The Mirage of the State: Why the West has failed in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and Central African Republic? Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 15, July 2014

The state still matters. However, the members of the Euro-Atlantic community may be misinterpreting this crucial baseline prior launching their military interventions since 2001. The latest violence and collapse of the state of Iraq after the invasion of Northern Iraq by a radical Sunni Muslim terrorist group, so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), demonstrate once again the centrality and requirement of a functioning state in order to maintain violent forces to disrupt domestic and regional stability. Since 2001, the US and its European allies have waged wars against failed-states in order to increase this security and national interests, and then have been involved in some type of state-building.1 This has been the case in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali, and Central African Republic (CAR). France went into Mali (2012) and CAR (2013), which preceded two European Union military and civilian Common Security and Defense Policy missions (CSDP), in order to avoid the collapse of these two states. The threat of the collapse of both states was a concern for the members of the Euro-Atlantic community as it could have spread to the region and causing even greater instabilities. In Mali, the country was under radical Islamic pressures coming from the North after the collapse of Libya ensuing the 2011 Western intervention, while in CAR it was mainly an ethno-religious crisis. Failed states are a real concern, as they can rapidly become training grounds for radical groups and permitting all types of smuggling and trafficking.2 In Mali, France wanted to protect its large French population and avoid the fall of Mali in the hands of radical Islamic groups directly or indirectly linked to Al-Qaeda. A fallen Mali could have destabilized the region of the Sahel and ultimately affected the stability of Southern European borders. France wanted to avoid the development of a safe haven across the Sahel where movements of people and goods are uncontrolled and illegal.3 Since the end of the Cold War, Western powers have been involved in stabilizing neighborhoods and regions, like the Balkans, Africa, and Middle East, which at the exceptions of the Balkans, have led to failed policies. 9/11 changes everything. The US, under President George W. Bush, started to wage war against terrorism and all states link to it. This started a period of continuous Western interventions in this post-9/11 era in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and CAR. If history has demonstrated one thing, the members of the Euro-Atlantic community are struggling and will continue to struggle to stabilize Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and Central African Republic (CAR) for one simple reason: no clear endgame. Is it the creation of a state à la Westphalian in order to permit these states to operate as the sole guarantor of security? Or is the reestablishment of status quo in these countries permitting to exit and end Western operations? This article seeks to analyze Western interventions in these five countries in order to reflect on the concept of the state and the erroneous starting point for each intervention.4 In the first part, the political status of each country is analyzed in order to understand the internal and regional crisis. In a second time, the concept of the state, framed into the Buzanian trinity, is discussed and applied to the cases. In the last part the European and American civilian-military doctrines are examined in accordance with their latest military interventions and in their broader spectrum.

Britain’s Political Earthquake: What aftershocks for Europe and the UK? CEPS Commentary, 11 May 2015

In the wake of last week’s elections in Britain, Michael Emerson examines in this CEPS Commentary the implications of the astonishing results for the EU and the UK and outlines a possible reform package that David Cameron might present to the EU institutions and other member states to fulfil his pledge to achieve a “reformed EU”. He also urges the Prime Minister to consider adding a constructive component to his reform package, namely positioning the UK to act once again as a leading proponent of a more effective European foreign, security and defence policy.

La Unión Europea y la OTAN en el marco de la nueva Estrategia Global de Seguridad de la Unión Europea

El artículo analiza la relación entre la Unión Europea y la OTAN en cuestiones de defensa, según se ha reflejado en las estrategias de seguridad de la Unión Europea, con particular atención a la Estrategia Global de la Unión Europea presentada en 2016. Se estudia la Estrategia de Seguridad Europea de 2003, el Informe de Implementación de 2008, y las nuevas aproximaciones al contexto internacional y a la seguridad europea que se reflejan en la Estrategia Global. Se analiza también el papel de la OTAN, así como la evolución de la política de seguridad de los Estados Unidos hacia Europa durante la Administración Obama. Finalmente se discute el posible futuro de la Política Común de Seguridad y Defensa de la UE (PCSD) después del Bréxit, así como las consecuencias para su relación con la OTAN.

