Oligarchs, political regime changes, and firm valuation

This paper examines the impact of a regime shift on the valuation of politically powerful oligarch firms. Focusing on the Yeltsin-Putin regime shift in Russia, we find that the valuations of outside shareholders claims are significantly higher under the Putin regime than under the Yeltsin regime after controlling for industry and time effects. The findings suggest that the increasing cost of extracting private benefits outweigh the reduction in the value of political connections following the political regime change. The results are also consistent with changes in the risk of state expropriation. Our results show that effects driven by the political regime change complement the traditional view stating that increased ownership concentration improved the performance of Russian oligarch firms.

A Comparison of Managers’ Perception of Short-Termism in Finland, Sweden and the U.S

Increased media exposure to layoffs and corporate quarterly financial reporting have created arguable a common perception – especially favored by the media itself – that the companies have been forced to improve their financial performance from quarter to quarter. Academically the relevant question is whether companies themselves feel that they are exposed to short-term pressure to perform even if it means that they have to compromise company’s long-term future. This paper studies this issue using results from a survey conducted among the 500 largest companies in Finland. The results show that companies in general feel moderate short-term pressure, with reasonable dispersion across firms. There seems to be a link between the degree of pressure felt, and the firm’s ownership structure, i.e. we find support for the existence of short-term versus long-term owners. We also find significant ownership related differences, in line with expectations, in how such short-term pressure is reflected in actual decision variables such as the investment criteria used.

Essays on the Costs and Benefits of Large Shareholders in Corporate Governance (summary section only)

“Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to firms assure themselves of getting a return on their investment” (Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 737). According to La Porta et al. (1999), research in corporate finance relevant for most countries should focus on the incentives and capabilities of controlling shareholders to treat themselves preferentially at the expense of minority shareholders. Accordingly, this thesis sets out to answer a number of research questions regarding the role of large shareholders in public firms that have received little attention in the literature so far. A common theme in the essays stems from the costs and benefits of individual large-block owners and the role of control contestability from the perspective of outside minority shareholders. The first essay empirically examines whether there are systematic performance differences between family controlled and nonfamily controlled firms in Western Europe. In contrast to the widely held view that family control penalizes firm value, the essay shows that publicly traded family firms have higher performance than comparable firms. In the second essay, we present both theoretical and empirical analysis on the effects of control contestability on firm valuation. Consistent with the theoretical model, the empirical results show that minority shareholders benefit from a more contestable control structure. The third essay explores the effects of individual large-block owners on top management turnover and board appointments in Finnish listed firms. The results indicate that firm performance is an important determinant for management and board restructurings. For certain types of turnover decisions the corporate governance structure influences the performance / turnover sensitivity. In the fourth essay, we investigate the relation between the governance structure and dividend policy in Finnish listed firms. We find evidence in support of the outcome agency model of dividends stating that lower agency conflicts should be associated with higher dividend payouts.

Corporate Governance in China (summary section only)

The negative relationship between economic growth and stock market return is not an anomaly according to evidence documented in many economies. It is argued that future economic growth is largely irrelevant for predicting future equity returns, since long-run equity returns depend mainly on dividend yields and the growth of per share dividends. The economic growth does result in a higher standard of living for consumers, but does not necessarily translate into higher returns for owners of the capital. The divergence in performance between the real sector and stock markets appears to support the above argument. However, this thesis strives to offer an alternative explanation to the apparent divergence within the framework of corporate governance. It argues that weak corporate governance standards in Chinese listed firms exacerbated by poor inventor protection results into a marginalized capital market. Each of the three essays in the thesis addresses one particular aspect of corporate governance on the Chinese stock market in a sequential way through gathering empirical evidence on three distinctive stock market activities. The first essay questions whether significant agency conflicts do exist by building a game on rights issues. It documents significant divergence in interests among shareholders holding different classes of shares. The second essay investigates the level of agency costs by examining value of control through constructing a sample of block transactions. It finds that block transactions that transfer ultimate control entail higher premiums. The third essay looks into possible avenues through which corporate governance standards could be improved by investigating the economic consequences of cross-listing on the Chinese stock market. It finds that, by adopting a higher disclosure standard through cross-listings, firms voluntarily commit themselves to reducing information asymmetry, and consequently command higher valuation than their counterparts.

