The size and distribution of donations: Effects of numbers of potential recipients

Whereas much literature exists on choice overload, little is known about effects of numbers of alternatives in donation decisions. How do these affect both the size and distribution of donations? We hypothesize that donations are affected by the reputation of recipients and increase with their number, albeit at a decreasing rate. Allocations to recipients reflect different concepts of fairness equity and equality. Both may be employed but, since they differ in cognitive and emotional costs, numbers of recipients are important. Using a cognitive (emotional) argument, distributions become more uniform (skewed) as numbers increase. In a survey, respondents indicated how they would donate lottery winnings of 50 Euros. Results indicated that more was donated to NGO s that respondents knew better. Second, total donations increased with the number of recipients albeit at a decreasing rate. Third, distributions of donations became more skewed as numbers increased. We comment on theoretical and practical implications.

Insurance and safety after September 11, 2001: Coming to grips with the costs and threats of terrorism

This chapter, originally written as a consequence of the terrorist attacksof September 11, 2001, provides an elementary, everyday introduction tothe concepts of risk and insurance. Conceptually, risk has two dimensions:a potential loss, and the chance of that loss being realized. People can,however, transfer risk to insurance companies against the payment ofso-called premiums. In practice, however, one needs accurate assessmentsof both losses and probabilities to judge whether premiums are appropriate.For many risks, this poses little problem (e.g., life insurance); however,it is difficult to assess risks of many other kinds of events such as actsof terrorism. It is emphasized, that through evolution and learning, peopleare able to handle many of the common risks that they face in life. Butwhen people lack experience (e.g., new technologies, threats of terrorism),risk can only be assessed through imagination. Not surprisingly, insurancecompanies demand high prices when risks are poorly understood. In particular,the cost of insurance against possible acts of terrorism soared afterSeptember 11. How should people approach risk after the events of that day?Clearly, the world needs to protect itself from the acts of terrorists andother disturbed individuals. However, it is also important to address the root causes of such antisocial movements. It is, therefore, suggested thatprograms addressed at combatting ignorance, prejudice, and socialinequalities may be more effective premiums for reducing the risk ofterrosrtism than has been recognized to date.

Time scarcity and the market for news

We develop a theory of news coverage in environments of information abundance. News consumersare time-constrained and browse through news items that are available across competingoutlets, choosing which ones to read or skip. Media firms are aware of consumers' preferences andconstraints, and decide on rankings of news items that maximize their profits. We find that, evenwhen readers and outlets are rational and unbiased and when markets are competitive, readersmay read more than they would like to, and the stories they read may be significantly differentfrom the ones they prefer. Next, we derive implications on diverse aspects of new and traditionalmedia. These include a rationale for tabloid news, a theory of optimal advertisement placementin newscasts, and a justification for readers' migration to online media platforms in order to circumventinefficient rankings found in traditional media. We then analyze methods for restoringreader-efficient standards and discuss the political economy implications of the theory.

Risk aversion and embedding bias

In Selten (1967) ?Strategy Method,? the second mover in the game submits a complete strategy. This basic idea has been exported to nonstrategic experiments, where a participant reports a complete list of contingent decisions, one for each situation or state in a given sequence, out of which one and only one state, randomly selected, will be implemented.In general, the method raises the following concern. If S0 and S1 are two differentsequences of states, and state s is in both S0 and S1, would the participant make the same decision in state s when confronted with S0 as when confronted with S1? If not, the experimental results are suspect of suffering from an ?embedding bias.?We check for embedding biases in elicitation methods of Charles Holt and Susan Laury(Laury and Holt, 2000, and Holt and Laury, 2002), and of the present authors (Bosch-Dom?nech and Silvestre, 1999, 2002, 2006a, b) by appropriately chosen replications of the original experiments. We find no evidence of embedding bias in our work. But in Holt and Laury?s method participants tend to switch earlier to the riskier option when later pairs of lotteries are eliminated from the sequence, suggesting the presence of some embedding bias.

Averting risk in the face of large losses: Bernoulli vs. Tversky and Kahneman

We experimentally question the assertion of Prospect Theory that people display risk attraction in choices involving high-probability losses. Indeed, our experimental participants tend to avoid fair risks for large (up to ? 90), high-probability (80%) losses. Our research hinges on a novel experimental method designed to alleviate the house-money bias that pervades experiments with real (not hypothetical) loses.Our results vindicate Daniel Bernoulli?s view that risk aversion is the dominant attitude,But, contrary to the Bernoulli-inspired canonical expected utility theory, we do find frequent risk attraction for small amounts of money at stake.In any event, we attempt neither to test expected utility versus nonexpected utility theories, nor to contribute to the important literature that estimates value and weighting functions. The question that we ask is more basic, namely: do people display risk aversion when facing large losses, or large gains? And, at the risk of oversimplifying, our answer is yes.

Self-serving biases: Evidence from a simulated labor relationship

Previous studies have found evidence of a self-serving bias in bargaining and dispute resolution. We use experimental data to test for this effect in a simulated labor relatonship. We finda consistent discrepancy between employer beliefs and employee actions that can only be attributed to self-serving biases. This discrepancy is evident through stated beliefs, revealed satisfaction, and actual actions. We present evidenceand discuss implications.

