Experience, Education and Subjectivity: A Comparison of John Dewey's and Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Conceptions of Experience and Their Implications for Education

This thesis compares John Dewey’s philosophy of experience and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, and illustrates how Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology can strengthen and further Dewey’s philosophy of education. I begin by drawing the connection between Dewey’s philosophy of experience and his philosophy of education, and illustrate how Dewey’s understanding of growth, and thinking in education, is rooted in and informed by his detailed philosophy of experience. From there, I give an interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology with a focus on his descriptions of subjectivity that he presents in the Phenomenology of Perception. Following this, I outline some of the implications Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology has on our understanding of rationality, expression and existence. In the final chapter, I make the comparison between Dewey’s philosophy of experience and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. After demonstrating how these two philosophies are not only similar but also complementary, I then look to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology to provide insight into and to advance Dewey’s philosophy of education. I will illustrate how Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of subjectivity helps to support, and reinforce the rationale behind Dewey’s inquiry-based approach to education. Furthermore, I will show how Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and its implications for rationality, expression and existence support Dewey’s democratic ideal and add a hermeneutical element to Dewey’s philosophy of education.

An introduction to theosophy, or the science of the "Mystery of Christ", that is, of deity, nature, and creature : embracing the philosophy of all the working powers of life, magical and spiritual ... Vol. I. complete in itself

Los vols. proyectados no se publicaron.

An ecclesiastical history, ancient and modern : from the birth of Christ, to the beginning of the present century : in which the rise, progress, and variations of church power, are considered in their connection with the state of learning and philosophy, and the political history of Europe during that period /

Includes bibliographical references.

An ecclesiastical history, from the birth of Christ to the beginning of the eighteenth century : in which the rise, progress, and variations of church power, are considered in their connexion with the state of learning and philosophy, and the political history of Europe during that period. /

Mode of access: Internet.

An ecclesiastical history, ancient and modern, from the birth of Christ to the beginning of the present century. In which the rise, progress, and variation of church power, are considered in their connexion with the state of learning and philosophy, and the political history of Europe, during that period.

Mode of access: Internet.

The ADHD debate and the philosophy of truth

There is ongoing and wide-ranging dispute over the proliferation of childhood behaviour disorders. In particular, the veracity of the category Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), has been the subject of considerable scepticism. With no end to the debate in sight, it will be argued here that the problem might effectively be approached, not by addressing the specific features of ADHD itself, but rather by a philosophical analysis of one of the terms around which this entire problem revolves: that is, the notion of truth. If we state: “It is true that ADHD is a real disorder”, what exactly do we mean? Do we mean that it is an objective fact of nature? Do we mean that it fits seamlessly with other sets of ideas and explanations? Or do we simply mean that it works as an idea in a practical sense? This paper will examine the relationship between some of the dominant models of truth, and the assertions made by those in the field of ADHD. Specifically, the paper will contrast the claim that ADHD is a real disorder, with the claim that ADHD is a product of social governance. The intention is, first, to place some significant qualifications upon the validity of the truth-claims made by ADHD advocates, and second, to re-emphasise the potential and promise of philosophical investigation in providing productive new ways of thinking about some obstinate and seemingly intractable educational problems.

Insights from ecological psychology and dynamical systems theory can underpin a philosophy of coaching

The aim of this paper is to show how principles of ecological psychology and dynamical systems theory can underpin a philosophy of coaching practice in a nonlinear pedagogy. Nonlinear pedagogy is based on a view of the human movement system as a nonlinear dynamical system. We demonstrate how this perspective of the human movement system can aid understanding of skill acquisition processes and underpin practice for sports coaches. We provide a description of nonlinear pedagogy followed by a consideration of some of the fundamental principles of ecological psychology and dynamical systems theory that underpin it as a coaching philosophy. We illustrate how each principle impacts on nonlinear pedagogical coaching practice, demonstrating how each principle can substantiate a framework for the coaching process.

