Aggregate consequences of limited contract enforceability
| Contribuinte(s) |
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa |
|---|---|
| Data(s) |
15/09/2005
|
| Resumo |
We study a general equilibrium model in which entrepreneurs finance investment with optimal financial contracts. Because of enforceability problems, contracts are constrained efficient. We show that limited enforceability amplifies the impact of technological innovations on aggregate output. More generally, we show that lower enforceability of contracts will be associated with greater aggregate volatility. A key assumption for this result is that defaulting entrepreneurs are not excluded from the market. |
| Identificador | |
| Idioma(s) |
eng |
| Direitos |
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess <a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/</a> |
| Palavras-Chave | #Macroeconomics and International Economics #innovation #enforcement #aggregate fluctuations #development #financing innovation |
| Tipo |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
