Staying in the Delaware Corporate Governance Lane: Fee Shifting Bylaws and a Legislative Reaffirmation of the Rules of the Road

The Delaware legislature has taken steps towards the adoption of amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) that would prohibit fee shifting provisions in the articles and bylaws. The language in the legislative proposal, however, addresses fee shifting provisions only in the context of "internal corporate claims." Some have raised concerns that this language would allow for fee shifting provisions that applied to other types of actions, including at least some cases brought under the securities laws. This piece suggests that in fact the Delaware General Corporation Law already prohibits the adoption of bylaws and certificate provisions that apply to causes of action unrelated to internal corporate claims. As a result, there was no reason for the Delaware legislature to expressly bar fee shifting provisions in these types of actions.

Affordable Environmental Cleanup Actions at Abandoned Hard Rock Mine Sites

Abandoned mine land cleanups are limited by restrictive regulations, inconsistent and unavailable funds, and a lack of adequate protections for stakeholders attempting to improve site conditions. This study evaluated examples of two cleanup mechanisms: an EPA-lead CERCLA cleanup and a state-lead, stakeholder-funded approach. The case studies showed that CERCLA provides the most comprehensive funding mechanism for abandoned mine cleanups while offering very little flexibility. State-lead programs allow for more flexibility, yet states are bound by federal laws and are hampered by lack of funding. Case analysis determined that any new approach should provide adequate funding, be flexible in its cleanup criteria, and minimize liability for those undertaking cleanups. It must also protect human health and promote natural ecological recovery.

CERCLA: A Case Study of Local Government Involvement in the Decision-Making Process in Colorado

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980, and the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) of 1986 strengthen roles of the community in the CERCLA process. Many layers of bureaucracy and the complexity of regulations make the implementation and enforcement of environmental policy a burdensome process. Local government, the public and private corporations have a critical role in the CERCLA decision-making process by implementing a comprehensive public participation process. This paper examines a case study in which a local Colorado health department implemented a successful public participation process in order to positively affect the remediation decision-making process.

Workmen's compensation acts in the United States: the medical aspect

National Industrial Conference Board.

IV. Promissory Notes, 1790-1793

This series consists of handwritten slips written by the borrower with the promise of repayment with interest to a specified lender. Some of the notes reflect loans made to the Butler by members of the community, and others are promissory notes to Adams signed by Harvard students.

IV. Promissory Notes, 1790-1793

This series consists of handwritten slips written by the borrower with the promise of repayment with interest to a specified lender. Some of the notes reflect loans made to the Butler by members of the community, and others are promissory notes to Adams signed by Harvard students.

[ Majmūʻat rasāʼil]

li-Maḥmūd Afandī al-Ḥamzāwī.

A ação direta da vítima contra a seguradora nos seguros facultativos de responsabilidade civil na dogmática brasileira

