Asymmetric pulmonary edema after scorpion sting: a case report

A 12-year-old boy was referred with acute asymmetric pulmonary edema (APE) four-hour after scorpion sting to Emergency department. On admission, the main clinical manifestations were: dyspnea, tachypnea, and tachycardia. Chest x-ray revealed APE predominantly on the right hemithorax. The patient was treated with oxygen, intravenous frusemide and digoxin and discharged on the sixth hospital day in a good condition. This case report emphasizes the occurrence of asymmetric pulmonary edema after severe scorpion envenomation within few hours immediately after the sting.

Factorization of elliptic boundary value problems by invariant embedding and application to overdetermined problems

Dissertação para obtenção do Grau de Doutor em Matemática

Study of multi-component systems in polybenzimidazole membrane formation and their impact on membrane performance

Dissertação para obtenção do Grau de Mestre em Engenharia Química e Bioquímica

Decline in prevalence and asymmetric distribution of human T cell lymphotropic virus 1 and 2 in blood donors, State of Minas Gerais, Brazil, 1993 to 2007

INTRODUCTION: Human T cell lymphotropic virus types 1 and 2 (HTLV-1/2) are endemic in Brazil and are screened for in transfusion services since 1993. This study evaluated the evolution of the prevalence of HTLV-1 and 2 in blood donors of the Hemominas Foundation from 1993 to 2007, and its geographical distribution in State of Minas Gerais, Brazil. METHODS: The Hemominas Foundation is a centralized blood center in Minas Gerais, Brazil. The sources of data were the Hemominas Foundation Technical Bulletin and files from the centralized serological laboratory. Donors were tested in the period using enzyme linked immuno sorbent assays (ELISA), followed by Western blot, when repeatedly reactive. The data were analyzed by EPIINFO 6.2 and TABWIN 3.5 softwares. RESULTS: The average seroprevalence in the period 1993-2007 was 0.1%. A steady decline occurred from 0.4% in 1993 to below 0.1% in 2002 and later, with a transient peak of 0.5% in 1994. HTLV reactivity distribution was asymmetrical in the state, with regions of higher prevalence, interspersed with low prevalence areas. Comparison of positive and negative donors verified that increasing age was proportional to virus positivity. Odds ratio for age ranged from 1.43 (30 to 39 years-old) to 3.09 (50 to 65 years-old). Women had a greater chance of being positive (OR-1.64), as previously described. CONCLUSIONS: Possible explanations for HTLV-1/2 prevalence decline are the exclusion of positive donors from the donor pool, an increase in repeat donors and ELISA test improvement, with reduction in the number of false positive results.

Optimal choice between even- and uneven-aged forestry: the case of non-industrial private forest owners

An infinite-horizon discrete time model with multiple size-class structures using a transition matrix is built to assess optimal harvesting schedules in the context of Non-Industrial Private Forest (NIPF) owners. Three model specifications accounting for forest income, financial return on an asset and amenity valuations are considered. Numerical simulations suggest uneven-aged forest management where a rational forest owner adapts her or his forest policy by influencing the regeneration of trees or adjusting consumption dynamics depending on subjective time preference and market return rate dynamics on the financial asset. Moreover she or he does not value significantly non-market benefits captured by amenity valuations relatively to forest income.

