El concepto de “posesión común originaria” en la doctrina kantiana de la propiedad

Los primeros parágrafos de la sección “El derecho privado” (§§ 1-17) de la Doctrina del derecho de Kant incluyen el conjunto de los elementos sistemáticos que conciernen a la justificación de los derechos relativos a la propiedad. El propósito central de este trabajo es analizar la función sistemática del concepto de “posesión común originaria” en la doctrina kantiana de la propiedad, con especial interés en el sentido novedoso que adquiere ese concepto —que pertenecía a la tradición del derecho natural— en su reformulación como un “concepto práctico de la razón, que contiene a priori, el principio según el cual tan solo los hombres pueden hacer uso del lugar sobre la tierra siguiendo leyes jurídicas” (RL, 262).

Le problème de la souveraineté politique chez Thomas Hobbes

Sur le rapport de Hobbes au monarchisme, les études hobbesiennes font largement consensus : tout au long de sa vie, le théoricien du Léviathan aurait été, disent-elles, un monarchiste convaincu, fidèle à la dynastie anglaise des Stuart. Or le présent travail cherche à ébranler la rigueur de cette thèse traditionnelle. Acquis aux recherches contextualistes de J. Collins, qui ont déjà montré les affinités hobbesiennes à l’égard des politiques anticléricales de Cromwell, il souhaite montrer que de telles affinités dissimulent une intention politique beaucoup plus profonde, celle de la réalisation politique des principes moraux de la loi naturelle. Dans cette perspective, Hobbes serait, sous l’impulsion de la méthode résolutive-compositive, non seulement l’inventeur du premier droit naturel subjectif dans l’histoire de la philosophie politique, mais aussi le théoricien d’une loi naturelle inédite, édifiée sur la rationalité des volontés individuelles. Ainsi, par la publication du Léviathan en 1651, Hobbes n’aurait pas exprimé ses affinités politiques pour la monarchie anglaise renversée : il aurait plutôt dévoilé son projet politique d’instituer une souveraineté politique qui repose sur le consentement rationnel de tous les sujets. Monarchiste dans sa jeunesse, Hobbes serait alors devenu, en élaborant sa science politique, partisan d’un régime politique que l’on pourrait nommer démocratie de la raison positive.

Passage du nihilisme biologique au nihilisme moral dans la pensée d'Alex Rosenberg

La biologie évolutionnaire est au cœur des débats contemporains concernant les comportements humains. Les concepts de libre arbitre et de la moralité doivent, par conséquent, être repositionnés par rapport à ce type d’explication. Le consensus actuel concernant le libre arbitre est qu’il se réduit à l’expérience du libre arbitre et que la vraie question est alors d’expliquer comment cette expérience s’inscrit dans le processus darwinien. D’autres, darwiniens, par contre, semblent vouloir offrir une réalité au libre arbitre tout en maintenant un certain déterminisme darwinien. Dans ce mémoire, les arguments d’Alex Rosenberg proposant la position originale d’anti-libre arbitre et d’antidéterminisme seront étudiés. L’étude détaillée du passage du nihilisme biologique vers un nihilisme moral démontré par une position physicaliste et naturaliste, adoptée par Rosenberg, permettra d’illustrer la position anti-libre arbitre et antidéterministe. Pour ce faire, les théories de la deuxième loi de la thermodynamique et de l’évolution par la sélection naturelle seront présentées et analysées afin de démontrer en quoi elles répondent à la position physicaliste et naturaliste d’une part, et d’autre part, comment elles justifient le passage du nihilisme biologique au nihilisme moral selon Rosenberg. Finalement, les arguments et la position d’Alex Rosenberg seront mis en relation avec le domaine de la métaéthique afin d’y déceler une contradiction : le nihilisme moral n’est peut-être pas aussi gentil que Rosenberg l’affirme.

Derecho penal y la obligación de investigar y sancionar graves violaciones de derechos humanos y el derecho internacional humanitario -especial referencia a la sentencia de la corte constitucional colombiana c-579/13-

En el presente trabajo se analiza la obligación de investigar graves violaciones de Derechos Humanos y Derecho Internacional Humanitario, a la luz de la sentencia de la Corte Constitucional Colombiana referente a la constitucionalidad del Marco Jurídico para la paz. De la aparente remisión que hace la Corte Constitucional a la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos sobre el deber de investigar graves violaciones de Derechos Humanos y de Derecho Internacional Humanitario se concluye que la Corte Constitucional propone como premisa mayor una obligación que surge de una interpretación extensiva de la Convención Interamericana. De la misma forma, se estudia el tratamiento indebido del derecho aplicable a las amnistías e indultos, que se relaciona con la necesidad de evitar cualquier tipo de impunidad, cuyo concepto sirve para esclarecer cuáles son los estándares que se quiere proteger. Por último, se analiza el contexto al que se pretende aplicar dicha obligación, es decir, la justicia transicional, proponiendo un modelo interpretativo de los fines de la pena, y su aplicación por medio de la favorabilidad penal, para la justicia transicional, que sea acorde a la interpretación de la Convención Interamericana.

