990 resultados para privileges prevail over UCPR pleading rules
Resumo:
We use QCD sum rules (QCDSR) to calculate the width of the radiative decay of the meson X(3872), assumed to be a mixture between charmonium and exotic molecular [c (q) over bar][q (c) over bar] states with J(PC) = 1(++). We find that in a small range for the values of the mixing angle, 5 degrees <= theta <= 13 degrees, we get the branching ratio Gamma(X -> J/psi gamma)/Gamma(X -> J/psi pi(+)pi(-)) = 0.19 +/- 0.13, which is in agreement, with the experimental value. This result is compatible with the analysis of the mass and decay width of the mode J/psi(n pi) performed in the same approach.
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We evaluate the mass of the B(s0) scalar meson and the coupling constant in the B(s0)BK vertex in the framework of QCD sum rules. We consider the B(s0) as a tetraquark state to evaluate its mass. We get m(Bs0) = (5.85 +/- 0.13) GeV, which is in agreement, considering the uncertainties, with predictions supposing it as a b (s) over bar state or a B (K) over bar bound state with J(P) = 0(+). To evaluate the g(Bs0BK) coupling, we use the three-point correlation functions of the vertex, considering B(s0) as a normal b (s) over bar state. The obtained coupling constant is: g(Bs0BK) = (16.3 +/- 3.2) GeV. This number is in agreement with light-cone QCD sum rules calculation. We have also compared the decay width of the B(s0) -> BK process considering the B(s0) to be a b (s) over bar state and a BK molecular state. The width obtained for the BK molecular state is twice as big as the width obtained for the b (s) over bar state. Therefore, we conclude that with the knowledge of the mass and the decay width of the B(s0) meson, one can discriminate between the different theoretical proposals for its structure.
Resumo:
We use QCD sum rules to test the nature of the meson X(3872), assumed to be a mixture between charmonium and exotic molecular [c (q) over bar][q (c) over bar] states with J(PC) = 1(++). We find that there is only a small range for the values of the mixing angle theta that can provide simultaneously good agreement with the experimental value of the mass and the decay width, and this range is 5(0) <= theta <= 3(0). In this range we get m(X) = (3.77 +/- 0.18) GeV and Gamma(X -> J/psi pi(+)pi(-)) = (9.3 +/- 6.9) MeV, which are compatible, within the errors, with the experimental values. We, therefore, conclude that the X(3872) is approximately 97% a charmonium state with 3% admixture of similar to 88% D(0)D*(0) molecule and similar to 12% D(+)D*(-) molecule.
Resumo:
A stable matching rule is used as the outcome function for the Admission game where colleges behave straightforwardly and the students` strategies are given by their preferences over the colleges. We show that the college-optimal stable matching rule implements the set of stable matchings via the Nash equilibrium (NE) concept. For any other stable matching rule the strategic behavior of the students may lead to outcomes that are not stable under the true preferences. We then introduce uncertainty about the matching selected and prove that the natural solution concept is that of NE in the strong sense. A general result shows that the random stable matching rule, as well as any stable matching rule, implements the set of stable matchings via NE in the strong sense. Precise answers are given to the strategic questions raised.
Resumo:
Due to usage conditions, hazardous environments or intentional causes, physical and virtual systems are subject to faults in their components, which may affect their overall behaviour. In a ‘black-box’ agent modelled by a set of propositional logic rules, in which just a subset of components is externally visible, such faults may only be recognised by examining some output function of the agent. A (fault-free) model of the agent’s system provides the expected output given some input. If the real output differs from that predicted output, then the system is faulty. However, some faults may only become apparent in the system output when appropriate inputs are given. A number of problems regarding both testing and diagnosis thus arise, such as testing a fault, testing the whole system, finding possible faults and differentiating them to locate the correct one. The corresponding optimisation problems of finding solutions that require minimum resources are also very relevant in industry, as is minimal diagnosis. In this dissertation we use a well established set of benchmark circuits to address such diagnostic related problems and propose and develop models with different logics that we formalise and generalise as much as possible. We also prove that all techniques generalise to agents and to multiple faults. The developed multi-valued logics extend the usual Boolean logic (suitable for faultfree models) by encoding values with some dependency (usually on faults). Such logics thus allow modelling an arbitrary number of diagnostic theories. Each problem is subsequently solved with CLP solvers that we implement and discuss, together with a new efficient search technique that we present. We compare our results with other approaches such as SAT (that require substantial duplication of circuits), showing the effectiveness of constraints over multi-valued logics, and also the adequacy of a general set constraint solver (with special inferences over set functions such as cardinality) on other problems. In addition, for an optimisation problem, we integrate local search with a constructive approach (branch-and-bound) using a variety of logics to improve an existing efficient tool based on SAT and ILP.
