855 resultados para countervailing incentives


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We introduce and discuss the idea of Legal Integration, providing a few evidences on it, in Brazil and South America. The forms of and incentives to Legal Integration, as well as the answers to it, by Western Europe, Mexico and China, are also discussed. We advocate, for Brazil, the adoption of the concept of a more flexible and shared sovereignty, and a more active and concerned attitude in the delicate relationship between international treaties and the domestic juridical order.

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This paper analyzes the impact of profit sharing on the incentives that individuals face to set up their own business. It presents a model of capital accumulation in which individuals are equally skilled to be workers but differ in their abilities to manage a firm Given an exogenous profit sharing parameter, an individual chooses whether to be an employer or an employee in order to maximize his net income. It is shown that profit sharing can inhibit entrepreneurial initiatives, reducing the number of firms in operation, the aggregate output and the economy's long run capital stock.

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This paper studies the Bankruptcy Law in Latin America, focusing on the Brazilian reform. We start with a review of the international literature and its evolution on this subject. Next, we examine the economic incentives associated with several aspects of bankruptcy laws and insolvency procedures in general, as well as the trade-offs involved. After this theoretical discussion, we evaluate empirically the current stage of the quality of insolvency procedures in Latin America using data from Doing Business and World Development Indicators, both from World Bank and International Financial Statistics from IMF. We find that the region is governed by an inefficient law, even when compared with regions of lower per capita income. As theoretical and econometric models predict, this inefficiency has severe consequences for credit markets and the cost of capital. Next, we focus on the recent Brazilian bankruptcy reform, analyzing its main changes and possible effects over the economic environment. The appendix describes difficulties of this process of reform in Brazil, and what other Latin American countries can possibly learn from it.

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In this paper we look at various alternatives for monetary regimes: dollarization, monetary union and local currency. We use an extension of the debt crisis model of Cole and Kehoe ([3], [4] and [5]), although we do not necessarily follow their sunspot interpretation. Our focus is to appraise the welfare of a country which is heavily dependent on international capital due to low savings, for example, and might suffer a speculative attack on its external public debt. We study the conditions under which countries will be better off adopting each one of the regimes described above. If it belongs to a monetary union or to a local currency regime, a default may be avoided by an ination tax on debt denominated in common or local currency, respectively. Under the former regime, the decision to inate depends on each member country's political inuence over the union's central bank, while, in the latter one, the country has full autonomy to decide about its monetary policy. The possibility that the government inuences the central bank to create ination tax for political reasons adversely affects the expected welfare of both regimes. Under dollarization, ination is ruled out and the country that is subject to an external debt crisis has no other option than to default. Accordingly, one of our main results is that shared ination control strengthens currencies and a common-currency regime is superior in terms of expected welfare to the local-currency one and to dollarization if external shocks that member countries suffer are strongly correlated to each other. On the other hand, dollarization is dominant if the room for political ination under the alternative regime is high. Finally, local currency is dominant if external shocks are uncorrelated and the room for political pressure is mild. We nish by comparing Brazil's and Argentina's recent experiences which resemble the dollarization and the local currency regimes, and appraising the incentives that member countries would have to unify their currencies in the following common markets: Southern Common Market, Andean Community of Nations and Central American Common Market.

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This article highlights the problems associated with the existence of financiai institutions owned by a State which is a member of a federation. We show that these financiai institutions allow the States to transfer deficits to the federal government. This possibility creates incentives to higher deficits at State and federal leveis, implying an inefficiently high inflation rate. The main policy implication is that stabilization policies are more difficult to be implemented in countries such as Brazil, and Argentina which allow the members of the federation to own financiai institutions. A second policy implication is that Economic Blocks such as the European Community or Mercosur should not allow regional central banks if they create a monetary authority to help the members in financiai difficulty.

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We model the tradeoff between the balance and the strength of incentives implicit in the choice between hierarchical and matrix organizational structures. We show that managerial biases determine which structure is optimal: hierarchical forms are preferred when biases are low, while matrix structures are preferred when biases are high.

