Neural mechanisms of belief inference during cooperative games.

Humans have the arguably unique ability to understand the mental representations of others. For success in both competitive and cooperative interactions, however, this ability must be extended to include representations of others' belief about our intentions, their model about our belief about their intentions, and so on. We developed a "stag hunt" game in which human subjects interacted with a computerized agent using different degrees of sophistication (recursive inferences) and applied an ecologically valid computational model of dynamic belief inference. We show that rostral medial prefrontal (paracingulate) cortex, a brain region consistently identified in psychological tasks requiring mentalizing, has a specific role in encoding the uncertainty of inference about the other's strategy. In contrast, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex encodes the depth of recursion of the strategy being used, an index of executive sophistication. These findings reveal putative computational representations within prefrontal cortex regions, supporting the maintenance of cooperation in complex social decision making.

Effect of information transmission on cooperative behavior

Considering the fact, in the real world, that information is transmitted with a time delay, we study an evolutionary spatial prisoner's dilemma game where agents update strategies according to certain information that they have learned. In our study, the game dynamics are classified by the modes of information learning as well as game interaction, and four different combinations, i.e. the mean-field case, case I, case II and local case, are studied comparatively. It is found that the time delay in case II smoothes the phase transition from the absorbing states of C (or D) to their mixing state, and promotes cooperation for most parameter values. Our work provides insights into the temporal behavior of information and the memory of the system, and may be helpful in understanding the cooperative behavior induced by the time delay in social and biological systems.

Spiteful Strategies. The ontogeny and the practice of spite in human interaction: an experimental game theory approach and empirical applications