Resumo:
Ontologies formalized by means of Description Logics (DLs) and rules in the form of Logic Programs (LPs) are two prominent formalisms in the field of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning. While DLs adhere to the OpenWorld Assumption and are suited for taxonomic reasoning, LPs implement reasoning under the Closed World Assumption, so that default knowledge can be expressed. However, for many applications it is useful to have a means that allows reasoning over an open domain and expressing rules with exceptions at the same time. Hybrid MKNF knowledge bases make such a means available by formalizing DLs and LPs in a common logic, the Logic of Minimal Knowledge and Negation as Failure (MKNF). Since rules and ontologies are used in open environments such as the Semantic Web, inconsistencies cannot always be avoided. This poses a problem due to the Principle of Explosion, which holds in classical logics. Paraconsistent Logics offer a solution to this issue by assigning meaningful models even to contradictory sets of formulas. Consequently, paraconsistent semantics for DLs and LPs have been investigated intensively. Our goal is to apply the paraconsistent approach to the combination of DLs and LPs in hybrid MKNF knowledge bases. In this thesis, a new six-valued semantics for hybrid MKNF knowledge bases is introduced, extending the three-valued approach by Knorr et al., which is based on the wellfounded semantics for logic programs. Additionally, a procedural way of computing paraconsistent well-founded models for hybrid MKNF knowledge bases by means of an alternating fixpoint construction is presented and it is proven that the algorithm is sound and complete w.r.t. the model-theoretic characterization of the semantics. Moreover, it is shown that the new semantics is faithful w.r.t. well-studied paraconsistent semantics for DLs and LPs, respectively, and maintains the efficiency of the approach it extends.
Resumo:
Constitutional arrangements affect the decisions made by a society. We study how this effect leads to preferences of citizens over constitutions; and ultimately how this has a feedback that determines which constitutions can survive in a given society. Constitutions are stylized here, to consist of a voting rule for ordinary business and possibly different voting rule for making changes to the constitution. We deffine an equilibrium notion for constitutions, called self-stability, whereby under the rules of a self-stable constitution, the society would not vote to change the constitution. We argue that only self-stable constitutions will endure. We prove that self-stable constitutions always exist, but that most constitutions (even very prominent ones) may not be self-stable for some societies. We show that constitutions where the voting rule used to amend the constitution is the same as the voting rule used for ordinary business are dangerously simplistic, and there are (many) societies for which no such constitution is self-stable rule. We conclude with a characterization of the set of self-stable constitutions that use majority rule for ordinary business.
Resumo:
This paper analyzes secession and group formation in a general model of contest inspired by Esteban and Ray (1999). This model encompasses as special cases rent seeking contests and policy conflicts, where agents lobby over the choice of a policy in a one-dimensional policy space. We show that in both models the grand coalition is the efficient coalition structure and agents are always better off in the grand coalition than in a symmetric coalition structure. Individual agents (in the rent seeking contest) and extremists (in the policy conflict) only have an incentive to secede when they anticipate that their secession will not be followed by additional secessions. Incentives to secede are lower when agents cooperate inside groups. The grand coalition emerges as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a sequential game of coalition formation in rent seeking contests.
