The principal-agent matching market

We propose a model based on competitive markets in order to analyze an economy with several principals and agents. We model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterize the set of stable outcomes of this principal-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to implement the set of stable outcomes is proposed. Finally, we put forward examples of principal-agent economies where the results fit into.

Bargaining on networks: An experiment

While markets are often decentralized, in many other cases agents in one role can only negotiate with a proper subset of the agents in the complementary role. There may be proximity issues or restricted communication flows. For example, information may be transmitted only through word-of-mouth, as is often the case for job openings, business opportunities, and confidential transactions. Bargaining can be considered to occur over a network that summarizes the structure of linkages among people. We conduct an alternating-offer bargaining experiment using separate simple networks, which are then joined during the session by an additional link. The results diverge sharply depending on how this connection is made. Payoffs can be systematically affected even for agents who are not connected by the new link. We use a graph-theoretic analysis to show that any two-sided network can be decomposed into simple networks of three types, so that our result can be generalized to more complex bargaining environments. Participants appear to grasp the essential characteristics of the networks and we observe a rather consistently high level of bargaining efficiency.

An axiomatization of the nucleolus of the assignment game

[cat] En el domini dels jocs bilaterals d’assignació, es presenta una axiomàtica del nucleolus com l´unica solució que compleix les propietats de consistència respecte del joc derivat definit per Owen (1992) i monotonia de les queixes dels sectors respecte de la seva cardinalitat. Com a conseqüència obtenim una caracterització geomètrica del nucleolus mitjançant una propietat de bisecció més forta que la que satisfan els punts del kernel (Maschler et al, 1979).

The maximun and the addition of assigment games

[cat] En el context dels mercats a dues bandes, considerem, en primer lloc, que els jugadors poden escollir on dur a terme les seves transaccions. Mostrem que el joc corresponent a aquesta situació, que es representa pel màxim d’un conjunt finit de jocs d’assignació, pot ser un joc no equilibrat. Aleshores proporcionem condicions per a l’equilibri del joc i, per aquest cas, analitzem algunes propietats del core del joc. En segon lloc, considerem que els jugadors poden fer transaccions en diversos mercats simultàniament i, llavors, sumar els guanys obtinguts. El joc corresponent, representat per la suma d’un conjunt finit de jocs d’assignació, és equilibrat. A més a més, sota certes condicions, la suma dels cores dels dos jocs d’assignació coincideix amb el core del joc suma.

An axiomatization of the nucleolus of the assignment game

[cat] En el domini dels jocs bilaterals d’assignació, es presenta una axiomàtica del nucleolus com l´unica solució que compleix les propietats de consistència respecte del joc derivat definit per Owen (1992) i monotonia de les queixes dels sectors respecte de la seva cardinalitat. Com a conseqüència obtenim una caracterització geomètrica del nucleolus mitjançant una propietat de bisecció més forta que la que satisfan els punts del kernel (Maschler et al, 1979).

The maximun and the addition of assigment games

[cat] En el context dels mercats a dues bandes, considerem, en primer lloc, que els jugadors poden escollir on dur a terme les seves transaccions. Mostrem que el joc corresponent a aquesta situació, que es representa pel màxim d’un conjunt finit de jocs d’assignació, pot ser un joc no equilibrat. Aleshores proporcionem condicions per a l’equilibri del joc i, per aquest cas, analitzem algunes propietats del core del joc. En segon lloc, considerem que els jugadors poden fer transaccions en diversos mercats simultàniament i, llavors, sumar els guanys obtinguts. El joc corresponent, representat per la suma d’un conjunt finit de jocs d’assignació, és equilibrat. A més a més, sota certes condicions, la suma dels cores dels dos jocs d’assignació coincideix amb el core del joc suma.

