Conflict-induced poverty: Evidence from Colombia

En Colombia, la pobreza y el conflicto están estrechamente relacionados. Este estudio usa medidas de disuasión del gobierno como instrumentos de varias variables específicas de conflicto para estimar el impacto del conflicto sobre la pobreza en Colombia. Usando datos del censo a nivel municipal para el año 2005, evalúo el efecto sobre la incidencia urbana y rural del recientemente-desarrollado Índice de Pobreza Multidimensional. Los resultados sugieren que el conflicto aumenta significativamente la pobreza rural. Esto es consistente con el hecho que la mayor parte del conflicto en Colombia ocurre en las áreas rurales. También evalúo el efecto rezagado del conflicto en la pobreza para concluir que éste dura por al menos tres años pero que decae en el tiempo. Finalmente, pruebo que mis resultados son robustos a una batería de especificaciones adicionales, incluyendo una versión modificada de mi variable dependiente y el uso de una base alternativa de conflicto.

Conflict, wages, and multiple equilibria

Firms’ compensation practices affect the protection of investors’ interests and the degree of economic inequality by changing the stakes of engaging in appropriation activities versus respecting the status quo. We use a general equilibrium model where workers can either work peacefully or join a guerrilla movement that expropriates entrepreneurs. If workers are peaceful, they receive a competitive wage. If they join a guerrilla movement, they receive a share of the appropriated wealth, which depends positively on the number of guerrilla members. In this framework, we find one low-income, low-wage equilibrium with guerrilla activity and one peaceful, high-income, high-wage equilibrium. The peaceful equilibrium can be reached through redistribution policies, which can be implemented at the firm level. In essence, through their compensation policies entrepreneurs, not the state might be able to protect their assets against expropriation and simultaneously control the internal principal-agent problem.

Internal displacement and the Kampala Convention: an opportunity for development actors

According to the African Union (AU), Africa is "a continent disproportionately affected by internal displacement". The African region, with almost 10 million people internally displaced in 22 countries by armed conflict and other forms of violence, hosts more than one third of the 26.4 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) worldwide at the end of 2011. Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia rank globally among the states with the five biggest displacement situations. Even in African countries with smaller figures, very large percentages of people may be in displacement in regions primarily affected by violence. Such violence has multiple causes, including the long-lasting consequences of colonial heritage, outside intervention, crises of identity in multi-ethnic countries and conflicts over resources. Today, political exclusion and inequality between ethnic, regional or religious groups are particularly important drivers of violence.

Affect and cognition measures in preference-based decisions: Validity testing of the Ottawa Decisional Conflict Scale and a decision-specific anxiety measure with men eligible for prostate cancer screening

Background. At present, prostate cancer screening (PCS) guidelines require a discussion of risks, benefits, alternatives, and personal values, making decision aids an important tool to help convey information and to help clarify values. Objective: The overall goal of this study is to provide evidence of the reliability and validity of a PCS anxiety measure and the Decisional Conflict Scale (DCS). Methods. Using data from a randomized, controlled PCS decision aid trial that measured PCS anxiety at baseline and DCS at baseline (T0) and at two-weeks (T2), four psychometric properties were assessed: (1) internal consistency reliability, indicated by factor analysis intraclass correlations and Cronbach's α; (2) construct validity, indicated by patterns of Pearson correlations among subscales; (3) discriminant validity, indicated by the measure's ability to discriminate between undecided men and those with a definite screening intention; and (4) factor validity and invariance using confirmatory factor analyses (CFA). Results. The PCS anxiety measure had adequate internal consistency reliability and good construct and discriminant validity. CFAs indicated that the 3-factor model did not have adequate fit. CFAs for a general PCS anxiety measure and a PSA anxiety measure indicated adequate fit. The general PCS anxiety measure was invariant across clinics. The DCS had adequate internal consistency reliability except for the support subscale and had adequate discriminate validity. Good construct validity was found at the private clinic, but was only found for the feeling informed subscale at the public clinic. The traditional DCS did not have adequate fit at T0 or at T2. The alternative DCS had adequate fit at T0 but was not identified at T2. Factor loadings indicated that two subscales, feeling informed and feeling clear about values, were not distinct factors. Conclusions. Our general PCS anxiety measure can be used in PCS decision aid studies. The alternative DCS may be appropriate for men eligible for PCS. Implications: More emphasis needs to be placed on the development of PCS anxiety items relating to testing procedures. We recommend that the two DCS versions be validated in other samples of men eligible for PCS and in other health care decisions that involve uncertainty. ^

The Sandinista Revolution and Post-Conflict Development--Key Issues

Following Daniel Ortega's victory in the presidential election held in November 2006, Nicaragua has been undergoing a transition from a democratic to authoritarian system. In the 1980s, Ortega served as President of the Sandinista government and implemented a Cuban-type socialist system, but the system failed and democracy was established during 1990-2007. Considering this failure, why did Ortega succeed in taking power again? This paper provides a brief history of modern Nicaragua and gives some insights into the twists of Latin American politics. The paper was prepared for the international seminar on Helping Failed States Recover: The Role of Business in Promoting Stability and Development, organized by the University of Kansas Center for International Business Education and Research (CIBER), held on April 4-6, 2007 in Lawrence. The opinions and views expressed herein are those of the author. All mistakes and/or errors are entirely the author's responsibility.

Conflict and land tenure in Rwanda

The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the historical relation between conflict and land tenure in Rwanda, a country that experienced a harsh civil war and genocide in the mid-1990s. The victory of the Tutsi-led rebel, Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) at that time triggered a massive return of refugees and a drastic change in land tenure policy. These were refugees who had fled the country at around the time of independence, in 1962, due to the political turmoil and persecution (the "social revolution") and who shared the background of the core RPF members. The social revolution had dismantled the existent Tutsi-led political order, compelling many Tutsi families to seek refuge outside their homeland. Under the post-independence rule of a Hutu-led government, the Tutsi refugees were not allowed to return and the lands they left behind were often arbitrarily distributed by local authorities among Hutu peasants. After victory in the mid-1990s civil war, the newly established RPF-led government ordered the current inhabitants of the lands to divide the properties in order to allocate portions to the Tutsi returnees. Different patterns of land holding and land division will be explained in the paper from data gathered through the authors' fieldworks in the southern and eastern parts of Rwanda. Although overt resistance to land division has not been observed to date, the land rights of the Tutsi returnees must be considered unstable because their legitimacy depends primarily on the strength and political stability of the RPF-led government. If the authority of RPF were to weaken, the land rights will be jeopardized. Throughout Rwandan history, in which political exclusion has often led to serious conflict, macro-level politics have repeatedly influenced land holding. Promotion of an inclusive democracy, therefore, is indispensable to escape the vicious circle between political instability and land rights.

Food crop diversification as a risk mitigating strategy during conflict : evidence from Cote d'Ivoire

This study examines the significance of food crop diversification as a household risk mitigating strategy to achieve "self-sufficiency" to ensure food security during the civil conflict in Cote d’Ivoire. The main motivation for seeking self-sufficiency stems from the fact that during the period of heightened tension due to conflict, the north–south divide set by the UN peacekeeping line disrupted the agricultural supply chain from the food surplus zone, Savane in the north. While we theoretically predict a positive effect on crop diversification because of interrupted food supply chain, we also consider a negative effect due to the covariate shocks. We find robust and statistically significant empirical outcomes supporting such claims. The baseline outcomes withstand a series of robustness checks. The net effect of conflict on crop diversification is positive but not statistically significant. In addition, we find that increasing vulnerability to poverty and food insecurity during conflict seems to be the underlying factors that motivate farm households to adopt such coping strategies.

Reintegration or Reconquest? Georgia's policy towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the context of the internal and international situation. OSW Point of View, May 2008

The conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been Georgia's main security problem since the beginning of the 1990s, and, along with the Armenian-Azeri conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, have made up the main security problems in the South Caucasus.