As forças de tipo gendarmerie e as operações/missões de gestão de crises da União Europeia

The European Union has taken in recent years an increasingly important role in ensuring peace and stability in the international community, and the security and defence policy of the Union has become synonymous with crisis management. The Union has addressed the issue of crisis management through two sources: the military side and the civilian side, which consists in carrying out numerous crisis management operations and missions. This study discusses the role of the European Union in conducting crisis management operations and missions and how the gendarmerie forces contribute to the success of the same. It will discuss the evolution of the European Union's security policy and the concept of crisis management, and seek to demonstrate the added value of the commitment of gendarmerie forces in operations and missions of crisis management, particularly with regard to employment of the European Gendarmerie Force. On the other hand, it will study the planning process for crisis management of the European Union, featuring the entities and agencies involved in it, and presenting the products that result from this same process. The use of Gendarmerie forces in crisis management operations and missions has significant advantages. Its use is recommended to post - conflict scenarios, in complementarity with the armed forces, in order to overcome the "security gap" that mediates the transition from the state of conflict for the period of peace and reconstruction. Gendarmerie forces can also be engaged both in military crisis management operations and civilian crisis management missions.

Como se han ido transformando las políticas de seguridad y defensa de Estados Unidos después del 11 de septiembre de 2001-2009 y su incidencia en Colombia

El presente Estado del Arte, tiene como fin entender las diferentes perspectivas planteadas desde publicaciones academicas y especializadas acerca de como a raíz de los atentados terroristas del 11 de septiembre en Estados Unidos se ha ido transformando la Política de Seguridad y Defensa y a consecuencia de ello cuál ha sido su impacto particularmente en el caso colombiano. Si bien es cierto que Colombia es un país que ha tenido que llevar a cuestas por más de 60 años el flagelo del terrorismo, fue solo hasta después del 11 de septiembre que EE.UU., implemento una estrategia direccionada específicamente hacia combatir este fenómeno.

Challenges of the accession of Turkey into the European Union

Turkey's accession to the European Union (EU) has become, over the years, one of the most contentious issues of European integration. On October 3rd 2005, the European Commission began negotiations for its accession, and, although they will probably not be completed within a decade, its objective is the full accession to the Union. Turkey's accession to the EU presents challenges for both parties, but especially for the European Union. There are very different challenges from the previous accessions, indeed. This work aims to analyze the challenges the EU will face towards Turkey's possible accession to the European Community. Therefore, this work has been divided into three sections. In the first of them, entitled "Brief history of a complex negotiation", the negotiation is briefly described. The second, "Aspects to take into account for Turkey's accession to the European Union", in which different relevant (geopolitical, economic and financial, demographic, cultural and religious) aspects of the possible a cession are discussed: aspects that will have an important impact in the development and performance of the European Community, once accession is fulfilled. The third and last section, "Turkey's incorporating challenges", discusses the challenges the EU will have to face with the potential accession of Turkey, specifically concerning four dimensions: institutional capacity, regional and cohesion policy, EU common security and foreign policy.

From Structure to Substance: Has the Constitutional Treaty improved the Chances for a Common Foreign and Security Policy? Research Papers in Law, 6/2005

From the Introduction. A common foreign and security policy for the European Union is an issue of the day. While most academic and many political observers believe that it would be in the interest of the Union to have a common policy, there is quite some disagreement as to how this is to be achieved and whether it should be accomplished in an assured and regular manner or whether it should come about on an ad hoc basis only when it is in the clear interest of all member states at any particular time. In other words, is a common foreign policy to be a fundamental characteristic of the Union or is it to be an occasional occurrence when advantageous and convenient, the ‘C’ in CFSP – as one observer has sarcastically commented – standing not for ‘Common’ but for ‘Convenient’?2

Information Guide: Common Foreign and Security Policy

A guide to the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), with hyperlinks to sources of information within European Sources Online and on external websites

Russia and the Common Space on Freedom, Security and Justice. CEPS Paper on Liberty and Security in Europe No. 54, 25 February 2013

EU-Russia cooperation in the framework of the Common Space on Freedom, Security and Justice, launched almost a decade ago in 2003, has borne fruit more in the security aspects than the justice and liberty-related policy areas. This study assesses the uneven cooperation on justice and home affairs between the EU and Russia, while delving into the intersection between cooperation on justice, liberty and security and the promotion of human rights, democracy and rule of law in EU-Russia relations. The study concludes by proposing a set of policy recommendations to the European Parliament for playing a more active role in this important field of cooperation between the EU and Russia.

Sitting on the fence: Swedish defence policy and the Baltic Sea region. OSW Point of View Number 33, April 2013

Sweden finds itself in the midst of the most heated debates about defence policy and the direction of military reforms since the end of the Cold War, as Stockholm faces the challenge of finding a new military security formula. From the Swedish point of view, the post-Cold War strategic timeout in Europe is coming to an end. The international environment is reverting to a situation in which the use of force among states is no longer an improbable scenario. Stockholm cannot rule out the emergence of crises or conflicts in Northern Europe in the future, which could directly or indirectly affect Sweden. In this context, the transformations of Sweden’s defence policy over the past twenty years have become a problem. Sweden has moved from neutrality, i.e. non-involvement on any side of an armed interstate conflict, to non-alignment, whereby it stays outside military alliances and freely shapes its policies during wartime. It has joined the European Union and co-operates closely with NATO on foreign missions. Its ability to defend its own territory, however, has diminished.

