Bridging East and West : The Establishment of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in the United States Foreign Policy of Bridge Building, 1964-1972.

The dissertation examines the foreign policies of the United States through the prism of science and technology. In the focal point of scrutiny is the policy establishing the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) and the development of the multilateral part of bridge building in American foreign policy during the 1960s and early 1970s. After a long and arduous negotiation process, the institute was finally established by twelve national member organizations from the following countries: Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), France, German Democratic Republic (GDR), Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Poland, Soviet Union and United States; a few years later Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands also joined. It is said that the goal of the institute was to bring together researchers from East and West to solve pertinent problems caused by the modernization process experienced in industrialized world. It originates from President Lyndon B. Johnson s bridge building policies that were launched in 1964, and was set in a well-contested and crowded domain of other international organizations of environmental and social planning. Since the distinct need for yet another organization was not evident, the process of negotiations in this multinational environment enlightens the foreign policy ambitions of the United States on the road to the Cold War détente. The study places this project within its political era, and juxtaposes it with other international organizations, especially that of the OECD, ECE and NATO. Conventionally, Lyndon Johnson s bridge building policies have been seen as a means to normalize its international relations bilaterally with different East European countries, and the multilateral dimension of the policy has been ignored. This is why IIASA s establishment process in this multilateral environment brings forth new information on US foreign policy goals, the means to achieve these goals, as well as its relations to other advanced industrialized societies before the time of détente, during the 1960s and early 1970s. Furthermore, the substance of the institute applied systems analysis illuminates the differences between European and American methodological thinking in social planning. Systems analysis is closely associated with (American) science and technology policies of the 1960s, especially in its military administrative applications, thus analysis within the foreign policy environment of the United States proved particularly fruitful. In the 1960s the institutional structures of European continent with faltering, and the growing tendencies of integration were in flux. One example of this was the long, drawn-out process of British membership in the EEC, another is de Gaulle s withdrawal from NATO s military-political cooperation. On the other hand, however, economic cooperation in Europe between East and West, and especially with the Soviet Union was expanding rapidly. This American initiative to form a new institutional actor has to be seen in that structural context, showing that bridge building was needed not only to the East, but also to the West. The narrative amounts to an analysis of how the United States managed both cooperation and conflict in its hegemonic aspirations in the emerging modern world, and how it used its special relationship with the United Kingdom to achieve its goals. The research is based on the archives of the United States, Great Britain, Sweden, Finland, and IIASA. The primary sources have been complemented with both contemporary and present day research literature, periodicals, and interviews.

The Iranian Foreign Policy in the Persian Gulf Region under the Rule of President Hassan Rouhani: Continuity of Change

Although Iran borders with many states and has direct access to the Caspian Sea as well as the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf region seems to be the most vital area to its security and prosperity. Yet since the 70’s Iran’s relations with the Arab states in the region have been rather strained and complex. The main reason for that had been the success of the Islamic revolution in 1979 which later resulted in a new dimension of Sunni-Shia rivalry. Moreover, post-revolutionary Iranian authorities also intended to maintain the regional hegemony from the Imperial State of Iran period. As a result, successive Iranian governments competed for hegemony in the Persian Gulf with the littoral Arab states which consolidated their regional positions due to close links and intensive cooperation with the West especially with the United States. Despite some political and economic initiatives which were undertaken by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, this rivalry was also evident between 2005–2013. The main aim of this article is to find out whether Iranian foreign policy towards the Arab states in the Persian Gulf region has undergone any significant changes since Hassan Rouhani became the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran in August 2013. According to Mohammad Reza Deshiri, the Iranian foreign policy after 1979 can be divided into so-called waves of idealism and realism. During dominance of idealism values and spirituality are more important than pragmatism while during the realistic waves political as well as economic interests prevail over spirituality. Iranian idealism is connected with export of revolutionary ideas, Shia dominance as well as the restoration of unity among all muslims (ummah). On this basis both presidential terms of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad can be classified as ‘waves of idealism’, albeit some of his ideas were very pragmatic. The question is if Hassan Rouhani’s foreign policy represents a continuity or a change. Is the current Iran’s foreign policy towards the Persian Gulf region idealistic or rather realistic? The main assumption is that there will be no Arab-Iranian rapprochement in the Persian Gulf without a prior normalization of political relations between Iran and the West especially the United States.

Introduction: the impact of the 'War on Terror' on executive–legislative relations: a global perspective

In democratic polities, constitutional equilibria or balances of power between the executive and the legislature shift over time. Normative and empirical political theorists have long recognised that war, civil unrest, economic and political crises, terrorist attacks, and other events strengthen the power of the executive, disrupt and threaten constitutional politics, and damage democratic institutions: crises require swift action and executives are thought to be more capable than parliaments and legislatures of taking such actions. The terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 and the ensuing so-called 'war on terror' declared by President Bush clearly constituted a crisis, not only in the United States but also in other political systems, in part because of the US's hegemonic position in defining and shaping many other states' foreign and domestic policies. Dicey, Schmitt, and Rossiter suggest that critical events and political crises inevitably trigger the concentration of (emergency) powers in the hands of the executive. Aristotle and Machiavelli questioned the inevitability of this process. This article and the articles that follow in this Special Issue utilise empirical evidence, through the use of case studies of the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, Australia, Israel, Italy and Indonesia, to address this debate. Specifically, the issue explores to what extent the external shock or crisis of 9/11 (and other terrorist attacks) and the ensuing 'war on terror' significantly changed the balance of executive-legislative relations from t (before the crisis) to t+1 (after the crisis) in these political systems, all of which were the targets of actual or foiled terrorist attacks. The most significant findings are that the shock of 9/11 and the 'war on terror' elicited varied responses by national executives and legislatures/parliaments and thus the balance of executive-legislative relations in different political systems; that, therefore, executive-legislative relations are positive rather than zero-sum; and that domestic political contexts conditioned these institutional responses.