Russia and its Near Neighborhood: Competition and Conflict within the EU. Natolin Research Paper 04/May 2011

Russia in 2004 politely rejected the offer to become a participant in the European Neighbourhood Policy, preferring instead to pursue bilateral relations with the EU under the heading of ‘strategic partnership’. Five years later, its officials first reacted with concern to the ENP’s eastern dimension, the Eastern Partnership initiative. Quickly, however, having become convinced that the project would not amount to much, their concern gave way to indifference and derision. Furthermore, Russian representatives have failed to support idealistic or romantic notions of commonality in the area between Russia and the EU, shunned the terminology of ‘common European neighbourhood’ and replaced it in EU-Russian documents with the bland reference to ‘regions adjacent to the EU and Russian borders’. Internally, the term of the ‘near abroad’ was the official designation of the area in the Yeltsin era, and unofficially it is still in use today. As the terminological contortions suggest, Moscow officials consider the EU’s eastern neighbours as part of a Russian sphere of influence and interest. Assurances to the contrary notwithstanding, they look at the EU-Russia relationship as a ‘zero-sum game’ in which the gain of one party is the loss of the other. EU attempts to persuade the Russian power elite to regard cooperation in the common neighbourhood not as a competitive game but providing ‘win-win’ opportunities have been to no avail. In fact, conceptual approaches and practical policies conducted vis-à-vis the three Western CIS countries (Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova) and the southern Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) confirm that, from Moscow’s perspective, processes of democratisation, liberalisation and integration with Western institutions in that region are contrary to Russian interests. In each and every case, therefore, the area’s ‘frozen conflicts’ have not been regarded by the Kremlin as an opportunity to promote stability and prosperity in the countries concerned but as an instrument to prevent European choices in their domestic and foreign policy. The current ‘reset’ in Russia’s relations with the United States and the ‘modernisation partnership’ with the EU have as yet failed to produce an impact on Russia’s policies in ‘its’ neighbourhood. The EU is nevertheless well advised to maintain its course of attempting to engage that country constructively, including in the common neighbourhood. However, its leverage is small. For any reorientation to occur in Moscow towards perceptions and policies of mutual benefit in the region, much would depend on Russia’s internal development.

The Baltic states on the conflict in Ukraine. OSW Commentary [no doc #] 2015-01-23

Before Russia began its aggression against Ukraine, including the annexation of Crimea, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia had felt a higher level of security due to their membership in NATO and the EU. This has now changed. The authorities of these states claim that Russia has been pursuing an aggressive policy towards them for a long time, using various instruments of pressure. They claim that Russia is now able to organise acts of sabotage against them in several areas and that these could threaten both their internal stability and the territorial integrity of the region. The Baltic states’ reaction to the threat from Russia has demonstrated that the level of cooperation between them is low. It has also revealed certain weaknesses in several areas of how these states function, which Moscow may be willing to use for its own purposes. Paradoxically, this has created a chance for the Baltic states’ governments to take measures which in different political circumstances would meet with resistance from society, such as strengthening the military sector and the level of energy security.

The War republics in the Donbas one year after the outbreak of the conflict. OSW Commentary Number 174, 17 June 2015

More than one year since the first pro-Russian moves in the Donbas, separatists have taken control of parts of the Donbas and Luhansk oblasts but are still unable to form truly functioning administrative structures. The exercise of power by the central administration of the so-called ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ (DPR) and ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’ (LPR) is restricted to resolving problems as they arise, while administration proper is the prerogative of the local authorities reporting to them which had been performing this function before the conflict broke out. The way the situation is developing and the fact that access to information is restricted make it difficult to determine the structure of the separatist government in more detail, precisely how it is organised, and what the internal hierarchy is like. The overriding goal of the governments of the DPR and the LPR is to maintain and develop their military potential. In effect, the lives of the so-called republics are subordinate to military goals. The Donbas separatism is a conglomerate of different groups of interests, with Russia at the fulcrum. Its representatives set the main tactical and strategic goals and thus have a decisive influence on the development of the situation in the region. Individual separatist groupings come into conflict, and some oligarchs linked to the former Party of Regions circles have also been making attempts to maintain their influence. The struggle between individual groups of interest is intensifying as the situation on the war front becomes calmer. Since the situation has temporarily stabilised after the seizure of Debaltseve, the central governments of the DPR and the LPR have made attempts to expand their influence, combating armed criminals who are outside their control and that of Russia. The civilian population is taking the brunt of the devastation caused by the war and the increasing militarisation of the region. Despite the fact that the intensity of the fighting on the war front is falling, worsening humanitarian problems are causing refugees to continue their flight from the territories controlled by the separatists. 2 million people have fled the conflict zone since the beginning of the war: 1.3 million of them have found shelter in other regions of Ukraine, and more than 700,000 have left for Russia. The region has also sustained great economic losses – most mines have been either destroyed or closed, many industrial plants have restricted or completely discontinued their production, and many firms have been taken over by force. In effect, the region has seen an economic downturn.

