Unfair terms in residential land contracts : will the Australian consumer law improve a buyer’s bargaining position?

The prohibition on unfair contract terms in standard form consumer contracts has the potential to significantly impact on the terms of contracts for the sale of land. The definition of ‘consumer contract’ includes contracts for the sale or grant of an interest in land to an individual wholly or predominantly for personal or domestic use. Therefore, a contract for the purchase of a residence for personal occupation by the buyer, as opposed to a purchase for investment purposes, will be a consumer contract potentially attracting the application of the unfair terms provisions. Significant consumer protection mechanisms already exist in most state jurisdictions requiring disclosure of relevant matters to the buyer and providing remedies for the provision of misleading conduct. Minimal evidence of unfair terms in land contract was presented to the Productivity Commission Inquiry into the Australian Consumer Policy Framework raising the question as to whether there is an identified problem of unfair terms in real estate contracts and if so, whether the same economic and ethical rationales justify regulatory intervention. This article examines what effect if any the introduction of the unfair contract provisions will have on the enforcement of residential land contracts and the viability of previously accepted conditions if challenged as being “unfair terms”. The article concludes that despite the existence of several potentially unfair terms in some land contracts, the intervention of the rules of equity to overcome perceived hardship or unfairness to buyers from strict enforcement of terms means the unfair terms provisions are only likely to operate on terms untouched by those principles. In the authors’ view the scope for operation of the unfair terms provisions will be limited to terms untouched by the principles of equity and consumer protection legislation making it unlikely that there will be any significant realignment of the contractual obligations and rights of buyers and sellers of land.

Reforming the procurement of construction and financing of Australian infrastructure : advancing capacity, competition and investment

Funded by an Australian Research Council (ARC) Linkage grant over four years (2009–13), the Major Infrastructure Procurement project sought to find more effective and efficient ways of procuring and delivering the nation’s social and economic infrastructure by investigating constraints relating to construction capacity, competition, and finance in new public sector major infrastructure.1 The research team comprised researchers in construction economics and finance from Queensland University of Technology (QUT), Griffith University (GU), The University of Hong Kong (UHK), and The University of Newcastle (UoN). Project partners included state government departments and agencies responsible for infrastructure procurement and delivery from all Australian mainland states, and private sector companies and peak bodies in the infrastructure sector (see “Introduction” for complete list). There are a number of major outcomes from this research project. The first of these is a scientifically developed decisionmaking model for procurement of infrastructure that deploys a novel and state-of-the-art integration of dominant microeconomic theory (including theories developed by two Nobel Prize winners). The model has been established through empirical testing and substantial experiential evidence as a valid and reliable guide to configuring procurement of new major and mega infrastructure projects in pursuance of superior Valuefor- Money (VfM). The model specifically addresses issues of project size, bundling of contracts, and exchange relationships. In so doing, the model determines the suitability of adopting a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) mode.

The stewardship performance of forms of privatised water infrastructure

In this research Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory are used to analyse the relative performance of different forms of privitisation of water infrastructure and in doing so enriches understanding of previously underdeveloped aspects of both theories. The prior Agency Theory literature had established assumptions about the behaviour of principals and agents in contracts and these were found not to be correct in the context of contracts between modern government and private organisations. Agency theory was extended to include steward-like behaviour of an agent and Stewardship Theory was developed by the identification of factors within the contractual relationship which promote the sense of responsibility to the principal. The alliance, joint venture and Build Own Operate Transfer (BOOT) forms of privatisation were found to achieve stewardship of the infrastructure.

Government grants - an abrogation or management of risks?

New public management (NPFM), with its hands-on, private sector-style performance measurement, output control, parsimonious use of resources, disaggreation of public sector units and greater competition in the public sector, has significantly affected charitable and nonprofit organisations delivering community services (Hood, 1991; Dunleavy, 1994; George & Wilding, 2002). The literature indicates that nonprofit organisations under NPM believe they are doing more for less: while administration is increasing, core costs are not being met; their dependence on government funding comes at the expense of other funding strategies; and there are concerns about proportionality and power asymmetries in the relationship (Kerr & Savelsberg, 2001; Powell & Dalton, 2011; Smith, 2002, p. 175; Morris, 1999, 2000a). Government agencies are under increased pressure to do more with less, demonstrate value for money, measure social outcomes, not merely outputs and minimise political risk (Grant, 2008; McGreogor-Lowndes, 2008). Government-community service organisation relationships are often viewed as 'uneasy alliances' characterised by the pressures that come with the parties' differing roles and expectations and the pressures that come with the parties' differing roles and expectations and the pressurs of funding and security (Productivity Commission, 2010, p. 308; McGregor-Lowndes, 2008, p. 45; Morris, 200a). Significant community services are now delivered to citizens through such relationships, often to the most disadvantaged in the community, and it is important for this to be achieved with equity, efficiently and effectively. On one level, the welfare state was seen as a 'risk management system' for the poor, with the state mitigating the risks of sickness, job loss and old age (Giddens, 1999) with the subsequent neoliberalist outlook shifting this risk back to households (Hacker, 2006). At the core of this risk shift are written contracts. Vincent-Jones (1999,2006) has mapped how NPM is characterised by the use of written contracts for all manner of relations; e.g., relgulation of dealings between government agencies, between individual citizens and the state, and the creation of quais-markets of service providers and infrastructure partners. We take this lens of contracts to examine where risk falls in relation to the outsourcing of community services. First we examine the concept of risk. We consider how risk might be managed and apportioned between governments and community serivce organisations (CSOs) in grant agreements, which are quasiy-market transactions at best. This is informed by insights from the law and economics literature. Then, standard grant agreements covering several years in two jurisdictions - Australia and the United Kingdom - are analysed, to establish the risk allocation between government and CSOs. This is placed in the context of the reform agenda in both jurisdictions. In Australia this context is th enonprofit reforms built around the creation of a national charities regulator, and red tape reduction. In the United Kingdom, the backdrop is the THird Way agenda with its compacts, succeed by Big Society in a climate of austerity. These 'case studies' inform a discussion about who is best placed to bear and manage the risks of community service provision on behalf of government. We conclude by identifying the lessons to be learned from our analysis and possible pathways for further scholarship.

Performance-based contracting for roads – Experiences of Australia and Indonesia

Many countries over the last decade, have used performance-based contracting (PBC) to manage and maintain roads. The implementation of PBC provides additional benefits for the government/public such as cost savings and improved conditions of contracted road assets. In Australia, PBC is already being implemented on all categories of roads: national, state, urban and rural. Australian PBC arrangement is designed to turn over control and responsibility for roadway system maintenance, rehabilitation, and capital improvement projects to private contractors. Contractors’ responsibilities include determination of treatment types, the design, programming and the undertaking of works needed to maintain road networks at predetermined performance levels. Indonesia initiated two PBC pilot projects in 2011, the Pantura Section Demak-Trengguli (7.68 kilometers) in Central Java Province and Section Ciasem-Pamanukan (18.5 kilometers) in West Java Province. Both sections are categorized as national roads. The contract duration for both of these projects is four years. To facilitate a possible way forward, it is proposed to conduct a study to understand Australia's experiences of advancing from pilot projects to nation-wide programs using PBC. The study focuses on the scope of contracts, bidding processes, risk allocation, and key drivers, using relevant PBC case studies from Australia. Recommendations for future PBC deployment nation-wide should be based on more research associated with risk allocation. This will include investigation of standard conditions of contract. Implications of the contract clauses for the risk management strategy to be adopted by contractors. Based on the nature of risks, some are best managed by the project owner. It is very important that all parties involved to be open to the new rules of contract and to convince themselves about the potential increased benefits of the use of PBC. The most recent states of challenging issues were explored and described.

Do more decentralized local governments do better? an evaluation of the 2001 decentralization reform in Colombia

In this paper I evaluate the impact of the 2001 decentralization reform in Colombia. I use data from Colombia's municipalities. I look at the effect of the 2001 reform on enrolment in pre-college schools. While all municipalities received earnmarked national transfers, withthe reform some of then now have more responsabilities to provide education (deeper decen-tralization) than others. Particulary important, the reform entitle the more decentralizedmunicipalities to sign subsidy contracts with private school. Departments (the regional gov-ernments) are entitle to sign this type of contracts for the less decentralized municipalities.Since the rule for municipalities to receive more responsabilities follows and exogenous popu-lation threshold, I can implement Regression Discontinuity Design. Enrolment is measuredthrough two variables: the number of students enroled in public schools and the number of subsidized students enroled in private schools. Results sugest that more decentralized mu-nicipalities subsidize more students in private schools. The difference is significant at all thelevels of pre-college school for the period 2004-2006. In 2005, the difference accounts for20% of enrolment in private schools and 3% of population of school age. Besides, there are not significant differences among municipalities regarding enrolment in public schools.