The Pelosi-type versus the modified Misgav-Ladach: a randomized trial of two surgical techniques for cesarean section

Cesarean section (CS) is now the most common major surgical procedure performed on women worldwide. A quarter of deliveries in Spain are performed by cesarean section. With the increasing rates of the operation, there is the need to use evidence-based techniques to optimize outcomes and minimize complications. The goal of this study is to employ a well-designed randomized controlled trial to evaluate the intraoperative blood loss of two surgical techniques for cesarean section, the Pelosi-type and the modified Misgav-Ladach. The trial will take place in Hospital Universitari de Girona Dr. Josep Trueta From 2014 to 2015, 512 pregnant women undergoing delivery by their first lower segment cesarean section in this center will be selected through a consecutive nonprobability sampling. We will collect the main obstetrical characteristics, intraoperative outcomes, short-term outcomes for the baby and postoperative outcomes. We will evaluate the intraoperative blood loss by comparing the changes in hemoglobin levels, pre and postoperatively. Patients will be followed during the postoperative period and in a two-week postoperative appointment. We will analyze the continuous variables, such as the differences in hemoglobin levels, using an unpaired two-sided Student’s t-test, while for the categorical variables Fischer’s exact test will be used

Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets in Matching Problems

The following properties of the core of a one well-known: (i) the core is non-empty; (ii) the core is a lattice; and (iii) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the core. The literature on two-sided matching focuses almost exclusively on the core and studies extensively its properties. Our main result is the following characterization of (von Neumann-Morgenstern) stable sets in one-to-one matching problem only if it is a maximal set satisfying the following properties : (a) the core is a subset of the set; (b) the set is a lattice; (c) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the set. Furthermore, a set is a stable set if it is the unique maximal set satisfying properties (a), (b) and (c). We also show that our main result does not extend from one-to-one matching problems to many-to-one matching problems.

Manipulation via Capacities Revisited

This paper revisits manipulation via capacities in centralized two-sided matching markets. Sönmez (1997) showed that no stable mechanism is nonmanipulable via capacities. We show that non-manipulability via capacities can be equivalently described by two types of non-manipulation via capacities: non-Type-I-manipulability meaning that no college with vacant positions can manipulate by dropping some of its empty positions; and non-Type-II-manipulability meaning that no college with no vacant positions can manipulate by dropping some of its filled positions. Our main result shows that the student-optimal stable mechanism is the unique stable mechanism which is non-Type-I-manipulable via capacities and independent of truncations. Our characterization supports the use of the student-optimal stable mechanism in these matching markets because of its limited manipulability via capacities by colleges.

