Contracts Accepted, Iowa Department of Transportation, April 11, 2011

Contracts Accepted for letting reports from the Iowa Department of Transportation.

Contracts Accepted, Iowa Department of Transportation, April 18, 2011

Contracts Accepted for letting reports from the Iowa Department of Transportation.

Report on a Review of Statewide Procurement for contracts established between July 1, 2007 and December 31, 2008

Report on a Review of Statewide Procurement for contracts established between July 1, 2007 and December 31, 2008

Iowa Department of Transportation Office of Contracts Letting Summary July 1, 2010 through June 30, 2011

Twelve regularly scheduled lettings and three emergency/special lettings were held by the Iowa Department of Transportation for construction and maintenance work during the period covered by this report. At these lettings, projects totally $741,289,234 were approved.

Contracts, Reference Points, and Competition - Behavioral Effects of the Fundamental Transformation

In this paper we study the role of incomplete ex ante contracts for ex post trade. Previous experimental evidence indicates that a contract provides a reference point for entitlements when the terms are negotiated in a competitive market. We show that this finding no longer holds when the terms are determined in a non-competitive way. Our results imply that the presence of a "fundamental transformation" (i.e., the transition from a competitive market to a bilateral relationship) is important for a contract to become a reference point. To the best of our knowledge this behavioral aspect of the fundamental transformation has not been shown before.

Less Risk, More Effort : Demand Risk Allocation in Incomplete Contracts

This article investigates the allocation of demand risk within an incomplete contract framework. We consider an incomplete contractual relationship between a public authority and a private provider (i.e. a public-private partnership), in which the latter invests in non-verifiable cost-reducing efforts and the former invests in non-verifiable adaptation efforts to respond to changing consumer demand over time. We show that the party that bears the demand risk has fewer hold-up opportunities and that this leads the other contracting party to make more effort. Thus, in our model, bearing less risk can lead to more effort, which we describe as a new example of âeuro~counter-incentivesâeuro?. We further show that when the benefits of adaptation are important, it is socially preferable to design a contract in which the demand risk remains with the private provider, whereas when the benefits of cost-reducing efforts are important, it is socially preferable to place the demand risk on the public authority. We then apply these results to explain two well-known case studies.

Consumer Advisory: Cell Phone Contracts, January 2014

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Cell Phone Contracts

Growth, selection and appropriate contracts

We study a dynamic model where growth requires both long-term investmentand the selection of talented managers. When ability is not ex-ante observable and contracts are incomplete, managerial selection imposes a cost, as managers facing the risk ofbeing replaced choose a sub-optimally low level of long-term investment. This generates atrade-off between selection and investment that has implications for the choice of contractualrelationships and institutions. Our analysis shows that rigid long-term contracts sacrificingmanagerial selection may prevail at early stages of economic development and when heterogeneity in ability is low. As the economy grows, however, knowledge accumulation increasesthe return to talent and makes it optimal to adopt flexible contractual relationships, wheremanagerial selection is implemented even at the cost of lower investment. Measures of investor protection aimed at limiting the bargaining power of managers improve selection undershort-term contract. Given that knowledge accumulation raises the value of selection, theoptimal level of investor protection increases with development.

Three essays in incomplete contracts

General Introduction These three chapters, while fairly independent from each other, study economic situations in incomplete contract settings. They are the product of both the academic freedom my advisors granted me, and in this sense reflect my personal interests, and of their interested feedback. The content of each chapter can be summarized as follows: Chapter 1: Inefficient durable-goods monopolies In this chapter we study the efficiency of an infinite-horizon durable-goods monopoly model with a fmite number of buyers. We find that, while all pure-strategy Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) are efficient, there also exist previously unstudied inefficient MPE where high valuation buyers randomize their purchase decision while trying to benefit from low prices which are offered once a critical mass has purchased. Real time delay, an unusual monopoly distortion, is the result of this attrition behavior. We conclude that neither technological constraints nor concern for reputation are necessary to explain inefficiency in monopolized durable-goods markets. Chapter 2: Downstream mergers and producer's capacity choice: why bake a larger pie when getting a smaller slice? In this chapter we study the effect of downstream horizontal mergers on the upstream producer's capacity choice. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find anon-monotonic relationship: horizontal mergers induce a higher upstream capacity if the cost of capacity is low, and a lower upstream capacity if this cost is high. We explain this result by decomposing the total effect into two competing effects: a change in hold-up and a change in bargaining erosion. Chapter 3: Contract bargaining with multiple agents In this chapter we study a bargaining game between a principal and N agents when the utility of each agent depends on all agents' trades with the principal. We show, using the Potential, that equilibria payoffs coincide with the Shapley value of the underlying coalitional game with an appropriately defined characteristic function, which under common assumptions coincides with the principal's equilibrium profit in the offer game. Since the problem accounts for differences in information and agents' conjectures, the outcome can be either efficient (e.g. public contracting) or inefficient (e.g. passive beliefs).

Balancing knowledge sharing and protection in collaborative innovation - The roles and dynamics of contracts, IPR's and trust

Pro-gradu tutkielman tavoitteena on tutkia, miten yritykset tasapainoilevat tiedon jakamisen ja suojaamisen välillä innovaatioyhteistyöprojekteissa, ja miten sopimukset, immateriaalioikeudet ja luottamus voivat vaikuttaa tähän tasapainoon. Yhteistyössä yritysten täytyy jakaa tarpeellista tietoa kumppanilleen, mutta toisaalta niiden täytyy varoa, etteivät ne menetä ydinosaamiseensa kuuluvaa tietoa ja kilpailuetuaan. Yrityksillä on useita keinoja tietovuodon estämiseen. Tutkielmassa keskitytään patenttien, sopimusten ja liikesalaisuuksien käyttöön tietoa suojaavina mekanismeina. Kyseiset suojamekanismit vaikuttavat luottamukseen kumppaneiden välillä, ja täten myös näiden halukkuuteen jakaa tietoa kumppaneilleen. Jos kumppanit eivät jaa tarpeeksi tietoa toisilleen, voi yhteistyö epäonnistua. Sopimusten, immateriaalioikeuksien ja luottamuksen rooleja ja vuorovaikutusta tutkitaan kahdenvälisissä yhteistyöprojekteissa. Tutkielmassa esitellään neljä case-esimerkkiä, jotka on koottu suomalaisen metsätoimialan yrityksen haastatteluista.

Profitability Analysis of Service Contracts of Devices

The objective of this study has been to make a profitability analysis of service contracts for a company in Finland. The purpose has been to see how profitable the contracts are and if there possibly were some things to change or develop in the contracts. Allocation rules of cost accounting, service costs both profitability and management of services have been considered in the theory part. All the service contracts that have been valid at least three last accounting periods have been included in the study. All direct costs relating to the contracts have been collected and indirect costs have been assigned to the contracts. Profitability of the contracts has been calculated over three years. Results have been analyzed according to the key figures the company is controlling. Some suggestions for developments have been given at the end of the study. The study has shown differences between the contracts. Part of them has turned out to be like the profitability aims of the company and part less profitable. The study has shown that many factors have an effect on the profitability of the service contracts.