Water planning law and government.

Water planning efforts typically identify problems and needs. But simply calling attention to issues is usually not enough to spur action; the end result of many well-intentioned planning efforts is a report that ends up gathering dust on a shelf. Vague recommendations like “Water conservation measures should be implemented” usually accomplish little by themselves as they don’t assign responsibility to anyone. Success is more likely when an implementation strategy — who can and should do what — is developed as part of the planning process. The more detailed and specific the implementation strategy, the greater the chance that something will actually be done. The question then becomes who has the legal authority or responsibility to do what? Are new laws and programs needed or can existing ones be used to implement the recommendations? ... This document is divided into four main parts. The first, “Carrots and Sticks” looks at two basic approaches — regulatory and non-regulatory — that can be, and are, used to carry out water policy. Both have advantages and disadvantages that need to be considered. The second, “The powers of federal, state and local governments…,” looks at the constitutional powers the federal government and state and local governments have to carry out water policy. An initial look at the U. S. Constitution might suggest the federal government’s regulatory authority over water is limited but, in fact, its powers are very substantial. States have considerable authority to do a number of things but have to be mindful of any federal efforts that might conflict with those state efforts. And local governments can only do those things the state constitution or state legislature says they can do and must conform to any requirements or limitations on those powers that are contained in the enabling acts. Parts three and four examine in more detail the main programs and agencies at the federal level as well as Iowa’s state and local levels and the roles they play in national and state water policy.

Governor’s Office of Drug Control Policy Performance Plan, FY 2014

The Agency Performance Report for the Governor’s Office of Drug Control Policy is published in accordance with the Accountable Government Act. The information provided illustrates accountability to stakeholders and citizens. The report is indicative of the agency’s progress in achieving goals consistent with the enterprise strategic plan, the agency strategic plan and agency performance plan.

The impact of authority advice and accountability on auditors' decision to recognise norm-violating transactions.

Auditors face the difficult responsibilty to approve companies' financial accounting information reliably. They are trained to work according to accounting standards that are designed to help them in their decision making. Yet, auditors do not work in a social vacuum and are thus subject to various influences. One important source of influence at work is authority figures (e.g., experts, supervisors). On this background, we examined within two studies the impact of (1) authority advice to comply with accounting standards or to additionally maximize profits and (2) of participants' accountability for their decision. In Study 1, (n = 184 accounting students), participants who were advised by an authority to comply with accounting standards had a lower probability to recognise transactions that violated those standards than participants who were advised to comply but also to maximise profit. However, holding participants accountable for their decision reduced the difference between the two groups. In Study 2, (n = 58 managers), we again found an interaction between authority advice and accountability. But unlike the first study, participants only showed a lower probability to recognise transactions that violated accounting standards when they were held accountable and when the authority only advised them to comply with the standards. We discuss our results in light of unethical decision making and different norms or pressures to which managers may be exposed but students may not.

Water Planning Law and Government, November 2008

Water planning efforts typically identify problems and needs. But simply calling attention to issues is usually not enough to spur action; the end result of many well-intentioned planning efforts is a report that ends up gathering dust on a shelf. Vague recommendations like “Water conservation measures should be implemented” usually accomplish little by themselves as they don’t assign responsibility to anyone. Success is more likely when an implementation strategy — who can and should do what — is developed as part of the planning process. The more detailed and specific the implementation strategy, the greater the chance that something will actually be done.

Shrouded costs of government: The political economy of state and local public pensions

Why do public-sector workers receive so much of their compensation in the formof pensions and other benefits? This paper presents a political economy model inwhich politicians compete for taxpayers' and government employees' votes by promising compensation packages, but some voters cannot evaluate every aspect of promisedcompensation. If pension packages are "shrouded", so that public-sector workers better understand their value than ordinary taxpayers, then compensation will be highlyback-loaded. In equilibrium, the welfare of public-sector workers could be improved,holding total public-sector costs constant, if they received higher wages and lowerpensions. Centralizing pension determination has two offsetting effects on generosity:more state-level media attention helps taxpayers better understand pension costs, andthat reduces pension generosity; but a larger share of public-sector workers will votewithin the jurisdiction, which increases pension generosity. A short discussion of pensions in two decentralized states (California and Pennsylvania) and two centralizedstates (Massachusetts and Ohio) suggests that centralization appears to have modestlyreduced pensions, but, as the model suggests, this is unlikely to be universal.

