Admissions of law or fact?

In Pollock v Thiess Pty Ltd, McMeekin J considered two applications for the withdrawal of deemed admissions. The judgment provides important guidance on pleadings and deemed admissions under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld).

The rule of law, the public interest and the management of natural resources in Australia

The statutory arrangements for the management of natural resources in Australia confer powers of decision-making upon government agencies and, at the same time, restrict how these powers are to be exercised by reference either to stated criteria or in some instances to the public interest. These restrictions perform different functions according to their structure, form and language: for example they may be in the form of jurisdictional, deliberative or purposive rules. This article reviews how the offshore resources legislation of the Commonwealth and some examples of the onshore resources legislation of Queensland address the functions performed by the public interest in determining whether there is compliance with the principle of the rule of law.

A values analysis of attitudes towards the use of law to prevent obesity: How might these values inform public health law theory and practice?

This thesis asks whether values, like government duty, individual responsibility, community and social justice, influence the way that scholars and research participants think about the use of law to prevent obesity. It explores the way participants speak about values when expressing their support for or against a variety of government regulatory interventions, including taxation, food labelling reforms and advertising restrictions. This research contributes to our understanding of theories of public health law and public health ethics. The qualitative findings also have implications for policy development, in advocating for a variety of government interventions to prevent obesity.

Pioneering use of narrative method in a first-year law course to provide an authentic, inquiry-based entry into the discipline of law

Law is saturated with stories. People tell their stories to lawyers; lawyers tell their client's stories to courts; and legislators develop regulation to respond to their constituent's stories of injustice or inequality. My approach to first-year legal education respects this narrative tradition. Both my curriculum design and assessment scheme in the compulsory first-year subject Australian Legal System deploy narrative methodology as the central teaching and learning device. Throughout the course, students work on resolving the problems of four hypothetical clients. Like a murder mystery, pieces of the puzzle come together as students learn more about legal institutions and the texts they produce, the process of legal research, the analysis and interpretation of primary legal sources, the steps in legal problem-solving, the genre conventions of legal writing style, the practical skills and ethical dimensions of professional practice, and critical inquiry into the normative underpinnings and impacts of the law. The assessment scheme mirrors this design. In their portfolio-based assignment, for example, students devise their own client profile, research the client's legal position and prepare a memorandum of advice.

Karl Popper's Philosophy of Science - And the Evolution of the Popperian Worlds

This doctoral thesis in theoretical philosophy is a systematic analysis of Karl Popper's philosophy of science and its relation to his theory of three worlds. The general aim is to study Popper's philosophy of science and to show that Popper's theory of three worlds was a restatement of his earlier positions. As a result, a new reading of Popper's philosophy and development is offered and the theory of three worlds is analysed in a new manner. It is suggested that the theory of three worlds is not purely an ontological theory, but has a profound epistemological motivation. In Part One, Popper's epistemology and philosophy of science is analysed. It is claimed that Popper's thinking was bifurcated: he held two profound positions without noticing the tension between them. Popper adopted the position called the theorist around 1930 and focused on the logical structure of scientific theories. In Logik der Forschung (1935), he attempted to build a logic of science on the grounds that scientific theories may be regarded as universal statements which are not verifiable but can be falsified. Later, Popper emphasized another position, called here the processionalist. Popper focused on the study of science as a process and held that a) philosophy of science should study the growth of knowledge and that b) all cognitive processes are constitutive. Moreover, the constitutive idea that we see the world in the searchlight of our theories was combined with the biological insight that knowledge grows by trial and error. In Part Two, the theory of three worlds is analysed systematically. The theory is discussed as a cluster of theories which originate from Popper's attempt to solve some internal problems in his thinking. Popper adhered to realism and wished to reconcile the theorist and the processionalist. He also stressed the real and active nature of the human mind, and the possibility of objective knowledge. Finally, he wished to create a scientific world view.

