Dignity and the Eighth Amendment: A New Approach to Challenging Solitary Confinement

The use of solitary confinement in U.S. prisons and jails has come under increasing scrutiny. Over the past few months, Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy all but invited constitutional challenges to the use of solitary confinement, while President Obama asked, “Do we really think it makes sense to lock so many people alone in tiny cells for 23 hours a day for months, sometime for years at a time?” Even some of the most notorious prisons and jails, including California’s Pelican Bay State Prison and New York’s Rikers Island, are reforming their use of solitary confinement because of successful litigation and public outcry. Rovner suggests that in light of these developments and “the Supreme Court’s increasing reliance on human dignity as a substantive value underlying and animating constitutional rights,” there is a strong case to make that long-term solitary confinement violates the constitutional right to freedom from cruel and unusual punishment.

The 2011 Constitutional reform in Morocco: more flaws than merits. Jean Monnet Occasional Paper No. 07/2014

Introduction. In the speech given to both Houses of Parliament on 11 October 2013 during the first parliamentary session, King Mohammed VI said that the “Moroccan democratic model” was “a precursor in the region as well as on the continental level.”1 Similarly, with the purpose of stressing the “democratic exceptionalism”2 of the country, the new government, led by Abdeilah Benkirane, emphasised that Morocco represents a “third way” compared to countries such as Tunisia, Libya or Egypt since it “…has not embarked on a limited process of reform from the top, driven and controlled by the King. Nor has it experienced a revolution brought a angry citizens rising up against the regime. Rather, it has chosen an alternate path based on a genuine partnership between the King and the PJD (Parti de la justice et du développement) that promises to bring about more far-reaching reform than palace alone would grant, without the disruption caused by uncontrolled popular upheaval.”4 It should not be at all surprising that the regime and the new Government consider Morocco a “democratic model” or a “third way.” After all, they are refe country. What is harder to understand is that when discussing the Arab uprisings, even prominent Western political leaders, representatives of the European Union institutions and the mainstream media (when they do not forget about Morocc to praise the process of democratic reform carried out by Mohammed VI. For example, on 12 September 2012, Hillary Clinton, former US Secretary of State, said, “in many ways, the United States looks to Morocco to be a leader and a model […] On political reform, we have all seen remarkable changes taking place across North Africa and the Middle East. I commend Morocco and your government for your efforts to stay ahead of these changes by holding free and fair elections, empowering the elected parliament, taking other steps to ensure that the government reflects the will of the people.”5 Similarly, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy sang the praises of the process that led to the adoption of the new 2011 Constitution: “King Mohammed VI has shown the path towards a profound, peaceful and modern transformation of Moroccan institutions and society […] France fully supports this exemplary process.” Interestingly enough, even at the European Union level the constitutional reform that took more far-reaching reform than palace alone would grant, without the disruption caused by uncontrolled popular upheaval.”4 It should not be at all surprising that the regime and the new Government consider Morocco a “democratic model” or a “third way.” After all, they are refe country. What is harder to understand is that when discussing the Arab uprisings, even prominent Western political leaders, representatives of the European Union institutions and the mainstream media (when they do not forget about Morocc to praise the process of democratic reform carried out by Mohammed VI. For example, on 12 September 2012, Hillary Clinton, former US Secretary of State, said, “in many ways, the United States looks to Morocco to be a leader and a model […] On political reform, we have all seen remarkable changes taking place across North Africa and the Middle East. I commend Morocco and your government for your efforts to stay ahead of these changes by holding free and fair elections, empowering the elected parliament, taking other steps to ensure that the government reflects the will of the people.”5 Similarly, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy sang the praises of the process that led to the adoption of the new 2011 Constitution: “King Mohammed VI has shown the path towards a profound, peaceful and modern transformation of Moroccan institutions and society […] France fully supports this exemplary process.” Interestingly enough, even at the European Union level the constitutional reform that took place in Morocco was considered an extremely positive step taken by the country, as well as a means to strengthen the cooperation between the EU and Morocco. Indeed, according to the High Representative Catherine Ashton, this reform “constitute[s] a significant response to the legitimate aspirations of the Moroccan people and [is] consistent with Morocco’s Advanced Status with the EU.”7 When it comes to the media, it is worth noting that following the ratification of the 2011 Constitution, The New York Times headlined: “All Hail the (Democratic) King.” Even sections of the academic literature have commended the constitutional reform carried out by the Moroccan Sovereign.9 In this paper I argue against the aforementioned idea, according to which Morocco should be considered a model in the region, and in particular I show that the constitution-making process, the 2011 Constitution and its subsequent implementation have more flaws than merits. Accordingly, this paper proceeds in five steps. First of all, I examine the reaction of the regime to the upheavals that broke out in the country after 20 February 2011. Secondly, I analyse the process of constitution showing its main strengths and weaknesses, and comparing it with other constituent processes that took place in the region following the Arab uprisings. In the third section, I highlight the most significant elements of continuity and discontinuity with the previous 1996 Constitution. The fourth section deals with the process of implementation: specifically process is proceeding quite slowly and that in some cases ordinary legislation is in contrast with the new Constitution and international human rights treaties. Moreover, I discuss the role that the judiciary and the Constitutional Court can play in the implementation and interpretation of the Constitution. Finally, I draw some concluding remarks.

The National Constituent Assembly of Tunisia and Civil Society Dynamics. EUSpring Working Paper No. 2, 8 July 2015

The Tunisian constitution of 27 January 2014 was deemed essentially compatible with international human rights principles and standards. These were adopted at the outcome of a dual process, which was underway both inside the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) and outside it, between the NCA and civil society stakeholders. Three successive drafts fell considerably short of expectations (6 August 2012, 14 December 2012 and 22 April 2013). The fourth draft (1 June 2013) was still fraught with 20 or so fundamental divergences. These were resolved, thanks to the National Dialogue in cooperation with the ad hoc “consensus commission” (lajnet tawafuqat) within the NCA, which is chaired by Mustapha Ben Jaafar (President of the NCA). The final text was overwhelmingly adopted on 26 January 2014 by 200 votes, with 12 against and four abstentions. It was promulgated on 10 February.

Offensive language, offensive behaviour and public nuisance: Empirical and theoretical analyses

Offensive behaviour and offensive language - new Queensland public nuisance offence - interpretation and enforcement by police and magistrates - impact of changes to legislation on the number and nature of prosecutions for legally unacceptable behaviour and language coming before the courts - results of empirical study indicate that public nuisance offence is not meeting its objectives - not being targeted only at behaviour which threatens the safety or security of people using public space as was its intention.

CIVIL WAR SETTLEMENTS AND COMBATANTS’ BEHAVIORS: STRATEGY, PERCEPTION, AND REPUTATION

Three projects in my dissertation focus on the termination of internal conflicts based on three critical factors: a combatant’s bargaining strategy, perceptions of relative capabilities, and reputation for toughness. My dissertation aims to provide the relevant theoretical framework to understand war termination beyond the simple two-party bargaining context. The first project focuses on the government’s strategic use of peace agreements. The first project suggests that peace can also be designed strategically to create a better bargain in the near future by changing the current power balance, and thus the timing and nature of peace is not solely a function of overcoming current barriers to successful bargaining. As long as the government has no overwhelming capability to defeat all rebel groups simultaneously, it needs to keep multiple rebel groups as divided as possible. This strategic partial peace helps to deter multiple rebel groups from collaborating in the battlefield and increases the chances of victory against non-signatories. The second project deals with combatants’ perceptions of relative capabilities. While bargaining theories of war suggest that war ends when combatants share a similar perception about their relative capabilities, combatants’ perceptions about relative capabilities are not often homogeneous. While focusing on information problems, this paper examines when a rebel group underestimates the government’s supremacy in relative capabilities and how this heterogeneous perception about the power gap influences negotiated settlements. The third project deals with the tension between different types of reputations in the context of civil wars: 1) a reputation for resolve and 2) a reputation for keeping human rights standards. In the context of civil wars, the use of indiscriminate violence by the government is costly, and as such, it signals the government’s toughness (or resolve) to rebel groups. I argue that the rebels are more likely to accept the government’s offer when the government recently engaged in indiscriminate violence against civilians during the conflict. This effect, however, is conditional on the government’s international human rights reputation; suggesting that rebel groups interpret this violence as a signal particularly when the government does not have a penchant for attacking civilians in general.

Espiritualidad y política: una propuesta tibetana para la transformación del orden mundial

La Revolución Espiritual promovida por el Dalai Lama plantea una unión entre espiritualidad y política. El proyecto de una ética universal, que se inscribe dentro de dicha Revolución, busca impactar la manera en que las relaciones internacionales se desarrollan, dándole prevalencia a los valores humanos. Sin embargo, esa proposición se encuentra ligada al contexto de exilio en el marco del conflicto sino-tibetano que afecta al continente asiático. Por esto, en la presente monografía, haciendo uso de los conceptos de marco de acción colectiva e identidad inscritos en la corriente de los movimientos sociales en la disciplina de las Relaciones Internacionales, se pretende determinar la relación entre identidad tibetana, marco de acción colectiva y la propuesta de una ética universal. Para ello se recurre, metodológicamente, a textos y a trabajo de campo en Bogotá. Así, se pretende establecer la relación entre espiritualidad y política como propuesta tibetana atravesada por el conflicto sino-tibetano.

