In whose backyard? A generalized bidding approach
| Contribuinte(s) |
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica |
|---|---|
| Data(s) |
09/05/2006
|
| Resumo |
We analyze situations in which a group of agents (and possibly a designer) have to reach a decision that will affect all the agents. Examples of such scenarios are the location of a nuclear reactor or the siting of a major sport event. To address the problem of reaching a decision, we propose a one-stage multi-bidding mechanism where agents compete for the project by submitting bids. All Nash equilibria of this mechanism are efficient. Moreover, the payoffs attained in equilibrium by the agents satisfy intuitively appealing lower bounds.. |
| Formato |
21 145333 bytes application/pdf |
| Identificador | |
| Idioma(s) |
eng |
| Relação |
Working papers; 463.00 |
| Direitos |
Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús de Creative Commons, amb la qual es permet copiar, distribuir i comunicar públicament l'obra sempre que se'n citin l'autor original, la universitat, la unitat i l’institut i no se'n faci cap ús comercial ni obra derivada, tal com queda estipulat en la llicència d'ús (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/es/) |
| Palavras-Chave | #Decisió, Presa de |
| Tipo |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