Obligación política en el caso del genocidio armenio

La autoridad legítima del soberano y la obligación política del ciudadano constituyen el fundamento del poder del Estado, no obstante, una y otra se ven seriamente cuestionadas ante situaciones de extrema injusticia como lo es el Genocidio. En casos como este la obligación de obedecer la ley por parte del súbdito puede e, incluso, debe ser exceptuada y sustituida por los mandatos de la razón moral. El caso de un tribunal alemán que decide absolver al asesino del principal perpetrador del Genocidio Armenio, desobedeciendo de esta manera la ley penal de su país, apoya la tesis enunciada apoyándose en argumentos de la teoría contractualista de Thomas Hobbes y John Locke. La misma tesis es analizada desde la perspectiva del Juego Limpio, en este caso la conclusión no es tan clara, sin embargo, plantea un nuevo problema sobre el Derecho de los Pueblos que deberá ser abordado en otra instancia.

Unwritten law in Hobbesian political thought

In Hobbesian terminology, ‘unwritten laws’ are natural laws enforced within a polity, by a non-sovereign judge, without some previous public promulgation. This article discusses the idea in the light of successive Hobbesian accounts of ‘law’ and ‘obligation’. Between De Cive and Leviathan, Hobbes dropped the idea that natural law is strictly speaking law, but he continued to believe unwritten laws must form a part of any legal system. He was unable to explain how such a law could claim a legal status. His loyalty to the notion, in spite of all the trouble that it caused, is a sign of his belief that moral knowledge is readily accessible to all.

The foundations of the rule of law

Formal conceptions of the rule of law are popular among contemporary legal philosophers. Nonetheless, the coherence of accounts of the rule of law committed to these conceptions is sometimes fractured by elements harkening back to substantive conceptions of the rule of law. I suggest that this may be because at its origins the ideal of the rule of law was substantive through and through. I also argue that those origins are older than is generally supposed. Most authors tend to trace the ideas of the rule of law and natural law back to classical Greece, but I show that they are already recognisable and intertwined as far back as Homer. Because the founding moment of the tradition of western intellectual reflection on the rule of law placed concerns about substantive justice at the centre of the rule of law ideal, it may be hard for this ideal to entirely shrug off its substantive content. It may be undesirable, too, given the rhetorical power of appeals to the rule of law. The rule of law means something quite radical in Homer; this meaning may provide a source of normative inspiration for contemporary reflections about the rule of law.

The philosopher's courtly love? Leo Strauss, Eros, and the law

This essay poses a critical response to Strauss' political philosophy that takes as its primary object Strauss' philosophy of Law. It does this by drawing on recent theoretical work in psychoanalytic theory, conceived after Jacques Lacan as another, avowedly non-historicist theory of Law and its relation to eros. The paper has four parts. Part I, `The Philosopher's Desire: Making an Exception, or “The Thing Is...''', recounts Strauss' central account of the complex relationship between philosophy and `the city'. Strauss' Platonic conception of philosophy as the highest species of eros is stressed, which is that aspect of his work which brings it into striking proximity with the Lacanian-psychoanalytic account of the dialectic of desire and the Law. Part II, `Of Prophecy and Law', examines Strauss' analysis of Law as first presented in his 1935 book, Philosophy and Law, and central to his later `rebirth of classical political philosophy'. Part III, `Primordial Repression and Primitive Platonism', is the central part of the paper. Lacan's psychoanalytic understanding of Law is brought critically to bear upon Strauss' philosophy of Law. The stake of the position is ultimately how, for Lacanian psychoanalysis, the Law is transcendental to subjectivity, and has a founding symbolic force, which mitigates against speaking of it solely or primarily in terms of more or less inequitable `rules of thumb', as Plato did. Part IV, `Is the Law the Thing?' then asks the question of what eros might underlie Strauss' paradoxical defense of esoteric writing in the age of `permissive' modern liberalism - that is, outside of the `closed' social conditions which he, above all, alerts us to as the decisive justification for this ancient practice.

Good global governance : custom, the cosmopolitan and international law

International law has both less and more to offer to the cosmopolitan project than one might think. As currently understood, international law presages a global system of obligations comprising the convergent systems of universal customary international laws and near-universal conventional instruments (treaties), both of which legal forms are characterised by natural law tendencies. From the point of view of a pluralistic cosmopolitanism, this is a dead end. Thinking beyond these formulae requires that international law be treated as a species of general law rather than state-centred law.

