Ensayos de Montaigne ; seguidos de todas sus cartas conocidas hastael día

UANL

Dogs in the paradise: The influence of the cynical philosophy in the construction of the myth of the good savage

This paper studies the influence of cynic philosophy in the construction of the myth of the good savage. In the first part it studies the importance of cynicism in the XVI century and how the cynic influence of Erasmus, More and Montaigne was fundamental to the way that Europe approached the American indigenous. In the second part it studies the cynic motives that could have influenced in the construction of the myth of the good savage.

Biblia sacra iuxta vulgatam quam dicunt editionem, summa cura, parique fide repurgata : hic adiecimus Hebraicorum, Chaldaeorum Graecorum nominum interpretationem : cum indicibus copiosissimis

Mode of access: Internet.

Le "jeu de la constance" et le plus "apparent vice de nostre nature" : constance et inconstance dans les Essais de Michel de Montaigne

Thèse de doctorat effectuée en cotutelle au Département de philosophie Faculté des arts et des sciences de l’Université de Montréal et au département de philosophie école doctorale V de l’Université de la Sorbonne – Paris IV. Soutenue à Paris le 8 avril 2010.

Michel de Montaigne.

Ejemplar fotocopiado

Le silence des limites dans la littérature: Deux exemples :Michel de Montaigne et Marguerite Duras

The paper studies the concept of limit in literary discourse. Two aspects are discussed: 1) the limit as a necessary structuring element in the process of verbal nomination; 2) the limit as a verbal constraint which appeals to be defeated in case of extreme experience, as death, love, desire, Shoah. We analyse two examples dealing with the language restriction in the literary practice: Montaignes’ essays and Duras’ novels. Montaigne adopts a specific style of unlimited judgements and topics accumulation in a spontaneous order and logic with the purpose of revealing the deepest profile of human nature. Duras practices a minimalist writing that ruins the linear syntactic structure and the narrative model, achieving an effect of silence thus providing the possibility of unlimited meaning.

Nietzsche and Montaigne: cheerful naturalism

The influence of the Essays of Michel de Montaigne on the thought of Friedrich Nietzsche has, hitherto, received scant scholarly attention. The aim of this thesis is to address this lacuna in the literature by making evident the importance of the Essays to the development of Nietzsche’s philosophy. I argue that, in order to fully appreciate Nietzsche’s thought, it must be recognized that, from the beginning to the end of his philosophical life, Montaigne was for him a thinker of the deepest personal and philosophical significance. Against the received scholarly opinion, which would see Montaigne as influential only for Nietzsche’s middle works, I contend that the Essays continue to be a key inspiration for Nietzsche even into his late and final works. Montaigne, with his cheerful affirmation of life, his experimental mode of philosophizing, and his resolutely naturalized perspective, was an exemplar for Nietzsche as a philosopher, psychologist, sceptic and naturalist. The Essays not only stimulated Nietzsche’s thinking on questions to do with morality, epistemology and the nature of the soul but also informed his conception of the ideal philosophical life. Moreover, to explore the Essays from a Nietzschean viewpoint, allows the drawing out of the more radical aspects of Montaigne’s thought, while to probe Montaigne’s impact on Nietzsche, provides insight into the trajectory of Nietzsche’s philosophy as he broke free from romantic pessimism and embraced the naturalism that would guide his works from Human, All Too Human onward.

ALBUM AMICORUM de Jean Durand (1583-1592). In-8 de 2 f. lim. et 380 p., mar. r., comp. de mos. de mar. v., riche dorure à petits fers, tr. dor. et ciselée. (Rel. du XVIe siècle.)

Durand (Jean). Album amicorum (1583-1592)

Educació, filosofia i escriptura en Montaigne : un comentari a De l'educació dels infants. 'Educación, filosofía y escritura en Montaigne : un comentario a De la educación de los niños'.

Resumen tomado parcialmente del propio recurso

En torno a la primera traducción de Montaigne al español.

Se compara el original de 'Los ensayos', de Michel Eyquem de Montaigne, con el texto de la primera traducción española, realizada por Diego de Cisneros entre 1634 y 1637, analizando los aspectos lingüísticos, sociológicos, psicológicos y etnológicos de la época.

