A segurança no terrorismo e na indústria dos eventos

Nowadays, safety and security regarding the tourism and events industries are a fundamental subject to society. Portugal’s tourism has significantly increased its number of visitors, whether due to the increasing number of cruisers docking in Lisbon, or due to visitors arriving by air, travelling the country from North to South and staying in the most varied accommodation units. Issues like human security and internal security of the different countries, even the security in the world, as development factors of a modern society, are discussed on a daily basis. On the contrary, few deal with tourism and major events security as being part of internal security, as well as the existing barriers tourism encounters to integrate the system for fighting terrorism. Although two distinct activities, they are complementary and may influence the country’s economy, provided that they can offer certainty to all actors involved. It is this substance that organised crime groups look for when planning terror acts. Therefore, as tourism can offer deception and shelter opportunities and events the theatre of a possible attack, those events assemble all the necessary conditions for an attack to achieve its goals.

Operações de vigilância transfronteiras

This master dissertation is a small and humble contribution to a better assumption of the national position on the provisions of Article 40 of the Schengen Implementing Convention, particularly regarding authorities responsible for the implementation of border surveillance. And, above all, aims to be an asset to the strategic definition of this matter within the Public Security Police. To fulfill this aim, we tried to reconcile, against the almost non-existent bibliographic support frame, the professional experience of the several roles in the criminal area of Public Security Police and as a Group 7 National Expert (Mobile Organised Crime Groups) for EU Policy Cicle 2011-2013 – EMPACT Projects (European Platform Against Threats criminal Multidisciplinary) –, with the opinion conveyed by commanders, who perform management functions in the criminal structure of the Public Security Police or, not exercising, to be recognized with high merit in the criminal area.

Être motard : Hells Angels malgré tout

Les Hells Angels (HA) sont un groupe de motards qui surprennent par leur longévité. Implantés dans la province en 1977, ils sont toujours présents et actifs. Pourtant, ils ont évolué dans un contexte où les risques endogènes et exogènes furent croissants : conflits internes chez les motards, hostilités et rivalités inter groupes, opérations policières, incarcérations massives et changements législatifs sont autant d’obstacles qui se sont dressés devant eux. Que signifie être un motard et comment sont-ils demeurés résilients? Bien que différentes forces matérielles et organisationnelles aident les HA à surmonter les difficultés, nous avançons que l’élément clé de cette continuité réside dans leur réputation. En ce sens, nous adhérons à la thèse de Gambetta (2009) qui affirme que la persistance de la croyance en l’immortalité de la mafia provoque un phénomène de self-fulfilling prophecy qui rend l’organisation effectivement résiliente. Cet argument est ici appliqué aux Hells du Québec. Des entrevues auprès de motards incarcérés et non incarcérés, de délinquants non motards et de membres du personnel du Service correctionnel du Canada, ont permis de constater que l’étiquette de « Hells Angels » influence la vie des individus qui la portent. Les résultats supportent l’hypothèse que la réputation d’être une organisation dangereuse offre au groupe une valeur économique et symbolique. Néanmoins, la réputation des Hells Angels engendre des aspects négatifs pour les individus qui endossent ce nom. Il devient intéressant de comprendre l’impact d’une telle étiquette à travers différentes phases d’une carrière collective.

La lucha de la Unión Europea contra el crimen organizado transnacional. Estudio de caso: tráfico ilegal de armas pequeñas y ligeras provenientes de Albania y Kosovo (2001-2005)

En el contexto de la lucha de la Unión Europea contra el crimen organizado transnacional, el tráfico ilegal de armas pequeñas y ligeras proveniente de los grupos criminales albaneses y kosovares, es uno de los delitos a los que la Unión Europea ha tenido que hacer frente. Así pues, esta investigación logró analizar cómo la falta de coordinación de las políticas europeas implementadas para luchar contra el tráfico ilegal de armas pequeñas y ligeras y la corrupción estatal en Albania y Kosovo, fueron los dos factores de mayor influencia para evidenciar el impacto a la efectividad de dichas políticas implementadas. Para esto se debió comprender las dinámicas de los grupos criminales y la influencia de la corrupción en su actuar, y después examinar las políticas implementadas por la Unión Europea y los factores que no permitieron que existiera coordinación entre ellas.

Disrupting the market for illegal rhino horn and ivory

This paper considers methods for regulating the trafficking of rhino horn and ivory, seen through the lens of compliance theories. It stresses the importance of the distinction between normative and instrumental motivations. It argues for a balanced set of strategies that include normative levers designed to change the behaviour of poachers, traffickers and consumers of these products. In particular it considers the options needed to achieve demand reduction in consumer countries, and those needed to provide incentives to local communities in producer countries to disengage from poaching.

