House allocation via deferred-acceptance

We study the simple model of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offi ces, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. For this model, known as the house allocation model, we characterize the class of rules satisfying unavailable object invariance, individual rationality, weak non-wastefulness, resource-monotonicity, truncation invariance, and strategy-proofness: any rule with these properties must allocate objects based on (implicitly induced) objects' priorities over agents and the agent-proposing deferred-acceptance-algorithm.

Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics

We study the problem of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, school or university admissions etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We consider mechanisms satisfying a set of basic properties (unavailable-type-invariance, individual-rationality, weak non-wastefulness, or truncation-invariance). In the house allocation problem, where at most one copy of each object is available, deferred-acceptance (DA)-mechanisms allocate objects based on exogenously fixed objects' priorities over agents and the agent-proposing deferred-acceptance-algorithm. For house allocation we show that DA-mechanisms are characterized by our basic properties and (i) strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity or (ii) strategy-proofness and resource-monotonicity. Once we allow for multiple identical copies of objects, on the one hand the first characterization breaks down and there are unstable mechanisms satisfying our basic properties and (i) strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity. On the other hand, our basic properties and (ii) strategy-proofness and resource-monotonicity characterize (the most general) class of DA-mechanisms based on objects' fixed choice functions that are acceptant, monotonic, substitutable, and consistent. These choice functions are used by objects to reject agents in the agent-proposing deferred-acceptance-algorithm. Therefore, in the general model resource-monotonicity is the «stronger» comparative statics requirement because it characterizes (together with our basic requirements and strategy-proofness) choice-based DA-mechanisms whereas population-monotonicity (together with our basic properties and strategy-proofness) does not.

A Dream Deferred

Presentation at the MLK Annual Unity Breakfast, Boston College, January 19, 2005.

Turing’s imitation game and human thought

In 1950, the English mathematician Alan Mathison Turing proposed the basis of what some authors consider the test that a machine must pass to establish that it can think. This test is basically a game; nevertheless, it has had great infl uence in the development of the theories of the mind performance. The game specifications and some of its repercussions in the conception of thinking, the consciousness and the human will, will be ramifications of the path that will take us through the beginning of the artificial intelligence, passing along some of its singular manifestations, to culminate in the posing of certain restrictions of its fundaments.

The effect of "picture story" context on verbal elicted imitation in deaf students

This paper reviews a study to determine the effects of including a supporting context in an imitation procedure for use with the deaf.

A study of imitation, comprehension, and production

This paper examines the relationship between imitation, comprehension and speech production in language disordered children, and in identifying whether language-disordered children are "language impaired" or "talking impaired."

Acquisition of automatic imitation is sensitive to sensorimotor contingency

The associative sequence learning model proposes that the development of the mirror system depends on the same mechanisms of associative learning that mediate Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning. To test this model, two experiments used the reduction of automatic imitation through incompatible sensorimotor training to assess whether mirror system plasticity is sensitive to contingency (i.e., the extent to which activation of one representation predicts activation of another). In Experiment 1, residual automatic imitation was measured following incompatible training in which the action stimulus was a perfect predictor of the response (contingent) or not at all predictive of the response (noncontingent). A contingency effect was observed: There was less automatic imitation indicative of more learning in the contingent group. Experiment 2 replicated this contingency effect and showed that, as predicted by associative learning theory, it can be abolished by signaling trials in which the response occurs in the absence of an action stimulus. These findings support the view that mirror system development depends on associative learning and indicate that this learning is not purely Hebbian. If this is correct, associative learning theory could be used to explain, predict, and intervene in mirror system development.

Intact imitation of emotional facial actions in autism spectrum conditions.

It has been proposed that there is a core impairment in autism spectrum conditions (ASC) to the mirror neuron system (MNS): If observed actions cannot be mapped onto the motor commands required for performance, higher order sociocognitive functions that involve understanding another person's perspective, such as theory of mind, may be impaired. However, evidence of MNS impairment in ASC is mixed. The present study used an 'automatic imitation' paradigm to assess MNS functioning in adults with ASC and matched controls, when observing emotional facial actions. Participants performed a pre-specified angry or surprised facial action in response to observed angry or surprised facial actions, and the speed of their action was measured with motion tracking equipment. Both the ASC and control groups demonstrated automatic imitation of the facial actions, such that responding was faster when they acted with the same emotional expression that they had observed. There was no difference between the two groups in the magnitude of the effect. These findings suggest that previous apparent demonstrations of impairments to the MNS in ASC may be driven by a lack of visual attention to the stimuli or motor sequencing impairments, and therefore that there is, in fact, no MNS impairment in ASC. We discuss these findings with reference to the literature on MNS functioning and imitation in ASC, as well as theories of the role of the MNS in sociocognitive functioning in typical development.

