L'imitation de Jesus-Christ, traduction nouvelle avec des reflexionsa la fin de chaque capitre

UANL

Imitation du Sacré-Coeur de Jésus

UANL

Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance under Responsive Priorities

In many economic environments - such as college admissions, student placements at public schools, and university housing allocation - indivisible objects with capacity constraints are assigned to a set of agents when each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not allowed. In these important applications the agent-proposing deferred-acceptance algorithm with responsive priorities (called responsive DA-rule) performs well and economists have successfully implemented responsive DA-rules or slight variants thereof. First, for house allocation problems we characterize the class of responsive DA-rules by a set of basic and intuitive properties, namely, unavailable type invariance, individual rationality, weak non-wastefulness, resource-monotonicity, truncation invariance, and strategy-proofness. We extend this characterization to the full class of allocation problems with capacity constraints by replacing resource- monotonicity with two-agent consistent con ict resolution. An alternative characterization of responsive DA-rules is obtained using unassigned objects invariance, individual rationality, weak non-wastefulness, weak consistency, and strategy-proofness. Various characterizations of the class of "acyclic" responsive DA-rules are obtained by using the properties efficiency, group strategy-proofness, and consistency.

Strategy-proofness makes the difference: deferred-acceptance with responsive priorities

In college admissions and student placements at public schools, the admission decision can be thought of as assigning indivisible objects with capacity constraints to a set of students such that each student receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not allowed. In these important market design problems, the agent-proposing deferred-acceptance (DA-)mechanism with responsive strict priorities performs well and economists have successfully implemented DA-mechanisms or slight variants thereof. We show that almost all real-life mechanisms used in such environments - including the large classes of priority mechanisms and linear programming mechanisms - satisfy a set of simple and intuitive properties. Once we add strategy-proofness to these properties, DA-mechanisms are the only ones surviving. In market design problems that are based on weak priorities (like school choice), generally multiple tie-breaking (MTB)procedures are used and then a mechanism is implemented with the obtained strict priorities. By adding stability with respect to the weak priorities, we establish the first normative foundation for MTB-DA-mechanisms that are used in NYC.

House allocation via deferred-acceptance

We study the simple model of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offi ces, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. For this model, known as the house allocation model, we characterize the class of rules satisfying unavailable object invariance, individual rationality, weak non-wastefulness, resource-monotonicity, truncation invariance, and strategy-proofness: any rule with these properties must allocate objects based on (implicitly induced) objects' priorities over agents and the agent-proposing deferred-acceptance-algorithm.

Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics

We study the problem of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, school or university admissions etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We consider mechanisms satisfying a set of basic properties (unavailable-type-invariance, individual-rationality, weak non-wastefulness, or truncation-invariance). In the house allocation problem, where at most one copy of each object is available, deferred-acceptance (DA)-mechanisms allocate objects based on exogenously fixed objects' priorities over agents and the agent-proposing deferred-acceptance-algorithm. For house allocation we show that DA-mechanisms are characterized by our basic properties and (i) strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity or (ii) strategy-proofness and resource-monotonicity. Once we allow for multiple identical copies of objects, on the one hand the first characterization breaks down and there are unstable mechanisms satisfying our basic properties and (i) strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity. On the other hand, our basic properties and (ii) strategy-proofness and resource-monotonicity characterize (the most general) class of DA-mechanisms based on objects' fixed choice functions that are acceptant, monotonic, substitutable, and consistent. These choice functions are used by objects to reject agents in the agent-proposing deferred-acceptance-algorithm. Therefore, in the general model resource-monotonicity is the «stronger» comparative statics requirement because it characterizes (together with our basic requirements and strategy-proofness) choice-based DA-mechanisms whereas population-monotonicity (together with our basic properties and strategy-proofness) does not.

A Dream Deferred

Presentation at the MLK Annual Unity Breakfast, Boston College, January 19, 2005.

Turing’s imitation game and human thought

In 1950, the English mathematician Alan Mathison Turing proposed the basis of what some authors consider the test that a machine must pass to establish that it can think. This test is basically a game; nevertheless, it has had great infl uence in the development of the theories of the mind performance. The game specifications and some of its repercussions in the conception of thinking, the consciousness and the human will, will be ramifications of the path that will take us through the beginning of the artificial intelligence, passing along some of its singular manifestations, to culminate in the posing of certain restrictions of its fundaments.

The effect of "picture story" context on verbal elicted imitation in deaf students

This paper reviews a study to determine the effects of including a supporting context in an imitation procedure for use with the deaf.

A study of imitation, comprehension, and production

This paper examines the relationship between imitation, comprehension and speech production in language disordered children, and in identifying whether language-disordered children are "language impaired" or "talking impaired."

Acquisition of automatic imitation is sensitive to sensorimotor contingency

The associative sequence learning model proposes that the development of the mirror system depends on the same mechanisms of associative learning that mediate Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning. To test this model, two experiments used the reduction of automatic imitation through incompatible sensorimotor training to assess whether mirror system plasticity is sensitive to contingency (i.e., the extent to which activation of one representation predicts activation of another). In Experiment 1, residual automatic imitation was measured following incompatible training in which the action stimulus was a perfect predictor of the response (contingent) or not at all predictive of the response (noncontingent). A contingency effect was observed: There was less automatic imitation indicative of more learning in the contingent group. Experiment 2 replicated this contingency effect and showed that, as predicted by associative learning theory, it can be abolished by signaling trials in which the response occurs in the absence of an action stimulus. These findings support the view that mirror system development depends on associative learning and indicate that this learning is not purely Hebbian. If this is correct, associative learning theory could be used to explain, predict, and intervene in mirror system development.