Paul Karl Feyerabend Las proyecciones de la proliferación teórica en la relación ciencia-metafísica
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25/05/2015
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La doctrina de la Proliferación teórica de Paul Karl Feyerabend ha sido interpretada por sus especialistas como un intento de salvaguardar el ideal del progreso científico. Aunque tales estudios hacen justicia, en parte, a la intencionalidad de nuestro filósofo no explicitan la crítica fundamental que implica para Feyerabend el pluralismo teórico. La proliferación teórica constituye en sí misma una reductio ad absurdum de los distintos intentos del positivismo lógico y del racionalismo crítico por definir la ciencia a expensas de lo metafísico. Este artículo presenta la proliferación teórica como una reivindicación del papel positivo que ocupa la metafísica en el quehacer científico. Se consigna la defensa que hace Feyerabend de la metafísica en cuanto que ésta constituye la posibilidad de superar el conservadurismo conceptual, aumentar de contenido empírico de la ciencia y recuperar el valor descriptivo de las teorías científicas. The Paul Karl Feyerabend’s doctrine of theoretical proliferation has been interpreted by his experts as an attempt to preserve the ideal of scientific progress. This hermeneutics describes, in part, the intention of our philosopher. However, this reading does not explain the fundamental criticism that theoretical pluralism supposes for Feyerabend. The theoretical proliferation is itself a reductio ad absurdum of the attempts of logical positivism and critical rationalism to define science at the expense of the metaphysical. This article presents the theoretical proliferation as a vindication of the positive role that the metaphysical plays in scientific practice. We expose the Feyerabend’s defense of metaphysics inasmuch as it is constitute the possibility to overcome the conceptual conservatism, to increase empirical content of science and to recover the descriptive value of scientific theories. |
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application/pdf |
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http://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/ASHF/article/view/48687 10.5209/rev_ASHF.2015.v32.n1.48687 |
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Ediciones Complutense |
| Relação |
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| Fonte |
Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía; Vol 32, No 1 (2015); 221-258 |
| Palavras-Chave | #Ciencia; ciencia-metafísica; Feyerabend; Positivismo lógico; proliferación teórica; racionalismo crítico. #Critical rationalism; science; science-metaphysics; Feyerabend; logical positivism; theoretical proliferation. |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/article Artículo revisado por pares info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
