993 resultados para Reputation for performance


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Materials Science Forum Vols. 730-732 (2013) pp 617-622

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Dissertação apresentada para cumprimento dos requisitos necessários à obtenção do grau de Mestre em Ciências Musicais, variante de Etnomusicologia

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We characterize the optimal job design in a multitasking environment when the firms rely on implicit incentive contracts (i.e., bonus payments). Two natural forms of job design are compared: (i) individual accountability, where each agent is assigned to a particular job and assumes full responsibility for its outcome; and (ii) team accountability, where a group of agents share responsibility for a job and are jointly accountable for its outcome. The key trade-off is that team accountability mitigates the multitasking problem but may weaken the implicit contracts. The optimal job design follows a cut-off rule: firms with high reputation concerns opt for team accountability, whereas firms with low reputation concerns opt for individual accountability. Team accountability is more likely the more acute the multitasking problem is. However, the cut-off rule need not hold if the firm combines implicit incentives with explicit pay-per-performance contracts.

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Dissertação para obtenção do Grau de Mestre em Engenharia Informática

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Trabalho de Projecto apresentado para cumprimento dos requisitos necessários à obtenção do grau de Mestre em Antropologia - Culturas Visuais

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Trabalho de projecto apresentado para cumprimento dos requisitos necessários à obtenção do grau Mestre em Ciências da Comunicação na especialização de Comunicação e Artes

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Tese apresentada para cumprimento dos requisitos necessários à obtenção do grau de Doutor em Ciências da Comunicação

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We use an adverse selection model to study the dynamics of firms' reputations when firms implement joint projects. We show that in contrast with projects implemented by a single firm, in the case of joint projects a firm's reputation does not necessarily increase following a success and does not necessarily decrease following a failure. We also study how reputation considerations affect firms ' decisions to participate in joint projects. We show that a high quality partner may not be preferable to a low quality partner, and that a high reputation partner is not necessarily preferable to a low reputation partner.

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A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

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A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

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A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

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A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

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A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

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This paper uses a field experiment to investigate the quality of individuals’ forecasts of relative performance in tournaments. We ask players in luck-based (poker) and skill-based (chess) tournaments to make point forecasts of rank. The main finding of the paper is that players’ forecasts in both types of tournaments are biased towards overestimation of relative performance. However, the size of the biases found is not as large as the ones often reported in the psychology literature. We also find support for the “unskilled and unaware hypothesis” in chess: high skilled chess players make better forecasts than low skilled chess players. Finally, we find that chess players’ forecasts of relative performance are not efficient.

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A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics