Objects that move: Japanese Namban screens in the realm of the senses

This paper identifies and critiques the value of stillness as a necessary condition for the display and appreciation of art objects like the 16th century Japanese Namban screens, whose history and function is characterised by forms of movement. Drawing on multi-sited fieldwork in museum galleries that display these screens in Japan, Portugal and North America I will detail how the art-historical interpretation of the physical passage of these objects and their value as cultural heritage is based upon the fixed point perspectivism of networks and a visualist paradigm. Museum focused processes of conservation and display can be understood as extending this paradigm. By means of environmental controls, directed towards the location of perceptible meaning in what is available to vision and the necessary attenuation of the other senses the material movements of the object and movements of constituent materials in the object are stilled. The argument is for a sensory approach to museums and the objects within them, which in this case takes account of the material movements of the screens by engaging the senses through the ‘touch of sound’ as well as vision.

How premium brands should do to upgrade and move to a luxury status

Premium brands’ upgrade process to luxury is a phenomenon still not well analysed. A literature review allowed assessment of what distinguishes premium and luxury brands. We infered five propositions then tested through a case study research. The research investigated three Portuguese brands that successfully moved from premium to luxury - Claus Porto, Josefinas and Vila Joya. We conclude that acquiring social status is the most essential and difficult feature to deal with, when migrating from premium to luxury as it depends on voluntary and involuntary factors.

Social venture move

This study has the purpose of presenting the path of a social microcredit start-up in Mozambique. Its members had just gotten out of college and decided to put in practice what they had learnt. Even though the whole foundation of the project was developed in Mozambique, the team has extended its experience to other countries: São Tomé and Timor. However, the focus of this study will be solely in the Ilha de Mozambique’s project and the difficulties that it is facing right now, in order to try to find answers that would allow the project entrepreneurs to overcome what is keeping them from having a more successful return rate. The main issue of the project and the worse and unexpected default rate is within the fishing sector. This is peculiar, since the mission is in an island where there are plenty of fish and shellfish. By addressing this problem, and presenting the whole structure of the venture, it is its goal to understand better ways to deal with the difficulties. Its format will be as a case study and it will present as well the macroeconomics of Mozambique to justify the choice of the place, align with the team itself, and why it is possible to have a successful project with as many contacts and sponsors as this one does.

Prevention in underground construction with sequential excavation method

This paper aims to describe the Sequential Excavation Method, used for excava-tion in underground works, as well as the related risks and preventive measures. This method has characteristics that differentiate it from other tunnelling techniques: it uses a larger number of workers and equipment; it has a high concurrency of tasks with various workers and equip-ment quite exposed to hazards; and it uses many potentially aggressive chemicals. Firstly, it is given a broad overview of this issue. Afterwards, it will be presented the results of a survey to a sample of experienced technicians, aimed at gauging the relevance of a set of guidelines relat-ing to the design and work phases, applicable to the domestic market and prepared following technical visits to works abroad.

Coalition formation in a contest game with three heterogeneous players

We analyze the incentives for cooperation of three players differing in their efficiency of effort in a contest game. We concentrate on the non-cooperative bargaining foundation of coalition formation, and therefore, we adopt a two-stage model. In the first stage, individuals form coalitions following a bargaining protocol similar to the one proposed by Gul (1989). Afterwards, coalitions play the contest game of Esteban and Ray (1999) within the resulting coalition structure of the first stage. We find that the grand coalition forms whenever the distribution of the bargaining power in the coalition formation game is equal to the distribution of the relative efficiency of effort. Finally, we use the case of equal bargaining power for all individuals to show that other types of coalition structures may be observed as well.

Bidding at sequential first-price auctions with(out) supply uncertainty: a laboratory analysis

We report on a series of experiments that test the effects of an uncertain supply on the formation of bids and prices in sequential first-price auctions with private-independent values and unit-demands. Supply is assumed uncertain when buyers do not know the exact number of units to be sold (i.e., the length of the sequence). Although we observe a non-monotone behavior when supply is certain and an important overbidding, the data qualitatively support our price trend predictions and the risk neutral Nash equilibrium model of bidding for the last stage of a sequence, whether supply is certain or not. Our study shows that behavior in these markets changes significantly with the presence of an uncertain supply, and that it can be explained by assuming that bidders formulate pessimistic beliefs about the occurrence of another stage.

When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in rent seeking contests and policy conflicts

This paper analyzes secession and group formation in a general model of contest inspired by Esteban and Ray (1999). This model encompasses as special cases rent seeking contests and policy conflicts, where agents lobby over the choice of a policy in a one-dimensional policy space. We show that in both models the grand coalition is the efficient coalition structure and agents are always better off in the grand coalition than in a symmetric coalition structure. Individual agents (in the rent seeking contest) and extremists (in the policy conflict) only have an incentive to secede when they anticipate that their secession will not be followed by additional secessions. Incentives to secede are lower when agents cooperate inside groups. The grand coalition emerges as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a sequential game of coalition formation in rent seeking contests.

Sequential formation of coalitions through bilateral agreements

We study a sequential protocol of endogenous coalition formation based on a process of bilateral agreements among the players. We apply the game to a Cournot environment with linear demand and constant average costs. We show that the final outcome of any Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the game is the grand coalition, provided the initial number of firms is high enough and they are sufficiently patient.

