836 resultados para Endogenous Price Flexibility
Resumo:
Este artigo propõe um novo teste para distinção entre modelos macroeconômicos de precificação. Onde testes antigos concluíram haver uma relação negativa entre inflação corrente e duração de um preço, indicando estado-dependência, nosso teste indica que a relação verdadeira é entre inflação esperada e duração do preço, indicando tempo-dependência-endógena. Argumentamos que os resultados previamente encontrados possivelmente sofreram de viés de variável omitida.
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Este estudo tem como objetivo determinar os principais fatores macroeconômicos que influenciam a formação do preço de imóveis, tomando como base o mercado imobiliário residencial da cidade de São Paulo entre os anos de 2001 e 2012. Para capturar o efeito endógeno do PIB, da taxa de juros e da bolsa de valores sobre o preço de imóveis, optou-se por um modelo VAR. Concluiu-se que, dentre as variáveis, o PIB foi o fator mais preponderante na formação do preço, chegando a ter um impacto quase três vezes superior à taxa de juros. Não foram encontradas evidências estatísticas significativas do efeito da bolsa sobre o preço dos imóveis. Constatou-se ainda que choques no PIB e na taxa de juros demoram, no mínimo, um ano para começarem a refletir sobre o preço. Essas conclusões foram mais robustas no período anterior à crise imobiliária americana de 2008.
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Esse artigo apresenta um modelo dinâmico de competição em precos que incorpora tanto custos de procura quanto custos de switching e onde que as decisões do consumidor e das firmas são simultâneas. Dadas as hipóteses feitas n ós veremos que este modelo possui equilí brio. As principais propriedades do equil íbrio deste modelo são: Se os custos de procura forem baixos o suficiente, em equilí brio o consumidor vai procurar todas as firmas no mercado enquanto que o aumento dos custos de procura vai reduzir a propor cão de firmas que o consumidor busca. Um resultado contraintuitivo e que os pre cos esperados pagos pelo consumidor normalmente decresce em nossas computa cões numéricas do equil íbrio quando os custos de procura aumentam. Enquanto que aumentar os custos de switching tamb ém vai produzir o resultado contraituitivo que as firmas unmatched vão diminuir suas ofertas de modo a atrair o consumidor.
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This paper studies the effects of generic drug’s entry on bidding behavior of drug suppliers in procurement auctions for pharmaceuticals, and the consequences on procurer’s price paid for drugs. Using an unique data set on procurement auctions for off-patent drugs organized by Brazilian public bodies, we surprisingly find no statistically difference between bids and prices paid for generic and branded drugs. On the other hand, some branded drug suppliers leave auctions in which there exists a supplier of generics, whereas the remaining ones lower their bidding price. These findings explain why we find that the presence of any supplier of generic drugs in a procurement auction reduces the price paid for pharmaceuticals by 7 percent. To overcome potential estimation bias due to generic’s entry endogeneity, we exploit variation in the number of days between drug’s patent expiration date and the tendering session. The two-stage estimations document the same pattern as the generalized least square estimations find. This evidence indicates that generic competition affects branded supplier’s behavior in public procurement auctions differently from other markets.
Resumo:
We extend the standard price discovery analysis to estimate the information share of dual-class shares across domestic and foreign markets. By examining both common and preferred shares, we aim to extract information not only about the fundamental value of the rm, but also about the dual-class premium. In particular, our interest lies on the price discovery mechanism regulating the prices of common and preferred shares in the BM&FBovespa as well as the prices of their ADR counterparts in the NYSE and in the Arca platform. However, in the presence of contemporaneous correlation between the innovations, the standard information share measure depends heavily on the ordering we attribute to prices in the system. To remain agnostic about which are the leading share class and market, one could for instance compute some weighted average information share across all possible orderings. This is extremely inconvenient given that we are dealing with 2 share prices in Brazil, 4 share prices in the US, plus the exchange rate (and hence over 5,000 permutations!). We thus develop a novel methodology to carry out price discovery analyses that does not impose any ex-ante assumption about which share class or trading platform conveys more information about shocks in the fundamental price. As such, our procedure yields a single measure of information share, which is invariant to the ordering of the variables in the system. Simulations of a simple market microstructure model show that our information share estimator works pretty well in practice. We then employ transactions data to study price discovery in two dual-class Brazilian stocks and their ADRs. We uncover two interesting ndings. First, the foreign market is at least as informative as the home market. Second, shocks in the dual-class premium entail a permanent e ect in normal times, but transitory in periods of nancial distress. We argue that the latter is consistent with the expropriation of preferred shareholders as a class.
