens have the same utility function for the private and the public goods, inhabitants of a given jurisdiction are all identical, and they are not able to move across jurisdictions. We show that the constitution maker favors a progressive equalization payments scheme for all distributions of wealth and all population sizes if and only if its objective function is additively separable between each jurisdiction’s per capita wealth and number of inhabitants. When interpreted as a mean of order r social welfare function, this condition is shown to be equivalent to additive separability of the individual’s indirect utility function with respect to wealth and the price of the public good. Some implications of this restriction to the case where the individual’s direct utility function is additively separable are also derived.

Nearly Serial Sharing Methods

A group of agents participate in a cooperative enterprise producing a single good. Each participant contributes a particular type of input; output is nondecreasing in these contributions. How should it be shared? We analyze the implications of the axiom of Group Monotonicity: if a group of agents simultaneously decrease their input contributions, not all of them should receive a higher share of output. We show that in combination with other more familiar axioms, this condition pins down a very small class of methods, which we dub nearly serial.

Distribution-Free Bounds for Serial Correlation Coefficients in Heteroskedastic Symmetric Time Series

We consider the problem of testing whether the observations X1, ..., Xn of a time series are independent with unspecified (possibly nonidentical) distributions symmetric about a common known median. Various bounds on the distributions of serial correlation coefficients are proposed: exponential bounds, Eaton-type bounds, Chebyshev bounds and Berry-Esséen-Zolotarev bounds. The bounds are exact in finite samples, distribution-free and easy to compute. The performance of the bounds is evaluated and compared with traditional serial dependence tests in a simulation experiment. The procedures proposed are applied to U.S. data on interest rates (commercial paper rate).

Intertemporal Social Evaluation

Intertemporal social-evaluation rules provide us with social criteria that can be used to assess the relative desirability of utility distributions across generations. The trade-offs between the well-being of different generations implicit in each such rule reflect the underlying ethical position on issues of intergenerational equity or justice. We employ an axiomatic approach in order to identify ethically attractive socialevaluation procedures. In particular, we explore the possibilities of using welfare information and non-welfare information in a model of intertemporal social evaluation. We focus on the individuals’ birth dates and lengths of life as the relevant non-welfare information. As usual, welfare information is given by lifetime utilities. It is assumed that this information is available for each alternative to be ranked. Various weakenings of the Pareto principle are employed in order to allow birth dates or lengths of life (or both) to matter in social evaluation. In addition, we impose standard properties such as continuity and anonymity and we examine the consequences of an intertemporal independence property. For each of the Pareto conditions employed, we characterize all social-evaluation rules satisfying it and our other axioms. The resulting rules are birth-date dependent or lifetime-dependent versions of generalized utilitarianism. Furthermore, we discuss the ethical and axiomatic foundations of geometric discounting in the context of our model.

Consistent House Allocation

In practice we often face the problem of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., schools, housing, jobs, offices) to agents (e.g., students, homeless, workers, professors) when monetary compensations are not possible. We show that a rule that satisfies consistency, strategy-proofness, and efficiency must be an efficient generalized priority rule; i.e. it must adapt to an acyclic priority structure, except -maybe- for up to three agents in each object's priority ordering.

Social Choice: Recent Developments

In the past quarter century, there has been a dramatic shift of focus in social choice theory, with structured sets of alternatives and restricted domains of the sort encountered in economic problems coming to the fore. This article provides an overview of some of the recent contributions to four topics in normative social choice theory in which economic modelling has played a prominent role: Arrovian social choice theory on economic domains, variable-population social choice, strategy-proof social choice, and axiomatic models of resource allocation.

Consistent Relations

Consistency, a natural weakening of transitivity introduced in a seminal contribution by Suzumura (1976b), has turned out to be an interesting and promising concept in a variety of areas within economic theory. This paper summarizes its recent applications and provides some new observations in welfarist social choice and in population ethics. In particular, it is shown that the conclusion of the welfarism theorem remains true if transitivity is replaced by consistency and that an impossibility result in variable-population social-choice theory turns into a possibility if transitivity is weakened to consistency.

Land Ownership, Working Capital, and the Agricultural Output: Egypt, 1913-1958.