New way of seeing things : Ernst Troeltsch and the theological agenda

The aim of this thesis, as set out in the Introduction, is to assess the (seminal) significance of Troeltsch as one who set the agenda for twentieth century theology, particularly modern sociopolitical theology, and whose thought still has a special relevance. The first main chapter deals with the implications of the philosophy of history for theology. The Protestant theological orthodoxy of Troeltsch's time was essential ahistorical: he thought this to be untenable. Theology had to come to terms with the historical method, which was ‘a leaven which transforms everything, and finally bursts all previous forms of theological method.’ This chapter discusses Troeltsch's work concerning the principles, the cultural matrix, and the philosophy of history. The second main chapter examines another main concern of Troeltsch, namely, the status of Christianity vis-a-vis other religions. The background to this was the increasing awareness of the existence of other religions and the question of relativity and universality which this posed. Troeltschfs major response was Die Absolutheit des Christentums in which the ideas of essence, Europeanism, and absolutism were discussed, The third, and longest, chapter looks at the impact of social theory on theology. Sociology gave Troeltsch ‘a new way of seeing things’, and this new perspective is to be seen pre-eminently in The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches. Discussion of this centres on the three main concepts that Troeltsch delineated, compromise, natural law, and church/sect typology.

Lei natural e lei civil em J-J Rousseau

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Problem of Tragedy and Tragic Consciousness in Russia at the turn of the 19th Century

This project intertwines philosophical and historico-literary themes, taking as its starting point the concept of tragic consciousness inherent in the epoch of classicism. The research work makes use of ontological categories in order to describe the underlying principles of the image of the world which was created in philosophical and scientific theories of the 17th century as well as in contemporary drama. Using these categories brought Mr. Vilk to the conclusion that the classical picture of the world implied a certain dualism; not the Manichaean division between light and darkness but the discrimination between nature and absolute being, i.e. God. Mr. Vilk begins with an examination of the philosophical essence of French classical theatre of the XVII and XVIII centuries. The history of French classical tragedy can be divided into three periods: from the mid 17th to early 19th centuries when it triumphed all over France and exerted a powerful influence over almost all European countries; followed by the period of its rejection by the Romantics, who declared classicism to be "artificial and rational"; and finally our own century which has taken a more moderate line. Nevertheless, French classical tragedy has never fully recovered its status. Instead, it is ancient tragedy and the works of Shakespeare that are regarded to be the most adequate embodiment of the tragic. Consequently they still provoke a great number of new interpretations ranging from specialised literary criticism to more philosophical rumination. An important feature of classical tragedy is a system of rules and unities which reveals a hidden ontological structure of the world. The ontological picture of the dramatic world can be described in categories worked out by medieval philosophy - being, essence and existence. The first category is to be understood as a tendency toward permanency and stability (within eternity) connected with this or that fragment of dramatic reality. The second implies a certain set of permanent elements that make up the reality. And the third - existence - should be understood as "an act of being", as a realisation of permanently renewed processes of life. All of these categories can be found in every artistic reality but the accents put on one or another and their interrelations create different ontological perspectives. Mr. Vilk plots the movement of thought, expressed in both philosophical and scientific discourses, away from Aristotle's essential forms, and towards a prioritising of existence, and shows how new forms of literature and drama structured the world according to these evolving requirements. At the same time the world created in classical tragedy fully preserves another ontological paradigm - being - as a fundamental permanence. As far as the tragic hero's motivations are concerned this paradigm is revealed in the dedication of his whole self to some cause, and his oath of fidelity, attitudes which shape his behaviour. It may be the idea of the State, or personal honour, or something borrowed from the emotional sphere, passionate love. Mr. Vilk views the conflicting ambivalence of existence and being, duty as responsibility and duty as fidelity, as underlying the main conflict of classical tragedy of the 17th century. Having plotted the movement of the being/existence duality through its manifestations in 17th century tragedy, Mr. Vilk moves to the 18th century, when tragedy took a philosophical turn. A dualistic view of the world became supplanted by the Enlightenment idea of a natural law, rooted in nature. The main point of tragedy now was to reveal that such conflicts as might take place had an anti-rational nature, that they arose as the result of a kind of superstition caused by social reasons. These themes Mr. Vilk now pursues through Russian dramatists of the 18th and early 19th centuries. He begins with Sumarakov, whose philosophical thought has a religious bias. According to Sumarakov, the dualism of the divineness and naturalness of man is on the one hand an eternal paradox, and on the other, a moral challenge for humans to try to unite the two opposites. His early tragedies are not concerned with social evils or the triumph of natural feelings and human reason, but rather the tragic disharmony in the nature of man and the world. Mr Vilk turns next to the work of Kniazhnin. He is particularly keen to rescue his reputation from the judgements of critics who accuse him of being imitative, and in order to do so, analyses in detail the tragedy "Dido", in which Kniazhnin makes an attempt to revive the image of great heroes and city-founders. Aeneas represents the idea of the "being" of Troy, his destiny is the re-establishment of the city (the future Rome). The moral aspect behind this idea is faithfulness, he devotes himself to Gods. Dido is also the creator of a city, endowed with "natural powers" and abilities, but her creation is lacking internal stability grounded in "being". The unity of the two motives is only achieved through Dido's sacrifice of herself and her city to Aeneus. Mr Vilk's next subject is Kheraskov, whose peculiarity lies in the influence of free-mason mysticism on his work. This section deals with one of the most important philosophical assumptions contained in contemporary free-mason literature of the time - the idea of the trinitarian hierarchy inherent in man and the world: body - soul - spirit, and nature - law - grace. Finally, Mr. Vilk assess the work of Ozerov, the last major Russian tragedian. The tragedies which earned him fame, "Oedipus in Athens", "Fingal" and "Dmitri Donskoi", present a compromise between the Enlightenment's emphasis on harmony and ontological tragic conflict. But it is in "Polixene" that a real meeting of the Russian tradition with the age-old history of the genre takes place. The male and female characters of "Polixene" distinctly express the elements of "being" and "existence". Each of the participants of the conflict possesses some dominant characteristic personifying a certain indispensable part of the moral world, a certain "virtue". But their independent efforts are unable to overcome the ontological gap separating them. The end of the tragedy - Polixene's sacrificial self-immolation - paradoxically combines the glorification of each party involved in the conflict, and their condemnation. The final part of Mr. Vilk's research deals with the influence of "Polixene" upon subsequent dramatic art. In this respect Katenin's "Andromacha", inspired by "Polixene", is important to mention. In "Andromacha" a decisive divergence from the principles of the philosophical tragedy of Russian classicism and the ontology of classicism occurs: a new character appears as an independent personality, directed by his private interest. It was Katenin who was to become the intermediary between Pushkin and classical tragedy.