Fiscal Year 2015 Report on the Condition of Affirmative Action, Diversity, and Multi-cultural Programs in State Government and Fiscal Year 2016 Plan, September 30, 2015

Each agency is invited and encouraged to send a representative to a quarterly Department of Administrative Services State Recruitment Coordinating Committee “Committee” meeting. This Committee conducts strategic planning sessions to identify top goals and initiatives for the next 2-3 years.

Country actions to meet UN commitments on non-communicable diseases: a stepwise approach.

Strong leadership from heads of state is needed to meet national commitments to the UN political declaration on non-communicable diseases (NCDs) and to achieve the goal of a 25% reduction in premature NCD mortality by 2025 (the 25 by 25 goal). A simple, phased, national response to the political declaration is suggested, with three key steps: planning, implementation, and accountability. Planning entails mobilisation of a multisectoral response to develop and support the national action plan, and to build human, financial, and regulatory capacity for change. Implementation of a few priority and feasible cost-effective interventions for the prevention and treatment of NCDs will achieve the 25 by 25 goal and will need only few additional financial resources. Accountability incorporates three dimensions: monitoring of progress, reviewing of progress, and appropriate responses to accelerate progress. A national NCD commission or equivalent, which is independent of government, is needed to ensure that all relevant stakeholders are held accountable for the UN commitments to NCDs.

The media accountability of independent regulatory agencies

Independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) are increasingly attracting academic and societal attention, as they represent the institutional cornerstone of the regulatory state and play a key role in policy-making. Besides the expected benefits in terms of credibility and efficiency, these regulators are said to bring about a 'democratic deficit', following their statutory separation from democratic institutions. Consequently, a 'multi-pronged system of control' is required. This article focuses on a specific component of this system, that is, the media. The goal is to determine whether media coverage of IRAs meets the necessary prerequisites to be considered a potential 'accountability forum' for regulators. The results of a comparison of two contrasted cases - the British and Swiss competition commissions - mostly support the expectations, because they show that media coverage of IRAs corresponds to that of the most relevant policy issues and follows the regulatory cycle. Furthermore, a systematic bias in media coverage can be excluded.

The influence of the quality of government institutions on entrepreneurial motivation: exploring the variance across countries

Despite the increasing understanding of the relationships between institutions and entrepreneurship, the influence of the quality of government institutions on entrepreneurship is less addressed. This paper focuses on this critical determinant of entrepreneurship in developing and developed countries. Drawing from institutional theory we hypothesize and empirically assess the role of the quality of institutions in entrepreneurial activity. We examine how the quality of government institutions influences the rate of necessity-based entrepreneurial activity across countries and over time by using a cross-sectional time-series approach on data from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) database covering the years 2001–2011. Our results suggest that higher economic development associated with better quality of institutions reduces the prevalence of necessity-based entrepreneurship. Our findings imply that developing countries must rationally organize their functions, and seek to remove unnecessary barriers, decrease political instability, and controls that hamper entrepreneurial activity

Effects of Government Ownership on Firm Performance: Evidence from Finnish Companies

Tutkimuksen tarkoituksena on selvittää, miten valtionomistajuus vaikuttaa yrityksen suorituskykyyn suomalaisissa pörssinoteeratuissa valtionyhtiöissä, joissa valtio toimii pää- tai osaomistajana. Suorituskykyä tutkitaan kandella eri menetelmällä. Ensin tutkitaan osaketuottoja Jensenin alfan avulla, jonka jälkeen suoritetaan tilinpäätöstunnuslukujen toimialavertailu. Tutkimuksen teoriaosuudessa esitetään yksityistämisen tuottamia etuja yrityksen taloudelliseen suorituskykyyn, sekä myöskin valtionomistajuuden tuottamia etuja. Lisäksi teoriaosuudessa käsitellään aikaisempien empiiristen tutkimusten tuloksia valtionomistajuuden vaikutuksista. Tämän tutkimuksen empiirisessä osiossa käytettävä data on saatu osakedatan osalta Datastreamista ja tilinpäätöstunnuslukujen osalta Balance Consulting Oy:ltä. Kokonaisosakedataa koskeva tutkimus Jensenin alfalla ei osoittanut valtionyhtiöiden toimivan tehottomasti, vaan osoitti yritysten kyenneen tuottamaan epänormaaleja tuottoja riskitasoonsa nähden. Vuositasolle pilkotun datan analysointi sen sijaan tuotti useita negatiivisia alfoja yrityksille eli merkkejä tehottomuudesta tiettyinä vuosina. Lisäksi tilinpäätöstunnuslukujen analysointi osoitti osan valtionyhtiöistä olleen pääosin omaa toimialaansa tehottomampia, kun taas osa kykenipäihittämään toimialansa.

