MASCEM: electricity markets simulation with strategic agents

Electricity markets are complex environments, involving numerous entities trying to obtain the best advantages and profits while limited by power-network characteristics and constraints.1 The restructuring and consequent deregulation of electricity markets introduced a new economic dimension to the power industry. Some observers have criticized the restructuring process, however, because it has failed to improve market efficiency and has complicated the assurance of reliability and fairness of operations. To study and understand this type of market, we developed the Multiagent Simulator of Competitive Electricity Markets (MASCEM) platform based on multiagent simulation. The MASCEM multiagent model includes players with strategies for bid definition, acting in forward, day-ahead, and balancing markets and considering both simple and complex bids. Our goal with MASCEM was to simulate as many market models and player types as possible. This approach makes MASCEM both a short- and mediumterm simulation as well as a tool to support long-term decisions, such as those taken by regulators. This article proposes a new methodology integrated in MASCEM for bid definition in electricity markets. This methodology uses reinforcement learning algorithms to let players perceive changes in the environment, thus helping them react to the dynamic environment and adapt their bids accordingly.

Opções reais: Avaliação do projecto de investimento de três parques eólicos em ambiente onshore e offshore

Os Projectos de Investimento desempenham um importante papel no crescimento económico-social dos países, proporcionando emprego e desenvolvimento tecnológico. Na óptica dos projectos inovadores, concretamente no sector das energias renováveis, acarretam elevados investimentos, numa base temporal de longo prazo. Nestes casos as decisões estratégicas assumem um papel determinante, assim, o principal objectivo desta dissertação é a utilização das Opções Reais como métrica de avaliação dos projectos de investimento. A análise e avaliação dos projectos implica em si incerteza nas previsões, desta forma, as Opções Reais minimizam o risco associado à incerteza através da inclusão da flexibilidade no processo de avaliação. A primeira parte da dissertação consiste na contextualização energética mundial e nacional, ao nível da energia primária e das energias renováveis, com incidência na energia eólica. A segunda consiste na introdução teórica dos projectos de investimento e dos conceitos inerentes às Opções Financeiras e às Opções Reais. Por último, apresenta-se um caso de estudo de construção de três parques eólicos e as consequentes decisões de investimento concluindo que os modelos de avaliação das Opções Reais proporcionam alternativas e interdependência em investimentos futuros.

The invisible factors that can make the difference. Language management and knowledge transfer in multinational sites

The knowledge-based society we live in has stressed the importance of human capital and brought talent to the top of most wanted skills, especially to companies who want to succeed in turbulent environments worldwide. In fact, streams, sequences of decisions and resource commitments characterize the day-to-day of multinational companies (MNCs). Such decision-making activities encompass major strategic moves like internationalization and new market entries or diversification and acquisitions. In most companies, these strategic decisions are extensively discussed and debated and are generally framed, formulated, and articulated in specialized language often developed by the best minds in the company. Yet the language used in such deliberations, in detailing and enacting the implementation strategy is usually taken for granted and receives little if any explicit attention (Brannen & Doz, 2012) an can still be a “forgotten factor” (Marschan et al. 1997). Literature on language management and international business refers to lack of awareness of business managers of the impact that language can have not only in communication effectiveness but especially in knowledge transfer and knowledge management in business environments. In the context of MNCs, management is, for many different reasons, more complex and demanding than that of a national company, mainly because of diversity factors inherent to internationalization, namely geographical and cultural spaces, i.e, varied mindsets. Moreover, the way of functioning, and managing language, of the MNC depends on its vision, its values and its internationalization model, i.e on in the way the MNE adapts to and controls the new markets, which can vary essentially from a more ethnocentric to a more pluricentric focus. Regardless of the internationalization model followed by the MNC, communication between different business units is essential to achieve unity in diversity and business sustainability. For the business flow and prosperity, inter-subsidiary, intra-company and company-client (customers, suppliers, governments, municipalities, etc..) communication must work in various directions and levels of the organization. If not well managed, this diversity can be a barrier to global coordination and create turbulent environments, even if a good technological support is available (Feely et al., 2002: 4). According to Marchan-Piekkari (1999) the tongue can be both (i) a barrier, (ii) a facilitator and (iii) a source of power. Moreover, the lack of preparation for the barriers of linguistic diversity can lead to various costs, including negotiations’ failure and failure on internationalization.. On the other hand, communication and language fluency is not just a message transfer procedure, but above all a knowledge transfer process, which requires extra-linguistic skills (persuasion, assertiveness …) in order to promote credibility of both parties. For this reason, MNCs need a common code to communicate and trade information inside and outside the company, which will require one or more strategies, in order to overcome possible barriers and organization distortions.

