Contingent Edis: a new contractual framework for minimizing the risk of incentive failures

Granting economic development incentives (or “EDIs”) has become commonplace throughout the United States, but the efficiency of these mechanisms is generally unwarranted. Both the politicians granting, and the companies seeking, EDIs have incentives to overestimate the EDIs benefits. For politicians, ribbon–cutting ceremonies can be the highly desirable opportunity to please political allies and financiers, and the same time that they demonstrate to the population that they are successful in promoting economic growth – even when the population would be better off otherwise. In turn, businesses are naturally prone to seek governmental aid. This explains in part why EDIs often “fail” (i.e. don’t pay–off). To increase transparency and mitigate the risk of EDI failure, local and state governments across the country have created a number of accountability mechanisms. The general trait of these accountability mechanisms is that they apply controls to some of the sub–risks that underlie the risk of EDI failure. These sub–risks include the companies receiving EDIs not generating the expected number of jobs, not investing enough in their local facilities, not attracting the expected additional businesses investments to the jurisdiction, etc. The problem with such schemes is that they tackle the problem of EDI failure very loosely. They are too narrow and leave multiplier effects uncontrolled. I propose novel contractual framework for implementing accountability mechanisms. My suggestion is to establish controls on the risk of EDI failure itself, leaving its underlying sub–risks uncontrolled. I call this mechanism “Contingent EDIs”, because the EDIs are made contingent on the government achieving a preset target that benchmarks the risk of EDI failure. If the target is met, the EDIs will ex post kick in; if not, then the EDIs never kick in.

Contractual solutions to the holdup problem: a survey

In this survey, we presented the general idea and main results from what we understand that are the most important contributions to contractual solutions to the holdup problem literature. The aim of this paper is to push the previous analysis, uniform the notation and provide a snapshot on the most recent literature, as well as bring topics for future inquires on this issue.

The role of bond covenants and short-term debt: evidence from Brazil

Esta dissertação tem como objetivo analisar a relação entre covenants e alavancagem financeira no curto e longo prazo com oportunidades de crescimento. A partir de uma amostra de 159 debêntures, encontramos evidência de que: 1) Covenants e dívida de curto-prazo podem ser considerados substitutos na atenuação do conflito de agência, uma vez que apresentaram relação negativa e significante e; 2) A relação negativa existente entre dívida de curto prazo e oportunidades de crescimento pode ser reduzida através da utilização de covenants.

Performance-based compensation vs. guaranteed compensation: contractual incentives and performance

Top management from retail banks must delegate authority to lower-level managers to operate branches and service centers. Doing so, they must navigate through conflicts of interest, asymmetric information and limited monitoring in designing compensation plans for such agents. Pursuant to this delegation, the banks adopt a system of performance targets and incentives to align the interests of senior management and unit managers. This paper evaluates the causal relationship between performance-based salaries and managers’ effective performance. We use a fixed effects estimator to analyze an unbalanced panel of data from one of the largest Brazilian retail banks during the period from January 2007 to June 2009. The results indicate that agents with guaranteed variable salary contracts demonstrate inferior performance compared with agents who have performance-based compensation packages. We conclude that there is a moral hazard that can be observed in the behavior of agents who are subject to guaranteed variable salary contracts.

A função social do contrato como concretização de direitos fundamentais nas relações privadas