Essays on Corporate Governance and the Quality of Disclosed Earnings: Across Transitional Europe

A growing body of empirical research examines the structure and effectiveness of corporate governance systems around the world. An important insight from this literature is that corporate governance mechanisms address the excessive use of managerial discretionary powers to get private benefits by expropriating the value of shareholders. One possible way of expropriation is to reduce the quality of disclosed earnings by manipulating the financial statements. This lower quality of earnings should then be reflected by the stock price of firm according to value relevance theorem. Hence, instead of testing the direct effect of corporate governance on the firm’s market value, it is important to understand the causes of the lower quality of accounting earnings. This thesis contributes to the literature by increasing knowledge about the extent of the earnings management – measured as the extent of discretionary accruals in total disclosed earnings - and its determinants across the Transitional European countries. The thesis comprises of three essays of empirical analysis of which first two utilize the data of Russian listed firms whereas the third essay uses data from 10 European economies. More specifically, the first essay adds to existing research connecting earnings management to corporate governance. It testifies the impact of the Russian corporate governance reforms of 2002 on the quality of disclosed earnings in all publicly listed firms. This essay provides empirical evidence of the fact that the desired impact of reforms is not fully substantiated in Russia without proper enforcement. Instead, firm-level factors such as long-term capital investments and compliance with International financial reporting standards (IFRS) determine the quality of the earnings. The result presented in the essay support the notion proposed by Leuz et al. (2003) that the reforms aimed to bring transparency do not correspond to desired results in economies where investor protection is lower and legal enforcement is weak. The second essay focuses on the relationship between the internal-control mechanism such as the types and levels of ownership and the quality of disclosed earnings in Russia. The empirical analysis shows that the controlling shareholders in Russia use their powers to manipulate the reported performance in order to get private benefits of control. Comparatively, firms owned by the State have significantly better quality of disclosed earnings than other controllers such as oligarchs and foreign corporations. Interestingly, market performance of firms controlled by either State or oligarchs is better than widely held firms. The third essay provides useful evidence on the fact that both ownership structures and economic characteristics are important factors in determining the quality of disclosed earnings in three groups of countries in Europe. Evidence suggests that ownership structure is a more important determinant in developed and transparent countries, while economic determinants are important determinants in developing and transitional countries.

Owners' Way or the Highway: Short-term Expectations and Owner Impatience

Increased media exposure to layoffs and corporate quarterly financial reporting have created arguable a common perception – especially favored by the media itself – that the companies have been forced to improve their financial performance from quarter to quarter. Academically the relevant question is whether the companies themselves feel that they are exposed to short-term pressure to perform even if it means that they have to compromise company’s long-term future. This paper studies this issue using results from a survey conducted among the 500 largest companies in Finland. The results show that companies in general feel moderate short-term pressure, with reasonable dispersion across firms. There seems to be a link between the degree of pressure felt, and the firm’s ownership structure, i.e. we find support for the existence of short-term versus long-term owners. We also find significant ownership related differences, in line with expectations, in how such short-term pressure is reflected in actual decision variables such as the investment criteria used.

Stock Option Compensation in Finland: An Analysis of Economic Determinants, Contracting Frequency, and Design

This paper addresses several questions in the compensation literature by examining stock option compensation practices of Finnish firms. First, the results indicate that principal-agent theory succeeds quite well in predicting the use of stock options. Proxies for monitoring costs, growth opportunities, ownership structure, and risk are found to determine the use of incentives consistent with theory. Furthermore, the paper examines whether determinants of stock options targeted to top management differ from determinants of broad-based stock option plans. Some evidence is found that factors driving these two types of incentives differ. Second, the results reveal that systematic risk significantly increases the likelihood that firms adopt stock option plans, whereas total firm risk and unsystematic risk do not seem to affect this decision. Third, the results show that growth opportunities are related to time-dimensional contracting frequency, consistent with the argument that incentive levels deviate more rapidly from optimum in firms with high growth opportunities. Finally, the results suggest that vesting schedules are decreasing in financial leverage, and that contract maturity is decreasing in firm focus. In addition, both vesting schedules and contract maturity tend to be longer in firms involving state ownership.