Self-love and self-liking in the moral and political philosophy of Bernard Mandeville and David Hume

This work offers a novel interpretation of David Hume’s (1711–1776) conception of the conjectural development of civil society and artificial moral institutions. It focuses on the social elements of Hume’s Treatise of human nature (1739–40) and the necessary connection between science of man and politeness, civilised monarchies, social distance and hierarchical structure of civil society. The study incorporates aspects of intellectual history, history of philosophy and book history. In order to understand David Hume’s thinking, the intellectual development of Bernard Mandeville (1670–1733) needs to be accounted for. When put into a historical perspective, the moral, political and social components of Treatise of human nature can be read in the context of a philosophical tradition, in which Mandeville plays a pivotal role. A distinctive character of Mandeville and Hume’s account of human nature and moral institutions was the introduction of a simple distinction between self-love and self-liking. The symmetric passions of self-interest and pride can only be controlled by the corresponding moral institutions. This is also the way in which we can say that moral institutions are drawn from human nature. In the case of self-love or self-interest, the corresponding moral institution is justice. Respectively, concerning self-liking or pride the moral institution is politeness. There is an explicit analogy between these moral institutions. If we do not understand this analogy, we do not understand the nature of either justice or politeness. The present work is divided into two parts. In the first part, ‘Intellectual development of Bernard Mandeville’, it is argued that the relevance of the paradigmatic change in Mandeville’s thinking has been missed. It draws a picture of Mandeville turning from the Hobbism of The Fable of the Bees to an original theory of civil society put forward in his later works. In order to make this change more apparent, Mandeville’s career and the publishing history of The Fable of the Bees are examined comprehensively. This interpretation, based partly on previously unknown sources, challenges F. B. Kaye’s influential decision to publish the two parts of The Fable of the Bees as a uniform work of two volumes. The main relevance, however, of the ‘Intellectual development of Mandeville’ is to function as the context for the young Hume. The second part of the work, ‘David Hume and Greatness of mind’, explores in philosophical detail the social theory of the Treatise and politics and the science of man in his Essays. This part will also reveal the relevance of Greatness of mind as a general concept for David Hume’s moral and political philosophy.

Non-reductive Physicalism, Irreducibility of the Mental and the Problem of Mental Causation : A study of Donald Davidson's and Georg Henrik von Wright's positions in the philosophy of mind

In this study I consider what kind of perspective on the mind body problem is taken and can be taken by a philosophical position called non-reductive physicalism. Many positions fall under this label. The form of non-reductive physicalism which I discuss is in essential respects the position taken by Donald Davidson (1917-2003) and Georg Henrik von Wright (1916-2003). I defend their positions and discuss the unrecognized similarities between their views. Non-reductive physicalism combines two theses: (a) Everything that exists is physical; (b) Mental phenomena cannot be reduced to the states of the brain. This means that according to non-reductive physicalism the mental aspect of humans (be it a soul, mind, or spirit) is an irreducible part of the human condition. Also Davidson and von Wright claim that, in some important sense, the mental aspect of a human being does not reduce to the physical aspect, that there is a gap between these aspects that cannot be closed. I claim that their arguments for this conclusion are convincing. I also argue that whereas von Wright and Davidson give interesting arguments for the irreducibility of the mental, their physicalism is unwarranted. These philosophers do not give good reasons for believing that reality is thoroughly physical. Notwithstanding the materialistic consensus in the contemporary philosophy of mind the ontology of mind is still an uncharted territory where real breakthroughs are not to be expected until a radically new ontological position is developed. The third main claim of this work is that the problem of mental causation cannot be solved from the Davidsonian - von Wrightian perspective. The problem of mental causation is the problem of how mental phenomena like beliefs can cause physical movements of the body. As I see it, the essential point of non-reductive physicalism - the irreducibility of the mental - and the problem of mental causation are closely related. If mental phenomena do not reduce to causally effective states of the brain, then what justifies the belief that mental phenomena have causal powers? If mental causes do not reduce to physical causes, then how to tell when - or whether - the mental causes in terms of which human actions are explained are actually effective? I argue that this - how to decide when mental causes really are effective - is the real problem of mental causation. The motivation to explore and defend a non-reductive position stems from the belief that reductive physicalism leads to serious ethical problems. My claim is that Davidson's and von Wright's ultimate reason to defend a non-reductive view comes back to their belief that a reductive understanding of human nature would be a narrow and possibly harmful perspective. The final conclusion of my thesis is that von Wright's and Davidson's positions provide a starting point from which the current scientistic philosophy of mind can be critically further explored in the future.