A constitution for Erdoğan. Consequences of the political conflict in Turkey. OSW COMMENTARY No. 213, 2016-06-01

Since mid-2015 Turkey has been affected by a deep internal crisis, caused by rising political polarisation, increased levels of terrorist threat (posed by the Kurds and Islamic radicals) and the revived conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). As a consequence of this crisis, over 350,000 residents of south-eastern Turkey have been forced to leave their homes. At the same time, due to the migration crisis and despite mutual distrust in relations between Turkey and the EU, cooperation between Ankara and Brussels has been intensifying. Turkey’s ongoing destabilisation does not challenge the status of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), which is de facto controlled by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan; paradoxically, it strengthens the party. The internal crisis which the authorities have been deliberately fuelling is an element of a plan to rubber-stamp political change by introducing a presidential system of government. This is happening amid a thorough reconstruction of the socio-political order which has been underway for over a decade. In the upcoming months it is expected to result in the constitution being changed and, as a consequence, the institutionalisation of Erdoğan’s autocratic rule.

The individual and society in the GDR under Honecker : orthodoxy, dissidence and internal debate.

The thesis offers a comparative interdisciplinary approach to the examination of the intellectual debates about the relationship between individual and society in the GDR under Honecker. It shows that there was not only a continuum of debate between the academic disciplines, but also from the radical critics of the GDR leadership such as Robert Havemann, Rudolf Bahro and Stefan Heym through the social scientists, literary critics and legal theorists working in the academic institutions to theorists close to the GDR leadership. It also shows that the official line and policy of the ruling party itself on the question of the individual and society was not static over the period, but changed in response to internal and external pressures. Over the period 1971 - 1989 greater emphasis was placed by many intellectuals on the individual, his needs and interests. It was increasingly recognised that conflicts could exist between the individual and society in GDR socialism. Whereas the radical critics argued that these conflicts were due to features of GDR society, such as the hierarchical system of labour functions and bureaucracy, and extrapolated from this a general conflict between the political leadership and population, orthodox critics argued that conflicts existed between a specific individual and society and were largely due to external and historical factors. The internal critics also pointed to the social phenomena which were detrimental to the individual's development in the GDR, but they put forward less radical solutions. With the exception of a few radical young writers, all theorists studied in this thesis gave precedence to social interests over individual interests and so did not advocate a return to `individualistic' positions. The continuity of sometimes quite controversial discussions in the GDR academic journals and the flexibility of the official line and policy suggests that it is inappropriate to refer to GDR society under Honecker simply as totalitarian, although it did have some totalitarian features. What the thesis demonstrates is the existence of `Teiloffentlichkeiten' in which critical discussion is conducted even as the official, orthodox line is given out for public consumption in the high-circulation media.

»The German likes quarrelling.« Conflict and belonging in German diasporic communities around 1900

Discourses of inclusion and exclusion were an integral part of German nation building after 1871. The paper shows that they were not confined to the metropole but were, in fact, reciprocated abroad. Selected instances of conflict within German migrant communities around the world are taken as a springboard to analyze public contestations of (trans-)national belonging. The sources abound with gossip, aggressive bickering, and official complaints to authorities. Contentious issues cover the areas of politics, religion, class, and language. The case studies engage critically with a number of wider issues. First, they question contemporaneous interpretations of an Imperial diaspora as a unified and Heimat-oriented block. Second, on a theoretical level the article argues that internal ruptures are constitutive elements of diaspora construction and should be considered in concomitant theorizations. Third, the case studies highlight the close connection between diaspora and nation building. Fourth, the discourses studied did not only take place within communities, but also between them, as well as with the metropole, all in multi-directional ways. Questions of belonging were discussed around the world with strikingly similar arguments and terminology. Globalization was at work at the discourse level.