968 resultados para private business
Resumo:
When to allow Research Joint Ventures (RJVs) or not is an importantinstrument in the development of an optimal R&D policy. Theregulator, however, is unlikely to know all the relevant informationto regulate R&D optimally. The extent to which there existappropriability problems between the firms is one such variable thatis private information to the firms in the industry. In a duopolysetting we analyze the characteristics of a second-best R&D policywhere the government can either allow RJVs or not and give lump-sumsubsidies to the parties involved. The second-best R&D policy withoutsubsidies will either block some welfare improving RJVs or allow somewelfare reducing ones. With lump-sum subsidies, the second-best policytrades off the expected subsidy cost with allowing welfare decreasingRJVs or blocking welfare increasing ones.
Resumo:
Previous analysis has shown that traders may opt for specific technologies with nojoint productivity advantage as a way to commit themselves to trading jointly, butonly when long-term contracting is infeasible. This paper proves that speciÞcity canalso be optimal (by relaxing the budget-balance constraint) in settings with long-termcontracting. Traders will opt for specificity when one trader makes a cross-investmentand either (1) this cross-investment has a direct externality on the other trader, (2) bothparties invest, or (3) private information is present. The specificity (e.g. from non-salvageable investments, specific assets and technologies, narrow business strategies,and exclusivity restrictions) is equally effective regardless of which trader's alternativetrade payoff is reduced. Specificity supports long-term contracts in a broad rangeof settings - both with and without renegotiation. The theory also offers a novelperspective on franchising and vertical integration.
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The aim of this paper is to test formally the classical business cyclehypothesis, using data from industrialized countries for the timeperiod since 1960. The hypothesis is characterized by the view that the cyclical structure in GDP is concentrated in the investment series: fixed investment has typically a long cycle, while the cycle in inventory investment is shorter. To check the robustness of our results, we subject the data for 15 OECD countries to a variety of detrending techniques. While the hypothesis is not confirmed uniformly for all countries, there is a considerably high number for which the data display the predicted pattern. None of the countries shows a pattern which can be interpreted as a clear rejection of the classical hypothesis.
Resumo:
Over the past two decades, technological progress in the United States hasbeen biased towards skilled labor. What does this imply for business cycles?We construct a quarterly skill premium from the CPS and use it to identifyskill-biased technology shocks in a VAR with long-run restrictions. Hours fallin response to skill-biased technology shocks, indicating that at least part of thetechnology-induced fall in total hours is due to a compositional shift in labordemand. Skill-biased technology shocks have no effect on the relative price ofinvestment, suggesting that capital and skill are not complementary in aggregateproduction.
Resumo:
In a world filled with poverty, environmental degradation, and moral injustice, social enterprises offer a ray of hope. These organizations seek to achieve social missions through business ventures. Yet social missions and business ventures are associated with divergent goals, values, norms, and identities. Attending to them simultaneously creates tensions, competing demands, and ethical dilemmas. Effectively understanding social enterprises therefore depends on insight into the nature and management of these tensions. While existing research recognizes tensions between social missions and business ventures, we lack any systematic analysis. Our paper addresses this issue. We first categorize the types of tensions that arise between social missions and business ventures, emphasizing their prevalence and variety. We then explore how four different organizational theories offer insight into these tensions, and we develop an agenda for future research. We end by arguing that a focus on social-business tensions not only expands insight into social enterprises, but also provides an opportunity for research on social enterprises to inform traditional organizational theories. Taken together, our analysis of tensions in social enterprises integrates and seeks to energize research on this expanding phenomenon.
Resumo:
This paper theoretically and empirically documents a puzzle that arises when an RBC economy with a job matching function is used to model unemployment. The standard model can generate sufficiently large cyclical fluctuations in unemployment, or a sufficiently small response of unemployment to labor market policies, but it cannot do both. Variable search and separation, finite UI benefit duration, efficiency wages, and capital all fail to resolve this puzzle. However, either sticky wages or match-specific productivity shocks can improve the model's performance by making the firm's flow of surplus more procyclical, which makes hiring more procyclical too.
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This paper analyses whether or not tax subsidies to private medicalinsurance are self-financing by means of a structural approach. Weconstruct a simulation routine based on a microeconometric discretechoice model that allows us to evaluate the impact of premium changeson the utilisation of outpatient and inpatient health care services. Wesimulate the 1999 Spanish tax reform that abolished the tax deductionfor expenditures on private health insurance using a representativesample of the Catalan population. Prior to this reform, foregone taxrevenue arising from deductions after the purchase of private insuranceamounted to 69.2 M. per year. In contrast, the elimination of thesubsidies to private policies is estimated to generate an extra costfor the public sector of about 8.9 M. per year.
Resumo:
Existing models of equilibrium unemployment with endogenous labor market participation are complex, generate procyclical unemployment rates and cannot match unemployment variability relative to GDP. We embed endogenous participation in a simple, tractable job market matching model, show analytically how variations in the participation rate are driven by the cross-sectional density of home productivity near the participation threshold, andhow this density translates into an extensive-margin labor supply elasticity. A calibration of the model to macro data not only matches employment and participation variabilities but also generates strongly countercyclical unemployment rates. With some wage rigidity the model also matches unemployment variations well. Furthermore, the labor supply elasticity implied by our calibration is consistent with microeconometric evidence for the US.