Trial by jury in civil proceedings : “convenience” and the philosophy of the UCPR

In Syddall v National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Limited [2008] QSC 101 Daubney J ordered the action be tried without a jury. His judgment considered the circumstances in which a trial involves any technical, scientific or other issue that can not be “conveniently” considered and resolved by a jury as provided in r 474 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld)

Self-love and self-liking in the moral and political philosophy of Bernard Mandeville and David Hume

This work offers a novel interpretation of David Hume’s (1711–1776) conception of the conjectural development of civil society and artificial moral institutions. It focuses on the social elements of Hume’s Treatise of human nature (1739–40) and the necessary connection between science of man and politeness, civilised monarchies, social distance and hierarchical structure of civil society. The study incorporates aspects of intellectual history, history of philosophy and book history. In order to understand David Hume’s thinking, the intellectual development of Bernard Mandeville (1670–1733) needs to be accounted for. When put into a historical perspective, the moral, political and social components of Treatise of human nature can be read in the context of a philosophical tradition, in which Mandeville plays a pivotal role. A distinctive character of Mandeville and Hume’s account of human nature and moral institutions was the introduction of a simple distinction between self-love and self-liking. The symmetric passions of self-interest and pride can only be controlled by the corresponding moral institutions. This is also the way in which we can say that moral institutions are drawn from human nature. In the case of self-love or self-interest, the corresponding moral institution is justice. Respectively, concerning self-liking or pride the moral institution is politeness. There is an explicit analogy between these moral institutions. If we do not understand this analogy, we do not understand the nature of either justice or politeness. The present work is divided into two parts. In the first part, ‘Intellectual development of Bernard Mandeville’, it is argued that the relevance of the paradigmatic change in Mandeville’s thinking has been missed. It draws a picture of Mandeville turning from the Hobbism of The Fable of the Bees to an original theory of civil society put forward in his later works. In order to make this change more apparent, Mandeville’s career and the publishing history of The Fable of the Bees are examined comprehensively. This interpretation, based partly on previously unknown sources, challenges F. B. Kaye’s influential decision to publish the two parts of The Fable of the Bees as a uniform work of two volumes. The main relevance, however, of the ‘Intellectual development of Mandeville’ is to function as the context for the young Hume. The second part of the work, ‘David Hume and Greatness of mind’, explores in philosophical detail the social theory of the Treatise and politics and the science of man in his Essays. This part will also reveal the relevance of Greatness of mind as a general concept for David Hume’s moral and political philosophy.

A Literary Turn : Rethinking the Roles of Generalization and Theory in Anglo-American Moral Philosophy

This work investigates the role of narrative literature in late-20th century and contemporary Anglo-American moral philosophy. It aims to show the trend of reading narrative literature for purposes of moral philosophy from the 1970 s and early 80 s to the present day as a part of a larger movement in Anglo-American moral philosophy, and to present a view of its significance for moral philosophy overall. Chapter 1 provides some preliminaries concerning the view of narrative literature which my discussion builds on. In chapter 2 I give an outline of how narrative literature is considered in contemporary Anglo-American moral philosophy, and connect this use to the broad trend of neo-Aristotelian ethics in this context. In chapter 3 I connect the use of literature to the idea of the non-generalizability of moral perception and judgment, which is central to the neo-Aristotelian trend, as well as to a range of moral particularisms and anti-theoretical positions of late 20th century and contemporary ethics. The joint task of chapters 2 and 3 is to situate the trend of reading narrative literature for the purposes of moral philosophy in the present context of moral philosophy. In the following two chapters, 4 and 5, I move on from the particularizing power of narrative literature, which is emphasized by neo-Aristotelians and particularists alike, to a broader under-standing of the intellectual potential of narrative literature. In chapter 4 I argue that narrative literature has its own forms of generalization which are enriching for our understanding of the workings of ethical generalizations in philosophy. In chapter 5 I discuss Iris Murdoch s and Martha Nussbaum s respective ways of combining ethical generality and particularity in a philosophical framework where both systematic moral theory and narrative literature are taken seriously. In chapter 6 I analyse the controversy between contemporary anti-theoretical conceptions of ethics and Nussbaum s refutation of these. I present my suggestion for how the significance of the ethics/literature discussion for moral philosophy can be understood if one wants to overcome the limitations of both Nussbaum s theory-centred, equilibrium-seeking perspective, and the anti-theorists repudiation of theory. I call my position the inclusive approach .