As estratégias de malevolência implicam que um indivíduo pague um custo para infligir um custo superior a um oponente. Como um dos comportamentos fundamentais da sociobiologia, a malevolência tem recebido menos atenção que os seus pares o egoísmo e a cooperação. Contudo, foi estabelecido que a malevolência é uma estratégia viável em populações pequenas quando usada contra indivíduos negativamente geneticamente relacionados pois este comportamento pode i) ser eliminado naturalmente, ou ii) manter-se em equilíbrio com estratégias cooperativas devido à disponibilidade da parte de indivíduos malevolentes de pagar um custo para punir. Esta tese propõe compreender se a propensão para a malevolência nos humanos é inerente ou se esta se desenvolve com a idade. Para esse efeito, considerei duas experiências de teoria de jogos em crianças em ambiente escolar com idades entre os 6 e os 22 anos. A primeira, um jogo 2x2 foi testada com duas variantes: 1) um prémio foi atribuído a ambos os jogadores, proporcionalmente aos pontos acumulados; 2), um prémio foi atribuído ao jogador com mais pontos. O jogo foi desenhado com o intuito de causar o seguinte dilema a cada jogador: i) maximizar o seu ganho e arriscar ter menos pontos que o adversário; ou ii) decidir não maximizar o seu ganho, garantindo que este não era inferior ao do seu adversário. A segunda experiência consistia num jogo do ditador com duas opções: uma escolha egoísta/altruísta (A), onde o ditador recebia mais ganho, mas o seu recipiente recebia mais que ele e uma escolha malevolente (B) que oferecia menos ganhos ao ditador que a A mas mais ganhos que o recipiente. O dilema era que se as crianças se comportassem de maneira egoísta, obtinham mais ganho para si, ao mesmo tempo que aumentavam o ganho do seu colega. Se fossem malevolentes, então prefeririam ter mais ganho que o seu colega ao mesmo tempo que tinham menos para eles próprios. As experiências foram efetuadas em escolas de duas áreas distintas de Portugal (continente e Açores) para perceber se as preferências malevolentes aumentavam ou diminuíam com a idade. Os resultados na primeira experiência sugerem que (1) os alunos compreenderam a primeira variante como um jogo de coordenação e comportaram-se como maximizadores, copiando as jogadas anteriores dos seus adversários; (2) que os alunos repetentes se comportaram preferencialmente como malevolentes, mais frequentemente que como maximizadores, com especial ênfase para os alunos de 14 anos; (3) maioria dos alunos comportou-se reciprocamente desde os 12 até aos 16 anos de idade, após os quais começaram a desenvolver uma maior tolerância às escolhas dos seus parceiros. Os resultados da segunda experiência sugerem que (1) as estratégias egoístas eram prevalentes até aos 6 anos de idade, (2) as tendências altruístas emergiram até aos 8 anos de idade e (3) as estratégias de malevolência começaram a emergir a partir dos 8 anos de idade. Estes resultados complementam a literatura relativamente escassa sobre malevolência e sugerem que este comportamento está intimamente ligado a preferências de consideração sobre os outros, o paroquialismo e os estágios de desenvolvimento das crianças.************************************************************Spite is defined as an act that causes loss of payoff to an opponent at a cost to the actor. As one of the four fundamental behaviours in sociobiology, it has received far less attention than its counterparts selfishness and cooperation. It has however been established as a viable strategy in small populations when used against negatively related individuals. Because of this, spite can either i) disappear or ii) remain at equilibrium with cooperative strategies due to the willingness of spiteful individuals to pay a cost in order to punish. This thesis sets out to understand whether propensity for spiteful behaviour is inherent or if it develops with age. For that effect, two game-theoretical experiments were performed with schoolboys and schoolgirls aged 6 to 22. The first, a 2 x 2 game, was tested in two variants: 1) a prize was awarded to both players, proportional to accumulated points; 2), a prize was given to the player with most points. Each player faced the following dilemma: i) to maximise pay-off risking a lower pay-off than the opponent; or ii) not to maximise pay-off in order to cut down the opponent below their own. The second game was a dictator experiment with two choices, (A) a selfish/altruistic choice affording more payoff to the donor than B, but more to the recipient than to the donor, and (B) a spiteful choice that afforded less payoff to the donor than A, but even lower payoff to the recipient. The dilemma here was that if subjects behaved selfishly, they obtained more payoff for themselves, while at the same time increasing their opponent payoff. If they were spiteful, they would rather have more payoff than their colleague, at the cost of less for themselves. Experiments were run in schools in two different areas in Portugal (mainland and Azores) to understand whether spiteful preferences varied with age. Results in the first experiment suggested that (1) students understood the first variant as a coordination game and engaged in maximising behaviour by copying their opponent’s plays; (2) repeating students preferentially engaged in spiteful behaviour more often than maximising behaviour, with special emphasis on 14 year-olds; (3) most students engaged in reciprocal behaviour from ages 12 to 16, as they began developing higher tolerance for their opponent choices. Results for the second experiment suggested that (1) selfish strategies were prevalent until the age of 6, (2) altruistic tendencies emerged since then, and (3) spiteful strategies began being chosen more often by 8 year-olds. These results add to the relatively scarce body of literature on spite and suggest that this type of behaviour is closely tied with other-regarding preferences, parochialism and the children’s stages of development.

Efficiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games

A contingent contract in a transferable utility game under uncertainty specifies an outcome for each possible state. It is assumed that coalitions evaluate these contracts by considering the minimal possible excesses. A main question of the paper concerns the existence and characterization of efficient contracts. It is shown that they exist if and only if the set of possible coalitions contains a balanced subset. Moreover, a characterization of values that result in efficient contracts in the case of minimally balanced collections is provided.

Cooperative of Noncooperative Behavior?

In an abstract two-agent model, we show that every deterministic joint choice function compatible with the hypothesis that agents act noncooperatively is also compatible with the hypothesis that they act cooperatively. the converse is false.