RECONHECENDO-SE SEM-RELIGIÃO NAS PERIFERIAS DA CIDADE: LIBERDADE COMPARTILHADA COMO RESISTÊNCIA

Reconhecendo, a partir da constatação empírica, a multiplicidade de escolhas de crenças no Mundo e em particular na periferia urbana paulistana, reconhecemos, também, a emergência criativa de novas possibilidades de crer e não crer. Tal amplitude não apenas aponta para o crer (segundo as ofertas de um sem número de religiões) e o não crer (ateu e agnóstico), mas para uma escolha que poderia vir a ser silenciada e esquecida, neste binômio arcaico e obsoleto, quando alguém se dá à liberdade crer sem ter religião. Reconhecer interessadamente os sem-religião nas periferias urbanas paulistanas é dar-se conta das violências a que estes indivíduos estão submetidos: violência econômica, violência da cidadania (vulnerabilidade) e proveniente da armas (grupos x Estado). Tanto quanto a violência do esquecimento e silenciamento. A concomitância espaço-temporal dos sem-religião nas periferias, levou-nos buscar referências em teorias de secularização e de laicidade, e, a partir destas, traçar uma história do poder violento, cuja pretensão é a inelutabilidade, enquanto suas fissuras são abertas em espaços de resistências. A história da legitimação do poder que se quer único, soberano, de caráter universal, enquanto fragmenta a sociedade em indivíduos atomizados, fragilizando vínculos horizontais, e a dos surgimentos de resistências não violentas questionadoras da totalidade trágica, ao reconhecer a liberdade de ser com autonomia, enquanto se volta para a produção de partilha de bens comuns. Propomos reconhecer a igual liberdade de ser (expressa na crença da filiação divina) e de partilhar o bem comum em reconhecimentos mútuos (expressa pela ação social), uma expressão de resistência não violenta ao poder que requer a igual abdicação da liberdade pela via da fragmentação individualizante e submissão inquestionável à ordem totalizante. Os sem-religião nas periferias urbanas, nossos contemporâneos, partilhariam uma tal resistência, ao longo da história, com as melissas gregas, os profetas messiânicos hebreus, os hereges cristãos e os ateus modernos, cuja pretensão não é o poder, mas a partilha igual da liberdade e dos bens comuns. Estes laicos, de fato, seriam agentes de resistências de reconhecimento mútuos, em espaços de multiplicidade crescente, ao poder violento real na história.