Essais en microéconomie appliquée

La thèse comporte trois essais en microéconomie appliquée. En utilisant des modèles d’apprentissage (learning) et d’externalité de réseau, elle étudie le comportement des agents économiques dans différentes situations. Le premier essai de la thèse se penche sur la question de l’utilisation des ressources naturelles en situation d’incertitude et d’apprentissage (learning). Plusieurs auteurs ont abordé le sujet, mais ici, nous étudions un modèle d’apprentissage dans lequel les agents qui consomment la ressource ne formulent pas les mêmes croyances a priori. Le deuxième essai aborde le problème générique auquel fait face, par exemple, un fonds de recherche désirant choisir les meilleurs parmi plusieurs chercheurs de différentes générations et de différentes expériences. Le troisième essai étudie un modèle particulier d’organisation d’entreprise dénommé le marketing multiniveau (multi-level marketing). Le premier chapitre est intitulé "Renewable Resource Consumption in a Learning Environment with Heterogeneous beliefs". Nous y avons utilisé un modèle d’apprentissage avec croyances hétérogènes pour étudier l’exploitation d’une ressource naturelle en situation d’incertitude. Il faut distinguer ici deux types d’apprentissage : le adaptive learning et le learning proprement dit. Ces deux termes ont été empruntés à Koulovatianos et al (2009). Nous avons montré que, en comparaison avec le adaptive learning, le learning a un impact négatif sur la consommation totale par tous les exploitants de la ressource. Mais individuellement certains exploitants peuvent consommer plus la ressource en learning qu’en adaptive learning. En effet, en learning, les consommateurs font face à deux types d’incitations à ne pas consommer la ressource (et donc à investir) : l’incitation propre qui a toujours un effet négatif sur la consommation de la ressource et l’incitation hétérogène dont l’effet peut être positif ou négatif. L’effet global du learning sur la consommation individuelle dépend donc du signe et de l’ampleur de l’incitation hétérogène. Par ailleurs, en utilisant les variations absolues et relatives de la consommation suite à un changement des croyances, il ressort que les exploitants ont tendance à converger vers une décision commune. Le second chapitre est intitulé "A Perpetual Search for Talent across Overlapping Generations". Avec un modèle dynamique à générations imbriquées, nous avons étudié iv comment un Fonds de recherche devra procéder pour sélectionner les meilleurs chercheurs à financer. Les chercheurs n’ont pas la même "ancienneté" dans l’activité de recherche. Pour une décision optimale, le Fonds de recherche doit se baser à la fois sur l’ancienneté et les travaux passés des chercheurs ayant soumis une demande de subvention de recherche. Il doit être plus favorable aux jeunes chercheurs quant aux exigences à satisfaire pour être financé. Ce travail est également une contribution à l’analyse des Bandit Problems. Ici, au lieu de tenter de calculer un indice, nous proposons de classer et d’éliminer progressivement les chercheurs en les comparant deux à deux. Le troisième chapitre est intitulé "Paradox about the Multi-Level Marketing (MLM)". Depuis quelques décennies, on rencontre de plus en plus une forme particulière d’entreprises dans lesquelles le produit est commercialisé par le biais de distributeurs. Chaque distributeur peut vendre le produit et/ou recruter d’autres distributeurs pour l’entreprise. Il réalise des profits sur ses propres ventes et reçoit aussi des commissions sur la vente des distributeurs qu’il aura recrutés. Il s’agit du marketing multi-niveau (multi-level marketing, MLM). La structure de ces types d’entreprise est souvent qualifiée par certaines critiques de système pyramidal, d’escroquerie et donc insoutenable. Mais les promoteurs des marketing multi-niveau rejettent ces allégations en avançant que le but des MLMs est de vendre et non de recruter. Les gains et les règles de jeu sont tels que les distributeurs ont plus incitation à vendre le produit qu’à recruter. Toutefois, si cette argumentation des promoteurs de MLMs est valide, un paradoxe apparaît. Pourquoi un distributeur qui désire vraiment vendre le produit et réaliser un gain recruterait-il d’autres individus qui viendront opérer sur le même marché que lui? Comment comprendre le fait qu’un agent puisse recruter des personnes qui pourraient devenir ses concurrents, alors qu’il est déjà établi que tout entrepreneur évite et même combat la concurrence. C’est à ce type de question que s’intéresse ce chapitre. Pour expliquer ce paradoxe, nous avons utilisé la structure intrinsèque des organisations MLM. En réalité, pour être capable de bien vendre, le distributeur devra recruter. Les commissions perçues avec le recrutement donnent un pouvoir de vente en ce sens qu’elles permettent au recruteur d’être capable de proposer un prix compétitif pour le produit qu’il désire vendre. Par ailleurs, les MLMs ont une structure semblable à celle des multi-sided markets au sens de Rochet et Tirole (2003, 2006) et Weyl (2010). Le recrutement a un effet externe sur la vente et la vente a un effet externe sur le recrutement, et tout cela est géré par le promoteur de l’organisation. Ainsi, si le promoteur ne tient pas compte de ces externalités dans la fixation des différentes commissions, les agents peuvent se tourner plus ou moins vers le recrutement.

Are one-sided S,s rules useful proxies for optimal pricing rules?