The engineer under FDIC's conditions of contract for construction

FIDIC has over the years produced standard forms of contracts for the international procurement of projects. A source of continuing criticism of its Red Book concerns the duality in the traditional role of the engineer as the employer's agent and as an independent third party holding the balance fairly between the employer and the contractor. In response to this and other criticisms FIDIC produced a replacement for it in 1999. The role of the engineer under the new Red Book is critically examined in the light of relevant case law, expert commentaries and feedback from two multidisciplinary workshops with international participation. The examination identified three major changes: (1) a duty to act impartially has been replaced by a duty to make fair determination of certain matters; (2) it is open to parties to allow greater control of the engineer by the employer by stating in the appropriate part of the contract powers the engineer must not exercise without the employer's approval; (3) there is provision for a Dispute Adjudication Board (DAB) to which disputes may be referred. Although the duality has not been eliminated completely, the contract is structured flexibly enough to support those who wish to contract on the basis of the engineer acting solely as the agent of the employer.

Responsiveness to change by standard-form contract drafters: A case study of the FIDIC White Book

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to focus on the Fédération Internationale des Ingénieurs-Conseils (FIDIC) White Book standard form of building contract. It tracks the changes to this contract over its four editions, and seeks to identify their underlying causes. Design/methodology/approach – The changes made to the White Book are quantified using a specific type of quantitative content analysis. The amended clauses are then examined to understand the nature of the changes made. Findings – The length of the contract increased by 34 per cent between 1990 and 2006. A large proportion of the overall increase can be attributed to the clauses dealing with “conflict of interest/corruption” and “dispute resolution”. In both instances, the FIDIC drafting committees have responded to international developments to discourage corruption, and to encourage the use of alternative dispute resolution. Between 1998 and 2006, the average length of the sentences increased slightly, raising the question of whether long sentences are easily understood by users of contracts. Research limitations/implications – Quantification of text appears to be particularly useful for the analysis of documents which are regularly updated because changes can be clearly identified and the length of sentences can be determined, leading to conclusions about the readability of the text. However, caution is needed because changes of great relevance can be made to contract clauses without actually affecting their length. Practical implications – The paper will be instructive for contract drafters and informative for users of FIDIC's White Book. Originality/value – Quantifying text has been rarely used regarding standard-form contracts in the field of construction.

Regulating vertical relations in the presence of retailer differentiation costs

We discuss public policy towards vertical relations, comparing different types of contracts between a manufacturer and a maximum of two retailers. Together with (potential) price competition between the retailers, we study the role of a (sunk) differentiation cost paid by them in order to relax competition in the retail market and broaden the market potential of the distributed product. This non-price competition element in the downstream market is responsible for our conclusion that, unlike in standard policy guidelines and previous theoretical analysis, restrictions in intra-brand competition may deserve a permissive treatment even in the absence of inter-brand competition, if retailer differentiation is costly.

Rethinking the ontology of the shareholder model of the corporation

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the critical assumptions lying behind the Anglo American model of corporate governance. Design/methodology/approach – Literature review examining the concept of a nexus of contracts underpinning agency theory which, it is argued, act as the platform for neo-liberal corporate governance focusing on shareholder wealth creation. Findings – The paper highlights the unaddressed critical challenge of why eighteenth century ownership structures are readily adopted in the twenty-first century. Social implications – A re-examination of wealth creation and wealth redistribution. Originality/value – The paper is highly original due to the fact that few contributions have been made in the area of rethinking shareholder value.

Opting only in: Contractarians, waiver of liability provisions, and the race to the bottom

This paper will test the core claim of scholars in the nexus of contracts tradition—that private ordering as a process of bargaining creates optimal rules. We do this by analyzing empirical evidence in the context of waiver of liability provisions. These provisions allow companies to eliminate monetary damages for breach of the duty of care through amendments to the articles of incorporation. With all states allowing some form of these provisions, they represent a good laboratory to examine the bargaining process between management and shareholders. The contractarian approach would suggest that shareholders negotiate with management to obtain agreements that are in their best interests. If a process of bargaining is at work as they claim, the opt-in process for waiver of liability provisions ought to generate a variety of approaches. Shareholders wanting a high degree of accountability would presumably not support a waiver of liability. In other instances, shareholders might favor them in order to attract or retain qualified managers. Still others would presumably want a mix, allowing waiver but only in specified circumstances.Our analysis reveals that the diversity predicted by a private ordering model is not borne out by the evidence with waiver of liability provisions for Fortune 100 companies. All states permit such provisions and in the Fortune 100, all but one company has them. Moreover, they are remarkably similar in effect, waiving liability to the fullest extent permitted by law. In other words, one categorical rule was merely replaced by another, dealing a significant blow to the contractarian thesis.