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Esta tese se dedica ao estudo de modelos de fixação de preços e suas implicações macroeconômicas. Nos primeiros dois capítulos analiso modelos em que as decisões das firmas sobre seus preços praticados levam em conta custos de menu e de informação. No Capítulo 1 eu estimo tais modelos empregando estatísticas de variações de preços dos Estados Unidos, e concluo que: os custos de informação são significativamente maiores que os custos de menu; os dados claramente favorecem o modelo em que informações sobre condições agregadas são custosas enquanto que as idiossincráticas têm custo zero. No Capítulo 2 investigo as consequências de choques monetários e anúncios de desinflação usando os modelos previamente estimados. Mostro que o grau de não-neutralidade monetária é maior no modelo em que parte da informação é grátis. O Capítulo 3 é um artigo em conjunto com Carlos Carvalho (PUC-Rio) e Antonella Tutino (Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas). No artigo examinamos um modelo de fixação de preços em que firmas estão sujeitas a uma restrição de fluxo de informação do tipo Shannon. Calibramos o modelo e estudamos funções impulso-resposta a choques idiossincráticos e agregados. Mostramos que as firmas vão preferir processar informações agregadas e idiossincráticas conjuntamente ao invés de investigá-las separadamente. Este tipo de processamento gera ajustes de preços mais frequentes, diminuindo a persistência de efeitos reais causados por choques monetários.
Resumo:
We develop a simple model of endogenous bank networks to study financial contagion and how leverage regulation may affect it. Banks maximize expected profit by choosing the optimal allocation of resources between three different classes of assets. An interbank network arise as result of loans between banks, creating a direct channel of contagion in the financial system. Contagion may occur when the realized return of the risky asset is sufficiently low to make a bank insolvent, subsequently triggering a cascade effect that propagates through default in interbank loans. Contrary to what would be expected, our results show that despite forcing banks to deleverage, increasing minimum capital requirements may lead to a system with higher aggregate levels of default.
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Este trabalho investiga como os padrões de compras de consumidores de bens estocáveis são afetados por suas expectativas de preços. Usando um modelo dinâmico padrão de maximização da utilidade, deriva-se uma expressão analítica para as compras dos consumidores como uma função das suas expectativas em relação aos preços futuros. Em seguida, uma versão mais tratável do modelo é construída, de forma a ilustrar graficamente como os diferentes tipos de expectativas de preços implicam diferentes padrões de compras dos consumidores. Além disso, na aplicação empírica, investigo qual o modelo de expectativas de preços, entre aqueles comumente utilizados na literatura, é consistente com os dados. Por fim, encontra-se suficiente heterogeneidade em expectativa de preços dos consumidores. Mostra-se que famílias de pequeno porte acreditam que os preços seguem um processo de Markov de primeira ordem, enquanto famílias de alta renda são racionais.
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Usando como base o ambiente descrito em Moreno e Wooders (2010), neste trabalho, analisamos trocas em um ambiente dinâmico, descentralizado e com seleção adversa. Ao contrário dos autores e da literatura, não consideramos a proporção de ativos de alta qualidade entrantes como independente das características do mercado. Desse modo, adaptamos o modelo dinâmico básico de seleção adversa para incorporar a decisão do vendedor sobre a possibilidade de pagar ou não um preço e transformar seu ativo de baixa qualidade em um ativo de alta qualidade antes de entrar no mercado. E, sob essas condições, mostramos que o bem-estar pode se comportar de maneira diferente do modelo tradicional.
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This article develops a life-cycle general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents who make choices of nondurables consumption, investment in homeowned housing and labour supply. Agents retire from an specific age and receive Social Security benefits which are dependant on average past earnings. The model is calibrated, numerically solved and is able to match stylized U.S. aggregate statistics and to generate average life-cycle profiles of its decision variables consistent with data and literature. We also conduct an exercise of complete elimination of the Social Security system and compare its results with the benchmark economy. The results enable us to emphasize the importance of endogenous labour supply and benefits for agents' consumption-smoothing behaviour.