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Este trabalho discute a racionalidade econômica para o desenvolvimento de um sistema de metas sociais como forma do governo federal aumentar a eficiência na utilização dos recursos sociais transferidos para os municípios. O trabalho desenvolve algumas extensões do modelo de agente-principal incluindo abordagens estáticas com e sem informação imperfeita. Os resultados dos modelos estáticos indicam que o uso de critérios usuais de focalização onde localidades mais pobres recebem mais recursos podem levar a incentivos adversos para a erradicação da pobreza. Demonstramos que transferências incondicionais do governo federal deslocam gastos sociais locais. O trabalho argumenta em favor do uso de contratos onde quanto maior for a melhora no indicador social escolhido, mais recursos o município receberia. A introdução de informação imperfeita neste modelo basicamente gera uma penalidade aos segmentos pobres de áreas onde os governos demonstram ser menos avessos a pobreza. O trabalho também aborda o problema de favoritismo político onde determinados grupos sociais têm maior, ou menor, atenção por parte de governos locais. O resultado é que as políticas sociais acabam privilegiando determinados setores em detrimento de outros. Com o estabelecimento de metas sociais é possível, se não eliminar o problema, ao menos criar incentivos corretos para que os gastos sociais sejam distribuídos de forma mais equânime.

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Este trabalho discute a racionalidade econômica para o desenvolvimento de um sistema de metas sociais como forma do governo federal aumentar a eficiência na utilização dos recursos sociais transferidos para os municípios. O trabalho desenvolve algumas extensões do modelo de agente-principal incluindo abordagens estáticas com e sem informação imperfeita. Os resultados dos modelos estáticos indicam que o uso de critérios usuais de focalização onde localidades mais pobres recebem mais recursos podem levar a incentivos adversos para a erradicação da pobreza. Demonstramos que transferências incondicionais do governo federal deslocam gastos sociais locais. O trabalho argumenta em favor do uso de contratos onde quanto maior for a melhora no indicador social escolhido, mais recursos o município receberia. A introdução de informação imperfeita neste modelo basicamente gera uma penalidade aos segmentos pobres de áreas onde os governos demonstram ser menos avessos a pobreza. O trabalho também aborda o problema de favoritismo político onde determinados grupos sociais têm maior, ou menor, atenção por parte de governos locais. O resultado é que as políticas sociais acabam privilegiando determinados setores em detrimento de outros. Com o estabelecimento de metas sociais é possível, se não eliminar o problema, ao menos criar incentivos corretos para que os gastos sociais sejam distribuídos de forma mais equânime.

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The calls urging colleges and universities to improve their productivity are coming thick and fast in Brazil. Many studies are suggesting evaluation systems and external criteria to control universities production in qualitative terms. Since universities and colleges are not profit-oriented organizations (considering just the fair and serious researching and teaching organizations, of course) the traditional microeconomics and administrative variables used to measure efficiency do not have any direct function. In this sense, It could be created a as if market control system to evaluate universities and colleges production. The budget and the allocation resources mechanism inside it can be used as an incentive instrument to improve quality and productivity. It will be the main issue of this paper.

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The aim of this paper is to show that corruption shoud be an important subject for economic analysis and modern positive political economy. I sustain that one could construct general models of corrupt behavior with the notion of definition of corruption linked with the notion of institutions and incentives. Socondly, I discuss critically the weberian notions of public action to purpose finally, a political economy approach to the problem. The main conclusion of this essay is that economics and modern political economy could be extremely useful tools in the study of this social and economic fact.

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This article describes some of the current transformations regarding the processes by which information and culture are generated, from the point of view of developing countries. In this brief analysis, the article discusses the role of projects such as Creative Commons for developing countries. It also discusses the idea of legal commons and social commons. While the idea of legal commons can be understood as the voluntary use of licenses such as Creative Commons in order to create a “commons”, the idea of social commons has to do with the tensions between legality and illegality in developing countries. These tensions appear prominently in the so-called global “peripheries”, and in many instances make the legal structure of intellectual property irrelevant, unfamiliar, or unenforceable, for various reasons. With the emergence of digital technology and the Internet, in many places and regions in developing countries (especially in the “peripheries”), technology ended up arriving earlier than the idea of intellectual property. Such a de facto situation propitiated the emergence of cultural industries that were not driven by intellectual property incentives. In these cultural businesses, the idea of “sharing” and of free dissemination of the content is intrinsic to the social circumstances taking place in these peripheries. Also, the appropriation of technology on the part of the “peripheries” ends up promoting autonomous forms of bridging the digital divide, such as the “LAN house” phenomenon discussed below. This paper proposes that many lessons can be learned from the business models emerging from social commons practices in developing countries. The tension between legality and illegality in “peripheral” areas in developing countries is not new. The work of Boaventura de Sousa Santos and others in the 1970s was paradigmatic for the discussion of legal pluralism regarding the occupation of land in Brazil. This paper aims to follow in that same pioneer tradition of studies about legal pluralism, and to apply those principles to the discussion of “intellectual property” rather than the ownership of land.

