Biostratigraphy and paleobiogeographic affinities of the Jurassic brachiopod assemblages from Sierra Espuña (Maláguide Complex, Internal Betic Zones, Spain)

The assemblages of Early Jurassic brachiopods (Pliensbachian - Toarcian) from Sierra Espuña (Murcia Province, SE Spain) are described. This is the only area in the Internal Zones of the Betic Cordillera, corresponding to the margins of the Alborán Terrane, where Jurassic brachiopods are known to occur. In the tectonic Unit of Morrón de Totana (more southward located) assemblage MT1 of Late Pliensbachian age has been characterized. This assemblage has been subdivided into three successive sub-assemblages: MT1a (Algovianum Zone), MT1b (Emaciatum Zone, Solare Subzone) and MT1c (Emaciatum Zone, Elisa Subzone). Northward, in the Perona tectonic Unit two distinct assemblages, P1 (Latest Sinemurian - Early Pliensbachian) and P2 (Early Toarcian, Serpentinum Zone) have been recognized. Differences between the assemblages from the two tectonic units are evident after the paleobiogeographical analysis. In the Morrón de Totana Unit, taxa with Mediterranean affinities occur. MT1 assemblage is very similar to assemblages previously known in the Eastern Subbetic as well as in other areas of the Mediterranean Province. In the Perona Unit the Mediterranean affinity of the assemblages is not so evident. P1 Assemblage consists of widely distributed taxa, lacking in the most characteristic elements of the Mediterranean Province which, however, are present in neighbouring Betic areas. P2 Assemblage belongs to the Spanish Province that develops in Western Tethys after the Early Toarcian Mass Extinction Event. The occurrence in this assemblage of Prionorhynchia aff. msougari Rousselle, until now only found in North Africa, indicates a closer connection of the Perona Unit with the African paleomargin of the Tethys than with the South Iberian paleomargin. The paleobiogeographical data suggest a more southern and marginal (close to epicontinental areas) position of the Perona Unit than the Morrón de Totana Unit.

Letter of recommendation for Amos Main from Joseph Moodey to Nathan Prince, 1725 July 2

Handwritten letter sent by Joseph Moody, schoolmaster in York, to Harvard Tutor Nathan Prince recommending student Amos Main for acceptance to the College. In the letter, Moody requests Prince give Main an examination for admission, with the caveat that though Main has been studying Latin and Greek he has a difficult home life and is "somewhat Raw; yet I hope you'l wink at it." The letter, dated July 2, 1725, is written on a folded folio-sized leaf; there are handwritten notes about Massachusetts towns on the verso.

Boston, Massachusetts, 2-Dimensional Building Footprints with Height Data (from LIDAR data), 2002

This dataset consists of 2D footprints of the buildings in the metropolitan Boston area, based on tiles in the orthoimage index (orthophoto quad ID: 229890, 229894, 229898, 229902, 233886, 233890, 233894, 233898, 233902, 237890, 237894, 237898, 237902, 241890, 241894, 241898, 241902, 245898, 245902). This data set was collected using 3Di's Digital Airborne Topographic Imaging System II (DATIS II). Roof height and footprint elevation attributes (derived from 1-meter resolution LIDAR (LIght Detection And Ranging) data) are included as part of each building feature. This data can be combined with other datasets to create 3D representations of buildings and the surrounding environment.

Endolymphatic sac tumor : A report of 2 cases with long term follow-up

Trabalho Final do Curso de Mestrado Integrado em Medicina, Faculdade de Medicina, Universidade de Lisboa, 2014

A relação inconsciente-consciente na produção do pensamento consciente

Tese de mestrado, Psicologia (Ciência Cognitiva), Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Psicologia, Faculdade de Letras, Faculdade de Ciências, Faculdade de Medicina, 2016

Authorisations under EU internal market rules. Research Paper in Law, 05/2013

From the Introduction. That the requirement of a prior authorisation, as a precondition for the exercise of any economic activity, may restrict the freedom of establishment and the free provision of services is a truism. If an authorisation is required in the Member State where establishment is to take place or the service is to be offered (host Member State), then operators who lack such authorisation are in no right to proceed to the projected activity. Therefore, as soon as it is being accepted that the EU internal market rules are not only about discriminatory measures, but also cover mere restrictions, it comes as no surprise that national authorisation systems come to be scrutinized under the Internal Market rules.