Testing Turing's five minutes, parallel-paired imitation game

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to consider Turing's two tests for machine intelligence: the parallel-paired, three-participants game presented in his 1950 paper, and the “jury-service” one-to-one measure described two years later in a radio broadcast. Both versions were instantiated in practical Turing tests during the 18th Loebner Prize for artificial intelligence hosted at the University of Reading, UK, in October 2008. This involved jury-service tests in the preliminary phase and parallel-paired in the final phase. Design/methodology/approach – Almost 100 test results from the final have been evaluated and this paper reports some intriguing nuances which arose as a result of the unique contest. Findings – In the 2008 competition, Turing's 30 per cent pass rate is not achieved by any machine in the parallel-paired tests but Turing's modified prediction: “at least in a hundred years time” is remembered. Originality/value – The paper presents actual responses from “modern Elizas” to human interrogators during contest dialogues that show considerable improvement in artificial conversational entities (ACE). Unlike their ancestor – Weizenbaum's natural language understanding system – ACE are now able to recall, share information and disclose personal interests.

Imitation of lateralised body movements: doing it the hard way

Two experiments examined imitation of lateralised body movement sequences presented at six viewing angles (0º, 60º, 120º, 180º, 240º, and 300º rotation relative to the participant’s body). Experiment 1 found that, when participants were instructed simply to ‘‘do what the model does’’, at all viewing angles they produced more actions using the same side of the body as the model (anatomical matches), than actions using the opposite side (anatomical non-matches). In Experiment 2 participants were instructed to produce either anatomical matches or anatomical non-matches of observed actions. When the model was viewed from behind (0º), the anatomically matching group were more accurate than the anatomically non-matching group, but the non-matching group was superior when the model faced the participant (180º and 240º). No reliable differences were observed between groups at 60º, 120º, and 300º. In combination, the results of Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that, when they are confronting a model, people choose to imitate the hard way; they attempt to match observed actions anatomically, in spite of the fact that anatomical matching is more subject to error than anatomical non-matching.

Automatic imitation of intransitive actions

Previous research has indicated a potential discontinuity between monkey and human ventral premotor-parietal mirror systems, namely that monkey mirror systems process only transitive (object-directed) actions, whereas human mirror systems may also process intransitive (non-object-directed) actions. The present study investigated this discontinuity by seeking evidence of automatic imitation of intransitive actions—hand opening and closing—in humans using a simple reaction time (RT), stimulus–response compatibility paradigm. Left–right and up–down spatial compatibility were controlled by ensuring that stimuli were presented and responses executed in orthogonal planes, and automatic imitation was isolated from simple and complex orthogonal spatial compatibility by varying the anatomical identity of the stimulus hand and response hemispace, respectively. In all conditions, action compatible responding was faster than action incompatible responding, and no effects of spatial compatibility were observed. This experiment therefore provides evidence of automatic imitation of intransitive actions, and support for the hypothesis that human and monkey mirror systems differ with respect to the processing of intransitive actions.

Stimulus-driven selection of routes to imitation

Several models have proposed that an action can be imitated via one of two routes: a direct visuospatial route, which can in principle mediate imitation of both meaningful (MF) and meaningless (ML) actions, and an indirect semantic route, which can be used only for MF actions. The present study investigated whether selection between the direct and indirect routes is strategic or stimulus driven. Tessari and Rumiati (J Exp Psychol Hum Percept Perform 30:1107–1116, 2004) have previously shown, using accuracy measures, that imitation of MF actions is superior to imitation of ML actions when the two action types are presented in separate blocks, and that the advantage of MF over ML items is smaller or absent when they are presented in mixed blocks. We first replicated this finding using an automated reaction time (RT), as well as accuracy, measure. We then examined imitation of MF and ML actions in the mixed condition as a function of the action type presented in the previous trial and in relation to the number of previous test trials. These analyses showed that (1) for both action types, performance was worse immediately after ML than MF trials, and (2) even at the beginning of the mixed condition, responding to MF actions was no better than responding to ML items. These results suggest that the properties of the action stimulus play a substantial role in determining whether imitation is mediated by the direct or the indirect route, and that effects of block composition on imitation need not be generated through strategic switching between routes.