Factors Affecting Knowledge Sharing in Strategic Alliances: The Role of Knowledge Sharing as Strategic Control Behavior among Multinational Enterprises

International strategic alliances (ISAs) have become increasingly important for the stability, growth, and long-term viability of modern business organizations. Alliance partnerships as inter-firm cooperative ventures represent an influential mechanism for asserting corporate strategic control among autonomous multinational enterprises. These different cooperative arrangements are made of equity investments or contractually-based partnerships. Different alliance forms represent different approaches that partner firms adopt to control their mutual dependence on the alliance and on other partners. Earlier research shows that the partner characteristics could provide an explanation for alliance strategic behavior and see alliances as alternative forms to markets or hierarchies for addressing specific strategic needs linked to partners’ characteristics and their subsequent strategic motives. These characteristics of the partners’ and subsequent strategic motives are analyzed as knowledge sharing factors and how these influence inter-firm control in alliances within the context of the focal-firm STMicroelectronics and its alliance partners Nokia, Ericsson and IBM. This study underline that as contracts are incomplete, they are therefore required to maintain mutual dependence based control mechanisms in addition to a contract. For example, mutual dependence based control mechanisms could be joint financial investments and the building of an ownership structure between the parties (e.g., JVs). However, the present study clarifies that subsequent inter-firm control is also exercised through inter-firm knowledge sharing. The present study contributes by presenting a dynamic interplay between competitive and cooperative rent seeking behavior. Such coopetition behavior describes the firm's strategic orientation to achieve a dynamic balance between competitive and cooperative strategies. This balance is seen in knowledge sharing based cooperation and competition behavior. Thus this study clarifies coopetition strategies by introducing the role of inter-firm cooperation and the competitive nature of knowledge sharing. Simultaneous cooperative and competitive behavior is also seen as synergetic rent-seeking behavior. Therefore, this study extends the perspective of previous studies on competitive and cooperative seeking behavior.

The Annual Economic Survey of Federal Gulf Shrimp Permit Holders: Report on the Design, Implementation, and Descriptive Results for 2006