Welfare comparisons: sequential procedures for heterogenous populations

Some analysts use sequential dominance criteria, and others use equivalence scales in combination with non-sequential dominance tests, to make welfare comparisons of oint distributions of income and needs. In this paper we present a new sequential procedure hich copes with situations in which sequential dominance fails. We also demonstrate that there commendations deriving from the sequential approach are valid for distributions of equivalent income whatever equivalence scale the analyst might adopt. Thus the paper marries together the sequential and equivalizing approaches, seen as alternatives in much previous literature. All results are specified in forms which allow for demographic differences in the populations being compared.

Does affirmative action reduce effort incentives? A contest game analysis

In this paper a contest game with heterogeneous players is analyzed in which heterogeneity could be the consequence of past discrimination. Based on the normative perception of the heterogeneity there are two policy options to tackle this heterogeneity: either it is ignored and the contestants are treated equally, or affirmative action is implemented which compensates discriminated players. The consequences of these two policy options are analyzed for a simple two-person contest game and it is shown that the frequently criticized trade-off between affirmative action and total effort does not exist: Instead, affirmative action fosters effort incentives. A generalization to the n-person case and to a case with a partially informed contest designer yields the same result if the participation level is similar under each policy.

Inter-group conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game

We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The relevant theoretical prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and independent of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that our results contradict the independence of group-size prediction: conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are substantially above equilibrium. Towards the end of the experiment material losses in groups are 257% of the predicted level. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity in the investment behaviour of individual group members. Second, allowing group members to punish each other after individual contributions to the contest effort are revealed leads to even larger conflict expenditures. Now material losses are 869% of the equilibrium level and there is much less heterogeneity in individual group members' investments. These results contrast strongly with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency and leads to higher material payoffs.

Foundations for contest success functions

In the literature the outcome of contests is either interpreted as win probabilities or as shares of the prize. With this in mind, we examine two approaches to contest success functions. In the first we analyze the implications of contestants' incomplete information concerning the "type" of the contest administrator. While in the case of two contestants this approach can rationalize prominent contest success functions, we show that it runs into difficulties when there are more agents. Our second approach interprets contest success functions as sharing rules and establishes a connection to bargaining and claims problems which is independent of the number of contestants. Both approaches provide foundations for popular contest success functions and guidelines for the definition of new ones. Keywords: Endogenous Contests, Contest Success Function. JEL Classification: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D74 (Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances).

Hydrogeophysical data integration at larger scales: Application of Bayesian sequential simulation for the characterization of heterogeneous alluvial aquifers

Knowledge of the spatial distribution of hydraulic conductivity (K) within an aquifer is critical for reliable predictions of solute transport and the development of effective groundwater management and/or remediation strategies. While core analyses and hydraulic logging can provide highly detailed information, such information is inherently localized around boreholes that tend to be sparsely distributed throughout the aquifer volume. Conversely, larger-scale hydraulic experiments like pumping and tracer tests provide relatively low-resolution estimates of K in the investigated subsurface region. As a result, traditional hydrogeological measurement techniques contain a gap in terms of spatial resolution and coverage, and they are often alone inadequate for characterizing heterogeneous aquifers. Geophysical methods have the potential to bridge this gap. The recent increased interest in the application of geophysical methods to hydrogeological problems is clearly evidenced by the formation and rapid growth of the domain of hydrogeophysics over the past decade (e.g., Rubin and Hubbard, 2005).

Do Productivity Improvements Move Us Along the Environmental Kuznets Curve?

The Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) hypothesis focuses on the argument that rising prosperity will eventually be accompanied by falling pollution levels as a result of one or more of three factors: (1) structural change in the economy; (2) demand for environmental quality increasing at a more-than-proportional rate; (3) technological progress. Here, we focus on the third of these. In particular, energy efficiency is commonly regarded as a key element of climate policy in terms of achieving reductions in economy-wide CO2 emissions over time. However, a growing literature suggests that improvements in energy efficiency will lead to rebound (or backfire) effects that partially (or wholly) offset energy savings from efficiency improvements. Where efficiency improvements are aimed at the production side of the economy, the net impact of increased efficiency in any input to production will depend on the combination and relative strength of substitution, output/competitiveness, composition and income effects that occur in response to changes in effective and actual factor prices, as well as on the structure of the economy in question, including which sectors are targeted with the efficiency improvement. In this paper we consider whether increasing labour productivity will have a more beneficial, or more predictable, impact on CO2/GDP ratios than improvements in energy efficiency. We do this by using CGE models of the Scottish regional and UK national economies to analyse the impacts of a simple 5% exogenous (and costless) increase in energy or labour augmenting technological progress.

Bargaining and Conflict with Incomplete Information

This paper studies bargaining and conflict under incomplete information, provides an overview and a critical account of the literature on the topic and contributes with original research. We first revise models of mechanism design and sequential bargaining that take confrontation as final. Conflict and inefficiencies are to be expected in these models whenever parties have optimistic prospects on the outcome of the all-out conflict. After examining the causes and reasons for this optimism, we move to the analysis of the recent literature that considers the existence of limited confrontations that allow bargaining to resume. In the presence of private information, these limited conflicts convey information and thus become a bargaining instrument. The paper closes with a discussion on the related empirical literature, the challenges that it faces and some potential avenues for further research.