An exploration of transformation theory and the western tradition: a critical evaluation of a graduate studies class

This qualitative study is an exploration of transformation theory, the Western tradition, and a critical evaluation of a graduate studies class at a university. It is an exploration of assumptions that are embedded in experience, that influence the experience and provide meaning about the experience. An attempt has been made to identify assumptions that are embedded in Western experience and connect them with assumptions that shape the graduate class experience. The focus is on assumptions that facilitate and impede large group discussions. Jungian psychology of personality type and archetype and developmental psychology is used to analyze the group experience. The pragmatic problem solving model, developed by Knoop, is used to guide thinking about the Western tradition. It is used to guide the analysis, synthesis and writing of the experience of the graduate studies class members. A search through Western history, philosophy. and science revealed assumptions about the nature of truth, reality, and the self. Assumptions embedded in Western thinking about the subject-object relationship, unity and diversity are made explicit. An attempt is made to identify Western tradition assumptions underlying transformation theory. The critical evaluation of the graduate studies class experience focuses upon issues associated with group process, self-directed learning, the educator-learner transaction and the definition of adult education. The advantages of making implicit assumptions explicit is explored.

Barnes Wines, Limited By-Law No. 90

The By-Law summary states it is "a by-law relating generally to the transaction of the business and affairs of Barnes Wines, Limited". The sub headings of the bill are as follows: Head Office, Corporate Seal, Meetings of Shareholders, Directors, Officers, Notices, Interpretation.

Indenture of Land Sold by Benjamin Middough to William Woodruff

Indenture stating that Benjamin Middough of Stamford sold a tract of land in the County of Oxford, district of London to William Woodruff of Niagara. The land consisted of 200 acres on lot 34 of the 2nd Concession. This transaction was registered on August 4, 1834 - instrument no. 2413. The date of sale was January 17, 1823.

Indenture of Land Sold by John Robertson to John Jackson

Indenture regarding land sold by John Robertson of Niagara to John Jackson of Niagara. This transaction is for part of Lot no. 93 in Niagara Township. This document was registered in the Lincoln and Haldimand Registry on September 10, 1823 in Book J folio 322 - instrument no. 6357. Date of transaction was May 5, 1823.

Indenture between Orson Phelps and Calista M. Phelps and Owen Clifford

Indenture of bargain and sale between Orson Phelps formerly of St. Catharines, but at the time of the transaction, was living in Buffalo, New York and Calista M. Phelps (his wife) and Owen Clifford of Grantham for lots numbered 12 and 13 in the 8th Concession in Grantham Township. The instrument no. is 3411, July 11, 1851.

Indenture between Julia Cleveland Woodruff and Margaret Julia Band

Indenture of Release of Dower between Julia Cleveland Woodruff of St. Catharines (widow of Hamilton K. Woodruff) and Margaret Julia Band of Toronto (wife of Percy K. Band). On Jan.28, 1926 Hamilton K. Woodruff granted and conveyed to Margaret Julia Band 1 acre in the Township of Sherbourne composed of Woodruff Island in St. Nora’s Lake opposite lot no.2 in the 1st concession of Sherborne, except the pine trees on the island. There were also 75 acres in the town of Sherborne composed of St. Margaret’s Island in St. Nora’s Lake. Julia Cleveland did not join in the execution of this conveyance but has agreed to execute this indenture in order to release her dower in said lands. Margaret Julia Band paid $1 to Julia Cleveland Woodruff to complete this transaction, Dec. 1947.

International Transmission of the Business Cycle in a Multi-Sector Model.

Multi-country models have not been very successful in replicating important features of the international transmission of business cycles. Standard models predict cross-country correlations of output and consumption which are respectively too low and too high. In this paper, we build a multi-country model of the business cycle with multiple sectors in order to analyze the role of sectoral shocks in the international transmission of the business cycle. We find that a model with multiple sectors generates a higher cross-country correlation of output than standard one-sector models, and a lower cross-country correlation of consumption. In addition, it predicts cross-country correlations of employment and investment that are closer to the data than the standard model. We also analyze the relative effects of multiple sectors, trade in intermediate goods, imperfect substitution between domestic and foreign goods, home preference, capital adjustment costs, and capital depreciation on the international transmission of the business cycle.

Information Sharing and the Stability of Cooperation in Research Joint Ventures.

The model studies information sharing and the stability of cooperation in cost reducing Research Joint Ventures (RJVs). In a four-stage game-theoretic framework, firms decide on participation in a RJV, information sharing, R&D expenditures, and output. An important feature of the model is that voluntary information sharing between cooperating firms increases information leakage from the RJV to outsiders. It is found that it is the spillover from the RJV to outsiders which determines the decision of insiders whether to share information, while it is the spillover affecting all firms which determines the level of information sharing within the RJV. RJVs representing a larger portion of firms in the industry are more likely to share information. It is also found that when sharing information is costless, firms never choose intermediate levels of information sharing : they share all the information or none at all. The size of the RJV is found to depend on three effects : a coordination effect, an information sharing effect, and a competition effect. Depending on the relative magnitudes of these effects, the size of the RJV may increase or decrease with spillovers. The effect of information sharing on the profitability of firms as well as on welfare is studied.