Legal Aspects in Establishing the Internal Market for services. Research Papers in Law, 6/2007

Introduction. The internal market for services is one of the objectives set by the founding fathers of the EC back in 1957. It is only in the last ten-fifteen years, however, that this aspect of the internal market has seriously attracted the attention of the EC legislature and judiciary.1 With the exception of some sector-specific directives dating back in the late ‘80s, it is only with the deregulation of network industries, the development of electronic communications and the spread of financial services, in the ‘90s that substantial bits of legislation got adopted in the field of services. Similarly, the European Court of Justice (ECJ, the Court) left the principles established in Van Binsbergen back in 1973, hibernate for a long time before fully applying them in Säger and constantly thereafter.2 Ever since, the Court’s case law in this field has grown so important that it has become the compulsory starting point for any study concerning the (horizontal) regulation of the internal market in services. The limits inherent to negative integration and to the casuistic approach pursued by judiciary decisions have prompted the need for a general legislative text to be adopted for services in the internal market. This text, however, hotly debated both at the political and at the legal level, has ended up in little more than a complex restatement of the Court’s case law. It may be, however, that this ‘little more’ is not that little. In view of the ever expanding application of the Treaty rules on services, promoted by the ECJ (para. 1),3 the Directive certainly appears to be a limited regulatory attempt (para. 2). This, however, does not mean that the Directive is a toothless, or useless regulatory instrument (conclusion: para. 3).

To Be or Not to Be a Normative Power: The EU’s Promotion of Human Rights and Democracy in Russia. Bruges Regional Integration & Global Governance Papers 2/2013

The ‘Normative Power Europe’ debate has been a leitmotif in the academic discourse for over a decade. Far from being obsolete, the topic is as relevant as when the term was first coined by Ian Manners in 2002.1 ‘To be or not to be a normative power’ is certainly one of the existential dilemmas in the foreign policy of the European Union. This paper, however, intends to move beyond the black-and-white debate on whether the European Union is a normative power and to make it more nuanced by examining the factors that make it such. Contrary to the conventional perception that the European Union is a necessarily ‘benign’ force in the world, it assumes that it has aspirations to be a viable international actor. Consequently, it pursues different types of foreign policy behaviour with a varying degree of normativity in them. The paper addresses the question of under what conditions the European Union is a ‘normative power’. The findings of the study demonstrate that the ‘normative power’ of the European Union is conditioned upon internal and external elements, engaged in a complex interaction with a decisive role played by the often neglected external elements.

Rok Putina. Obwod kaliningradzki w kontekscie rozszerzenia Unii Europejskiej. Prace OSW 2/2001. = Putin's Year. The Kaliningrad Oblast in the context of EU enlargement. OSW Study 2/2001

Last year Kaliningrad became the subject of an international debate involving first of all the European Union, Russia, the USA, and the countries bordering the enclave, Poland and Lithuania. Such keen interest in a small region of less than a million inhabitants was mainly due to the fact that Kaliningrad has found itself in the very centre of two processes which are of paramount importance for Europe: EU and NATO enlargement. If Lithuania becomes a member of those units and Poland joins the EU, this Russian enclave will become an island surrounded on all land borders by a totally different, political, economic and military entity. In the course of the debate many questions were raised about the situation in the Oblast and how it affects neighbouring countries, the real interests and intentions of the parties involved in the debate, and the future of the region. The authors of this publication are attempting to answer these questions. The first part of this analysis is devoted to presenting the most important internal problems of the enclave, considering their influence on the surrounding world and the consequences of adopting the acquis communautaire in Poland and Lithuania. The second part characterises Moscow's policies towards Kaliningrad on the one hand, and those of Western countries on the other. Finally, the authors discuss the probable ways in which the situation in the enclave will develop.

Mutual recognition in goods and services: an economic perspective. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 2/2002

Mutual recognition is a remarkable innovation facilitating economic intercourse across borders. In the EU's internal goods market it has been helpful in tackling or avoiding the remaining obstacles, namely, regulatory barriers between Member States. However, there is a curious paradox. Despite the almost universal acclaim of the great merits of mutual recognition the principle has, in and by itself, contributed only modestly to the actual realisation of free movement in the single market. It is also surprising that economists have not or hardly underpinned their widespread appreciation for the principle by providing rigorous analysis which could substantiate the case for mutual recognition for policy makers. Business in Europe has shown a sense of disenc hantment with the principle because of the many costs and uncertainties in its application in actual practice. The purpose of the present paper is to provide the economic and strategic arguments for employing mutual recognition much more systematically in the single market for goods and services. The strategic and the "welfare" gains are analysed and adetailed exposition of the fairly high information , transaction and compliance costs is provided. The information costs derive from the fact that mutual recognition remains a distant abstraction for day-to-day business life. Understandably, verifying the "equivalence" of objectives of health and safety between Member States is perceived as difficult and uncertain. This sentiment is exacerbated by the complications of interpreting the equivalence of "effects". In actual practice, these abstractions are expected to override clear and specific national product or services rules, which local inspectors or traders may find problematic without guidance. The paper enumerates several other costs including, inter alia, the absence of sectoral rule books and the next-to-prohibitive costs of monitoring of the application of the principle. The basic problems in applying mutual recognition in the entire array of services are inspected, showing why the principle can only be used in a limited number of services markets and even there it may contribute only modestly to genuine free movement and competitive exposure. A special section is devoted to a range of practical illustrations of the difficulties business experiences when relying on mutual recognition. Finally, the corollary of mutual recognition - regulatory competition - is discussed in terms of a cost/benefits analysis compared to what is often said to be the alternative , that is "harmonisation" , in EU parlance the "new approach" to approximation. The conclusion is that the manifold benefits of mutual recognition for Europe are too great to allow the present ambiguities to continue. The Union needs much more pro-active approaches to reduce the costs of mutual recognition as well as permanent monitoring structures for its application to services (analogous to those already successfully functioning in goods markets). Above all, what is required is a "mutual recognition culture" so that the EU can better enjoy the fruits of its own regulatory ingenuity.