A investigação parte do surgimento histórico do contrato de seguro, abordando em sequencia sua teoria geral e a dogmática brasileira pertinente para, após, traçar os contornos específicos do contrato de seguro de responsabilidade civil, tanto pelo viés doutrinário quanto da legislação vigente no Brasil, dando ênfase maior ao seu conceito e finalidade social, às peculiaridades de seu sinistro, assim como à pluralidade de interesses nele albergado, afastando-se a ideia de se tratar de um seguro de reembolso, e adotando-se sua conceituação como de um seguro de garantia. Após, são fixados os conceitos básicos de processo civil aplicáveis ao objeto do estudo: jurisdição, processo, ação e seus elementos, para somente então expor o surgimento e desenvolvimento teórico da ação direta da vítima contra a seguradora na doutrina e jurisprudência francesas, passando pelas fases exegética, legalista e doutrinária de sua análise. Com base neste desenvolvimento histórico, adota-se concepção da ação direta da vítima contra a seguradora como instituto jurídico de conformação própria, oriundo dos princípios de equidade e justiça, e destinado ao afastamento dos princípios gerais de direito civil da relatividade contratual e da igualdade entre credores, constituindo meio de exercício do direito próprio da vítima contra a seguradora do causador do dano. Delimitados os conceitos em estudo, são expostas algumas experiências estrangeiras acerca do uso da ação direta e, partindo-se do embasamento teórico do seguro de responsabilidade civil e da ação direta da vítima por este protegida, ingressa-se na análise de seu desenvolvimento na dogmática brasileira. Para tanto, volta-se à ideia do seguro de responsabilidade civil como seguro de reembolso, e aos argumentos dela decorrentes para afastar o cabimento da ação direta, tais como o princípio da relatividade contratual, a ausência de previsão de solidariedade entre segurado e seguradora, e as dificuldades de exercício da ação e também de defesa por parte da seguradora e do segurado. Expostos e criticados os argumentos contrários ao cabimento da ação direta, passa-se ao estudo das tentativas doutrinárias e jurisprudenciais, no direito brasileiro, de se fornecer à vítima um meio de exercício de sua ação contra a seguradora, inicialmente por instrumentos de processo civil, e terminando por se reconhecer a possibilidade de acionamento conjunto de segurado e seguradora pelo Superior Tribunal de Justiça na sua Súmula 529. Por último, são tratados os argumentos doutrinários e legislativos favoráveis ao cabimento da ação direta da vítima contra a seguradora em qualquer seguro de responsabilidade civil, com e sem a participação inicial do segurado no processo, com destaque à função social do contrato de seguro de responsabilidade civil facultativo e ao direito próprio da vítima perante a seguradora. Conclui-se, assim, que a ação direta da vítima contra a seguradora, em qualquer seguro de responsabilidade civil, é instrumento apto e cabível na dogmática brasileira para dar vazão aos preceitos de equidade e justiça, despersonalizando a responsabilidade civil, ao levar seu foco da imputação para a indenidade, respeitando ao duplo interesse do moderno contrato de seguro de responsabilidade civil, e solucionando pela via mais apta e simples situação complexa.

Responsabilidade civil extracontratual por omissão do Estado brasileiro e os direitos fundamentais dos sujeitos de direitos especificados na Constituição de 1988

A presente tese de mestrado tem como principal objetivo discutir a natureza da responsabilidade civil extracontratual do Estado por ato omissivo, em face dos direitos fundamentais de prestações positivas aos sujeitos de direitos especificados na CF/1988. Para tanto, buscou-se conhecer os contornos constitutivos da responsabilidade civil e dos direitos fundamentais; a relação constitucional do Estado com a cidadania; o papel do Estado em relação à efetividade dos direitos fundamentais destinados aos sujeitos de direitos especificados. Para execução desse propósito, a doutrina e a legislação constitucional e infraconstitucional foram consultadas e interpretadas. Da análise doutrinária, pode-se perceber que a corrente majoritária defende ser subjetiva a natureza da responsabilidade civil do Estado por omissão; e da análise jurisprudencial constata-se que, nos dias de hoje, há um movimento crescente em considerar como objetiva essa mesma responsabilidade. Por fim, chegou-se à conclusão de que a responsabilidade civil do Estado é sempre objetiva e, com relação aos danos produzidos por sua omissão em conferir efetividade aos direitos fundamentais dos sujeitos de direitos especificados, há que se observar uma abordagem diferenciada na apuração dos pressupostos.

A Proper Yield Curve for Greece to Kick-Start Financial Intermediation. ECMI Policy Brief No. 21, 10 December 2013

At present, the market is severely mispricing Greece’s sovereign risk relative to the country’s fundamentals. As a result of the mispricing, financial intermediation in Greece has become dysfunctional and the privatisation of state-owned assets has stalled. This mispricing is partially due to an illiquid and fragmented government yield curve. A well-designed public liability management exercise can lead to a more efficient pricing of Greece’s government bonds and thereby help restore stable and affordable financing for the country’s private sector, which is imperative in order to overcome Greece’s deep recession. This paper proposes three measures to enhance the functioning of the Greek government debt market: i) Greece should issue a new five-year bond, ii) it should consolidate the 20 individual series of government bonds into four liquid securities and iii) it should offer investors a swap of these newly created bonds into dollar-denominated securities. Each of these measures would be beneficial to the Hellenic Republic, since the government would be able to reduce the face value and the net present value of its debt stock. Furthermore, this exercise would facilitate the resumption of market access, which is a necessary condition for continuous multilateral disbursements to Greece.