Strategic bidding in electricity markets: an agent-based simulator with game theory for scenario analysis

Electricity markets are complex environments, involving a large number of different entities, with specific characteristics and objectives, making their decisions and interacting in a dynamic scene. Game-theory has been widely used to support decisions in competitive environments; therefore its application in electricity markets can prove to be a high potential tool. This paper proposes a new scenario analysis algorithm, which includes the application of game-theory, to evaluate and preview different scenarios and provide players with the ability to strategically react in order to exhibit the behavior that better fits their objectives. This model includes forecasts of competitor players’ actions, to build models of their behavior, in order to define the most probable expected scenarios. Once the scenarios are defined, game theory is applied to support the choice of the action to be performed. Our use of game theory is intended for supporting one specific agent and not for achieving the equilibrium in the market. MASCEM (Multi-Agent System for Competitive Electricity Markets) is a multi-agent electricity market simulator that models market players and simulates their operation in the market. The scenario analysis algorithm has been tested within MASCEM and our experimental findings with a case study based on real data from the Iberian Electricity Market are presented and discussed.

The strategic deployment of quality-improvement innovations

Journal of Business, Vol. 78 Issue 3, p1049-1072

Strategic environmental assessment in Tróia (Portugal)

Proceedings of the First International Conference on Coastal Conservation and Management in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, p. 91-98

Strategic Bidding in Electricity Markets: An agent-based simulator with game theory for scenario analysis

Electricity markets are complex environments, involving a large number of different entities, with specific characteristics and objectives, making their decisions and interacting in a dynamic scene. Game-theory has been widely used to support decisions in competitive environments; therefore its application in electricity markets can prove to be a high potential tool. This paper proposes a new scenario analysis algorithm, which includes the application of game-theory, to evaluate and preview different scenarios and provide players with the ability to strategically react in order to exhibit the behavior that better fits their objectives. This model includes forecasts of competitor players’ actions, to build models of their behavior, in order to define the most probable expected scenarios. Once the scenarios are defined, game theory is applied to support the choice of the action to be performed. Our use of game theory is intended for supporting one specific agent and not for achieving the equilibrium in the market. MASCEM (Multi-Agent System for Competitive Electricity Markets) is a multi-agent electricity market simulator that models market players and simulates their operation in the market. The scenario analysis algorithm has been tested within MASCEM and our experimental findings with a case study based on real data from the Iberian Electricity Market are presented and discussed.

Geospatial technologies for public participation: better decisions for smarter cities?

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Geospatial Technologies.

A strategic plan for “ADHD Project”

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Essays on bounded rationality: Individual decision and strategic interaction

Economics is a social science which, therefore, focuses on people and on the decisions they make, be it in an individual context, or in group situations. It studies human choices, in face of needs to be fulfilled, and a limited amount of resources to fulfill them. For a long time, there was a convergence between the normative and positive views of human behavior, in that the ideal and predicted decisions of agents in economic models were entangled in one single concept. That is, it was assumed that the best that could be done in each situation was exactly the choice that would prevail. Or, at least, that the facts that economics needed to explain could be understood in the light of models in which individual agents act as if they are able to make ideal decisions. However, in the last decades, the complexity of the environment in which economic decisions are made and the limits on the ability of agents to deal with it have been recognized, and incorporated into models of decision making in what came to be known as the bounded rationality paradigm. This was triggered by the incapacity of the unboundedly rationality paradigm to explain observed phenomena and behavior. This thesis contributes to the literature in three different ways. Chapter 1 is a survey on bounded rationality, which gathers and organizes the contributions to the field since Simon (1955) first recognized the necessity to account for the limits on human rationality. The focus of the survey is on theoretical work rather than the experimental literature which presents evidence of actual behavior that differs from what classic rationality predicts. The general framework is as follows. Given a set of exogenous variables, the economic agent needs to choose an element from the choice set that is avail- able to him, in order to optimize the expected value of an objective function (assuming his preferences are representable by such a function). If this problem is too complex for the agent to deal with, one or more of its elements is simplified. Each bounded rationality theory is categorized according to the most relevant element it simplifes. Chapter 2 proposes a novel theory of bounded rationality. Much in the same fashion as Conlisk (1980) and Gabaix (2014), we assume that thinking is costly in the sense that agents have to pay a cost for performing mental operations. In our model, if they choose not to think, such cost is avoided, but they are left with a single alternative, labeled the default choice. We exemplify the idea with a very simple model of consumer choice and identify the concept of isofin curves, i.e., sets of default choices which generate the same utility net of thinking cost. Then, we apply the idea to a linear symmetric Cournot duopoly, in which the default choice can be interpreted as the most natural quantity to be produced in the market. We find that, as the thinking cost increases, the number of firms thinking in equilibrium decreases. More interestingly, for intermediate levels of thinking cost, an equilibrium in which one of the firms chooses the default quantity and the other best responds to it exists, generating asymmetric choices in a symmetric model. Our model is able to explain well-known regularities identified in the Cournot experimental literature, such as the adoption of different strategies by players (Huck et al. , 1999), the inter temporal rigidity of choices (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003) and the dispersion of quantities in the context of di cult decision making (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003). Chapter 3 applies a model of bounded rationality in a game-theoretic set- ting to the well-known turnout paradox in large elections, pivotal probabilities vanish very quickly and no one should vote, in sharp contrast with the ob- served high levels of turnout. Inspired by the concept of rhizomatic thinking, introduced by Bravo-Furtado & Côrte-Real (2009a), we assume that each per- son is self-delusional in the sense that, when making a decision, she believes that a fraction of the people who support the same party decides alike, even if no communication is established between them. This kind of belief simplifies the decision of the agent, as it reduces the number of players he believes to be playing against { it is thus a bounded rationality approach. Studying a two-party first-past-the-post election with a continuum of self-delusional agents, we show that the turnout rate is positive in all the possible equilibria, and that it can be as high as 100%. The game displays multiple equilibria, at least one of which entails a victory of the bigger party. The smaller one may also win, provided its relative size is not too small; more self-delusional voters in the minority party decreases this threshold size. Our model is able to explain some empirical facts, such as the possibility that a close election leads to low turnout (Geys, 2006), a lower margin of victory when turnout is higher (Geys, 2006) and high turnout rates favoring the minority (Bernhagen & Marsh, 1997).