Luce Irigaray's Philosophy of Feminine Being : Body, Desire and Wisdom

Luce Irigaray is a Belgian-born philosopher, psychoanalyst and linguist. Irigaray s concept of woman is crucial for understanding her own work but also for examining and developing the theoretical and methodological basis of feminist theory. This thesis argues that, ultimately, Irigaray s exploration of woman s being challenges our traditional notion of philosophy as a neutral discourse and the traditional notion of ourselves as philosophizing persons or human beings. However, despite its crucial role, Irigaray s idea of woman still lacks a comprehensive explication. This is because the discourse of sexual difference is blurred by the ideas of essentialism and biologism. --- Irigaray s concept of woman has been interpreted and criticized from the perspectives of metaphysical essentialism, strategic essentialism, realist essentialism and deconstructionism. This thesis argues that a reinterpretation is necessary to account for Irigaray s claims about the the traditional woman , mimesis, the specificity of the feminine body, feminine expression and sexual difference. Moreover, any reading should account for the differences between women and avoid giving a prescriptive function to the essence of woman. --- My thesis develops a new interpretation of Irigaray s concept of woman on the basis of the phenomenology of the body. It argues that Irigaray s discourse on woman can and must be understood by an idea of existential style. Existential style is embodied, affective and spiritual and it is constituted in relation to oneself, to others and to the world. It is temporal, it evolves and changes but preserves its open unity in its transformations. Stylistic unities, such as femininity or philosophy, are constituted in and by the singulars. -- This study discusses and analyses feminine existential style as a central theme and topic of Irigaray s works and shows how her work operates as a primary and paradigmatic example of the feminine style. These tasks are performed by studying the mimetic positions available for women and by explicating the phenomenological background of Irigaray s conceptions of the philosophical method, and the lived, expressive and affective body. The critical occupation and transformation of these mimetic positions, the inquiry into the first-person pre-discursive experience, and the cultivation of feminine expressivity open up the possibility of becoming a woman writer, a woman lover and a woman philosopher. The appearance of these new feminine figures is a precondition for the realization of sexual difference. So Irigaray opens up the possibility of sexual difference by instituting and constituting a feminine subject of love and wisdom, and by problematizing the idea of a neutral and absolute subject.

Audience members (including Max Rieser?); Second International Congress of the International Union for the Philosophy of Science; Zurich Portraits Groups Men

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Building an understanding of law: Engaging property economics students by using technology

It is assumed university students engage with technology as easily for their university studies as they do socially. However, prior research reflects the difficulties that non-law students face in engaging with legal materials. The purpose of this research was to determine how technology use impacts upon non-law students’ engagement with legal materials. The project explored inter alia the extent to which first year non-law students engaged with technology for their studies and in particular with legal materials and databases. The project was undertaken during semester 2, 2014 in a legal service unit delivered to a mixed cohort, which included construction management, property economics, planning and quantity surveying students. Actual technology use and familiarity was tested by means of an in class survey delivered in the Week 2 lecture. Use and familiarity was then retested at the end of semester in the Week 13 lecture, with adjustments made in lecture delivery and materials in-between.

The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-border Insolvency and its Potential Role in Upholding the Rule of Law

The rule of law is understood to be a core aspect in achieving a stable economy and an ordered society. Without the elements that are inherent in this principle the possibilities of anarchy, unfairness and uncertainty are amplified, which in turn can result in an economy with dramatic fluctuations. In this regard, commentators do not always agree that the rule of law is strictly adhered to in the international legal context. Therefore, this paper will explore one aspect of international regulation and consider whether the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-border Insolvency (1997) (‘Model Law’) and its associated Guide to Enactment and Interpretation (2013) contribute to the promotion of the key elements of the rule of law.