851 resultados para Competing Risk Model
Resumo:
This paper confronts the Capital Asset Pricing Model - CAPM - and the 3-Factor Fama-French - FF - model using both Brazilian and US stock market data for the same Sample period (1999-2007). The US data will serve only as a benchmark for comparative purposes. We use two competing econometric methods, the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) by (Hansen, 1982) and the Iterative Nonlinear Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimation (ITNLSUR) by Burmeister and McElroy (1988). Both methods nest other options based on the procedure by Fama-MacBeth (1973). The estimations show that the FF model fits the Brazilian data better than CAPM, however it is imprecise compared with the US analog. We argue that this is a consequence of an absence of clear-cut anomalies in Brazilian data, specially those related to firm size. The tests on the efficiency of the models - nullity of intercepts and fitting of the cross-sectional regressions - presented mixed conclusions. The tests on intercept failed to rejected the CAPM when Brazilian value-premium-wise portfolios were used, contrasting with US data, a very well documented conclusion. The ITNLSUR has estimated an economically reasonable and statistically significant market risk premium for Brazil around 6.5% per year without resorting to any particular data set aggregation. However, we could not find the same for the US data during identical period or even using a larger data set. Este estudo procura contribuir com a literatura empírica brasileira de modelos de apreçamento de ativos. Dois dos principais modelos de apreçamento são Infrontados, os modelos Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)e de 3 fatores de Fama-French. São aplicadas ferramentas econométricas pouco exploradas na literatura nacional na estimação de equações de apreçamento: os métodos de GMM e ITNLSUR. Comparam-se as estimativas com as obtidas de dados americanos para o mesmo período e conclui-se que no Brasil o sucesso do modelo de Fama e French é limitado. Como subproduto da análise, (i) testa-se a presença das chamadas anomalias nos retornos, e (ii) calcula-se o prêmio de risco implícito nos retornos das ações. Os dados revelam a presença de um prêmio de valor, porém não de um prêmio de tamanho. Utilizando o método de ITNLSUR, o prêmio de risco de mercado é positivo e significativo, ao redor de 6,5% ao ano.
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Há mais de uma década, o Value-at-Risk (VaR) é utilizado por instituições financeiras e corporações não financeiras para controlar o risco de mercado de carteiras de investimentos. O fato dos métodos paramétricos assumirem a hipótese de normalidade da distribuição de retornos dos fatores de risco de mercado, leva alguns gestores de risco a utilizar métodos por simulação histórica para calcular o VaR das carteiras. A principal crítica à simulação histórica tradicional é, no entanto, dar o mesmo peso na distribuição à todos os retornos encontrados no período. Este trabalho testa o modelo de simulação histórica com atualização de volatilidade proposto por Hull e White (1998) com dados do mercado brasileiro de ações e compara seu desempenho com o modelo tradicional. Os resultados mostraram um desempenho superior do modelo de Hull e White na previsão de perdas para as carteiras e na sua velocidade de adaptação à períodos de ruptura da volatilidade do mercado.
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Verdelhan (2009) shows that if one is to explain the foreign exchange forward premium behavior using Campbell and Cochrane (1999)’s habit formation model one must specify it in such a way to generate pro-cyclical short term risk free rates. At the calibration procedure, we show that this is only possible in Campbell and Cochrane’s framework under implausible parameters specifications given that the price-consumption ratio diverges in almost all parameters sets. We, then, adopt Verdelhan’s shortcut of fixing the sensivity function λ(st) at its steady state level to attain a finite value for the price-consumption ratio and release it in the simulation stage to ensure pro-cyclical risk free rates. Beyond the potential inconsistencies that such procedure may generate, as suggested by Wachter (2006), with procyclical risk free rates the model generates a downward sloped real yield curve, which is at odds with the data.
