On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model

For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q-separable preferences over subsets of workers we show that the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers. In order to prove this result, we also show that under this domain of preferences (which contains the domain of responsive preferences of the college admissions problem) the workers-optimal stable matching is weakly Pareto optimal for the workers and the Blocking Lemma holds as well. We exhibit an example showing that none of these three results remain true if the preferences of firms are substitutable but not quota q-separable.

When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in rent seeking contests and policy conflicts

This paper analyzes secession and group formation in a general model of contest inspired by Esteban and Ray (1999). This model encompasses as special cases rent seeking contests and policy conflicts, where agents lobby over the choice of a policy in a one-dimensional policy space. We show that in both models the grand coalition is the efficient coalition structure and agents are always better off in the grand coalition than in a symmetric coalition structure. Individual agents (in the rent seeking contest) and extremists (in the policy conflict) only have an incentive to secede when they anticipate that their secession will not be followed by additional secessions. Incentives to secede are lower when agents cooperate inside groups. The grand coalition emerges as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a sequential game of coalition formation in rent seeking contests.

Stable coalition structures with fixed decision scheme

This paper studies the stability of a finite local public goods economy in horizontal differentiation, where a jurisdiction's choice of the public good is given by an exogenous decision scheme. In this paper, we characterize the class of decision schemes that ensure the existence of an equilibrium with free mobility (that we call Tiebout equilibrium) for monotone distribution of players. This class contains all the decision schemes whose choice lies between the Rawlsian decision scheme and the median voter with mid-distance of the two median voters when there are ties. We show that for non-monotone distribution, there is no decision scheme that can ensure the stability of coalitions. In the last part of the paper, we prove the non-emptiness of the core of this coalition formation game

Self-selection consistent functions

This paper studies collective choice rules whose outcomes consist of a collection of simultaneous decisions, each one of which is the only concern of some group of individuals in society. The need for such rules arises in different contexts, including the establishment of jurisdictions, the location of multiple public facilities, or the election of representative committees. We define a notion of allocation consistency requiring that each partial aspect of the global decision taken by society as a whole should be ratified by the group of agents who are directly concerned with this particular aspect. We investigate the possibility of designing envy-free allocation consistent rules, we also explore whether such rules may also respect the Condorcet criterion.

In whose backyard? A generalized bidding approach

We analyze situations in which a group of agents (and possibly a designer) have to reach a decision that will affect all the agents. Examples of such scenarios are the location of a nuclear reactor or the siting of a major sport event. To address the problem of reaching a decision, we propose a one-stage multi-bidding mechanism where agents compete for the project by submitting bids. All Nash equilibria of this mechanism are efficient. Moreover, the payoffs attained in equilibrium by the agents satisfy intuitively appealing lower bounds..

The density of injective endomorphisms of a free group

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."

Cooperative vs. non-cooperative mechanisms in the EU decision making process

According to the account of the European Union (EU) decision making proposed in this paper, this is a bargaining process during which actors shift their policy positions with a view to reaching agreements on controversial issues.

Learning from Shocks and the Decision to Open

Two claims pervade the literature on the political economy of market reforms: that economic crises cause reforms; and that crises matter because they bring into question the validity of the economic model held to be responsible for them. Economic crises are said to spur a process of learning that is conducive to the abandonment of failing models and to the adoption of successful models. But although these claims have become the conventional wisdom, they have been hardly tested empirically due to the lack of agreement on what constitutes a crisis and to difficulties in measuring learning from them. I propose a model of rational learning from experience and apply it to the decision to open the economy. Using data from 1964 through 1990, I show that learning from the 1982 debt crisis was relevant to the first wave of adoption of an export promotion strategy, but learning was conditional on the high variability of economic outcomes in countries that opened up to trade. Learning was also symbolic in that the sheer number of other countries that liberalized was a more important driver of others’ decisions to follow suit.

Simulium argentiscutum sp. nov. (Diptera: simuliidae), a member of the S. amazonicum-group of species; description of adults, pupa and larva

The adult, pupal and larval morphology of S. argentiscutum sp. nov., a member of the S. amazonicum-group, is compared with S. amazonicum Goeldi and its distribution, biology and medical importance are discussed. S. argentiscutum is one the most important anthropophilic species in the S. amazonicum-group as it is responsible, together with S. amazonicum, for the transmission of Mansonella ozzardi in Brazil.

The microps group of Lutzomyia França with descriptions of two new species from South America (Diptera: Psychodidae: Phlebotominae)

Six species of phlebotomine sand flies in the genus Lutzomyia França from South America are included in the newly-created species group microps. References and illustrations of the species are given, including descriptions of two new forms - L. nematoducta n.sp., male and female from northern Brazil, and l. preclara n.sp. male from Colombia and Peru. The males in the species group microps are keyed.

Inter-group conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game

We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The relevant theoretical prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and independent of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that our results contradict the independence of group-size prediction: conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are substantially above equilibrium. Towards the end of the experiment material losses in groups are 257% of the predicted level. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity in the investment behaviour of individual group members. Second, allowing group members to punish each other after individual contributions to the contest effort are revealed leads to even larger conflict expenditures. Now material losses are 869% of the equilibrium level and there is much less heterogeneity in individual group members' investments. These results contrast strongly with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency and leads to higher material payoffs.

New Phlebotomine Sandflies of the walkeri group (Diptera: Psychodidae) from Pará State, Brazil, with a pictorial key 1

The male and female of Lutzomyia carmelinoi n.sp., and the female only of L. baculus and L. williamsi, (Diptera:Psychodidae) are described and illustrated from specimens collected in Pará state, Brazil. A pictorial key is presented to these and the other members of the walkeri group.

Mediterranean populations of the lesser white-toothed shrew (Crocidura suaveolens group): an unexpected puzzle of Pleistocene survivors and prehistoric introductions.

An earlier study revealed the strong phylogeographical structure of the lesser white-toothed shrew (Crocidura suaveolens group) within the northern Palaearctic. Here, we aim to reconstruct the colonization history of Mediterranean islands and to clarify the biogeography and phylogeographical relationships of the poorly documented Middle East region with the northern Palaearctic. We performed analyses on 998-bp-long haplotypes of the mitochondrial cytochrome b gene of 143 samples collected around the Mediterranean basin, including islands and the Middle East. The analyses suggest that the Cypriot shrew belongs to the rare group of relict insular Pleistocene mammal taxa that have survived to the present day. In contrast, the Cretan, Corsican and Menorcan populations were independently introduced from the Middle East during the Holocene. The phylogeographical structure of this temperate Palaearctic species within the Middle East appears to be complex and rich in diversity, probably reflecting fragmentation of the area by numerous mountain chains. Four deeply divergent clades of the C. suaveolens group occur in the area, meaning that a hypothetical contact zone remains to be located in central western Iran.