Do Too Many Chefs Really Spoil the Broth? The European Commission, Bureaucratic Politics and European Integration, CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 09.2, 5 August 1999

There is a puzzling, little-remarked contradiction in scholarly views of the European Commission. On the one hand, the Commission is seen as the maestro of European integration, gently but persistently guiding both governments and firms toward Brussels. On the other hand, the Commission is portrayed as a headless bunch of bickering fiefdoms who can hardly be bothered by anything but their own in­ ternecine turf wars. The reason these very different views of the same institution have so seldom come into conflict is quite apparent: EU studies has a set of relatively autonomous and poorly integrated sub­ fields that work at different levels of analysis. Those scholars holding the "heroic" view of the Com­ mission are generally focused on the contest between national and supranational levels that character­ ized the 1992 program and subsequent major steps toward European integration. By contrast, those scholars with the "bureaucratic politics" view are generally authors of case studies or legislative his­ tories of individual EU directives or decisions. However, the fact that these twO images of the Commis­ sion are often two ships passing in the night hardly implies that there is no dispute. Clearly both views cannot be right; but then, how can we explain the significant support each enjoys from the empirical record? The CommiSSion, perhaps the single most important supranational body in the world, certainly deserves better than the schizophrenic interpretation the EU studies community has given it. In this paper, I aim to make a contribution toward the unraveling of this paradox. In brief, the argument I make is as follows: the European Commission can be effective in pursuit of its broad integration goals in spite of, and even because of, its internal divisions. The folk wisdom that too many chefs spoil the broth may often be true, but it need not always be so. The paper is organized as follows. 1 begin with an elaboration of the theoretical position briefly out­ lined above. 1 then tum to a case study from the major Commission efforts to restructure the computer industry in the context of its 1992 program. The computer sector does not merely provide interesting, random illustrations of the hypothesis 1 have advanced. Rather, as Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman have stressed, the Commission's efforts on informatics formed one of the most crucial parts of the en­ tire 1992 program, and so the Commission's success in "Europeanizing" these issues had significant ripple effects across the entire European political economy. I conclude with some thoughts on the fol­ lowing question: now that the Commission has succeeded in bringing the world to its doorstep, does its bureaucratic division still serve a useful purpose?

Evidências de validade da versão brasileira do Exercise Motivation Inventory-2 em contexto de academia e personal training

Este estudo teve como objetivos verificar a validade fatorial e a validade interna da versão brasileira do Exercise Motivation Inventory-2 (EMI-2) e comparar os principais motivos para prática de exercício tendo em conta os contextos de academia e personal training. Um total de 588 praticantes de exercício da cidade de Pelotas/RS/Brasil (405 de academia e 183 de personal training) preencheram o EMI-2, o qual é constituído por 51 itens, agrupados em 14 motivos (fatores) para prática de exercício físico. A validade fatorial do EMI-2 foi testada através da realização de análises fatoriais confirmatórias e a validade interna através do alfa de Cronbach. Para a verificar o efeito do contexto nos motivos foi utilizada a MANOVA e calculado o tamanho do efeito. Os resultados obtidos dão suporte à estrutura original do EMI-2 com 14 fatores, nesta amostra. Verificou-se um efeito multivariado significativo do contexto sobre os motivos de prática [Wilks’ λ = 0.912, F (14, 573.000) = 3.9, p < 0.001, η² = 0.088]. Os motivos de “Prazer”, “Força e resistência”, “Desafio”, “Socialização”, “Competição” e “Reconhecimento Social” foram significativamente superiores no contexto de academia e os motivos de “Agilidade” e “Prevenção de Doenças” foram significativamente superiores no contexto de personal training.