EU enlargement to the Balkans: will the leopard change its spots? EPC Commentary, 29 September 2014

As the leadership of the European Union hands over the baton to a new management this autumn, will the winds of change blow also through the cobwebs of the EU’s enlargement agenda? Jean-Claude Juncker – the incoming President of the European Commission – has already promised to put the gearbox of further EU widening in neutral for the next five years of his mandate, and has designated the Austrian Johannes Hahn as Commissioner for the re-baptised portfolio of now European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, instructing him to focus on the Union’s political and economic ties with Southern and Eastern Europe, and in particular with the Balkans. Such an approach in the field of enlargement – once crowned the jewel of EU foreign policy – has all the appeal of a damp rag but does not necessarily depart from the festina lente strategy of the recent past. Inside the Union, political appetite and public support for expansion have been fizzling since Bulgaria and Romania joined in 2007, and were then severely curbed in the context of the on-going crisis by growing fears of importing organised crime and migrants from the Balkans. Juncker’s logic of consolidation sounds depressingly similar to what it supposedly replaces and incidentally, it also fits neatly with the unambitious and inward-looking mantra favoured at present in discussions at all levels on the future of European integration, more generally. With the 28-member block determined to catch its breath in the immediate time period, and given that even the forerunner countries in the Balkans – that is, Montenegro and Serbia – will realistically need more than five years to complete their accession talks, what priorities should guide Commissioner Hahn, soon to be Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations – when they get down to business on 1 November?

The Kremlin plays the immigration card. OSW Commentary No. 112, 2013-08-19

Russia is currently the world’s second most popular destination country for international migrants (second only to the United States). In recent years, Russia’s relatively high economic growth has attracted foreign workers from poorer neighbouring republics in Central Asia, as well as from Ukraine and Belarus. In the absence of a consistent immigration policy, the largescale influx of immigrants has become a major issue affecting social relations in Russia. The majority of Russians oppose the arrival of both foreign workers and internal migrants from Russia’s North Caucasus republics, claiming that their presence in Russia contributes to the escalation of ethnic and religious tensions, fuels organised crime and corruption, and increases competition on the labour market. As many as 70% of Russians are in favour of restricting the number of immigrants allowed into the country, calling on the government for a more stringent policy on immigration. Since the end of July the authorities have responded to these calls by carrying out a series of raids on markets and construction sites across Moscow, where most immigrants tend to find employment. The raids have led to arrests and deportations. However, these measures should not be seen as a serious attempt to deal with the problem of economic migrants in the capital, mainly because of the highly selective and staged nature of the crackdown. This, coupled with the timing of the initiative, might indicate that the raids are a part of an ongoing election campaign, particularly in the run-up to the Moscow mayoral elections scheduled for 8 September. By adopting anti-immigration rhetoric, the Kremlin is seeking both to garner support among Russian voters, who tend to be easily swayed by nationalist sentiments, and to steal the anti-immigration card from the opposition and its leader Alexei Navalny. The opposition has been calling for a clearer policy on this issue and has blamed the government for the current lack of control over migrant numbers, accusing the authorities of benefiting from the widespread corruption linked to immigration. In a broader context, the actions taken by the government are a response to the declining legitimacy of the current ruling elite. By attempting to address the immigration issue, the Kremlin is trying to restore its image as a government attentive to social problems and capable of solving them effectively.

Criminals and terrorists in partnership:unholy alliance

The nexus between terrorism and organised crime consists in a strategic alliance between two non-state actors, able to exploit illegal markets, threaten the security of individuals, and influence policy-making on a global level. Recent Europol reports have pointed towards the importance of studying the links between organised crime and terrorist groups, and have underlined that the nature and extent of these connections have seldom been addressed from an academic perspective. Considering the degree of dangerousness that both organised crime and terrorism currently represent in the world, the collusion between these two phenomena is of urgent contemporary interest. Basing itself on geographical case-studies, this edited volume aims at contributing to the existing literature in three ways: by enriching the empirical knowledge on the nature of the crime-terror nexus and its evolution; by exploring the impact of the nexus within different economic, political and societal contexts; and by expanding on its theoretical conceptualization.