A simple model is constructed in which short-term credit is needed to finance the purchase of inputs, in which there is bankruptcy risk, and in which we argue were important characteristics of Egyptian agriculture during the first half of this century, result in aggregate agricultural output being dependant on the distribution of land ownership. The main theorical insight is that aggregate agricultural output will be increased by a decrease in the inequality of the distribution of land ownership when returns to scale are decreasing. Testable short- and long-run empirical propositions are formulated and carefully tested on Egyptian data for the 1913-1958 period. We find that, controlling for factor inputs, there is no tradeoff between equity and efficiency for Egyptian agriculture - they go hand in hand in the short run.

Ancrage de l'idéologie de l'Union des producteurs agricoles et de l'utopie de l'Union paysanne dans des significations imaginaires sociales.

Le but de cette thèse est de découvrir l'idéologie de l'Union des producteurs agricoles et l'utopie de l'Union paysanne et de les interpréter à la lumière de "significations imaginaires sociales" déterminantes de notre période historique. Dans la première partie de notre thèse, nous présentons l'évolution de l'imaginaire social du syndicalisme agricole québécois de 1924 à 2005. Nous distinguons quatre périodes et notre étude s'attarde à la dernière, c'est-à-dire celle qui débute en 2001 avec la naissance de l'Union paysanne. Afin d'étudier cette période nous présentons d'abord l'imaginaire social de la société, c'est-à-dire une configuration de significations imaginaires sociales (SIS) - des "idées-valeurs" générales et "englobantes" - qui fait qu'une société est ce qu'elle est et qu'elle ne pourrait être autrement compte tenu de son noyau de SIS. Ensuite, nous constatons que les travaux d'auteurs importants nous permettent de parler de niveaux et types d'imaginaires sociaux et d'établir des relations entre ces niveaux et formes d'imaginaires sociaux. C'est par l'entremise de la problématique générale agriculture-ruralité que nous démontrons, dans la deuxième partie de cette thèse, que des imaginaires sociaux "intermédiaires" - l'idéologie de l'UPA et l'utopie de la "minorité active", l'UP - permettent, en les ancrant dans quelqu'un et dans quelque chose, d'une part de découvrir les SIS de l'imaginaire social de la société et, d'autre part, de comprendre et d'interpréter ces deux imaginaires sociaux à la lumière des SIS. La problématique agriculture-ruralité est "opérationnalisée" à l'aide des trois dimensions suivantes: rapport à soi, rapport à l'autre et rapport à la nature. Le rapport à soi dévoile que la sphère du travail de l'agriculteur-éleveur dans l'idéologie de l'UPA correspond à la "sphère de la nécessité" qui implique notamment l'hétéronomie des agriculteurs, alors que l'utopie de l'UP la souhaite à la fois comme "sphère de la nécessité" et comme sphère de l'autonomie. Le rapport à l'autre permet de découvrir une utopie préconisant l'égalité des chances entre différents types d'agriculteurs et d'agricultures et entre la relève et les agriculteurs établis ainsi que l'égalité politique en territoire rural agricole. Dans l'idéologie de l'UPA, l'inégalité des chances et l'inégalité politique sont discutables mais inéluctables. Enfin, abstraction faite des nuances, la relation agriculture et nature est à l'utopie de l'UP ce que la relation agriculture ou nature est à l'idéologie de l'UPA. La construction partielle de l'idéologie et de l'utopie, nous permet, dans la troisième et dernière partie de cette thèse, d'y découvrir les SIS et de démontrer que l'utopie trouve son sens et sa cohérence en l'interprétant par l'entremise du naturalisme-écologie, de l'"autonomie" et de l'"autolimitation" comme SIS dominantes et de l'"expansion illimitée de la maîtrise rationnelle" (technique) et du capitalisme (économique) comme SIS "secondaires". Nous découvrons l'inverse dans l'idéologie de l'UPA. Les SIS dominantes et les SIS "secondaires" de l'utopie de l'UP sont respectivement les SIS secondaires et les SIS dominantes sous-jacentes à l'idéologie de l'UPA, ce qui correspond à la configuration des SIS dominantes de l'imaginaire social des sociétés constitutives de l'Occident contemporain.

L'approche critique du néolibéralisme dans la perspective de mise en oeuvre des règles GATT/OMC pour sortir les PVD de leur dépendance économique

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des Études supérieures En vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtrise en droit des affaires (LL.M.)"