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This paper is concerned with evaluating value at risk estimates. It is well known that using only binary variables to do this sacrifices too much information. However, most of the specification tests (also called backtests) avaliable in the literature, such as Christoffersen (1998) and Engle and Maganelli (2004) are based on such variables. In this paper we propose a new backtest that does not realy solely on binary variable. It is show that the new backtest provides a sufficiant condition to assess the performance of a quantile model whereas the existing ones do not. The proposed methodology allows us to identify periods of an increased risk exposure based on a quantile regression model (Koenker & Xiao, 2002). Our theorical findings are corroborated through a monte Carlo simulation and an empirical exercise with daily S&P500 time series.
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In this thesis, we investigate some aspects of the interplay between economic regulation and the risk of the regulated firm. In the first chapter, the main goal is to understand the implications a mainstream regulatory model (Laffont and Tirole, 1993) have on the systematic risk of the firm. We generalize the model in order to incorporate aggregate risk, and find that the optimal regulatory contract must be severely constrained in order to reproduce real-world systematic risk levels. We also consider the optimal profit-sharing mechanism, with an endogenous sharing rate, to explore the relationship between contract power and beta. We find results compatible with the available evidence that high-powered regimes impose more risk to the firm. In the second chapter, a joint work with Daniel Lima from the University of California, San Diego (UCSD), we start from the observation that regulated firms are subject to some regulatory practices that potentially affect the symmetry of the distribution of their future profits. If these practices are anticipated by investors in the stock market, the pattern of asymmetry in the empirical distribution of stock returns may differ among regulated and non-regulated companies. We review some recently proposed asymmetry measures that are robust to the empirical regularities of return data and use them to investigate whether there are meaningful differences in the distribution of asymmetry between these two groups of companies. In the third and last chapter, three different approaches to the capital asset pricing model of Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) are tested with recent Brazilian data and estimated using the generalized method of moments (GMM) as a unifying procedure. We find that ex-post stock returns generally exhibit statistically significant coskewness with the market portfolio, and hence are sensitive to squared market returns. However, while the theoretical ground for the preference for skewness is well established and fairly intuitive, we did not find supporting evidence that investors require a premium for supporting this risk factor in Brazil.
Resumo:
Most studies around that try to verify the existence of regulatory risk look mainly at developed countries. Looking at regulatory risk in emerging market regulated sectors is no less important to improving and increasing investment in those markets. This thesis comprises three papers comprising regulatory risk issues. In the first Paper I check whether CAPM betas capture information on regulatory risk by using a two-step procedure. In the first step I run Kalman Filter estimates and then use these estimated betas as inputs in a Random-Effect panel data model. I find evidence of regulatory risk in electricity, telecommunications and all regulated sectors in Brazil. I find further evidence that regulatory changes in the country either do not reduce or even increase the betas of the regulated sectors, going in the opposite direction to the buffering hypothesis as proposed by Peltzman (1976). In the second Paper I check whether CAPM alphas say something about regulatory risk. I investigate a methodology similar to those used by some regulatory agencies around the world like the Brazilian Electricity Regulatory Agency (ANEEL) that incorporates a specific component of regulatory risk in setting tariffs for regulated sectors. I find using SUR estimates negative and significant alphas for all regulated sectors especially the electricity and telecommunications sectors. This runs in the face of theory that predicts alphas that are not statistically different from zero. I suspect that the significant alphas are related to misspecifications in the traditional CAPM that fail to capture true regulatory risk factors. On of the reasons is that CAPM does not consider factors that are proven to have significant effects on asset pricing, such as Fama and French size (ME) and price-to-book value (ME/BE). In the third Paper, I use two additional factors as controls in the estimation of alphas, and the results are similar. Nevertheless, I find evidence that the negative alphas may be the result of the regulated sectors premiums associated with the three Fama and French factors, particularly the market risk premium. When taken together, ME and ME/BE regulated sectors diminish the statistical significance of market factors premiums, especially for the electricity sector. This show how important is the inclusion of these factors, which unfortunately is scarce in emerging markets like Brazil.
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Esse trabalho é uma aplicação do modelo intertemporal de apreçamento de ativos desenvolvido por Campbell (1993) e Campbell e Vuolteenaho (2004) para as carteiras de Fama-French 2x3 brasileiras no period de janeiro de 2003 a abril de 2012 e para as carteiras de Fama-French 5x5 americanas em diferentes períodos. As varíaveis sugeridas por Campbell e Vuolteenaho (2004) para prever os excessos de retorno do mercado acionário americano no period de 1929 a 2001 mostraram-se também bons preditores de excesso de retorno para o mercado brasileiro no período recente, com exceção da inclinação da estrutura a termo das taxas de juros. Entretanto, mostramos que um aumento no small stock value spread indica maior excesso de retorno no futuro, comportamento que não é coerente com a explicação para o prêmio de valor sugerida pelo modelo intertemporal. Ainda, utilizando os resíduos do VAR preditivo para definir o risco de choques de fluxo de caixa e de choques nas taxas de desconto das carteiras de teste, verificamos que o modelo intertemporal resultante não explica adequadamente os retornos observados. Para o mercado norte-americano, concluímos que a abilidade das variáveis propostas para explicar os excessos de retorno do mercado varia no tempo. O sucesso de Campbell e Vuolteenaho (2004) em explicar o prêmio de valor para o mercado norte-americano na amostra de 1963 a 2001 é resultado da especificação do VAR na amostra completa, pois mostramos que nenhuma das varíaveis é um preditor de retorno estatisticamente significante nessa sub-amostra.
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This paper aims at contributing to the research agenda on the sources of price stickiness, showing that the adoption of nominal price rigidity may be an optimal firms' reaction to the consumers' behavior, even if firms have no adjustment costs. With regular broadly accepted assumptions on economic agents behavior, we show that firms' competition can lead to the adoption of sticky prices as an (sub-game perfect) equilibrium strategy. We introduce the concept of a consumption centers model economy in which there are several complete markets. Moreover, we weaken some traditional assumptions used in standard monetary policy models, by assuming that households have imperfect information about the ineflicient time-varying cost shocks faced by the firms, e.g. the ones regarding to inefficient equilibrium output leveIs under fiexible prices. Moreover, the timing of events are assumed in such a way that, at every period, consumers have access to the actual prices prevailing in the market only after choosing a particular consumption center. Since such choices under uncertainty may decrease the expected utilities of risk averse consumers, competitive firms adopt some degree of price stickiness in order to minimize the price uncertainty and fi attract more customers fi.'
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The paper analyzes a two period general equilibrium model with individual risk and moral hazard. Each household faces two individual states of nature in the second period. These states solely differ in the household's vector of initial endowments, which is strictly larger in the first state (good state) than in the second state (bad state). In the first period households choose a non-observable action. Higher leveis of action give higher probability of the good state of nature to occur, but lower leveIs of utility. Households have access to an insurance market that allows transfer of income across states of oature. I consider two models of financiaI markets, the price-taking behavior model and the nonlínear pricing modelo In the price-taking behavior model suppliers of insurance have a belief about each household's actíon and take asset prices as given. A variation of standard arguments shows the existence of a rational expectations equilibrium. For a generic set of economies every equilibrium is constraíned sub-optímal: there are commodity prices and a reallocation of financiaI assets satisfying the first period budget constraint such that, at each household's optimal choice given those prices and asset reallocation, markets clear and every household's welfare improves. In the nonlinear pricing model suppliers of insurance behave strategically offering nonlinear pricing contracts to the households. I provide sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and investigate the optimality properties of the modeI. If there is a single commodity then every equilibrium is constrained optimaI. Ir there is more than one commodity, then for a generic set of economies every equilibrium is constrained sub-optimaI.