This dissertation deals with the social function of the contract, based on constitutional principles, especially those relating to fundamental rights. The social function of the contract (general clause) is described in the Civil Code so intentionally generic, no precise criteria to define it. Because of the fluidity of this principle, it is justified its closer study, seeking to assess its various meanings and looking away from the legal uncertainty that an unlimited conceptual vagueness can cause. The social function of the contract arises from a transformation experienced in private law from the inflows received from the Constitutional Law, the result of an evolutionary process by which it became the state structure, leaving the foundations of the classical liberal state and moving toward a vision guided by existential human values that give the keynote of the Welfare State. Arose, then the concern about the effectiveness of fundamental rights in relations between individuals, which is studied from the inapplicability of fundamental rights in private relations (U.S. doctrine of State action), passing to the analysis of the Theory of indirect horizontal effect of fundamental rights (of German creation and majority acceptance), reaching the right horizontal efficacy Theory of fundamental rights, prevailing Brazilian doctrine and jurisprudence. It has also been investigated the foundations of the social contract, pointing out that, apart from the provisions of the constitutional legislation, that base the principle on screen, there have also been noticed foundations in the Federal Constitution, in devices like the art. 1, III, the dignity of the human person is the north of the relationship between contractors. Also art. 3rd, I CF/88 bases the vision of social covenants, equipping it for the implementation of social solidarity, as one of the fundamental objectives of the Republic. Still on art. 170 of the Constitution it is seen as a locus of reasoning in the social function of the contract, the maintenance of the economic order. It is also studied the internal and external aspects of the social function of the contract, being the first part the one that considers the requirement of respect for contractual loyalty, through the objective good faith, as a result of the dignity of the hirer may not be offended by the other through the contract. On the other hand, the external facet of the social function of the contract, in line with the constitutional mandate of solidarity, indicates the need for contractors to respect the rights of society, namely the diffuse, collective and individual third party. In this external appearance, it is also pointed the notion of external credit protection, addressing the duty of society to respect the contract. There has been shown some notions of the social contract in comparative law. Then, there has been investigated the content of principle study, through their interrelationships with other provisions of private and constitutional law, namely equality, objective good faith, private autonomy and dignity of the human person. We study the application of the social contract in contractual networks as well as the guidance of conservation of contracts, especially those denominated long-term captive contracts, considering the theory of substantive due performance, concluding with an analysis of the social contract in code of Consumer Protection

Open Innovation: Legal Hurdles in the Creation of Contractual Arrangements Governing Idea Competitions?

The phenomenon of Open Innovation has been gaining prominence over the last decade. Idea competitions have been used in a variety of industrial sectors. Nevertheless, the legal issues raised by this topic have not been broadly addressed, yet. These arise from the adverse interests of the actors. The company which organizes an idea competition would usually like to have the opportunity to comprehensively use the solutions, ideas or products submitted by the competition entrants. For the company it is important to obtain all intellectual property rights in the idea, in the product created as a result and, thus, in the rights to be exploited in the future, in particular, patents, utility models, trademarks, copyrights and registered designs as well as other industrial property rights. The participant would like to participate to the greatest extent possible in the success of the submitted solution. This affects, firstly, the question of fair remuneration or further participation in any profits earned as well as, secondly, any personal rights such as being named as inventor or author. The article aims to show the contractual difficulties which have to be addressed tailoring theterms of an idea competition under German law.

A Process Model of Complementarity and Substitution of Contractual and Relational Governance in IS Outsourcing

This paper develops a process model of how and why complementarity and substitution form over time between contractual and relational governance in the context of information systems outsourcing. Our analysis identifies four distinct process patterns that explain this formation as the outcome of interaction processes between key elements of both contractual and relational governance. These patterns unveil the dynamic nature of complementarity and substitution. In particular, we show that the relationship between contractual and relational governance oscillates between complementarity and substitution. Those oscillations are triggered mainly by three types of contextual events (goal fuzziness, goal conflict, and goal misalignment). Surprisingly, substitution of informal control did not occur as an immediate reaction to external events but emerged as a consequence of preceding complementarity. Thus, our study challenges the prevailing view of an either/or dichotomy of complementarity and substitution by showing that they are causally connected over time.

Contractual Difficulties in Environmental Management and the Protection of Biodiversity: The Case of Conservation and Mitigation Banking

This paper offers a principal-agent model of feasible private contracting in mitigation and conservation banking aimed at the protection of natural habitat and bio-diversity of US wetlands and uplands. It is shown that while it is straightforward to design an incentive contract, such a contract may not achieve the federally mandated objective of no net loss of habitat. This is because the minimum payment required as an economic incentive to private agents may be greater than what they should receive for the habitat values that they actually created in the field. This possible problem is shown to derive from nonconvexity in the production possibility set between the biological value of land as natural habitat and in non-habitat uses such as in urban development. The paper concludes with a consideration of several institutional devises that may promote the convergence of private contracting and the attainment of no net loss. These include the payment of subsidies, greater accuracy in the identification of actual quality by the principal, and the use of several incentive alignment devises.