Designing a Genuine EMU: Which "Unions" for EU and Eurozone? Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 34/2014

The initial ‘framing’ (in the summer of 2012) of the ‘genuine EMU’ for the wider public suggested to design an entire series of ‘unions’. So many ‘unions’ are neither necessary nor desirable – only some are and their design matters. The paper critically discusses first the negative fall-out of the crisis for EMU, and subsequently assesses the fiscal and the banking unions as accomplished so far, without going into highly specific technical details. The assessment is moderately positive, although there is ample scope for further improvement and a risk for short-term turbulence once the ECB has finished its tests and reviews. What about the parade of other ’unions’ such as economic union, social union and political union? The macro-economic imbalances procedure (MIP) and possibly the ESRB have overcome the pre-crisis disregard of macro competitiveness. The three components of ‘economic union’ (single market, economic policy coordination and budgetary disciplines) have all been strengthened. The last two ‘unions’, on the other hand, would imply a fundamental change in the conferral of powers to the EU/ Eurozone, with drastic and possibly very serious long-run implications, including a break-up of the Union, if such proposals would be pushed through. The cure is worse than the disease. Whereas social union is perhaps easier to dismiss as a ‘misfit’ in the EU, the recent popularity of suggesting a ‘political union’ is seen as worrisome. Probably, nobody knows what a ‘political union’ is, or, at best, it is a highly elastic notion: it might be thought necessary for reasons of domestic economic reforms in EU countries, for a larger common budget, for some EU tax power, for (greater) risk pooling, for ‘symmetric’ macro-economic adjustment and for some ultimate control of the ECB in times of crisis. Taking each one of these arguments separately, a range of more typical EU solutions might be found without suggesting a ‘political union’. Just as ‘fiscal capacity’ was long an all-or-nothing taboo for shifting bank resolution to the EU level, now solved with a modest common Fund and carefully confined but centralised powers, the author suggests that other carefully targeted responses can be designed for the various aspects where seen as indispensable, including the political say of a lender-of-last-resort function of the ECB. Hence, neither a social nor a political union worthy of the name ought to be pursued. Yet, political legitimacy matters, both with national parliaments and the grassroots. National parliaments will have to play a larger role.

The Monetary Policy of the European Central Bank (2002-2015). CEPS Special Report No. 109/May 2015

This paper examines the policies pursued by the European Central Bank (ECB) since the inception of the euro. The ECB was originally set up to pursue price stability, with an eye also to economic growth and financial stability as subsidiary goals, once the primary goal was secured. The application of a single monetary policy to a diverse economic area has entailed a pronounced pro-cyclicality in its real economic effects on the eurozone periphery. Later, monetary policy became the main policy instrument to tackle financial instability elicited by the failure of Lehman Brothers and the sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone. In the process, the ECB emerged as the lender of last resort in the sovereign debt markets of participating countries. Persistent economic depression and deflation eventually brought the ECB into the uncharted waters of unconventional policies. That the ECB could legally perform all of these tasks bears witness to the flexibility of the TFEU and its Statute, but its tools and operating procedures were stretched to their limit. In the end, the place of the ECB amongst EU policy-making institutions has been greatly enhanced, but has entailed repeated intrusions into the broader domain of economic policies – not least because of its market intervention policies – whose consequences have yet to be ascertained.

Greater TTIP Ambition in Chemicals: Why and how. CEPS Special Report, 28 July 2015. Paper No. 10 in the CEPS-CTR project ‘TTIP in the Balance’ and CEPS Special Report No. 114/July 2015.