Technological evolution

The evolution of a technology and the understanding of the moment in its life cycle is of the utmost importance to the entry strategy devised by any company. Having the entry of EDP Brazil on the micro-generation market as background, the present workproject attempts to summarize the most important topics in management literature concerning the theory of technology life-cycles and the updated literature on developments of photovoltaic technology to infer the current positioning of this technology in the theoretical models. The need for this type of work stems from the very common lack of bridging between the academic research of economic aspects relevant to the evolution of technologies and the agents of research on specific technological issues. When this occurs, namely due to the external nature of research to companies, thereby escaping the harsh economic controls of a profit seeking enterprise, the evolution many times lacks the appropriate framework to be studied on a more forward looking manner and to allow for management decisions to be based on.

Does the existing Corporate Governance structure and strict Legal Framework, affect the strategic decisionmaking of CEOs?

This thesis is a case study on Corporate Governance and Business Ethics, using the Portuguese Corporate Law as a general setting. The thesis was conducted in Portugal with illustrations on past cases under the Business Judgment Rule of the State of Delaware, U.SA along with illustrations on current cases in Portugal under the Portuguese Judicial setting, along with a comparative analysis between both. A debate is being considered among scholars and executives; a debate on best practices within corporate governance and corporate law, associated with recent discoveries of unlawful investments that lead to the bankruptcy of leading institutions and an aggravation of the crisis in Portugal. The study aimed at learning possible reasons and causes for the current situation of the country’s corporations along with attempts to discover the best way to move forward. From the interviews and analysis conducted, this paper concluded that the corporate governance structure and legal frameworks in Portugal were not the sole influencers behind the actions and decisions of Corporate Executives, nor were they the main triggers for the recent corporate mishaps. But it is rather a combination of different factors that played a significant role, such as cultural and ethical aspects, individual personalities, and others all of which created gray areas beyond the legal structure, which in turn accelerated and aggravated the corporate governance crisis in the country.

Aplicação da teoria das opções reais em análise de projetos estratégicos: um estudo de caso sobre o valor da opção de prosseguir com os investimentos no programa de desenvolvimento de submarinos da Marinha do Brasil

Dissertação de mestrado em Estudos de Gestão

Both Sides of the Story: Skill-biased Technological Change, Labour Market Frictions, and Endogenous Two-Sided Heterogeneity

This paper presents a stylised framework to examine how skill-biased technological change and labour market frictions affect the relationship between economic expansion and unskilled unemployment. The first part of the analysis focuses on the investment decisions in skill-acquisition and technology adoption activities faced by workers and firms in response to the introduction of an innovative technology. The second part examines how endogenous two-sided heterogeneity in the labour market affects the macroeconomic outcomes in terms of unemployment, technological diffusion, and economic expansion. To conclude, the framework is used to discuss the effects of alternative forms of policy intervention on agents' investment decisions and on the macroeconomic outcomes.

Expert Information and Majority Decisions

This paper studies dichotomous majority voting in common interest committees where each member receives not only a private signal but also a public signal observed by all of them. The public signal represents, e.g. expert information presented to an entire committee and its quality is higher than that of each individual private signal. We identify two informative symmetric strategy equilibria, namely i) the mixed strategy equilibrium where each member randomizes between following the private and public signals should they disagree; and ii) the pure strategy equilibrium where they follow the public signal for certain. The former outperforms the latter. The presence of the public signal precludes the equilibrium where every member follows their own signal, which is an equilibrium in the absence of the public signal. The mixed strategy equilibrium in the presence of the public signal outperforms the sincere voting equilibrium without the public signal, but the latter may be more efficient than the pure strategy equilibrium in the presence of the public signal. We suggest that whether expert information improves committee decision making depends on equilibrium selection.