Production externalities : cooperative and non-cooperative approaches

Thèse numérisée par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

A formalization for multi-agent decision support in cooperative environments. A framework for situated agents

La tesis propone un marco de trabajo para el soporte de la toma de decisiones adecuado para soportar la ejecución distribuida de acciones cooperativas en entornos multi-agente dinámicos y complejos. Soporte para la toma de decisiones es un proceso que intenta mejorar la ejecución de la toma de decisiones en escenarios cooperativos. Este proceso ocurre continuamente en la vida diaria. Los humanos, por ejemplo, deben tomar decisiones acerca de que ropa usar, que comida comer, etc. En este sentido, un agente es definido como cualquier cosa que está situada en un entorno y que actúa, basado en su observación, su interpretación y su conocimiento acerca de su situación en tal entorno para lograr una acción en particular.Por lo tanto, para tomar decisiones, los agentes deben considerar el conocimiento que les permita ser consientes en que acciones pueden o no ejecutar. Aquí, tal proceso toma en cuenta tres parámetros de información con la intención de personificar a un agente en un entorno típicamente físico. Así, el mencionado conjunto de información es conocido como ejes de decisión, los cuales deben ser tomados por los agentes para decidir si pueden ejecutar correctamente una tarea propuesta por otro agente o humano. Los agentes, por lo tanto, pueden hacer mejores decisiones considerando y representando apropiadamente tal información. Los ejes de decisión, principalmente basados en: las condiciones ambientales, el conocimiento físico y el valor de confianza del agente, provee a los sistemas multi-agente un confiable razonamiento para alcanzar un factible y exitoso rendimiento cooperativo.Actualmente, muchos investigadores tienden a generar nuevos avances en la tecnología agente para incrementar la inteligencia, autonomía, comunicación y auto-adaptación en escenarios agentes típicamente abierto y distribuidos. En este sentido, esta investigación intenta contribuir en el desarrollo de un nuevo método que impacte tanto en las decisiones individuales como colectivas de los sistemas multi-agente. Por lo tanto, el marco de trabajo propuesto ha sido utilizado para implementar las acciones concretas involucradas en el campo de pruebas del fútbol robótico. Este campo emula los juegos de fútbol real, donde los agentes deben coordinarse, interactuar y cooperar entre ellos para solucionar tareas complejas dentro de un escenario dinámicamente cambiante y competitivo, tanto para manejar el diseño de los requerimientos involucrados en las tareas como para demostrar su efectividad en trabajos colectivos. Es así que los resultados obtenidos tanto en el simulador como en el campo real de experimentación, muestran que el marco de trabajo para el soporte de decisiones propuesto para agentes situados es capaz de mejorar la interacción y la comunicación, reflejando en un adecuad y confiable trabajo en equipo dentro de entornos impredecibles, dinámicos y competitivos. Además, los experimentos y resultados también muestran que la información seleccionada para generar los ejes de decisión para situar a los agentes, es útil cuando tales agentes deben ejecutar una acción o hacer un compromiso en cada momento con la intención de cumplir exitosamente un objetivo colectivo. Finalmente, algunas conclusiones enfatizando las ventajas y utilidades del trabajo propuesto en la mejora del rendimiento colectivo de los sistemas multi-agente en situaciones tales como tareas coordinadas y asignación de tareas son presentadas.

Environmental agreements as a Hawk-Dove game with confirmed proposals

This paper aims at two different contributions to the literature on international environmental agreements. First, we model environmental agreements as a generic situation, characterized as a Hawk-Dove game with multiple asymmetric equilibria. Second, the article applies the theory on non-cooperative games with confirmed proposals, based on an alternating proposals bargaining protocol, as a way of overcoming the usual problems of coordination and bargaining failures in environmental agreement games, due to payoff asymmetry and equilibrium multiplicity.

Learn to design vs design to learn: enhancing educational opportunities using game technoloy

Recognizing as children’s input in game design and development process is critical, we applied cooperative inquiry experiences working with young children as game design partners. The computer-based games specifically were designed and developed for the acquisition of survival literacy by 12-14 year old intellectually disabled children. During the design and development game process, children learnt game design techniques without their acknowledgement. Importantly, the development process will be undertaken by the students with the minimum guidance of team members. The experiences, challenges and lesson learned through game design process are discussed.