This technical memorandum documents the design, implementation, data preparation, and descriptive results for the 2006 Annual Economic Survey of Federal Gulf Shrimp Permit Holders. The data collection was designed by the NOAA Fisheries Southeast Fisheries Science Center Social Science Research Group to track the financial and economic status and performance by vessels holding a federal moratorium permit for harvesting shrimp in the Gulf of Mexico. A two page, self-administered mail survey collected total annual costs broken out into seven categories and auxiliary economic data. In May 2007, 580 vessels were randomly selected, stratified by state, from a preliminary population of 1,709 vessels with federal permits to shrimp in offshore waters of the Gulf of Mexico. The survey was implemented during the rest of 2007. After many reminder and verification phone calls, 509 surveys were deemed complete, for an ineligibility-adjusted response rate of 90.7%. The linking of each individual vessel’s cost data to its revenue data from a different data collection was imperfect, and hence the final number of observations used in the analyses is 484. Based on various measures and tests of validity throughout the technical memorandum, the quality of the data is high. The results are presented in a standardized table format, linking vessel characteristics and operations to simple balance sheet, cash flow, and income statements. In the text, results are discussed for the total fleet, the Gulf shrimp fleet, the active Gulf shrimp fleet, and the inactive Gulf shrimp fleet. Additional results for shrimp vessels grouped by state, by vessel characteristics, by landings volume, and by ownership structure are available in the appendices. The general conclusion of this report is that the financial and economic situation is bleak for the average vessels in most of the categories that were evaluated. With few exceptions, cash flow for the average vessel is positive while the net revenue from operations and the “profit” are negative. With negative net revenue from operations, the economic return for average shrimp vessels is less than zero. Only with the help of government payments does the average owner just about break even. In the short-term, this will discourage any new investments in the industry. The financial situation in 2006, especially if it endures over multiple years, also is economically unsustainable for the average established business. Vessels in the active and inactive Gulf shrimp fleet are, on average, 69 feet long, weigh 105 gross tons, are powered by 505 hp motor(s), and are 23 years old. Three-quarters of the vessels have steel hulls and 59% use a freezer for refrigeration. The average market value of these vessels was $175,149 in 2006, about a hundred-thousand dollars less than the average original purchase price. The outstanding loans averaged $91,955, leading to an average owner equity of $83,194. Based on the sample, 85% of the federally permitted Gulf shrimp fleet was actively shrimping in 2006. Of these 386 active Gulf shrimp vessels, just under half (46%) were owner-operated. On average, these vessels burned 52,931 gallons of fuel, landed 101,268 pounds of shrimp, and received $2.47 per pound of shrimp. Non-shrimp landings added less than 1% to cash flow, indicating that the federal Gulf shrimp fishery is very specialized. The average total cash outflow was $243,415 of which $108,775 was due to fuel expenses alone. The expenses for hired crew and captains were on average $54,866 which indicates the importance of the industry as a source of wage income. The resulting average net cash flow is $16,225 but has a large standard deviation. For the population of active Gulf shrimp vessels we can state with 95% certainty that the average net cash flow was between $9,500 and $23,000 in 2006. The median net cash flow was $11,843. Based on the income statement for active Gulf shrimp vessels, the average fixed costs accounted for just under a quarter of operating expenses (23.1%), labor costs for just over a quarter (25.3%), and the non-labor variable costs for just over half (51.6%). The fuel costs alone accounted for 42.9% of total operating expenses in 2006. It should be noted that the labor cost category in the income statement includes both the actual cash payments to hired labor and an estimate of the opportunity cost of owner-operators’ time spent as captain. The average labor contribution (as captain) of an owner-operator is estimated at about $19,800. The average net revenue from operations is negative $7,429, and is statistically different and less than zero in spite of a large standard deviation. The economic return to Gulf shrimping is negative 4%. Including non-operating activities, foremost an average government payment of $13,662, leads to an average loss before taxes of $907 for the vessel owners. The confidence interval of this value straddles zero, so we cannot reject, with 95% certainty, that the population average is zero. The average inactive Gulf shrimp vessel is generally of a smaller scale than the average active vessel. Inactive vessels are physically smaller, are valued much lower, and are less dependent on loans. Fixed costs account for nearly three quarters of the total operating expenses of $11,926, and only 6% of these vessels have hull insurance. With an average net cash flow of negative $7,537, the inactive Gulf shrimp fleet has a major liquidity problem. On average, net revenue from operations is negative $11,396, which amounts to a negative 15% economic return, and owners lose $9,381 on their vessels before taxes. To sustain such losses and especially to survive the negative cash flow, many of the owners must be subsidizing their shrimp vessels with the help of other income or wealth sources or are drawing down their equity. Active Gulf shrimp vessels in all states but Texas exhibited negative returns. The Alabama and Mississippi fleets have the highest assets (vessel values), on average, yet they generate zero cash flow and negative $32,224 net revenue from operations. Due to their high (loan) leverage ratio the negative 11% economic return is amplified into a negative 21% return on equity. In contrast, for Texas vessels, which actually have the highest leverage ratio among the states, a 1% economic return is amplified into a 13% return on equity. From a financial perspective, the average Florida and Louisiana vessels conform roughly to the overall average of the active Gulf shrimp fleet. It should be noted that these results are averages and hence hide the variation that clearly exists within all fleets and all categories. Although the financial situation for the average vessel is bleak, some vessels are profitable. (PDF contains 101 pages)

Application of participatory rural appraisal (PRA) techniques in the verification of fisheries data and trend on Lake Kainji