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This paper aims at contributing to the research agenda on the sources of price stickiness, showing that the adoption of nominal price rigidity may be an optimal firms' reaction to the consumers' behavior, even if firms have no adjustment costs. With regular broadly accepted assumptions on economic agents behavior, we show that firms' competition can lead to the adoption of sticky prices as an (sub-game perfect) equilibrium strategy. We introduce the concept of a consumption centers model economy in which there are several complete markets. Moreover, we weaken some traditional assumptions used in standard monetary policy models, by assuming that households have imperfect information about the ineflicient time-varying cost shocks faced by the firms, e.g. the ones regarding to inefficient equilibrium output leveIs under fiexible prices. Moreover, the timing of events are assumed in such a way that, at every period, consumers have access to the actual prices prevailing in the market only after choosing a particular consumption center. Since such choices under uncertainty may decrease the expected utilities of risk averse consumers, competitive firms adopt some degree of price stickiness in order to minimize the price uncertainty and fi attract more customers fi.'
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This paper presents new indices for measuring the industry concentration. The indices proposed (C n ) are of a normative type because they embody (endogenous) weights matching the market shares of the individual firms to their Marshallian welfare shares. These indices belong to an enlarged class of the Performance Gradient Indexes introduced by Dansby&Willig(I979). The definition of Cn for the consumers allows a new interpretation for the Hirschman-Herfindahl index (H), which can be viewed as a normative index according to particular values of the demand parameters. For homogeneous product industries, Cn equates H for every market distribution if (and only if) the market demand is linear. Whenever the inverse demand curve is convex (concave), H underestimates( overestimates) the industry concentration measured by the normative indexo For these industries, H overestimates (underestimates) the concentration changes caused by market transfers among small firms if the inverse demand curve is convex(concave) and underestimates( overestimates) it when such tranfers benefit a large firm, according to the convexity (or the concavity) of the demand curve. For heterogeneous product industries, an explicit normative index is obtained with a market demand derived from a quasi-linear utilility function. Under symmetric preferences among the goods, the index Cn is always greater than or equal the H-index. Under asymmetric assumptions, discrepancies between the firms' market distribution and the differentiationj substitution distributions among the goods, increase the concentration but make room for some horizontal mergers do reduce it. In particular, a mean preserving spread of the differentiation(substitution) increases(decreases) the concentration only if the smaller firms' goods become more(less) differentiated(substitute) w.r.t. the other goods. One important consequence of these results is that the consumers are benefitted when the smaller firms are producing weak substitute goods, and the larger firms produce strong substitute goods or face demand curves weakly sensitive to their own prices.
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Using data from the United States, Japan, Germany , United Kingdom and France, Sims (1992) found that positive innovations to shortterm interest rates led to sharp, persistent increases in the price leveI. The result was confirmed by other authors and, as a consequence of its non-expectable nature, was given the name "price puzzle" by Eichenbaum (1992). In this paper I investigate the existence of a price puzzle in Brazil using the same type of estimation and benchmark identification scheme employed by Christiano et aI. (2000). In a methodological improvement over these studies, I qualify the results with the construction of bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals. Even though the data does show the existence of a statistically significant price puzzle in Brazil, it lasts for .only one quarter and is quantitatively immaterial.
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The paper extends the cost of altruism model, analyzed in Lisboa (1999). There are three types of agents: households, providers of a service and insurance companies. Households have uncertainty about future leveIs of income. Providers, if hired by a household, have to choose a non-observable leveI of effort, perform a diagnoses and privately learn a signal. For each signal there is a procedure that maximizes the likelihood of the household obtaining the good state of nature. Finally, insurance companies offer contracts to both providers and households. The paper provides suflicient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and shows the optimal contract induces providers to care about their income and also about the likelihood households will obtain the good state of nature, which in Lisboa (1999) was stated as altruism assumption. Equilibrium is inefficient in comparison with the standard moral hazard outcome whenever high leveIs of effort is chosen precisely due to the need to incentive providers to choose the least expensive treatment for some signals. We show, however that an equilibrium is always constrained optimal.