This article is motivated by the prominence of one-sided S,s rules in the literature and by the unrealistic strict conditions necessary for their optimality. It aims to assess whether one-sided pricing rules could be an adequate individual rule for macroeconomic models, despite its suboptimality. It aims to answer two questions. First, since agents are not fully rational, is it plausible that they use such a non-optimal rule? Second, even if the agents adopt optimal rules, is the economist committing a serious mistake by assuming that agents use one-sided Ss rules? Using parameters based on real economy data, we found that since the additional cost involved in adopting the simpler rule is relatively small, it is plausible that one-sided rules are used in practice. We also found that suboptimal one-sided rules and optimal two-sided rules are in practice similar, since one of the bounds is not reached very often. We concluded that the macroeconomic effects when one-sided rules are suboptimal are similar to the results obtained under two-sided optimal rules, when they are close to each other. However, this is true only when one-sided rules are used in the context where they are not optimal.

Sequential Pre-Marital Investment Games: Implications for Unemployment

Agents on the same side of a two-sided matching market (such as the marriage or labor market) compete with each other by making self-enhancing investments to improve their worth in the eyes of potential partners. Because these expenditures generally occur prior to matching, this activity has come to be known in recent literature (Peters, 2007) as pre-marital investment. This paper builds on that literature by considering the case of sequential pre-marital investment, analyzing a matching game in which one side of the market invests first, followed by the other. Interpreting the first group of agents as workers and the other group as firms, the paper provides a new perspective on the incentive structure that is inherent in labor markets. It also demonstrates that a positive rate of unemployment can exist even in the absence of matching frictions. Policy implications follow, as the prevailing set of equilibria can be altered by restricting entry into the workforce, providing unemployment insurance, or subsidizing pre-marital investment.

Marriage Matching with Correlated Preferences

Authors of experimental, empirical, theoretical and computational studies of two-sided matching markets have recognized the importance of correlated preferences. We develop a general method for the study of the effect of correlation of preferences on the outcomes generated by two-sided matching mechanisms. We then illustrate our method by using it to quantify the effect of correlation of preferences on satisfaction with the men-propose Gale-Shapley matching for a simple one-to-one matching problem.

Soil characteristics of cryosols from two sites on King George Island, maritime Antarctica

This study presents soil temperature and moisture regimes from March 2008 to January 2009 for two active layer monitoring (CALM-S) sites at King George Island, Maritime Antarctica. The monitoring sites were installed during the summer of 2008 and consist of thermistors (accuracy of ±0.2 °C), arranged vertically with probes at different depths and one soil moisture probe placed at the bottommost layer at each site (accuracy of ± 2.5%), recording data at hourly intervals in a high capacity datalogger. The active layer thermal regime in the studied period for both soils was typical of periglacial environments, with extreme variation in surface temperature during summer resulting in frequent freeze and thaw cycles. The great majority of the soil temperature readings during the eleven month period was close to 0 °C, resulting in low values of freezing and thawing degree days. Both soils have poor thermal apparent diffusivity but values were higher for the soil from Fildes Peninsula. The different moisture regimes for the studied soils were attributed to soil texture, with the coarser soil presenting much lower water content during all seasons. Differences in water and ice contents may explain the contrasting patterns of freezing of the studied soils, being two-sided for the coarser soil and one-sided for the loamy soil. The temperature profile of the studied soils during the eleven month period indicates that the active layer reached a maximum depth of approximately 92 cm at Potter and 89 cm at Fildes. Longer data sets are needed for more conclusive analysis on active layer behaviour in this part of Antarctica.

One-sided asymptotic inferences for a proportion.

Two-sided asymptotic confidence intervals for an unknown proportion p have been the subject of a great deal of literature. Surprisingly, there are very few papers devoted, like this article, to the case of one tail, despite its great importance in practice and the fact that its behavior is usually different from that of the case with two tails. This paper evaluates 47 methods and concludes that (1) the optimal method is the classic Wilson method with a correction for continuity and (2) a simpler option, almost as good as the first, is the new adjusted Wald method (Wald's classic method applied to the data increased in the values proposed by Borkowf: adding a single imaginary failure or success).