The Monetary policy rules and the inflation process in open emerging

This paper has three objectives. First, it aims at revealing the logic of interest rate setting pursued by monetary authorities of 12 new EU members. Using estimation of an augmented Taylor rule, we find that this setting was not always consistent with the official monetary policy. Second, we seek to shed light on the inflation process of these countries. To this end, we carry out an estimation of an open economy Philips curve (PC). Our main finding is that inflation rates were not only driven by backward persistency but also held a forward-looking component. Finally, we assess the viability of existing monetary arrangements for price stability. The analysis of the conditional inflation variance obtained from GARCH estimation of PC is used for this purpose. We conclude that inflation targeting is preferable to an exchange rate peg because it allowed decreasing the inflation rate and anchored its volatility.

Social rules govern vocal competition in the barn owl

To resolve the share of limited resources, animals often compete through exchange of signals about their relative motivation to compete. When two competitors are similarly motivated, the resolution of conflicts may be achieved in the course of an interactive process. In barn owls, Tyto alba, in which siblings vocally compete during the prolonged absence of parents over access to the next delivered food item, we investigated what governs the decision to leave or enter a contest, and at which level. Siblings alternated periods during which one of the two individuals vocalized more than the other. Individuals followed turn-taking rules to interrupt each other and momentarily dominate the vocal competition. These social rules were weakly sensitive to hunger level and age hierarchy. Hence, the investment in a conflict is determined not only by need and resource-holding potential, but also by social interactions. The use of turn-taking rules governing individual vocal investment has rarely been shown in a competitive context. We hypothesized that these rules would allow individuals to remain alert to one another's motivation while maintaining the cost of vocalizing at the lowest level.

Monetary policy rules and financial stress: does financial instability matter for monetary

We examine whether and how main central banks responded to episodes of financial stress over the last three decades. We employ a new methodology for monetary policy rules estimation, which allows for time-varying response coefficients as well as corrects for endogeneity. This flexible framework applied to the U.S., U.K., Australia, Canada and Sweden together with a new financial stress dataset developed by the International Monetary Fund allows not only testing whether the central banks responded to financial stress but also detects the periods and type of stress that were the most worrying for monetary authorities and to quantify the intensity of policy response. Our findings suggest that central banks often change policy

Solidarity and uniform rules in bankruptcy problems

The idea of ensuring a guarantee (a minimum amount of the resources) to each agent has recently acquired great relevance, in both social and politi- cal terms. Furthermore, the notion of Solidarity has been treated frequently in redistribution problems to establish that any increment of the resources should be equally distributed taking into account some relevant characteris- tics. In this paper, we combine these two general concepts, guarantee and solidarity, to characterize the uniform rules in bankruptcy problems (Con- strained Equal Awards and Constrained Equal Losses rules). Keywords: Constrained Equal Awards, Constrained Equal Losses, Lower bounds, Bankruptcy problems, Solidarity. JEL classification: C71, D63, D71.

Coloritto ([Edition augmentée de l'appendice et des 4 pl. (2 versions supplémentaires du visage de femme, accompagnées des deux palettes de couleurs correspondantes) ]) / ; or the harmony of colouring in painting : reduced to mechanical practice, under easy precepts, and infallible rules ; together with some colour'd figures, in order to render the said precepts and rules intelligible, not only to painters, but even to all lovers of painting. By J. C. Le Blon.

Ancien possesseur : Ledoux-Lebard, Guy (1912-2003)

Iowa Court Rules, 4th ed.

The Fourth Edition of the Iowa Court Rules, adopted by the supreme court November 9, 2001, effective February 15, 2002, is published pursuant to Iowa Code section 2B.5(2). Supplements to the loose-leaf compilation will be prepared and distributed as the rules are amended by the court.

From bargaining solutions to claims rules: a proportional approach

Is it important to negotiate on proportions rather than on numbers? To answer this question, we analyze the behavior of well-known bargaining solutions and the claims rules they induce when they are applied to a "proportionally transformed" bargaining set SP -so-called bargaining-in-proportions set. The idea of applying bargaining solutions to claims problems was already developed in Dagan and Volij (1993). They apply the bargaining solutions over a bargaining set that is the one de ned by the claims and the endowment. A comparison among our results and theirs is provided. Keywords: Bargaining problem, Claims problem, Proportional, Constrained Equal Awards, Constrained Equal Losses, Nash bargaining solution. JEL classi fication: C71, D63, D71.

Uniform Manual Real Property Acquisition and Relocation Assistance Section II - Chapter 111 Uniform Rules and Procedures April, 2006

The purpose of this chapter is to implement Iowa Code chapter 316 and sections 6B.42, 6B.45, 6B.54 and 6B.55, as required by the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-646, as amended by the Uniform Relocation Act Amendments of 1987, Title IV, Pub. L. No. 100-17 , Sec. 104, Pub. L. 105-117, and federal regulations adopted pursuant thereto.

Rules vs. political discretion: evidence from constitutionally guaranteed transfers to local governments in Brazil

Can rules be used to shield public resources from political interference? The Brazilian constitution and national tax code stipulate that revenue sharing transfers to municipal governments be determined by the size of counties in terms of estimated population. In this paper I document that the population estimates which went into the transfer allocation formula for the year 1991 were manipulated, resulting in significant transfer differentials over the entire 1990's. I test whether conditional on county characteristics that might account for the manipulation, center-local party alignment, party popularity and the extent of interparty fragmentation at the county level are correlated with estimated populations in 1991. Results suggest that revenue sharing transfers were targeted at right-wing national deputies in electorally fragmented counties as well as aligned local executives.