La cultura del trabajo y la igualdad en la Nueva Granada

Basada en los conceptos de Alexis de Tocqueville, esta investigación busca explicar de qué manera la cultura del trabajo influyó en la igualdad de condiciones. Para esto fue necesario analizar cómo la sociedad neogranadina acogía nuevas teorías y prácticas del mundo moderno liberal en su estructura socio-económica y política, haciendo indispensable, en primer lugar, realizar un estudio detallado de la situación de la Nueva Granada en los aspectos mencionados, durante finales del siglo XVIII y gran parte del siglo XIX. En principio se puede deducir que la cultura del trabajo no tuvo influencia en la igualdad de condiciones, porque la concepción protestante de la salvación del alma no halló en los neogranadinos la aceptación que requería para hacer de este un pueblo trabajador y tampoco se pudo garantizar una situación de igualdad de condiciones desde un aspecto cultural, sino que estuvo presente por medio de leyes que no eran respetadas.

Derechos humanos de los pueblos indígenas: Chile tras la ratificación del convenio 169 de la OIT

En el mes de septiembre del año 2008, Chile ratificó el Convenio 169 sobre Pueblos Indígenas y Tribales en Países Independientes de la organización Internacional del Trabajo (OIT). Esta ratificación pone nuevamente sobre el tapete la discusión respecto la jerarquía de los Tratados Internacionales de Derechos Humanos en el sistema jurídico chileno, discusión que no ha podido ser zanjada desde la reforma del año 1989, que modificó el artículo 5º de la Carta Fundamental.AbstractIn September 2008, the State of Chile proceeded with the ratification of the InternationalLabour Organization 169 Treaty Concerning Indigenous and Tribal People in Independent Countries. This ratification brings once again for discussion the hierarchical place that International Human Rights Treaties have within the jurisdictional system in Chile, discussion that has not been settled since the 1989 reform that modified article 5 of the Fundamental Letter.

Fondamento e limiti costituzionali del potere punitivo nel sistema di legalità integrata

La ricerca affronta la questione della punizione nella prospettiva del diritto costituzionale nazionale integrata con quella del diritto europeo dei diritti dell’uomo. Nella Parte I è sostenuta la tesi secondo cui la trasformazione della Costituzione penale avviata sotto l’influsso della giurisprudenza CEDU rappresenta complessivamente un avanzamento nel processo di costituzionalizzazione del potere punitivo. Questa conclusione è supportata attraverso un confronto della filosofia costituzionale classica sulla punizione con i diversi approcci interpretativi alla Costituzione penale sviluppati durante il XX secolo (approcci tradizionale, costituzionalistico ed EDU). Nella Parte II è invece sostenuta la tesi secondo cui, nonostante gli effetti positivi dell’armonizzazione sovranazionale, lo statuto costituzionale della punizione dovrebbe comunque rimanere formalmente autonomo dal diritto EDU. Non solo, infatti, nessun paradigma dei rapporti interordinamentali finora sviluppato può giustificarne un’integrazione totale, ma essa rischierebbe anche di diminuire la normatività dell’aspetto sociale della Costituzione penale, già ipocostituzionalizzato rispetto a quello liberale. Nella Conclusione sono quindi sviluppati gli elementi fondamentali di un approccio interpretativo alternativo alla Costituzione penale che risponda meglio di quelli esistenti alle esigenze sia di garantire la massima costituzionalizzazione della punizione sia di facilitare l’integrazione sovranazionale. In base a un simile approccio costituzionalmente fondato, sostanzialista, rights-based e inclusivo di tutte le ideologie costituenti, la Costituzione potrebbe essere letta nel senso di prevedere un modello di disciplina unitario per tutte le forme di esercizio del potere punitivo (salvo quello disciplinare, distinguibile sotto l’aspetto istituzionale) caratterizzato da: una riserva di legge a intensità variabile; uno scrutinio stretto della Corte sulla giustificabilità costituzionale della pena; l’estensione dell’ambito di applicazione dei principi di colpevolezza e rieducazione; un pieno sviluppo degli aspetti di garanzia collettiva dei classici principi costituzionalpenalistici (obblighi di tutela penale e garanzia dell’effettiva collocazione della pena in capo al soggetto colpevole), nonché derivabili dall’art. 3 Cost. (proporzionalità della pena alle condizioni materiali del soggetto punito).