Organizational Design of R&D Activities

This paper addresses the question of whether R&D should be carried out by an independent research unit or be produced in-house by the firm marketing the innovation. We define two organizational structures. In an integrated structure, the firm that markets the innovation also carries out and finances research leading to the innovation. In an independent structure, the firm that markets the innovation buys it from an independent research unit which is financed externally. We compare the two structures under the assumption that the research unit has some private information about the real cost of developing the new product. When development costs are negatively correlated with revenues from the innovation, the integrated structure dominates. The independent structure dominates in the opposite case.

Wage Policy of Firms: an Empirical Investigation.

This paper analyzes the dynamics of wages and workers' mobility within firms with a hierarchical structure of job levels. The theoretical model proposed by Gibbons and Waldman (1999), that combines the notions of human capital accumulation, job rank assignments based on comparative advantage and learning about workers' abilities, is implemented empirically to measure the importance of these elements in explaining the wage policy of firms. Survey data from the GSOEP (German Socio-Economic Panel) are used to draw conclusions on the common features characterizing the wage policy of firms from a large sample of firms. The GSOEP survey also provides information on the worker's rank within his firm which is usually not available in other surveys. The results are consistent with non-random selection of workers onto the rungs of a job ladder. There is no direct evidence of learning about workers' unobserved abilities but the analysis reveals that unmeasured ability is an important factor driving wage dynamics. Finally, job rank effects remain significant even after controlling for measured and unmeasured characteristics.

Industrial Adjustment: Context, Causes, Impacts and Methods for Analysis

Adjustement is an ongoing process by which factors of reallocated to equalize their returns in different uses. Adjustment occurs though market mechanisms or intrafirm reallocation of resources as a result of changes in terms of trade, government policies, resource availability, technological change, etc. These changes alter production opportunities and production, transaction and information costs, and consequently modify production functions, organizational design, etc. In this paper we define adjustment (section 2); review empirical estimates of the extent of adjustment in Canada and abroad (section 3); review selected features of the trade policy and adjustment context of relevance for policy formulation among which: slow growth, a shift to services, a shift to the Pacific Rim, the internationalization of production, investment distribution communications the growing use of NTB's, changes in foreign direct investment patterns, intrafirm and intraindustry trade, interregional trade flows, differences in micro economic adjustment processes of adjustment as between subsidiaries and Canadian companies (section 4); examine methodologies and results of studies of the impact of trade liberalization on jobs (section 5); and review the R. Harris general equilibrium model (section 6). Our conclusion emphasizes the importance of harmonizing commercial and domestic policies dealing with adjustment (section 7). We close with a bibliography of relevant publications.

Rank Regressions, Wage Distributions and the Gender Gap.

In this paper, we model the interactions between the distribution of male and female wages under the assumption that any change in the wage distribution of women must be offset by an opposite change in the wage distribution of men.

Coherent Cost-Sharing Rules

We reconsider the discrete version of the axiomatic cost-sharing model. We propose a condition of (informational) coherence requiring that not all informational refinements of a given problem be solved differently from the original problem. We prove that strictly coherent linear cost-sharing rules must be simple random-order rules.

Wage Flexibility and Contract Structure in Germany

In this paper, we look at how labor market conditions at different points during the tenure of individuals with firms are correlated with current earnings. Using data on individuals from the German Socioeconomic Panel for the 1985-1994 period, we find that both the contemporaneous unemployment rate and prior values of the unemployment rate are significantly correlated with current earnings, contrary to results for the American labor market. Estimated elasticities vary between 9 and 15 percent for the elasticity of earnings with respect to current unemployment rates, and between 6 and 10 percent with respect to unemployment rates at the start of current firm tenure. Moreover, whereas local unemployment rates determine levels of earnings, national rates influence contemporaneous variations in earnings. We interpret this result as evidence that German unions do, in fact, bargain over wages and employment, but that models of individualistic contracts, such as the implicit contract model, may explain some of the observed wage drift and longer-term wage movements reasonably well. Furthermore, we explore the heterogeneity of contracts over a variety of worker and job characteristics. In particular, we find evidence that contracts differ across firm size and worker type. Workers of large firms are remarkably more insulated from the job market than workers for any other type of firm, indicating the importance of internal job markets.

Natural-Resource Exploitation with Costly Enforcement of Property Rights

This paper proposes a model of natural-resource exploitation when private ownership requires costly enforcement activities. For a given wage rate, it is shown how enforcement costs can increase with labor's average productivity on a resource site. As a result, it is never optimal for the site owner to produce at the point where marginal productivity equals the wage rate. It may even be optimal to exploit at a point exhibiting negative marginal returns. An important parameter in the analysis is the prevailing wage rate. When wages are low, further decreases in the wage rates can reduce the returns from resource exploitation. At sufficiently low wages, positive returns can be rendered impossible to achieve and the site is abandoned to a free-access exploitation. The analysis provides some clues as to why property rights may be more difficult to delineate in less developed countries. It proposes a different framework from which to address normative issues such as the desirability of free trade with endogenous enforcement costs, the optimality of private decisions to enforce property rights, the effect of income distribution on property rights enforceability, etc.