Points to consider for prioritizing clinical genetic testing services: a European consensus process oriented at accountability for reasonableness.

Given the cost constraints of the European health-care systems, criteria are needed to decide which genetic services to fund from the public budgets, if not all can be covered. To ensure that high-priority services are available equitably within and across the European countries, a shared set of prioritization criteria would be desirable. A decision process following the accountability for reasonableness framework was undertaken, including a multidisciplinary EuroGentest/PPPC-ESHG workshop to develop shared prioritization criteria. Resources are currently too limited to fund all the beneficial genetic testing services available in the next decade. Ethically and economically reflected prioritization criteria are needed. Prioritization should be based on considerations of medical benefit, health need and costs. Medical benefit includes evidence of benefit in terms of clinical benefit, benefit of information for important life decisions, benefit for other people apart from the person tested and the patient-specific likelihood of being affected by the condition tested for. It may be subject to a finite time window. Health need includes the severity of the condition tested for and its progression at the time of testing. Further discussion and better evidence is needed before clearly defined recommendations can be made or a prioritization algorithm proposed. To our knowledge, this is the first time a clinical society has initiated a decision process about health-care prioritization on a European level, following the principles of accountability for reasonableness. We provide points to consider to stimulate this debate across the EU and to serve as a reference for improving patient management.

Corruption scandals, press reporting, and accountability. Evidence from Spanish mayors.

[spa] En este trabajo se analiza con datos de España los efectos de la corrupción local sobre los resultados electorales. En base a las noticias publicadas entre 1996 y 2009, se construye una nueva base de datos que recoge los casos de corrupción y noticias relativas a cambios en los planes urbanísticos que no han seguido el procedimiento legal. La base de datos muestra que los primeros escándalos de corrupción urbanística surgieron durante el mandato electoral de 1999-2003, pero que éstos alcanzaron sus niveles máximos justo antes de las elecciones de 2007. Se estima una ecuación del porcentaje de voto obtenido por el partido en el poder en estas elecciones locales y se encuentra que la pérdida media de voto después de un caso de corrupción se sitúa alrededor del 4%. Este efecto es más elevado (del 9%) si el caso de corrupción ha recibido una amplia cobertura por los diarios. Los efectos estimados para las elecciones de 2003 son significativamente inferiores. Cuando se consideran los casos en que los políticos han tenido cargas judiciales por corrupción y amplia cobertura por los diarios, la pérdida de voto asciende hasta el 12%. No obstante, la cobertura por los diarios genera un efecto negativo en el voto incluso cuando no hay cargas judiciales.

Corruption scandals, press reporting, and accountability. Evidence from Spanish mayors.

[spa] En este trabajo se analiza con datos de España los efectos de la corrupción local sobre los resultados electorales. En base a las noticias publicadas entre 1996 y 2009, se construye una nueva base de datos que recoge los casos de corrupción y noticias relativas a cambios en los planes urbanísticos que no han seguido el procedimiento legal. La base de datos muestra que los primeros escándalos de corrupción urbanística surgieron durante el mandato electoral de 1999-2003, pero que éstos alcanzaron sus niveles máximos justo antes de las elecciones de 2007. Se estima una ecuación del porcentaje de voto obtenido por el partido en el poder en estas elecciones locales y se encuentra que la pérdida media de voto después de un caso de corrupción se sitúa alrededor del 4%. Este efecto es más elevado (del 9%) si el caso de corrupción ha recibido una amplia cobertura por los diarios. Los efectos estimados para las elecciones de 2003 son significativamente inferiores. Cuando se consideran los casos en que los políticos han tenido cargas judiciales por corrupción y amplia cobertura por los diarios, la pérdida de voto asciende hasta el 12%. No obstante, la cobertura por los diarios genera un efecto negativo en el voto incluso cuando no hay cargas judiciales.