Complex Transition to Cooperative Behavior in a Structured Population Model

Cooperation plays an important role in the evolution of species and human societies. The understanding of the emergence and persistence of cooperation in those systems is a fascinating and fundamental question. Many mechanisms were extensively studied and proposed as supporting cooperation. The current work addresses the role of migration for the maintenance of cooperation in structured populations. This problem is investigated in an evolutionary perspective through the prisoner's dilemma game paradigm. It is found that migration and structure play an essential role in the evolution of the cooperative behavior. The possible outcomes of the model are extinction of the entire population, dominance of the cooperative strategy and coexistence between cooperators and defectors. The coexistence phase is obtained in the range of large migration rates. It is also verified the existence of a critical level of structuring beyond that cooperation is always likely. In resume, we conclude that the increase in the number of demes as well as in the migration rate favor the fixation of the cooperative behavior.

Capuchin Monkeys (Cebus apella) Fail to Be Equitable in an Ultimatum Game

The ultimatum game is a commonly used economics game testing humans' sense of fairness. In the game, a "proposer" is given a sum of money and is told they can split it however they want with another human partner. The partner can then either accept the division and both proposer and responder receive the proposed amounts, or the responder can reject the offer and neither player will get anything. Human subjects from most western cultures typically share almost half of an allotted amount, but it remains unknown whether our close primate relatives share this generosity. Recent attempts to present chimpanzees with the ultimatum game have provided inconclusive results, with some studies finding the animals share humans' disposition to behave 'fairly' and others concluding that chimpanzees act selfishly to maximize their own rewards. Capuchin monkeys are known to share many human and chimpanzee social and cooperative behaviors, and this study was the first to present capuchin monkeys with a version of the ultimatum game. Subjects were presented with two differently colored tokens representing different qualitative reward contingencies, one equitable and the other inequitable in favor of the subject proposer. Subjects could select and place one of the tokens in a transfer container. The capuchins were first tested with a "dictator game" where, after the subject monkey selected a token, the rewards (equitable or inequitable) were distributed to the subject and a nearby partner monkey that was not an active participant. The capuchins were then tested on an ultimatum game in which after the subject selected and placed a token in the container, the container was moved to the partner. The partner needed to remove the token and transfer it back to the experimenter for the rewards to be distributed. As such, the partner could reject the subject's offer by refusing to participate and neither would receive a reward. The experiment was conducted to determine if the subject monkey would select the equitable reward option rather than the selfish option in order to maintain the partner's cooperation in the task. Capuchin subjects behaved selfishly and selected the inequitable token significantly more often than the equitable token in both the dictator and ultimatum game with no significant difference in preference between the two games. Interestingly, despite the occasional occurrence of rejection by the partner monkeys (resulting in no reward for the subject), subjects never altered their strategy, continuing to prefer the selfish token. The study may indicate that capuchin monkeys have an inability to judge the effect of their behavior on a conspecific's reward outcome, or an indifference to the outcome if there is an individual cost associated with behaving prosocially.

Game theory and reciprocity in some extensive form experimental games

We examine decision making in two-person extensive form game trees using nine treatments that vary matching protocol, payoffs, and payoff information. Our objective is to establish replicable principles of cooperative versus noncooperative behavior that involve the use of signaling, reciprocity, and backward induction strategies, depending on the availability of dominated direct punishing strategies and the probability of repeated interaction with the same partner. Contrary to the predictions of game theory, we find substantial support for cooperation under complete information even in various single-play treatments.

Reports - California Cooperative Oceanic Fisheries Investigations.

At head of title: State of California, Dept. of Fish and Game, Marine Research Committee.

The status of game birds and mammals in Alabama,

"Literature cited": p. 38.