Essays on bounded rationality: Individual decision and strategic interaction

Economics is a social science which, therefore, focuses on people and on the decisions they make, be it in an individual context, or in group situations. It studies human choices, in face of needs to be fulfilled, and a limited amount of resources to fulfill them. For a long time, there was a convergence between the normative and positive views of human behavior, in that the ideal and predicted decisions of agents in economic models were entangled in one single concept. That is, it was assumed that the best that could be done in each situation was exactly the choice that would prevail. Or, at least, that the facts that economics needed to explain could be understood in the light of models in which individual agents act as if they are able to make ideal decisions. However, in the last decades, the complexity of the environment in which economic decisions are made and the limits on the ability of agents to deal with it have been recognized, and incorporated into models of decision making in what came to be known as the bounded rationality paradigm. This was triggered by the incapacity of the unboundedly rationality paradigm to explain observed phenomena and behavior. This thesis contributes to the literature in three different ways. Chapter 1 is a survey on bounded rationality, which gathers and organizes the contributions to the field since Simon (1955) first recognized the necessity to account for the limits on human rationality. The focus of the survey is on theoretical work rather than the experimental literature which presents evidence of actual behavior that differs from what classic rationality predicts. The general framework is as follows. Given a set of exogenous variables, the economic agent needs to choose an element from the choice set that is avail- able to him, in order to optimize the expected value of an objective function (assuming his preferences are representable by such a function). If this problem is too complex for the agent to deal with, one or more of its elements is simplified. Each bounded rationality theory is categorized according to the most relevant element it simplifes. Chapter 2 proposes a novel theory of bounded rationality. Much in the same fashion as Conlisk (1980) and Gabaix (2014), we assume that thinking is costly in the sense that agents have to pay a cost for performing mental operations. In our model, if they choose not to think, such cost is avoided, but they are left with a single alternative, labeled the default choice. We exemplify the idea with a very simple model of consumer choice and identify the concept of isofin curves, i.e., sets of default choices which generate the same utility net of thinking cost. Then, we apply the idea to a linear symmetric Cournot duopoly, in which the default choice can be interpreted as the most natural quantity to be produced in the market. We find that, as the thinking cost increases, the number of firms thinking in equilibrium decreases. More interestingly, for intermediate levels of thinking cost, an equilibrium in which one of the firms chooses the default quantity and the other best responds to it exists, generating asymmetric choices in a symmetric model. Our model is able to explain well-known regularities identified in the Cournot experimental literature, such as the adoption of different strategies by players (Huck et al. , 1999), the inter temporal rigidity of choices (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003) and the dispersion of quantities in the context of di cult decision making (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003). Chapter 3 applies a model of bounded rationality in a game-theoretic set- ting to the well-known turnout paradox in large elections, pivotal probabilities vanish very quickly and no one should vote, in sharp contrast with the ob- served high levels of turnout. Inspired by the concept of rhizomatic thinking, introduced by Bravo-Furtado & Côrte-Real (2009a), we assume that each per- son is self-delusional in the sense that, when making a decision, she believes that a fraction of the people who support the same party decides alike, even if no communication is established between them. This kind of belief simplifies the decision of the agent, as it reduces the number of players he believes to be playing against { it is thus a bounded rationality approach. Studying a two-party first-past-the-post election with a continuum of self-delusional agents, we show that the turnout rate is positive in all the possible equilibria, and that it can be as high as 100%. The game displays multiple equilibria, at least one of which entails a victory of the bigger party. The smaller one may also win, provided its relative size is not too small; more self-delusional voters in the minority party decreases this threshold size. Our model is able to explain some empirical facts, such as the possibility that a close election leads to low turnout (Geys, 2006), a lower margin of victory when turnout is higher (Geys, 2006) and high turnout rates favoring the minority (Bernhagen & Marsh, 1997).

Evolution of the gene regulatory network controlling flower dorsoventral asymmetry

Tese de Doutoramento em Biologia de Plantas.

Asymmetric demand information in uniform and discriminatory call auctions: an experimental analysis motivated by electricity markets

We study the outcomes of experimental multi-unit uniform and discriminatory auctions with demand uncertainty. Our study is motivated by the ongoing debate about market design in the electricity industry. Our main aim is to compare the effect of asymmetric demand-information between sellers on the performance of the two auction institutions. In our baseline conditions all sellers have the same information, whereas in our treatment conditions some sellers have better information than others. In both information conditions we find that average transaction prices and price volatility are not significantly different under the two auction institutions. However, when there is asymmetric information among sellers the discriminatory auction is significantly less efficient. These results are not in line with the typical arguments made in favor of discriminatory pricing in electricity industries; namely, lower consumer prices and less price volatility. Moreover, our results provide some indication that discriminatory auctions reduce technical efficiency relative to uniform auctions.