The communication by States of International Law to their direct stakeholders

El derecho internacional fue concebido como un derecho interestatal. Sin embargo, como consecuencia del desarrollo progresivo del derecho, nuevos actores y nuevos sujetos han ido surgiendo. El individuo es uno de ellos bajo diferentes perspectivas, bajo la perspectiva penal al asumir la responsabilidad de sus actos frente a los diferentes tribunales ad hoc y, ahora ante la Corte Penal Internacional. También se ha desarrollado la figura bajo la perspectiva de los derechos humanos. Este artículo analiza las formas como las políticas estatales relativas al derecho internacional se presentan a los individuos, a las personas jurídicas y a los demás actores.

Islamic law and international law: the terms of a relationship

The relationship between Islamic Law and other legal systems (basically western type domestic legal orders and international law) is often thought of in terms of compatibility or incompatibility. Concerning certain subject matters of choice, the compatibility of Islamic (legal) principles with the values embedded in legal systems that are regarded as characteristic of the Modern Age is tested by sets of questions: is democracy possible in Islam? Does Islam recognize human rights and are those rights equivalent to a more universal conception? Does Islam recognize or condone more extreme acts of violence and does it justify violence differently? Etc. Such questions and many more presuppose the existence of an ensemble of rules or principles which, as any other set of rules and principles, purport to regulate social behavior. This ensemble is generically referred to as Islamic Law. However, one set of questions is usually left unanswered: is Islamic Law a legal system? If it is a legal system, what are its specific characteristics? How does it work? Where does it apply? It is this paper`s argument that the relationship between Islamic Law and domestic and international law can only be understood if looked upon as a relationship between distinct legal systems or legal orders.

The autonomy of the EU legal order and the law-making activities of international organizations. Some examples regarding the Council most recent practice. Research Papers in Law 03/2012

[Introduction.] It is generally believed that while the principle of the autonomy of the EU legal order, in the sense of constitutional and institutional autonomy that is to say what concerns the autonomous decision-making of the EU, has been clearly strengthened by the most recent jurisprudence of the Court of Justice (eg. Moxplant3, Intertanko or the Kadi/Al Baraakat judgements or the Opinion 1/2009 of the CJEU etc.) as well as, in my opinion, in many aspects by the Treaty of Lisbon, it is still valid to add that the principle of a favourable approach, stemming from the Court jurisprudence, for the enhanced openness of the EU legal order to international law has remained equally important for the EU4. On the other hand, it should be also seen that in a globalized world, and following the increased role of the EU as an international actor, its indispensable and crucial role concerning the creation of world (legal) order in many policy fields ( for example let's think about the G20 issues, the global economic and financial crisis, the role of the EU in promoting and protecting human rights worldwide, the implementation of the multilateral or regional conventional law, developed in the framework the UN (e.g. in the field of agriculture or environment etc) or what concerns the Kyoto process on climate change or the conservation of marine biological resources at international level etc), it seems reasonable and justified to submit that the influence, for example, of the law-making activities of the main stakeholder international organizations in the mentioned policy-areas on the EU (especially on the development of its constantly evolving legal order) or vice-versa the influence of the EU law-making practice on these international organizations is significant, in many aspects mutually interdependent and more and more remarkable. This tendency of the 21st century doesn't mean, however, in my view, that the notion of the autonomy of the EU legal order would have been weakened by this increasing interaction between international law and EU law over the passed years. This contribution is going to demonstrate and prove these departuring points by giving some concrete examples from the most recent practice of the Council (all occuring either in the second half of 2009 or after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty), and which relate to two very important policy areas in the EU, namely the protection of human rights and the Common Fishery Policy.

Survey on Rules on Loss of Nationality in International Treaties and Case Law. CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe No. 57, 30 August 2013

This paper offers a picture of the obligations existing under international and European law in respect of the loss of nationality. It describes international instruments including obligations in this field with direct relevancy for the loss of nationality of Member States of the European Union, but also obligations regarding loss of nationality in regional non-European treaties. Attention is given to two important judicial decisions of the European Court of Justice (Janko Rottmann) and the European Court of Human Rights (Genovese v Malta) regarding nationality. Special attention is devoted to Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which forbids the arbitrary deprivation of nationality. A survey is provided of possible sub-principles that can be derived from this rule. Finally, some observations are made on the burden of proof in cases of loss of nationality.