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Economic reform in China has created a small, but fast-growing private sector that has spurred rapid productivity growth. Growth of the private sector is predicated upon continued labor movements away from state-run industries and into private firms. This paper presents a theory of labor market sectoral choice demonstrating that three factors determine private sector labor supply-the difference in wages between the state and private sectors, private sector wage risk and risk aversion. Estimation of the model using survey data provides strong support for the theory. We find that the riskiness of private sector earnings has a greater effect in discouraging workers from taking jobs in private firms than the wage premi um has in attracting workers.
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This paper examines the efects of the transfer of credit risk associated with bank loans. We are interested in (a) whether the transfer of credit risk has any impact on the intensity with which banks monitor their borrowers and (b) whether credit risk transfer infuences the amount of financing that is provided to firms in an economy. Our model first develops conditions under which bank finance is available to firrms, mainly in the spirit of Holmstrom/Tirole (1997). We then introduce projects with uncorrelated pay-offs and argue that one possible economic rationale for credit risk transfer is diversi¯cation. We analyze whether and how within this scenario the transfer of the credit risk of loans changes a bank's incentives to monitor its debtors. Finally we investigate whether and what kind of impact this may have on the amount of ¯nancing available to firms in an economy. Our results indicate that the monitoring incentives are being eroded indeed and that credit risk transfer can increase the overall amount of obtainable funds in an economy.
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The implementation of the Basle II agreement in the financial markets of world economies has been seen as a significant advance in relation to the model enforced under the first agreement (Basle I). It is generally understood that the new agreement represents a substantial advance in relation to the first because it allows banks to better deal with the risks to which they are exposed. Nevertheless, when the application of these principles to development banks is considered it can be noted that certain inconsistencies exist, notably the fact that these institutions are typically public institutions - or at least strongly dependent on public funding - and they do not operate the payment system of the economy. Therefore, the application of the Basle rules to these institutions does not make sense. This means that Basle does not represent an appropriate set of recommendations for how these institutions should deal with their risks, whether because the proposed form of dealing with risks is inadequate, or because other relevant risks for these institutions are not covered by Basle I and II.
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We extend the static portfolio choice problem with a small background risk to the case of small partially correlated background risks. We show that respecting the theories under which risk substitution appears, except for the independence of background risk, it is perfectly rational for the individual to increase his optimal exposure to portfolio risk when risks are partially negatively correlated. Then, we test empirically the hypothesis of risk substitutability using INSEE data on French households. We find that households respond by increasing their stockholdings in response to the increase in future earnings uncertainty. This conclusion is in contradiction with results obtained in other countries. So, in light of these results, our model provides an explanation to account for the lack of empirical consensus on cross-country tests of risk substitution theory that encompasses and criticises all of them.
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Theoretical models on moral hazard provide competing predictions on the incentive-risk relationship. These predictions are derived under the assumptions of homogeneous agents and exogenous risk. However, the existing empirical evidence does not account for risk-aversion heterogeneity and risk endogeneity. This paper uses a well-built database on tenancy contracts to address these issues. Detailed information on cropping activities is used to measure the exogenous risk. Risk-aversion heterogeneity and other self-selection problems are addressed through a portfolio schedule and a subsample of farmers who simultaneously own and sharecrop different farms. This controlled exercise finds a direct relation between incentives and exogenous risk.
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Usando a abordagem de competitive search, modelo um mercado de trabalho com trabalhadores heterogêneos no qual há um problema de risco moral na relação entre firmas e trabalhadores. Nesse contexto, consigo prever como contratos reagem a mudanças nos parâmetros do mercado (em particular, o risco de produção), assim como a variação da probabilidade dos trabalhadores serem contratados. Minha contribuição principal é ver que, no nível individual, existe uma relação negativa entre risco e incentivos, mas efeitos de equilíbrio geral implicam que essa relação pode ser positiva no nível agregado. Esse resultado ajuda a esclarecer resultados empíricos contraditórios sobre a relação entre risco e incentivos.