Operational capabilities’ typology: an evolution from operational practices

Operational capabilities são caracterizadas como um recurso interno da firma e fonte de vantagem competitiva. Porém, a literatura de estratégia de operações fornece uma definição constitutiva inadequada para as operational capabilities, desconsiderando a relativização dos diferentes contextos, a limitação da base empírica, e não explorando adequadamente a extensa literatura sobre práticas operacionais. Quando as práticas operacionais são operacionalizadas no ambiente interno da firma, elas podem ser incorporadas as rotinas organizacionais, e através do conhecimento tácito da produção se transformar em operational capabilities, criando assim barreiras à imitação. Apesar disso, poucos são os pesquisadores que exploram as práticas operacionais como antecedentes das operational capabilities. Baseado na revisão da literatura, nós investigamos a natureza das operational capabilities; a relação entre práticas operacionais e operational capabilities; os tipos de operational capabilities que são caracterizadas no ambiente interno da firma; e o impacto das operational capabilities no desempenho operacional. Nós conduzimos uma pesquisa de método misto. Na etapa qualitativa, nós conduzimos estudos de casos múltiplos com quatro firmas, duas multinacionais americanas que operam no Brasil, e duas firmas brasileiras. Nós coletamos os dados através de entrevistas semi-estruturadas com questões semi-abertas. Elas foram baseadas na revisão da literatura sobre práticas operacionais e operational capabilities. As entrevistas foram conduzidas pessoalmente. No total 73 entrevistas foram realizadas (21 no primeiro caso, 18 no segundo caso, 18 no terceiro caso, e 16 no quarto caso). Todas as entrevistas foram gravadas e transcritas literalmente. Nós usamos o sotware NVivo. Na etapa quantitativa, nossa amostra foi composta por 206 firmas. O questionário foi criado a partir de uma extensa revisão da literatura e também a partir dos resultados da fase qualitativa. O método Q-sort foi realizado. Um pré-teste foi conduzido com gerentes de produção. Foram realizadas medidas para reduzir Variância de Método Comum. No total dez escalas foram utilizadas. 1) Melhoria Contínua; 2) Gerenciamento da Informação; 3) Aprendizagem; 4) Suporte ao Cliente; 5) Inovação; 6) Eficiência Operacional; 7) Flexibilidade; 8) Customização; 9) Gerenciamento dos Fornecedores; e 10) Desempenho Operacional. Nós usamos análise fatorial confirmatória para confirmar a validade de confiabilidade, conteúdo, convergente, e discriminante. Os dados foram analisados com o uso de regressões múltiplas. Nossos principais resultados foram: Primeiro, a relação das práticas operacionais como antecedentes das operational capabilities. Segundo, a criação de uma tipologia dividida em dois construtos. O primeiro construto foi chamado de Standalone Capabilities. O grupo consiste de zero order capabilities tais como Suporte ao Cliente, Inovação, Eficiência Operacional, Flexibilidade, e Gerenciamento dos Fornecedores. Estas operational capabilities têm por objetivo melhorar os processos da firma. Elas têm uma relação direta com desempenho operacional. O segundo construto foi chamado de Across-the-Board Capabilities. Ele é composto por first order capabilities tais como Aprendizagem Contínua e Gerenciamento da Informação. Estas operational capabilities são consideradas dinâmicas e possuem o papel de reconfigurar as Standalone Capabilities.

(Table 1) Comparison of dive duration and speed of Adélie penguins (Pygoscelis adeliae) equipped with internal and external devices

Bio-logging studies suffer from the lack of real controls. However, it is still possible to compare indirect parameters between control and equipped animals to assess the level of global disturbance due to instrumentation. In addition, it is also possible to compare the behaviour of free-ranging animals between individuals equipped with different techniques or instruments to determine the less deleterious approach. We instrumented Adelie Penguins (Pygoscelis adeliae) with internal or external time-depth recorders and monitored them in parallel with a control group during the first foraging trip following instrumentation. Foraging trip duration was significantly longer in the internally-equipped group. This difference was due to a larger number of dives, reflecting a lower foraging ability or a higher food demand, and longer periods of recovery at the surface. These longer recovery periods were likely to be due to a reduced efficiency to ventilate at the surface, probably because the implanted devices pressurised adjacent organs such as air sacs. Moreover, descent and ascent rates were slightly lower in externally-equipped penguins, presumably because external instrumentation increased the bird drag. Looking at our results, implantation appears more disadvantageous - at least for short-term deployment - than external equipment in Adelie Penguins, while this method has been described to induce no negative effects in long-term studies. This underlines the need to control for potential effects due to methodological aspects in any study using data loggers in free-ranging animals, to minimise disturbance and collect reliable data.