847 resultados para Peace and Conflict
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Commentaire / Commentary
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En Colombia, la pobreza y el conflicto están estrechamente relacionados. Este estudio usa medidas de disuasión del gobierno como instrumentos de varias variables específicas de conflicto para estimar el impacto del conflicto sobre la pobreza en Colombia. Usando datos del censo a nivel municipal para el año 2005, evalúo el efecto sobre la incidencia urbana y rural del recientemente-desarrollado Índice de Pobreza Multidimensional. Los resultados sugieren que el conflicto aumenta significativamente la pobreza rural. Esto es consistente con el hecho que la mayor parte del conflicto en Colombia ocurre en las áreas rurales. También evalúo el efecto rezagado del conflicto en la pobreza para concluir que éste dura por al menos tres años pero que decae en el tiempo. Finalmente, pruebo que mis resultados son robustos a una batería de especificaciones adicionales, incluyendo una versión modificada de mi variable dependiente y el uso de una base alternativa de conflicto.
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Reseña del libro
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The present study contributes to the literature on the Job Demands-resources model in the italian school context. the aim of this paper is to examine how the interaction between work-family conflict (i.e., a typical job demand) and opportunities to learn and to develop and self-efficacy (i.e., typical job and personal resources, respectively) affect the core dimensions of burnout (exhaustion and depersonalization) and work engagement (vigor and dedication). Hypotheses were tested with a cross-sectional design among 143 teachers of a junior high school in the north of Italy. Results of moderated multiple regression analysis partially supported the hypotheses as the opportunities to learn and to develop buffered against the aversive effects of work-family conflict on depersonalization, whereas self-efficacy moderated the relationship between work-family conflict and vigor. From a practical viewpoint, our findings suggest that opportunities to learn and to develop and self-efficacy are important re- sources that help teachers to reduce the negative effects related to work-family conflict.
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I develop a dynamic model of social conflict whereby manifest grievances of the poor generate the incentive of taking over political power violently. Rebellion can be an equilibrium outcome depending on the level of preexisting inequality between the poor and the ruling elite, the relative military capabilities of the two groups and the destructiveness of conflict. Once a technology of repression is introduced, widespread fear reduces the parameter space for which rebellion is an equilibrium outcome. However, I show that repression driven peace comes at a cost as it produces a welfare loss to society.
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Despite a growing body of literature on how environmental degradation can fuel civil war, the reverse effect, namely that of conflict on environmental outcomes, is relatively understudied. From a theoretical point of view this effect is ambiguous, with some forces pointing to pressures for environmental degradation and some pointing in the opposite direction. Hence, the overall effect of conflict on the environment is an empirical question. We study this relationship in the case of Colombia. We combine a detailed satellite-based longitudinal dataset on forest cover across municipalities over the period 1990-2010 with a comprehensive panel of conflict-related violent actions by paramilitary militias. We first provide evidence that paramilitary activity significantly reduces the share of forest cover in a panel specification that includes municipal and time fixed effects. Then we confirm these findings by taking advantage of a quasi-experiment that provides us with an exogenous source of variation for the expansion of the paramilitary. Using the distance to the region of Urab´a, the epicenter of such expansion, we instrument paramilitary activity in each cross-section for which data on forest cover is available. As a falsification exercise, we show that the instrument ceases to be relevant after the paramilitaries largely demobilized following peace negotiations with the government. Further, after the demobilization the deforestation effect of the paramilitaries disappears. We explore a number of potential mechanisms that may explain the conflict-driven deforestation, and show evidence suggesting that paramilitary violence generates large outflows of people in order to secure areas for growing illegal crops, exploit mineral resources, and engage in extensive agriculture. In turn, these activities are associated with deforestation.
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This is a critical review of the empirical literature on the relationship between violence and economic growth in Colombia: an interesting case study for social scientists studying violence, conflict, crime and development. We argue that, despite the rapid development of this literature and the increasing use of new techniques, there is still much room for research. After assessing the contribution of the most influential papers on the subject, we suggest directions for future research.
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We propose a model where an autocrat rules over an ethnically divided society. The dictator selects the tax rate over domestic production and the nation’s natural resources to maximize his rents under the threat of a regime-switching revolution. We show that a weak ruler may let the country plunge in civil war to increase his personal rents. Inter-group fighting weakens potential opposition to the ruler, thereby allowing him to increase fiscal pressure. We show that the presence of natural resources exacerbates the incentives of the ruler to promote civil conflict for his own profit, especially if the resources are unequally distributed across ethnic groups. We validate the main predictions of the model using cross-country data over the period 1960-2007, and show that our empirical results are not likely to be driven by omitted observable determinants of civil war incidence or by unobservable country-specific heterogeneity.
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We study economic conflicts using a game theoretical approach. We model a conflict between two agents where each one has two possible strategies: cease-fire or neglect the truce. Under this setting, we use the concept of pre-donations, namely, a redefinition of the game where agents commit to transfer a share of their output to the other agent (Sertel, 1992), and explain under which conditions a system of pre-donations can facilitate a truce. We find that for conflicts involving high costs there is a distributive mechanism, acceptable for both parties, such that, the best strategy for both parties is Cease-Fire. However, in many cases there are no sufficient conditions for the scheme or pre-donations to be effective. We also analyze some limitations of this framework and extend the model in order to deal with some of these flaws. Finally, in order to illustrate the relevance of the theoretical results we briefly describe some of the circumstances that characterized the negotiation processes between the Colombian government and different illegal groups.
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Resumen basado en el de la publicación
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Monogr??fico con el t??tulo: "La educaci??n como quehacer de convicciones : homenaje acad??mico a Jos?? Antonio Ib????ez-Mart??n"
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Resumen basado en el de la publicaci??n