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This paper studies the macroeconomic implications of firms' investment composition choices in the presence of credit constraints. Following a negative andpersistent aggregate productivity shock, firms shift into short-term investments because they produce more pledgeable output and because they help alleviate futureborrowing constraints. This produces a short-run dampening of the effects of theshock, at the expense of lower long-term investment and future output, relativeto an economy with no credit market imperfections. The effects are exacerbatedby a steepening of the term structure of interest rates that further encourages ashift towards short-term investments in the short-run. Small temporary shocks tothe severity of financing frictions generate large and long-lasting effects on outputthrough their impact on the composition of investment. A positive financial shockproduces much stronger effects than an identical negative shock, while the responsesto positive and negative shocks to aggregate productivity are roughly symmetric.Finally, the paper introduces a novel explanation for the countercyclicality of financing constraints of firms.
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We study relative performance evaluation in executive compensation whenexecutives have private information about their ability. We assume that thejoint distribution of an individual firm s profit and market movements dependson the ability of the executive that runs the firm. In the equilibrium of theexecutive labor market, compensation schemes exploit this fact to sortexecutives of di ?erent abilities. This implies that executive compensation isincreasing in own performance, but may also be increasing in industryperformance-a sharp departure from standard relative performance evaluation.This result provides an explanation for the scarcity of relative performanceconsiderations in executive compensation documented by the empirical literature.
Resumo:
We analyze the impact of different types of international conventions thatrequire signatory countries to penalize domestic firms that are found tohave bribed foreign public officials. We analyze enforcement of penaltiesunder a convention styled after the OECD's 'Convention on Combating Briberyof Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions', in whichsignatory countries commit to prosecuting firms that have bribed publicofficials of any foreign country. We compare the results with the case inwhich the convention requires signatory countries to commit to prosecutingfirms that have bribed public officials of signatory countries only.We argue that the second type of convention is more likely to ensureenforcement of penalties on firms found to have bribed foreign publicofficials.
Resumo:
How much information does an auctioneer want bidders to have in a private value environment?We address this question using a novel approach to ordering information structures based on the property that in private value settings more information leads to a more disperse distribution of buyers updated expected valuations. We define the class of precision criteria following this approach and different notions of dispersion, and relate them to existing criteria of informativeness. Using supermodular precision, we obtain three results: (1) a more precise information structure yields a more efficient allocation; (2) the auctioneer provides less than the efficient level of information since more information increases bidder informational rents; (3) there is a strategic complementarity between information and competition, so that both the socially efficient and the auctioneer s optimal choice of precision increase with the number of bidders, and both converge as the number of bidders goes to infinity.
Resumo:
The paper reports results on the effects of stylized stabilization policies on endogenously created fluctuations. A simple monetary model with intertemporally optimizing agents is considered. Fluctuations in output may occur due to fluctuations in labor supply which are again caused by volatile expectations which are ``self fulfilling'', i.e. correct given the model. It turns out that stabilization policies that are sufficiently countercyclical in the sense that government spending (on transfers or demand) depends sufficiently strongly negatively on GNP-increases can stabilize the economy at a monetary steadystate for an arbitrarily low degree of distortion of that steady state. Such stabilization has unambiguously good welfare effects and can be achieved without features such as positive lump sum taxation or negative income taxation as part of the stabilization policy.
Resumo:
Registering originative business contracts allows entrepreneurs and creditors to choose, andcourts to enforce market-friendly contract rules that protect innocent third parties whenadjudicating disputes on subsequent contracts. This reduces information asymmetry for thirdparties, which enhances impersonal trade. It does so without seriously weakening property rights,because it is rightholders who choose or activate the legal rules and can, therefore, minimize thecost of any possible weakening. Registries are essential not only to make the chosen rules publicbut to ensure rightholders commitment and avoid rule-gaming, because independent registriesmake rightholders choices verifiable by courts. The theory is supported by comparative andhistorical analyses.
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Esta dissertação tem por finalidade evidenciar os “Impactos Decorrentes da Expansão da Cidade de Assomada”. Propõe-se ainda, analisar a relação urbanorural no município de Santa Catarina, Cabo Verde. Essa análise incidiu sobre os dados da sua ocupação, que remonta à 2ª metade do século XIX, no decurso da crise e decadência da primeira cidade de Cabo Verde (Ribeira Grande, atual Cidade- Velha) e às conjunturas regionais e nacionais que condicionaram sua trajetória, bem como, os principais agentes intervenientes na transformação do espaço urbano de Assomada (Estado, proprietários de terra e comerciantes), sobretudo, no período que decorre de 1961 a 2003. A pesquisa empreendida demonstra que a “ruralidade” é um dos aspectos fundamentais de Santa Catarina, abrangendo 21,3% da população rural do território nacional e 37,9% da ilha de Santiago. Do ponto de vista urbanístico, o mapeamento da evolução da cidade de Assomada, referente à área ocupada pelas edificações nesse lapso de tempo, permite-nos perceber um crescimento bastante acelerado desse espaço urbano, sobretudo, a partir dos anos 90. Dois aspectos importantes se encontram na base dessa transformação: a Independência Nacional ocorrida em 1975 e a Emigração. Com a Independência, o país passou a beneficiar de amplos programas de cooperação internacional o que veio a reforçar a sua importância econômica e política, visualizada através de projetos industrializantes, infra-estruturas e equipamentos de diversas naturezas. Esses investimentos foram por sua vez reforçados por aportes dos emigrantes, que passaram a ser um dos parceiros fundamentais no desenvolvimento de Santa Catarina, através de iniciativas privadas e empresariais, como a construção de residências e constituição de empresas. A análise do indicador uso e ocupação do solo urbano permitiu-nos identificar alguns impactos ambientais causados, sobretudo, pela falta de instrumentos de gestão urbanística, ausência de cadastro municipal e uma deficiente fiscalização dos órgãos administrativos.