The paradox of competition for airline passengers with reduced mobility (PRM)

Airline competition with customer service as product differentiator has forced down costs, air fares and investor returns. Two passenger markets operate in aviation: (1) able-bodied passengers for whom airlines openly compete and (2) passengers with reduced mobility (PRMs) – disabled by age, obesity or medical problems – for whom airlines do not compete. Government interference in the market intended to protect a minority of narrowly-defined PRMs has had unintended consequences of enabling increasing numbers of more widely-defined PRMs to access complimentary airline provisions. With growing ageing and overweight populations and long-haul travelling medical tourists such regulation could lead to even lower investors’ returns. The International Air Transport Association (IATA) (2013) examined the air transport value chain for competitiveness using Porter’s (2008) five forces but did not distinguish between able-bodied passengers and PRMs. Findings during an investigation of these two markets concurred with IATA-Porter that the markets for the bargaining powers of PRM customers and PRM suppliers were ‘highly competitive’. However, in contrast to the IATA conclusions the threats posed by new entrants, substitute products and intensity of competition for PRM passengers were all ‘low’. The conclusion is that airlines are strategically PRM defensive by omission. Paradoxically, the airline which delivers the best PRM customer service could become the least profitable.

Tutoria da anatomia mamária feminina utilizando uma rede neural artificial interactive activation and competition orientada a serviço

Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Faculdade Gama, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Engenharia Biomédica, 2015.

Where Are We After Five Editions?: Robot Vision Challenge, a Competition that Evaluates Solutions for the Visual Place Classification Problem

This article describes the Robot Vision challenge, a competition that evaluates solutions for the visual place classification problem. Since its origin, this challenge has been proposed as a common benchmark where worldwide proposals are measured using a common overall score. Each new edition of the competition introduced novelties, both for the type of input data and subobjectives of the challenge. All the techniques used by the participants have been gathered up and published to make it accessible for future developments. The legacy of the Robot Vision challenge includes data sets, benchmarking techniques, and a wide experience in the place classification research that is reflected in this article.

Corruption via media capture : the effect of competition

In this article, we compare a government's optimal choice of whether to engage in corruption by capturing the media outlets through bribery in two alternative media market structures: monopoly versus duopoly. While there is an extra bribe claimant in a media duopoly relative to monopoly, it may also be harder for each firm to individually expose corruption when the rival co-opts with the government. We find that when the latter effect is stronger than the former, media is captured at lower bribes under duopoly relative to monopoly and in such instances media competition facilitates rather than hindering corruption.

Does inter-jurisdictional competition engender a “race to the bottom”? A meta-regression analysis

A growing literature documents the existence of strategic political reactions to publicexpenditure between rival jurisdictions. These interactions can potentially createa downward expenditure spiral (“race to the bottom”) or a rising expenditure spiral(“race to the top”). However, in the course of identifying the existence of such interactions and ascertaining their underlying triggers, the empirical evidence has produced markedly heterogeneous findings. Most of this heterogeneity can be traced back to study design and institutional differences. This article contributes to the literature by applying meta-regression analysis to quantify the magnitude of strategic inter-jurisdictional expenditure interactions, controlling for study, and institutional characteristics. We find several robust results beyond confirming that jurisdictions do engage in strategic expenditure interactions, namely that strategic interactions: (i) are weakening over time, (ii) are stronger among municipalities than among higher levels of government, and (iii) appear to be more influenced from tax competition than yardstick competition, with capital controls and fiscal decentralization shaping the magnitude of fiscal interactions.

Using performance measurement models for benefit realization with enterprise systems: The Queensland Government approach (Case Study)

A range of influences, technical and organizational, has encouraged the wide spread adaption of Enterprise Systems (ES). Nevertheless, there is a growing consensus that Enterprise Systems have in the many cases failed to provide the expected benefits to organizations. This paper presents ongoing research, which analyzes the benefits realization approach of the Queensland Government. This approach applies a modified Balance Scorecard. First, history and background of Queensland Government’s Enterprise Systems initiative is introduced. Second, the most common reasons for ES under performance are related. Third, relevant performance measurement models and the Balanced Scorecard in particular are discussed. Finally, the Queensland Government initiative is evaluated in light of this overview of current work in the area. In the current and future work, the authors aim to use their active involvement in Queensland Government’s benefits realization initiative for an Action Research based project investigating the appropriateness of the Balanced Scorecard for the purposes of Enterprise Systems benefits realization.