Guest reputation indexes to analyze hotel’s online reputation using data extracted from OTAs

Nowadays many travelers use online travel agency (OTAs) to book flights, hotel rooms, rent-a-cars, cruises or entire vacation packages. Usually OTAs allow their users to give scores and to write reviews about what was used. Each OTA defines the terms and conditions for guest rating or review score and hoteliers are giving increasing importance to the scores and reviews their guests do in OTAs. This paper proposes two guest reputation index to help hoteliers to monitorize their presence in OTAs. The Aggregated Guest Reputation Index (AGRI), which shows the positioning of a hotel in different OTAs and it is calculated from the scores obtained by the hotels in those OTAs. Another one, the Semantic Guest Reputation Index (SGRI), which incorporates the social reputation of a hotel and that can be visualized through the development of word clouds or tag clouds. Examples of usage of these indexes are given with data extracted from 5-stars hotels in the Algarve, south region of Portugal, that are available on Booking and Expedia.

Limited Partnerships and Reputation Formation

This paper analyzes the optimal quality decision of a producer in a multi-period setting with reputation effects. Using a unique database of returns on real estate limited partnerships (RELPs), we empirically examine alternative theoretical predictions of optimal producer strategy. In particular, we test whether the producers in our market invest in reputation building by initially selling high quality goods and then lowering quality. Using a variety of statistical tests, we find evidence consistent with reputation building, both in the aggregate and for individual developers.

Evolution of reputation in networks: A mean field game approach

This work models the competitive behaviour of individuals who maximize their own utility managing their network of connections with other individuals. Utility is taken as a synonym of reputation in this model. Each agent has to decide between two variables: the quality of connections and the number of connections. Hence, the reputation of an individual is a function of the number and the quality of connections within the network. On the other hand, individuals incur in a cost when they improve their network of contacts. The initial value of the quality and number of connections of each individual is distributed according to an initial (given) distribution. The competition occurs over continuous time and among a continuum of agents. A mean field game approach is adopted to solve the model, leading to an optimal trajectory for the number and quality of connections for each individual.

Human cooperation based on punishment reputation.

The threat of punishment usually promotes cooperation. However, punishing itself is costly, rare in nonhuman animals, and humans who punish often finish with low payoffs in economic experiments. The evolution of punishment has therefore been unclear. Recent theoretical developments suggest that punishment has evolved in the context of reputation games. We tested this idea in a simple helping game with observers and with punishment and punishment reputation (experimentally controlling for other possible reputational effects). We show that punishers fully compensate their costs as they receive help more often. The more likely defection is punished within a group, the higher the level of within-group cooperation. These beneficial effects perish if the punishment reputation is removed. We conclude that reputation is key to the evolution of punishment.

Letter from Gordon Pringle Dallas of Edinburgh inquiring about the reputation of Jarvis, Conklin and Co.

Letter from Gordon Pringle Dallas of Edinburgh inquiring about the reputation of Jarvis, Conklin and Co. The letter is addressed to S.D. Woodruff, Sept. 4, 1884.

The physician himself and things that concern his reputation and succes

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