To date, the negotiations over chemicals in the Translatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) have not shown sufficient ambition. The talks have focused too much on the differences in the two ‘systems’, rather than on the actual levels of health and environmental protection for substances regulated by both the US and the EU. Given the accomplishments within the OECD and the UN Globally Harmonised System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals (GHS), the question is whether TTIP can be any more ambitious in the area of chemicals? We find that there is no detailed or systematic knowledge about how the two levels of protection in chemicals compare, although caricatures and stereotypes abound. This is partly due to an obsessive focus on a single US federal law, the Toxic Subtances Control Act (TSCA), whereas in practice US protection depends on many statutes and regulations, as well as on voluntary withdrawals (under pressure from the Environmental Protection Agency) and severe common law liability. This paper makes the economic case for firmly addressing the regulatory barriers, discusses the EU’s proposals, finds that the European Parliament’s Resolution on TTIP of July 2015 lacks a rationale (for chemicals), argues that both TSCA and REACH ought to be improved (based on ‘better regulation’), discusses the link with a global regime, advocates significant improvement of market access where equivalence of health and environmental objectives is agreed and, finally, proposes to lower the costs for companies selling in both markets by allowing them to opt into the other party’s more stringent rules, thereby avoiding duplication while racing-to-the-top. The ‘living agreement’ on chemicals ought to be led by a new TTIP institution authorised to establish the level of health and environmental protection on both sides of the Atlantic for substances regulated on both sides. These findings will lay the foundation for a highly beneficial lowering of trading costs without in any way affecting the level of protection. Indeed, this is exactly what TTIP is, or should be, all about.This paper is the 10th in a series produced in the context of the “TTIP in the Balance” project, jointly organised by CEPS and the Center for Transatlantic Relations (CTR) in Washington, D.C. It is published simultaneously on the CEPS (www.ceps.eu) and CTR websites (http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu).

The Monetary Policy of the European Central Bank (2002-2015). Bruges European Economic Policy Briefings (BEEP) 35/2015.

This paper examines the policies pursued by the European Central Bank (ECB) since the inception of the euro. The ECB was originally set up to pursue price stability, with an eye also to economic growth and financial stability as subsidiary goals, once the primary goal was secured. The application of a single monetary policy to a diverse economic area has entailed a pronounced pro-cyclicality in its real economic effects on the eurozone periphery. Later, monetary policy became the main policy instrument to tackle financial instability elicited by the failure of Lehman Brothers and the sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone. In the process, the ECB emerged as the lender of last resort in the sovereign debt markets of participating countries. Persistent economic depression and deflation eventually brought the ECB into the uncharted waters of unconventional policies. That the ECB could legally perform all of these tasks bears witness to the flexibility of the TFEU and its Statute, but its tools and operating procedures were stretched to their limit. In the end, the place of the ECB amongst EU policy-making institutions has been greatly enhanced, but has entailed repeated intrusions into the broader domain of economic policies – not least because of its market intervention policies – whose consequences have yet to be ascertained.

Firmer foundations for a stronger European Banking Union. Bruegel Working Paper 2015/13, November 2015

The move to European Banking Union involving the supervision and resolution of banks at euro-area level was stimulated by the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area in 2012. However, the long-term objective of Banking Union is dealing with intensified cross-border banking.The share of the assets of national banking systems that come from other EU countries was rising before the financial and economic crisis of 2007, but went into decline thereafter in the context of a general retrenchment of international banking. Most recent data, however, suggests the decline has been halted. About 14 percent of the assets of banks in Banking Union come from other EU countries, while about a quarter of the assets of the top 25 banks in the Banking Union are held in other EU countries.While a crisis-prevention framework for the euro area has largely been completed, the crisis-management framework remains incomplete, potentially creating instability. There is no governance mechanism to resolve disputes between different levels of crisis-management agencies, and incentives to promote optimum oversight are lacking. Most importantly, risk-sharing mechanisms do not adequately address the sovereign-bank loop, with a lack of clarity about the divide between bail-in and bail-out.To complete Banking Union, the lender-of-last-resort and deposit insurance functions should move to the euro-area level, breaking the sovereign-bank loop. A fully-fledged single deposit insurance (and resolution) fund should be favoured over a reinsurance scheme for reasons of cost and simplicity.