Contract enforcement and incentive compatibility in large economies with differential information: the role of exact feasibility

We consider exchange economies with a continuum of agents and differential information about finitely many states of nature. It was proved in Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2001) that if we allow for free disposal in the market clearing (feasibility) constraints then an irreducible economy has a competitive (or Walrasian expectations) equilibrium, and moreover, the set of competitive equilibrium allocations coincides with the private core. However when feasibility is defined with free disposal, competitive equilibrium allocations may not be incentive compatible and contracts may not be enforceable (see e.g. Glycopantis, Muir and Yannelis (2002)). This is the main motivation for considering equilibrium solutions with exact feasibility. We first prove that the results in Einy et al. (2001) are still valid without free-disposal. Then we define an incentive compatibility property motivated by the issue of contracts’ execution and we prove that every Pareto optimal exact feasible allocation is incentive compatible, implying that contracts of a competitive or core allocations are enforceable.

Non-monotone insurance contracts and their empirical consequences

The goal of this paper is to show the possibility of a non-monotone relation between coverage ans risk which has been considered in the literature of insurance models since the work of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We present an insurance model where the insured agents have heterogeneity in risk aversion and in lenience (a prevention cost parameter). Risk aversion is described by a continuous parameter which is correlated with lenience and for the sake of simplicity, we assume perfect correlation. In the case of positive correlation, the more risk averse agent has higher cosr of prevention leading to a higher demand for coverage. Equivalently, the single crossing property (SCP) is valid and iplies a positive correlation between overage and risk in equilibrium. On the other hand, if the correlation between risk aversion and lenience is negative, not only may the SCP be broken, but also the monotonocity of contracts, i.e., the prediction that high (low) risk averse types choose full (partial) insurance. In both cases riskiness is monotonic in risk aversion, but in the last case there are some coverage levels associated with two different risks (low and high), which implies that the ex-ante (with respect to the risk aversion distribution) correlation between coverage and riskiness may have every sign (even though the ex-post correlation is always positive). Moreover, using another instrument (a proxy for riskiness), we give a testable implication to desentangle single crossing ans non single croosing under an ex-post zero correlation result: the monotonicity of coverage as a function os riskiness. Since by controlling for risk aversion (no asymmetric information), coverage is monotone function of riskiness, this also fives a test for asymmetric information. Finally, we relate this theoretical results to empirical tests in the recent literature, specially the Dionne, Gouruéroux and Vanasse (2001) work. In particular, they found an empirical evidence that seems to be compatible with asymmetric information and non single crossing in our framework. More generally, we build a hidden information model showing how omitted variables (asymmetric information) can bias the sign of the correlation of equilibrium variables conditioning on all observable variables. We show that this may be the case when the omitted variables have a non-monotonic relation with the observable ones. Moreover, because this non-dimensional does not capture this deature. Hence, our main results is to point out the importance of the SPC in testing predictions of the hidden information models.

Non-monotone insurence contracts and their empirical consequences

The goal of t.his paper is to show the possibility of a non-monot.one relation between coverage and risk which has been considered in the literature of insurance models since the work of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We present an insurance model where the insured agents have heterogeneity in risk aversion and in lenience (a prevention cost parameter). Risk aversion is described by a continuou.'l parameter which is correlated with lenience and, for the sake of simplicity, we assume perfect correlation. In the case of positive correlation, the more risk averse agent has higher cost of prevention leading to a higher demand for coverage. Equivalently, the single crossing property (SCP) is valid and implies a positive correlation between coverage and risk in equilibrium. On the other hand, if the correlation between risk aversion and lenience is negative, not only may the sep be broken, but also the monotonicity of contracts, i.e., the prediction that high (Iow) risk averse types choose full (partial) insurance. In both cases riskiness is monotonic in risk aversion, but in the last case t,here are some coverage leveIs associated with two different risks (low and high), which implies that the ex-ante (with respect to the risk aversion distribution) correlation bet,ween coverage and riskiness may have every sign (even though the ex-post correlation is always positive). Moreover, using another instrument (a proxy for riskiness), we give a testable implication to disentangle single crossing and non single crossing under an ex-post zero correlation result: the monotonicity of coverage as a function of riskiness. Since by controlling for risk aversion (no asymmetric informat, ion), coverage is a monotone function of riskiness, this also gives a test for asymmetric information. Finally, we relate this theoretical results to empirica! tests in the recent literature, specially the Dionne, Gouriéroux and Vanasse (2001) work. In particular, they found an empirical evidence that seems to be compatible with asymmetric information and non single crossing in our framework. More generally, we build a hidden information model showing how omitted variabIes (asymmetric information) can bias the sign of the correlation of equilibrium variabIes conditioning on ali observabIe variabIes. We show that this may be t,he case when the omitted variabIes have a non-monotonic reIation with t,he observable ones. Moreover, because this non-monotonic reIat,ion is deepIy reIated with the failure of the SCP in one-dimensional screening problems, the existing lit.erature on asymmetric information does not capture t,his feature. Hence, our main result is to point Out the importance of t,he SCP in testing predictions of the hidden information models.

Social Panorama of Latin America 2002-2003

Includes bibliography