Endogenous capacity utilization and the asymmetric effects of monetary policy

This paper investigates the role of variable capacity utilization as a source of asymmetries in the relationship between monetary policy and economic activity within a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework. The source of the asymmetry is directly linked to the bottlenecks and stock-outs that emerge from the existence of capacity constraints in the real side of the economy. Money has real effects due to the presence of rigidities in households' portfolio decisions in the form of a Luces-Fuerst 'limited participation' constraint. The model features variable capacity utilization rates across firms due to demand uncertainty. A monopolistic competitive structure provides additional effects through optimal mark-up changes. The overall message of this paper for monetary policy is that the same actions may have different effects depending on the capacity utilization rate of the economy.

Real rank zero algebras have the corona factorization property

The purpose of this short note is to prove that a stable separable C*-algebra with real rank zero has the so-called corona factorization property, that is, all the full multiplier projections are properly in finite. Enroute to our result, we consider conditions under which a real rank zero C*-algebra admits an injection of the compact operators (a question already considered in [21]).

Leadership and overcoming coordination failure with asymmetric costs

We study how the heterogeneity of agents affects the extent to which changes in financial incentives can pull a group out of a situation of coordination failure. We focus on the connections between cost asymmetries and leadership. Experimental subjects interact in groups of four in a series of weak-link games. The treatment variable is the distribution of high and low effort cost across subjects. We present data for one, two and three low-cost subjects as well as control sessions with symmetric costs. The overall pattern of coordination improvement is common across treatments. Early coordination improvements depend on the distribution of high and low effort costs across subjects, but these differences disappear with time. We find that initial leadership in overcoming coordination failure is not driven by low-cost subjects but by subjects with the most frequent cost. This conformity effect can be due to a kind of group identity or to the cognitive simplicity of acting with identical others.

Internship report: improving asymmetric term extraction from bilingual text

Estudi elaborat a partir d’una estada a Xerox Research Centre Europe a Grenoble, França,entre juny i desembre del 2006. El projecte tradueïx termes tècnics anglesos a noruec. És asimètric perquè no tenim recursos lingüístics per a la llengua noruega, però solament per a l'anglès. S’ha desenvolupat i posat en pràctica mètodes que comprovaven contigüitat ("local reordering" i permutació selectiva) per a millorar el funcionament d’una eina anterior. Contigüitat és quan una paraula es traduïx en paraules múltiples, aquestes paraules han de ser adjacents en l'oració. A més, s’ha construït una taula de les operacions de recerca per als termes tècnics i s’ha integrat aquesta taula en un programa de demostració.

Outsourcing versus FDI in oligopoly equilibrium

We consider the make-or-buy decision of oligopolistic firms in an industry in which final good production requires specialised inputs. Factor price considerations dictate that firms acquire the intermediate abroad, by either producing it in a wholly owned subsidiary or outsourcing it to a supplier who must make a relationship specific investment. Firms’ internationalisation mode depends on cost and strategic considerations. Crucially, asymmetric equilibria emerge, with firms choosing different modes of internationalisation, even when they are ex-ante identical. With ex-ante asymmetries, lower cost producers have a stronger incentive to vertically integrate (FDI), while higher cost firms are more likely to outsource.

Technical Appendix-3-Regime asymmetric STAR modeling and exchange rate reversion

The breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and the adoption of generalized oating exchange rates ushered in a new era of exchange rate volatility and uncer- tainty. This increased volatility lead economists to search for economic models able to describe observed exchange rate behavior. The present is a technical Appendix to Cerrato et al. (2009) and presents detailed simulations of the proposed methodology and additional empirical results.