Combating corruption in international business transactions


Autoria(s): Celentani, Marco; Ganuza, Juan José; Peydró, José L.
Contribuinte(s)

Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa

Data(s)

15/09/2005

Resumo

We analyze the impact of different types of international conventions thatrequire signatory countries to penalize domestic firms that are found tohave bribed foreign public officials. We analyze enforcement of penaltiesunder a convention styled after the OECD's 'Convention on Combating Briberyof Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions', in whichsignatory countries commit to prosecuting firms that have bribed publicofficials of any foreign country. We compare the results with the case inwhich the convention requires signatory countries to commit to prosecutingfirms that have bribed public officials of signatory countries only.We argue that the second type of convention is more likely to ensureenforcement of penalties on firms found to have bribed foreign publicofficials.

Identificador

http://hdl.handle.net/10230/883

Idioma(s)

eng

Direitos

L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons

info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

<a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/</a>

Palavras-Chave #Business Economics and Industrial Organization #Microeconomics #international corruption #oecd convention
Tipo

info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper