Education in J.J. Rousseau: a methodological antecedent of competence based teaching

Taking into account the huge repercussion and influence that J.J. Rousseau has had on modern pedagogy, the recent tercentenary of his birth is a good opportunity to think about his outstanding relevance nowadays. This paper is a theoretical and educative research developed with an analytic and comparative hermeneutical method. The main objective is to show how some concepts of his philosophy of education have a great similarity with certain changes that the present competency based teaching is demanding, so it could be considered its methodological background. In order to achieve this objective this exposure has been divided in three parts. The first part is an analysis of Rousseau's educational theory as developed in the first three books of the Emilio, in which one of the main themes is self experience-based learning, fostering self-sufficiency, curiosity and the motivation for learning. Rousseau proposed as a method the negative education, which requires, among other conditions, a constant monitoring of the learner by the tutor. In the second part, a brief summary of the most relevant changes and characteristics of competency-based teaching is developed, as well as its purpose. The student’s participation and activity are highlighted within their own learning process through the carrying out of tasks. The new educational model involves a radical change in the curriculum, in which it is highlighted the transformation of the methodology used in the classroom as well as the role of the teacher. Finally, the aim of the third part is to offer a comparative synthesis of both proposals grouping the parallelisms found in 4 topics: origin of the two models, its aims, methodology, and change in the teaching roles.

The spatial turn: geographical approaches in the history of science

Over the past decade or so a number of historians of science and historical geographers, alert to the situated nature of scientific knowledge production and reception and to the migratory patterns of science on the move, have called for more explicit treatment of the geographies of past scientific knowledge. Closely linked to work in the sociology of scientific knowledge and science studies and connected with a heightened interest in spatiality evident across the humanities and social sciences this ‹spatial turn’ has informed a wide-ranging body of work on the history of science. This discussion essay revisits some of the theoretical props supporting this turn to space and provides a number of worked examples from the history of the life sciences that demonstrate the different ways in which the spaces of science have been comprehended.

Effect of angiotensin-related antihypertensives on brain neurotransmitter levels in rats.

The extensive clinical experience of angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitors and angiotensin AT(1) receptor antagonists as antihypertensive agents provide numerous examples of anecdotal evidence of improvements in cognition and mood. This study aimed to determine the effect of chronic treatment with the angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitor, perindopril, and the angiotensin AT(1) receptor antagonist, candesartan, on central neurotransmitter levels in the rat. Perindopril (1.0mg/kg/day) or candesartan (10mg/kg/day) was administered via the drinking water at for 1 week, while controls received water alone. At the end of treatment rats were sacrificed, brains removed and discrete regions dissected and analysed for noradrenaline, dopamine and its major metabolites, and serotonin content. As shown previously we found an increase in striatal dopamine levels after perindopril treatment, though this did not extend to the mesolimbic system with neurotransmitter levels unchanged in the hippocampus, nucleus accumbens and frontal cortex. Conversely, candesartan administration produced no change in dopamine, but significant decreases in both DOPAC and HVA in the striatum. In addition chronic candesartan infusion produced a significant increase in the levels of hippocampal noradrenaline and serotonin; and frontal cortex serotonin content. These results demonstrate that while angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitors and angiotensin AT(1) receptor antagonists act as antihypertensives by affecting the renin-angiotensin system, they have divergent actions on brain neurochemistry.

Paul Karl Feyerabend Las proyecciones de la proliferación teórica en la relación ciencia-metafísica

La doctrina de la Proliferación teórica de Paul Karl Feyerabend ha sido interpretada por sus especialistas como un intento de salvaguardar el ideal del progreso científico. Aunque tales estudios hacen justicia, en parte, a la intencionalidad de nuestro filósofo no explicitan la crítica fundamental que implica para Feyerabend el pluralismo teórico. La proliferación teórica constituye en sí misma una reductio ad absurdum de los distintos intentos del positivismo lógico y del racionalismo crítico por definir la ciencia a expensas de lo metafísico. Este artículo presenta la proliferación teórica como una reivindicación del papel positivo que ocupa la metafísica en el quehacer científico. Se consigna la defensa que hace Feyerabend de la metafísica en cuanto que ésta constituye la posibilidad de superar el conservadurismo conceptual, aumentar de contenido empírico de la ciencia y recuperar el valor descriptivo de las teorías científicas.

Temporal Decentering and the Development of Temporal Concepts

This article reviews some recent research on the development of temporal cognition, with reference to Weist's (1989) account of the development of temporal understanding. Weist's distinction between two levels of temporal decentering is discussed, and empirical studies that may be interpreted as measuring temporal decentering are described. We argue that if temporal decentering is defined simply in terms of the coordination of the temporal locations of three events, it may fail to fully capture the properties of mature temporal understanding. Characterizing the development of mature temporal cognition may require, in addition, distinguishing between event-dependent and event-independent thought about time. Experimental evidence relevant to such a distinction is described; these findings suggest that there may be important changes between 3 and 5 years in children's ability to think about points in time independently of the events that occur at those times.