Il silenzio e l’umanità autentica : antropologia ed etica fra Montaigne e Heidegger

During the long history of Western thought, silence has always represented the main condition for the development of a deep meditation about the Self. Through this activity, which could seem to be in contrast with social life and philosophical praxis, several thinkers have tried to reach the spiritual nature of human beings. However, when they had to assign a foundation to it, the same meditation, which had started from the same bases, brought them to opposite conclusions. The motive for this divergence is grounded on the fact that materiality is not the only component that constitutes silence, since it has indeed a complex nature and so it consists also of an immaterial part. In addition, this inner and more hidden aspect could only be perceived through a direct contact that is rarely and personally achieved. As a consequence of this complexity, beside an interpretation of silence as a manifestation of God’s voice and a proof of the transcendent peculiarity of human beings, another reading has developed along a parallel path. This interpretation has represented silence as an expression of an utterly immanent spirituality that characterizes humanity. Two authors, in particular, can exhibit this frequently forgotten second stream of Western thought that has unceasingly run from Hellenistic age to contemporary culture: they are Michel de Montaigne and Martin Heidegger. This essay seeks to rebuild this long and complex plot of the history of Western thought through the texts’ recourse. At the same time, it seeks to grasp, in the relationship between men and silence, some fundamental prerequisites that could be considered absolutely necessary in order to design an anthropology and, consequently, an ethics with the characteristics of a recovered authenticity. These two renovated categories, according to the immanent feature of silence, have their own justification exclusively in the voice of human conscience and their purpose lies precisely in the relationship with others.

On a neglected argument in French philosophy: Sceptical humanism in Montaigne, Voltaire and Camus

This paper wants to draw out a common argument in three great philosophers and littérateurs in modern French thought: Michel de Montaigne, Voltaire, and Albert Camus. The argument makes metaphysical and theological scepticism the first premise for a universalistic political ethics, as per Voltaire's: "it is clearer still that we ought to be tolerant of one another, because we are all weak, inconsistent, liable to fickleness and error." The argument, it seems to me, presents an interestingly overlooked, deeply important and powerful contribution to the philosophical discourse of modernity. On one hand, theological and post-structuralist critics of "humanism" usually take the latter to depend either on an essentialist philosophical anthropology, or a progressive philosophy of history. The former, it is argued, is philosophically contestable and ethically contentious (since however we define the human "essence," we are bound to exclude some "others"). The latter, for better or worse, is a continuation of theological eschatology by another name. So both, if not "modernity" per se, should somehow be rejected. But an ethical universalism - like that we find in Montaigne, Bayle, Voltaire, or Camus - which does not claim familiarity with metaphysical or eschatological truths, but humbly confesses our epistemic finitude, seeing in this the basis for ethical solidarity, eludes these charges. On the other hand, philosophical scepticism plays a large role in the post-structuralist criticisms of modern institutions and ideas in ways which have been widely taken to license forms of ethics which problematically identify responsibility, with taking a stand unjustifiable by recourse to universalizable reasons. But, in Montaigne, Voltaire and Camus, our ignorance concerning the highest or final truths does not close off, but rather opens up, a new descriptive sensitivity to the foibles and complexities of human experience: a sensitivity reflected amply, and often hilariously, in their literary productions. As such, a critical agnosticism concerning claims about things "in the heavens and beneath the earth" does not, for such a "sceptical humanism," necessitate decisionism or nihilism. Instead, it demands a redoubled ethical sensitivity to the complexities and plurality of political life which sees the dignity of "really-existing" others, whatever their metaphysical creeds, as an inalienable first datum of ethical conduct and reflection. After tracking these arguments in Montaigne, Voltaire, and Camus, the essay closes by reflecting on, and contesting, one more powerful theological argument against modern agnosticism's allegedly deleterious effects on ethical culture: that acknowledging ignorance concerning the highest things robs us of the basis for awe or wonder, the wellspring of human beings' highest ethical, aesthetic, and spiritual achievements.