After several years of surveys on the Kainji Lake fisheries activities by the Nigerian German Kainji Lake Fish promotion Project (KLFPP) trends regarding catches, yield and other parameter begin to emerge. However, it became obvious that some of the data were not quite as accurate as they were believed to be. Looking at the different editions of the statistical bulletin of Kainji Lake, concerning one given fisheries parameter, sometimes it is possible to reveal inconsistencies and unexplained trends. As compared to the survey method, PRA is primarily for analysis of differences in local phenomenon and processes. Therefore, PRA was used as a complementary tool to enhance the knowledge on issues like fisher women, entrepreneurs, gear ownership structure, mode of operation by owners of large gear number, preference in the use of twine and nylon gill nets, and reasons for misinformation on the number of fishing equipment owned by entrepreneurs, which cannot be done with frame survey. PRA techniques like timeline, mapping, seasonal calendar, transect walk and key informant interviews were utilized in the study process

Um estudo sobre a relação entre ações preferenciais e valor de mercado das empresas brasileiras de capital aberto

O mercado de capitais brasileiro se caracteriza pela alta concentração de poder nas mãos de poucos acionistas controladores. No Brasil, a existência de ações preferenciais sem direito a voto enseja o surgimento de conflito de agência entre acionistas controladores e acionistas minoritários, agravado pelo fato de que o controle pode ser exercido com uma participação relativamente pequena sobre o total de ações emitidas pelas companhias. A concentração de propriedade permitiria a possibilidade de expropriação dos direitos dos minoritários. Diversos estudos empíricos vêm sendo realizados ao longo dos últimos anos com o objetivo de avaliar a influência da estrutura de propriedade das ações sobre o valor de mercado das companhias. Nesse contexto, o presente trabalho pretende trazer novas contribuições, com ênfase na participação de ações preferenciais na estrutura de propriedade. Neste trabalho, usando uma amostra de empresas de capital aberto negociadas na BM&FBOVESPA, a partir de teste de diferença de médias, rejeita-se a hipótese de igualdade de valor entre empresas que só possuem ações ON em sua estrutura de propriedade, em relação às que possuem ambos os tipos, ON e PN. Em continuidade, usando modelos de regressão linear, encontra-se relação negativa estatisticamente significativa entre valor de mercado das empresas e variável utilizada para caracterizar a estrutura de propriedade, especificamente, a diferença entre o percentual de participação dos acionistas não controladores no total de ações PN e o percentual de participação dos acionistas controladores no total de ações PN.

Estrategias de diversificación en los grupos familiares y no familiares: principales diferencias según el tipo de grupo no familiar

[ES] Durante la última década surge un interés por el estudio de la estructura de propiedad como elemento determinante de la diversificación. Sin embargo, existe una carencia de investigaciones que analicen la influencia de la naturaleza del último propietario en el nivel y tipo de diversificación. Por ello, el objeto del presente trabajo es analizar las estrategias de diversificación empleadas por los grandes grupos empresariales españoles cuya empresa matriz cotiza en los mercados de valores, estudiando las diferencias existentes entre grupos familiares y no familiares, y considerando en estos últimos la naturaleza del último propietario. Se parte de una muestra de noventa y nueve grupos empresariales, donde se identifican las compañías que constituyen el grupo empresarial, siendo empleadas como metodologías econométricas los modelos logísticos binomiales y los modelos datos panel. Los resultados muestran como la naturaleza familiar del grupo influye positivamente en la especialización y en el empleo de estrategias de diversificación relacionada, y negativamente en el empleo de estrategias de diversificación no relacionada. Los grupos familiares difieren en mayor medida de aquellos grupos no familiares donde no existe un accionista de referencia que pueda ejercer el control efectivo del grupo y la dispersión de la propiedad es mayor, los denominados grupos sin control efectivo . La investigación permite profundizar en el análisis de las diferencias existentes entre grupos familiares y no familiares, y más concretamente en el ámbito de las estrategias de crecimiento, considerando la naturaleza del último propietario de los grupos no familiares.

Avaliação e depreciação do Ativo Imobilizado no Governo do Estado do Rio de Janeiro: desafios na implantação dos procedimentos contábeis.