Norway and the Bear. Norwegian defence policy- lessons for the Baltic Sea region. OSW Point of View Number 38, January 2014

Norway is currently the only Western European state and ‘old’ NATO member that strongly relies on the traditional dimension of NATO's collective defence. It is also the only ally in Western Europe which perceives Russia as a threat to its military security, in the so-called High North. In order to successfully deal with the potential challenges and threats in the region, Norway has been pursuing a defence policy based on cooperation and deterrence. Cooperation means improving collaboration with Russia in cross-border relations, in the petroleum sector and in the military sphere. The deterrent measures include maintaining NATO’s credibility as a collective defence alliance; increasing military cooperation with the United States; building up Norway’s own military capabilities; and developing military cooperation across Northern Europe. The primary objective of Oslo’s defence policy is to minimise the likelihood of crises and conflicts emerging in the High North which could prove too ‘big’ for Norway but too ‘small’ for NATO.

Between energy security and energy market integration. Guidelines for the future development of the EU’s external energy policy in Europe’s neighbourhood. OSW Report, June 2011

For many years the European Union has been improving the efficient use of energy resources and yet the demand for energy in the EU continues to increase. When Europe belonged to one of the world’s key energy markets with relatively easy access to energy resources, growing energy needs were not seen as a source of concern. Today, however, as the competition for energy resources is intensifying and the global position of the EU energy market is being challenged by growing economies in the developing countries, above all China and India, the EU needs to adopt bold policies to guarantee the sustainable supply of energy. This report argues the EU needs to develop a fully-fledged external energy policy; i.e. a common, coherent, strategic approach that build bridges between the interests and needs of the EU integrated energy market on the one hand and supplier countries on the other. The EU’s external energy policy has two main objectives. The first one is to ensure a sustainable, stable and cost-effective energy supply. The second is to promote energy market integration and regulatory convergence with neighbouring countries (often but not always this supports the achievement of the first objective). However, in order to improve its effectiveness, the EU’s external energy policy needs to be seen in a broader economic and political context. Any progress in energy cooperation with third countries is contingent upon the EU’s general stance and offer to those countries.

State Agent, Identity and the "New World Order" : Reconstructing Polish Defence Identity after the Cold War Era

National identity signifies and makes state s defence- and foreign policy behaviour meaningful. National consciousness is narrated into existence by narratives upon one s own exceptionalism and Otherness of the other nations. While national identity may be understood merely as a self-image of a nation, defence identity refers to the borders of Otherness and issues that have been considered as worth defending for. As national identities and all the world order models are human constructions, they may be changed by the human efforts as well; states and nations may deliberately promote communitarian or even cosmopolitan equality and tolerance without borders of Otherness. The main research question of the thesis is: How does Poland constitute herself as a nation and a state agent in the current world order and to what extent have contextual foreign and defence policy interactions changed the Polish defence identity during the post-Cold War era? The main empirical argument of the thesis is: Poland is a narrated idea of a Christian Catholic nation-state, which the Polish State, the Catholic Church of Poland, the Armed Forces of Poland as well as a majority of the Polish nation share. Polish defence identity has been almost impenetrable to contextual foreign and defence policy interactions during the post-Cold War era. While Christian religious ontology binds corporate Poland together, allowing her to survive any number of military and political catastrophes, it simultaneously brings her closer to the USA, raises tensions in the infidel EU-context, and restrains corporate Poland s pursuit of communitarian, or even cosmopolitan, global equality and tolerance. It is not the case that corporate Poland s foreign and defence policy orientation is instinctively Atlanticist by nature, as has been argued. Rather, it has been the State s rational project to overcome a habituated and reified fear of becoming geopolitically sandwiched between Russian and German Others by leaning on the USA; among the Polish nation, support for the USA has been declining since 2004. It is not corporate Poland either that has turned into a constructive European , as has been argued, but rather the Polish nation that has, at least partly, managed to emancipate itself from its habituation to a betrayal by Europe narrative, since it favours the EU as much as it favours NATO. It seems that in the Polish case a truly common European CFSP vis-à-vis Russia may offer a solution that will emancipate the Polish State from its habituated EU-sceptic role identity and corporate Poland from its narrated borders of Otherness towards Russia and Germany, but even then one cannot be sure whether any other perspective than the Polish one on a common stand towards Russia would satisfy the Poles themselves.