Valued tradition? Armed policing in the UK

The traditional social “contract” in the UK mainland between the public and the police involves the ideal of an unarmed police service. In recent years while the public have accepted the more visible role of specialist armed officers on security duties in airports and strategic positions, the majority of officers remain unarmed. Following 7/7 in London and the Derrick Bird case in Cumbria there have been media calls for more police officers to be armed on a routine basis .This would fundamentally change the social contract and the relationship with the British public. The principle of policing by consent and the idea of the citizen in uniform are the fundamental tenets of British policing .Historically the only forces in the UK which are routinely armed are the Police Service of Northern Ireland in Northern Ireland, the Ministry of Defence Police and the Civil Nuclear Constabulary. In contrast all major police forces in Europe, as well as the US, Canada and Australia routinely carry firearms, the exceptions apart from Britain, are the Irish Republic, and New Zealand. In Norway officers carry arms in their cars but not on their person. Every time unarmed police officers are killed, as with the tragic case of Nicola Hughes and Fiona Bone killed in the line of duty in Manchester in 2013, the question of arming the British Police is raised.So does the current balance protect the public and safeguard officers or does it fail to satisfy either. Is the current balance between unarmed and armed police in the UK suitable for the 21st Century? There appears to be competing agendas for the Police to contend with. These have been illustrated by recent controversy in Scotland about a standing authority which allowed a small number of officers to carry guns while on routine patrol .Politicians and community leaders attacked the nationwide roll-out of officers with a standing authority to carry guns on routine patrols since the formation of Scotland’s single police force. The Forces armed police monitoring group recommended keeping the standing authority in place after it was given intelligence on serious organised crime groups in 2014.The Inspectorate of Constabulary in Scotland (HMICS) in its review of the authority (2014) said the operational need for the authority is justified by national intelligence and threat levels.

Tackling trafficking in human beings in a security integrated Europe: addressing the challenges using trafficking schematics

This paper aims to conceptualise trafficking in human beings (THB) as an organised crime by drawing on the rational choice theory. Utilising crime scripting principles, it proposes trafficking schematics to capture and visualise THB in its entirety. Stemming from its transnational nature and varying conceptualisations, combatting THB faces challenges, such as the lack of harmonisation of policy instruments and differing stakeholder agendas. To mitigate these challenges, this paper proposes trafficking schematics. Their core lies in the modelling of THB constituent elements, including stages and their sequence, key actors and relationships, and financial modus operandi. Trafficking schematics may therefore contribute to addressing THB in a holistic, dynamic and integrated way, by enriching stakeholders’ understanding of the phenomenon and facilitating collaboration to address it. The paper contributes to theory and practice by drawing up a model of the procedural, human, logistical and environmental elements of THB that may be viewed as an instrument of public value creation.

New challenges for the EU internal security strategy

In recent years, the EU and its member states have experienced a number of changes, as well as challenges, in the areas of politics, economics, security and law. As these areas are interconnected, changes and challenges to any of them have implications for the others, as well as implications for the populations and institutions of the EU or those coming into contact with its international power and influence. This edited collection focuses primarily on security and law, particularly the EU’s internal security strategy. The EU’s Internal Security Strategy, adopted by the Spanish presidency early in 2010, followed the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, building on previous developments within the EU in the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ) policy. The focus of the EU Internal Security Strategy is to prevent and combat “serious and organised crime, terrorism and cybercrime, in strengthening the management of our external borders and in building resilience to natural and man-made disasters”. The Internal Security strategy intersects and overlaps with the European Union’s Counter-terrorism strategy, the Strategy for the External Dimension of JHA, and the EU’s Security Strategy. The role of and interaction between these strategies, their supplementing documents, and their implications for crime, victims, the law, political relations, democracy and human rights, form the backdrop against which the chapters in this collection are written. Building on original research by its contributors, this collection comprises work by authors from a wide variety of academic and professional areas and perspectives, as well as different countries, on a variety of areas and issues related to or raised by the EU’s Internal Security Strategy, from intelligence-led policing to human trafficking and port security. This book examines, from a wide variety of disciplinary perspectives including law, geography, politics and practice, both this further refinement of existing internal provisions on cross-border crime, and the increasing external relations of the EU in the AFSJ.

A formação das Forças e Serviços de Segurança na União Europeia rumo a uma política europeia de segurança comum