No Brasil, o início do processo de convergência às normas internacionais de contabilidade no setor público ocorre desde 2007 na União, nos Estados e nos Municípios, o que acaba gerando muitas mudanças e também muitos desafios na adoção dos novos procedimentos. Um dos novos procedimentos envolve a avaliação e depreciação do Ativo Imobilizado. Nota técnica divulgada recentemente pela STN descreve que os Entes estão encontrando dificuldades em adotar as novas regras. Nesse contexto, este estudo se propõe a responder a seguinte questão de pesquisa: como superar os desafios na implantação dos procedimentos contábeis sobre avaliação e depreciação do Ativo Imobilizado no Governo do Estado do Rio de Janeiro? Tem como objetivo geral identificar os desafios na implantação dos procedimentos contábeis sobre avaliação e depreciação do Ativo Imobilizado no Governo do Estado do Rio de Janeiro e como objetivo específico investigar e analisar a estrutura contábil e patrimonial, assim como propor soluções básicas e essenciais para a aplicação dos procedimentos contábeis. Quanto aos fins, foi realizada pesquisa descritiva e quanto aos meios, foi realizada pesquisa bibliográfica, documental e o estudo de caso, com a realização de entrevistas com os responsáveis de patrimônio e almoxarifado de 23 órgãos da Administração Direta do Estado do Rio de Janeiro. A análise dos dados coletados revela que não há integração entre o setor contábil, o setor de patrimônio e o setor de almoxarifado nestes órgãos. Os setores possuem baixo quantitativo de funcionários e estes são pouco valorizados, não existindo padronização dos procedimentos sobre gestão patrimonial. O desafio de adotar esses procedimentos ultrapassa a competência do setor de contabilidade e exige a integração dos setores de patrimônio, almoxarifado e contábil. Assim, o estudo propõe a aquisição ou desenvolvimento de um sistema integrado de controle de bens, em que a contabilidade, o patrimônio e o almoxarifado acessem os mesmos dados e possuam uma ferramenta de comunicação confiável, que possibilite a elaboração de relatórios que gerem informações úteis ao gestor e aos demais interessados. Propõe também a regulamentação dos novos procedimentos, o fortalecimento da carreira dos funcionários que atuam no patrimônio e no almoxarifado e orienta sobre a adoção de procedimentos iniciais, para o período de transição.

Physicians in leadership: the association between medical director involvement and staff-to-patient ratios

In a hospital environment that demands a careful balance between commercial and clinical interests, the extent to which physicians are involved in hospital leadership varies greatly. This paper assesses the influence of the extent of this involvement on staff-to-patient ratios. Using data gathered from 604 hospitals across Germany, this study evidences the positive relationship between a full-time medical director (MD) or heavily involved part-time MD and a higher staff-to-patient ratio. The data allows us to control for a range of confounding variables, such as size, rural/urban location, ownership structure, and case-mix. The results contribute to the sparse body of empirical research on the effect of clinical leadership on organizational outcomes.

Corporate Bond Market in the Transition Economy of Vietnam, 1990-2010

Corporate bond appeared early in 1992-1994 in Vietnamese capital markets. However, it is still not popular to both business sector and academic circle. This paper explores different dimensions of Vietnamese corporate bond market using a unique, and perhaps, most complete dataset. State not only intervenes in the bond markets with its powerful budget and policies but also competes directly with enterprises. The dominance of SOEs and large corporations also prevents SMEs from this debt financing vehicle. Whenever a convertible term is available, bondholders are more willing to accept lower fixed income payoff. But they would not likely stick to it. On one hand, prospective bondholders could value the holdings of equity when realized favorably ex ante. On the other hand, the applicable coupon rate for such bond could turn out negative inflationadjusted payoff when tight monetary policy is exercised and the corresponding equity holding turns out valueless, ex post. Given the weak primary market and virtually nonexistent secondary market, the corporate bond market in Vietnam reflects our perception of the relationship-based and rent-seeking behavior in the financial markets. For the corporate bonds to really work, they critically need a higher level of liquidity to become truly tradable financial assets.