Resumo:
We consider the following allocation problem: A fixed number of public facilities must be located on a line. Society is composed of $N$ agents, who must be allocated to one and only one of these facilities. Agents have single peaked preferences over the possible location of the facilities they are assigned to, and do not care about the location of the rest of facilities. There is no congestion. In this context, we observe that if a public decision is a Condorcet winner, then it satisfies nice properties of internal and external stability. Though in many contexts and for some preference profiles there may be no Condorcet winners, we study the extent to which stability can be made compatible with the requirement of choosing Condorcet winners whenever they exist.
Resumo:
The division problem consists of allocating an amount M of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, the uniform rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. Ching and Serizawa (1998) extended this result by showing that the set of single-plateaued preferences is the largest domain, for all possible values of M, admitting a rule (the extended uniform rule) satisfying strategy-proofness, efficiency and symmetry. We identify, for each M and n, a maximal domain of preferences under which the extended uniform rule also satisfies the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, continuity, and "tops-onlyness". These domains (called weakly single-plateaued) are strictly larger than the set of single-plateaued preferences. However, their intersection, when M varies from zero to infinity, coincides with the set of single-plateaued preferences.
Resumo:
This paper investigates underlying changes in the UK economy over the past thirtyfive years using a small open economy DSGE model. Using Bayesian analysis, we find UK monetary policy, nominal price rigidity and exogenous shocks, are all subject to regime shifting. A model incorporating these changes is used to estimate the realised monetary policy and derive the optimal monetary policy for the UK. This allows us to assess the effectiveness of the realised policy in terms of stabilising economic fluctuations, and, in turn, provide an indication of whether there is room for monetary authorities to further improve their policies.
Resumo:
To resolve the share of limited resources, animals often compete through exchange of signals about their relative motivation to compete. When two competitors are similarly motivated, the resolution of conflicts may be achieved in the course of an interactive process. In barn owls, Tyto alba, in which siblings vocally compete during the prolonged absence of parents over access to the next delivered food item, we investigated what governs the decision to leave or enter a contest, and at which level. Siblings alternated periods during which one of the two individuals vocalized more than the other. Individuals followed turn-taking rules to interrupt each other and momentarily dominate the vocal competition. These social rules were weakly sensitive to hunger level and age hierarchy. Hence, the investment in a conflict is determined not only by need and resource-holding potential, but also by social interactions. The use of turn-taking rules governing individual vocal investment has rarely been shown in a competitive context. We hypothesized that these rules would allow individuals to remain alert to one another's motivation while maintaining the cost of vocalizing at the lowest level.
Resumo:
We examine whether and how main central banks responded to episodes of financial stress over the last three decades. We employ a new methodology for monetary policy rules estimation, which allows for time-varying response coefficients as well as corrects for endogeneity. This flexible framework applied to the U.S., U.K., Australia, Canada and Sweden together with a new financial stress dataset developed by the International Monetary Fund allows not only testing whether the central banks responded to financial stress but also detects the periods and type of stress that were the most worrying for monetary authorities and to quantify the intensity of policy response. Our findings suggest that central banks often change policy
Resumo:
Is it important to negotiate on proportions rather than on numbers? To answer this question, we analyze the behavior of well-known bargaining solutions and the claims rules they induce when they are applied to a "proportionally transformed" bargaining set SP -so-called bargaining-in-proportions set. The idea of applying bargaining solutions to claims problems was already developed in Dagan and Volij (1993). They apply the bargaining solutions over a bargaining set that is the one de ned by the claims and the endowment. A comparison among our results and theirs is provided. Keywords: Bargaining problem, Claims problem, Proportional, Constrained Equal Awards, Constrained Equal Losses, Nash bargaining solution. JEL classi fication: C71, D63, D71.
Resumo:
Can rules be used to shield public resources from political interference? The Brazilian constitution and national tax code stipulate that revenue sharing transfers to municipal governments be determined by the size of counties in terms of estimated population. In this paper I document that the population estimates which went into the transfer allocation formula for the year 1991 were manipulated, resulting in significant transfer differentials over the entire 1990's. I test whether conditional on county characteristics that might account for the manipulation, center-local party alignment, party popularity and the extent of interparty fragmentation at the county level are correlated with estimated populations in 1991. Results suggest that revenue sharing transfers were targeted at right-wing national deputies in electorally fragmented counties as well as aligned local executives.