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Os Juizados Especiais foram criados para proporcionar acesso à justiça, de forma simples e rápida, sem custos, objetivando resolver conflitos de menor complexidade, de modo informal e preferencialmente através da conciliação. Decorridas mais de duas décadas desde a sua implantação, no Rio Grande do Sul, o sistema não vêm tendo a devida atenção, quer de parte dos operadores, quer de parte do próprio Judiciário. O risco de contaminação das práticas do sistema tradicional de justiça, burocrático e formalista e, por isso mesmo, moroso, exige medidas de administração judiciária que evitem o desvirtuamento dos princípios com base nos quais os Juizados Especiais foram concebidos. A correta atuação dos Juízes Presidentes dos Juizados Especiais, a orientação aos servidores que nele atuam, a prévia preparação dos juízes leigos e conciliadores para o exercício das relevantes funções que lhes são atribuídas, o comprometimento dos integrantes das Turmas Recursais com a unidade do sistema e, fundamentalmente, gestão deste pelo órgão estadual responsável pela coordenação e supervisão dos Juizados Especiais, são medidas que, juntamente com os necessários investimentos em informatização, incentivo à inovação e ao uso das novas tecnologias, padronização de procedimentos, aperfeiçoamento dos bancos de dados e sistema estatístico, podem promover melhorias significativas no seu desempenho.

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One of the central problems in contract law is to define the frontier between legal and illegal breaches of promises. The distinction between good and bad faith is perhaps the conceptual tool most commonly used to tell one from the other. Lawyers spend a lot of energy trying to frame better definitions of the concepts of good and bad faith based on principles of ethics or justice, but often pay much less attention to theories dealing with the incentives that can engender good faith behavior in contractual relationships. By describing the economics of what Stiglitz defined as “explicit” and “implicit” insurance, I highlight the “insurance function” hidden in any promise with basically no mathematical notation. My aim is to render the subject intelligible and useful to lawyers with little familiarity with economics.

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Granting economic development incentives (or “EDIs”) has become commonplace throughout the United States, but the efficiency of these mechanisms is generally unwarranted. Both the politicians granting, and the companies seeking, EDIs have incentives to overestimate the EDIs benefits. For politicians, ribbon–cutting ceremonies can be the highly desirable opportunity to please political allies and financiers, and the same time that they demonstrate to the population that they are successful in promoting economic growth – even when the population would be better off otherwise. In turn, businesses are naturally prone to seek governmental aid. This explains in part why EDIs often “fail” (i.e. don’t pay–off). To increase transparency and mitigate the risk of EDI failure, local and state governments across the country have created a number of accountability mechanisms. The general trait of these accountability mechanisms is that they apply controls to some of the sub–risks that underlie the risk of EDI failure. These sub–risks include the companies receiving EDIs not generating the expected number of jobs, not investing enough in their local facilities, not attracting the expected additional businesses investments to the jurisdiction, etc. The problem with such schemes is that they tackle the problem of EDI failure very loosely. They are too narrow and leave multiplier effects uncontrolled. I propose novel contractual framework for implementing accountability mechanisms. My suggestion is to establish controls on the risk of EDI failure itself, leaving its underlying sub–risks uncontrolled. I call this mechanism “Contingent EDIs”, because the EDIs are made contingent on the government achieving a preset target that benchmarks the risk of EDI failure. If the target is met, the EDIs will ex post kick in; if not, then the EDIs never kick in.

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Estudando o controle do endividamento público no Brasil e Estados Unidos, este trabalho examina a eficácia das restrições constitucionais e legais existentes nestes países, os fatores políticos e de mercado que afetam o deficit público e o nível do endividamento. Enfase especial é atribuída ao papel do Senado no caso brasileiro e aos mecanismos de controle através do mercado no caso americano.