La diplomacia cultural como herramienta para el mejoramiento de la relación económica de Colombia con Corea del Sur y Australia

Esta investigación se preocupa por dilucidar la función de la diplomacia cultural como herramienta para mejorar la relación económica de Colombia con Corea del Sur y Australia. Así, se analiza a la diplomacia cultural y lo que hace Colombia en esta materia en ambos países; así como el estado de la relación económica de Colombia en un periodo de ocho años con dichos países, y cómo las acciones culturales colombianas podrían llegar a mejorar dicha relación económica. De esta manera además del desarrollo conceptual de diplomacia cultural y los indicadores económicos, a saber; exportaciones; Inversión Extranjera Directa y turismo; se corrió un modelo de regresión lineal para saber si efectivamente hay relación entre ambas variables y una contribución final que consiste en una propuesta de generación de indicadores de gestión a utilizarse al momento de implementar la diplomacia cultural como herramienta en política exterior.

Japan and the Middle East after the Arab Spring

本稿は、中東における問題や紛争に対する日本の政策を考察し、中長期的な視野に立った日本の国益追求のためにはどのような選択肢が考えられるかを論じる。そのために、イランの核開発問題とシリアの市民戦争をケースとしてとりあげる。戦後の日本は中東での問題や紛争に対して、地域内諸国およびアメリカとの関係を同時に維持するために、双方の均衡を図る政策を打ち出してきたが、冷戦後には米国寄りの傾向が多く見られた。現在中東では、アラブの春の展望は不透明な部分が多い。日本は中東との関係において、問題や紛争の性質によっては負の遺産を抱える欧米とは一線を画した独自の政策とアプローチを打ち出すことが、中東資源国との関係の強化と拡大や中東市場の発展と安定には望ましいと考える。また同時に、今後の米国の中東における国益の変化が考えられることも要因ととらえ、本稿は冷戦期にみられたような、より均衡のとれた立場を打ち出し、より広い概念をもとに基づいた効果的なソフトパワーの行使を提唱する。

EU Migration Policy in the wake of the Arab Spring. What prospects for EU-Southern Mediterranean Relations? MEDPRO Technical Report No. 15/August 2012

The outbreak of the Arab Spring and the unrest, revolution and war that followed during the course of 2011 have forced the EU to acknowledge the need to radically re-think its policy approach towards the Southern Mediterranean, including in the domain of migration. Migration and mobility now feature as key components of High Representative Catherine Ashton’s new framework for cooperation with the region (Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity), while the EU has declared its intention to strengthen its external migration policy by setting up “mutually beneficial” partnerships with third countries – so-called ‘Dialogues for Migration, Mobility and Security’ – now placed at the centre of the EU’s renewed Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM). However, the success of this approach and its potential to establish genuine cooperative partnerships that will support smooth economic and political transformation in North Africa hinge on the working arrangements and institutional configurations shaping the renewed GAMM at EU level which has long been marked by internal fragmentation, a lack of transparency and a predominance of home affairs and security actors. This paper investigates the development of the Dialogues for Migration, Mobility and Security with the Southern Mediterranean in a post-Lisbon Treaty institutional setting. It asks to what extent has the application of the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of an “EU Foreign Minister” in High Representative Ashton, supported by a European External Action Service (EEAS), remedied or re-invigorated the ideological and institutional struggles around the implementation of the Global Approach? Who are the principal agents shaping and driving the Dialogues for Migration, Mobility and Security? Who goes abroad to speak on the behalf of the EU in these Dialogues and what impact does this have on the effectiveness, legitimacy and accountability of the Dialogues under the renewed GAMM as well as the wider prospects for the Southern Mediterranean?

Foreign assistance : North Korea restricts food aid monitoring : report to the Chairman, Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives /

"B-283605"--P. 3.

Proposed arms transfers to the Yemen Arab Republic : hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-sixth Congress, first session, March 12, 1979.

Mode of access: Internet.

Foreign assistance : status of USAID's reforms : briefing report to the Chairman, Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives /

"B-274657"--p. 1.

Records of the relations between Siam and foreign countries in the 17th century.

Copied from papers reserved at the India office.

Commercial relations of the United States.

Title from cover.

A Guide to the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (Foreign Service Labor-Management Relations Program).

Mode of access: Internet.

The foreign trade policy of the United States

DU1 .I5 1936 vol. 13, no. 5 with : Business and government under the National Recovery Administration / Theodore J. Kreps. New York : American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1936. Bound together subsequent to publication.

Diplomatic divergence in the antipodes: Globalisation, foreign policy and state identity in Australia and New Zealand

This article compares the constitutive relationship between foreign policy and globalisation in Australia and New Zealand. Drawing upon insights from constructivist international relations theory we argue that foreign policy instantiates a state's social identity, its self-understanding of its role and moral purpose by projecting a distinctive image onto the global stage. We explore the differences and the similarities between Australia and New Zealand by examining how each country views international order, global trade, global governance and human rights and international security. Although both countries appear to be transforming themselves into more 'globalised' states, there are significant differences in the way each seeks to balance the competing strategic and normative demands. This diplomatic divergence, we argue, stems from different conceptions of state identity.