Privatization and government preference in a public Stackelberg leader duopoly

We analyse the relationship between the privatization of a public firm and government preferences for tax revenue in a Stackelberg duopoly with the public firm as the leader. We assume that the government payoff is given by a weighted sum of tax revenue and the sum of consumer and producer surplus. We get that if the government puts a sufficiently larger weight on tax revenue than on the sum of both surpluses, it will not privatize the public firm. In contrast, if the government puts a moderately larger weight on tax revenue than on the sum of both surpluses, it will privatize the public firm.

Privatization and government preferences in a mixed duopoly: Stackelberg versus Cournot

We analyse the relationship between the privatization of a public firm and government preferences for tax revenue, by considering a (sequential) Stackelberg duopoly with the public firm as the leader. We assume that the government payoff is given by a weighted sum of tax revenue and the sum of consumer and producer surplus. We get that if the government puts a sufficiently larger weight on tax revenue than on the sum of both surpluses, it will not privatize the public firm. In contrast, if the government puts a moderately larger weight on tax revenue than on the sum of both surpluses, it will privatize the public firm. Furthermore, we compare our results with the ones previously published by an other author obtained in a (simultaneous) Cournot duopoly.

EcoTerra Model - application of environmental fiscal reform in local government financing in Portugal

Critical Issues in Environmental Taxation: International and Comparative Perspectives: Volume VI, 699-715

O imperativo das tecnologias do estado. Estratégias de e-government para empresas em Portugal

Dissertação apresentada para cumprimento dos requisitos necessários à obtenção do grau de Mestre em Ciência Política e Relações Internacionais, área de especialização em Ciência Política

Government preference, environmental taxes and privatization

We analyse the relationship between the privatization of a public firm and government preferences for environmental tax revenue. The model that we consider is more general than the one consider in Wang and Wang (2009), in the sense that we put a larger weight in the environment tax revenue than on the other terms of the government's objective function. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the government sets the environmental tax. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot competition, choosing output and pollution abatement levels.

Fiscal adjustments and sovereign default in different government systems

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Nominal and inflation-linked government bonds: An assessment of arbitrage opportunities in UK Gilt Market

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Government bond yield spreads in EMU countries: The story of an ephemeral convergence

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Determinants of the Portuguese government bond yield spread

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Fiscal adjustments and sovereign default in different government systems

This paper extends the model of Spolaore (2004) about adjustments in di erent government systems for the context of scal adjustments and sovereign default. We introduce asymmetry between groups in income and preferences towards scal reforms. Default a ects di erently each group and becomes a possibility if reforms are not enacted after public nance solvency shocks, in uencing the political game according to its likelihood. With the extensions, new situations which were not possible with the previous framework arise. After the exposition of the model, the Argentine default in 2001 provides an example of the political con icts addressed by the model.

Politically driven cycles in fiscal policy: in depth analysis of the functional components of government expenditures

NIPE - WP 02/2016

Enquadramento para a compreensão dos impactos do Open Government Data

Dissertação de mestrado integrado em Engenharia e Gestão de Sistemas de Informação

E-government e participação política em Portugal

Dissertação de Mestrado em MPA - Administração Pública

Report to the government of Baroda on the marine zoology of Okhamandal in Kattiawar, by James Hornell ... With supplementary reports on special groups by other zoologists ...

pt. 2

Report to the government of Baroda on the marine zoology of Okhamandal in Kattiawar, by James Hornell ... With supplementary reports on special groups by other zoologists ...

pt. 1