A criminalidade organizada opera cada vez mais em colaboração alargada, elevada mobilidade e grande diversificação nas suas formas de atuar. Após os recentes atentados terroristas em Paris e em Bruxelas as preocupações relacionadas com as ameaças à segurança da União Europeia (UE) estão cada vez mais na agenda política. O objetivo geral desta investigação foi analisar a importância que a formação comum das polícias da UE e o seu papel na Academia Europeia de Polícia (CEPOL) têm para a Guarda Nacional Republicada (GNR), compreendendo a importância desta formação na implementação da Política Comum de Segurança e Defesa (PCSD). Esta investigação procurou uma recolha de informação adequada, possibilitando a compreensão do fenómeno em estudo, adotando uma estratégia de investigação qualitativa, concretizada a partir de uma pesquisa documental e um inquérito por entrevista semiestruturada, cujos dados foram objeto de análise de conteúdo. Como resultado principal destacou-se o diagnóstico que fundamenta eventuais mudanças ou orientações que a GNR possa vir a prosseguir no âmbito da sua posição na CEPOL. Concluiu-se que a prossecução da segurança na UE exige uma adequada articulação entre a segurança interna e a segurança externa, bem como da importância das agências da UE em geral, e em particular, da CEPOL cuja missão de formação comum é essencial. Abstract: Organised crime is increasingly operating in extended collaboration, high mobility and great diversity in their ways of acting. After the recent terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels the concerns about threats to security of the European Union (EU) are increasingly on the political agenda. The general objective of this research was to analyse the importance of common training in the context of the EU's police forces and its role in the European Police College (CEPOL) have in the Portuguese Guarda Nacional Republicana (GNR), understanding the importance of this training in the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). This research looked for a collection of adequate information, adopting a qualitative research strategy, enabled the understanding of the phenomenon under study, adopting a qualitative research strategy, implemented from desk research and a survey by semistructured interviews, whose data were subject to content analysis. The main result highlighted the diagnosis set that underlies any changes or guidelines that GNR is likely to continue in its position on CEPOL. It was concluded that further security in the EU requires proper coordination between internal security and external security, and the importance of EU agencies in general, and in particular CEPOL whose common training mission is essential.

The issue of data protection and data security in the (pre-Lisbon) EU third pillar

The key functional operability in the pre-Lisbon PJCCM pillar of the EU is the exchange of intelligence and information amongst the law enforcement bodies of the EU. The twin issues of data protection and data security within what was the EU’s third pillar legal framework therefore come to the fore. With the Lisbon Treaty reform of the EU, and the increased role of the Commission in PJCCM policy areas, and the integration of the PJCCM provisions with what have traditionally been the pillar I activities of Frontex, the opportunity for streamlining the data protection and data security provisions of the law enforcement bodies of the post-Lisbon EU arises. This is recognised by the Commission in their drafting of an amending regulation for Frontex , when they say that they would prefer “to return to the question of personal data in the context of the overall strategy for information exchange to be presented later this year and also taking into account the reflection to be carried out on how to further develop cooperation between agencies in the justice and home affairs field as requested by the Stockholm programme.” The focus of the literature published on this topic, has for the most part, been on the data protection provisions in Pillar I, EC. While the focus of research has recently sifted to the previously Pillar III PJCCM provisions on data protection, a more focused analysis of the interlocking issues of data protection and data security needs to be made in the context of the law enforcement bodies, particularly with regard to those which were based in the pre-Lisbon third pillar. This paper will make a contribution to that debate, arguing that a review of both the data protection and security provision post-Lisbon is required, not only in order to reinforce individual rights, but also inter-agency operability in combating cross-border EU crime. The EC’s provisions on data protection, as enshrined by Directive 95/46/EC, do not apply to the legal frameworks covering developments within the third pillar of the EU. Even Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, which is supposed to cover data protection provisions within PJCCM expressly states that its provisions do not apply to “Europol, Eurojust, the Schengen Information System (SIS)” or to the Customs Information System (CIS). In addition, the post Treaty of Prüm provisions covering the sharing of DNA profiles, dactyloscopic data and vehicle registration data pursuant to Council Decision 2008/615/JHA, are not to be covered by the provisions of the 2008 Framework Decision. As stated by Hijmans and Scirocco, the regime is “best defined as a patchwork of data protection regimes”, with “no legal framework which is stable and unequivocal, like Directive 95/46/EC in the First pillar”. Data security issues are also key to the sharing of data in organised crime or counterterrorism situations. This article will critically analyse the current legal framework for data protection and security within the third pillar of the EU.

Continuum of police crime : an empirical study of court cases

The great majority of police officers are committed to honourable and competent public service and consistently demonstrate integrity and accountability in carrying out the often difficult, complex and sometimes dangerous, activities involved in policing by consent. However, in every police agency there exists an element of dishonesty, lack of professionalism and criminal behaviour. This article is based on archival research of criminal behaviour in the Norwegian police force. A total of 60 police employees were prosecuted in court because of misconduct and crime from 2005 to 2010. Court cases were coded as two potential predictors of court sentence in terms of imprisonment days, ie, type of deviance and level of deviance. Categories of police crime and levels were organised according to a conceptual framework developed for assessing and managing police deviance. Empirical findings support the hypothesis that as the seriousness of police crime increases in breadth and depth so also does the severity of the court sentence as measured by time in prison.