Determinants of linear judgment: A meta-analysis of lens model studies

The mathematical representation of Brunswik s lens model has been usedextensively to study human judgment and provides a unique opportunity to conduct ameta-analysis of studies that covers roughly five decades. Specifically, we analyzestatistics of the lens model equation (Tucker, 1964) associated with 259 different taskenvironments obtained from 78 papers. In short, we find on average fairly high levelsof judgmental achievement and note that people can achieve similar levels of cognitiveperformance in both noisy and predictable environments. Although overall performancevaries little between laboratory and field studies, both differ in terms of components ofperformance and types of environments (numbers of cues and redundancy). An analysisof learning studies reveals that the most effective form of feedback is information aboutthe task. We also analyze empirically when bootstrapping is more likely to occur. Weconclude by indicating shortcomings of the kinds of studies conducted to date, limitationsin the lens model methodology, and possibilities for future research.

Resolving inconsistencies in utility measurement under risk: Tests of generalizations of expected utility

This paper explores biases in the elicitation of utilities under risk and the contribution that generalizations of expected utility can make to the resolution of these biases. We used five methods to measure utilities under risk and found clear violations of expected utility. Of the theories studies, prospect theory was most consistent with our data. The main improvement of prospect theory over expected utility was in comparisons between a riskless and a risky prospect(riskless-risk methods). We observed no improvement over expected utility in comparisons between two risky prospects (risk-risk methods). An explanation why we found no improvement of prospect theory over expected utility in risk-risk methods may be that there was less overweighting of small probabilities in our study than has commonly been observed.

The role of role uncertainty in modified dictator games

We compare behavior in modified dictator games with and without role uncertainty. Subjectschoose between a selfish action, a costly surplus creating action (altruistic behavior) and acostly surplus destroying action (spiteful behavior). While costly surplus creating actions are themost frequent under role uncertainty (64%), selfish actions become the most frequent withoutrole uncertainty (69%). Also, the frequency of surplus destroying choices is negligible with roleuncertainty (1%) but not so without it (11%). A classification of subjects into four differenttypes of interdependent preferences (Selfish, Social Welfare maximizing, Inequity Averse andCompetitive) shows that the use of role uncertainty overestimates the prevalence of SocialWelfare maximizing preferences in the subject population (from 74% with role uncertainty to21% without it) and underestimates Selfish and Inequity Averse preferences. An additionaltreatment, in which subjects undertake an understanding test before participating in theexperiment with role uncertainty, shows that the vast majority of subjects (93%) correctlyunderstand the payoff mechanism with role uncertainty, but yet surplus creating actions weremost frequent. Our results warn against the use of role uncertainty in experiments that aim tomeasure the prevalence of interdependent preferences.

An experiment on Nash implementation

We perform an experimental test of Maskin's canonical mechanism for Nashimplementation, using 3 subjects in non-repeated groups, as well as 3 outcomes, states of nature, and integer choices. We find that this mechanism succesfully implements the desired outcome a large majority of the time and an imbedded comprehension test indicates that subjects were generally able to comprehend their decision tasks. The performance can also be improved by imposing a fine on non designated dissidents. We offer some explanations for the imperfect implementation, including risk preferences, the possibilities that agents have for collusion, and the mixed strategy equilibria of the game.

Regions of rationality: Maps for bounded agents

An important problem in descriptive and prescriptive research in decision making is to identify regions of rationality, i.e., the areas for which heuristics are and are not effective. To map the contours of such regions, we derive probabilities that heuristics identify the best of m alternatives (m > 2) characterized by k attributes or cues (k > 1). The heuristics include a single variable (lexicographic), variations of elimination-by-aspects, equal weighting, hybrids of the preceding, and models exploiting dominance. We use twenty simulated and four empirical datasets for illustration. We further provide an overview by regressing heuristic performance on factors characterizing environments. Overall, sensible heuristics generally yield similar choices in many environments. However, selection of the appropriate heuristic can be important in some regions (e.g., if there is low inter-correlation among attributes/cues). Since our work assumes a hit or miss decision criterion, we conclude by outlining extensions for exploring the effects of different loss functions.

The value of useless information

There are many situations in which individuals have a choice of whether or notto observe eventual outcomes. In these instances, individuals often prefer to remainignorant. These contexts are outside the scope of analysis of the standard vonNeumann-Morgenstern (vNM) expected utility model, which does not distinguishbetween lotteries for which the agent sees the final outcome and those for which hedoes not. I develop a simple model that admits preferences for making an observationor for remaining in doubt. I then use this model to analyze the connectionbetween preferences of this nature and risk-attitude. This framework accommodatesa wide array of behavioral patterns that violate the vNM model, and thatmay not seem related, prima facie. For instance, it admits self-handicapping, inwhich an agent chooses to impair his own performance. It also accommodatesa status quo bias without having recourse to framing effects, or to an explicitdefinition of reference points. In a political economy context, voters have strictincentives to shield themselves from information. In settings with other-regardingpreferences, this model predicts observed behavior that seems inconsistent witheither altruism or self-interested behavior.

Let's (not) talk about sex: The effect of information provision on gender differences in performance under competition

We study how gender differences in performance under competition areaffected by the provision of information regarding rival s gender and/ordifferences in relative ability. In a laboratory experiment, we use two tasks thatdiffer regarding perceptions about which gender outperforms the other. Weobserve women s underperformance only under two conditions: 1) tasks areperceived as favoring men and 2) rivals gender is explicitly mentioned. Thisresult can be explained by stereotype-threat being reinforced when explicitlymentioning gender in tasks in which women already consider they are inferior.Omitting information about gender is a safe alternative to avoid women sunderperformance in competition.

Rules or consequences? The role of ethical mindsets in moral dynamics

Recent research on the dynamics of moral behavior has documented two contrastingphenomena - moral consistency and moral balancing. Moral balancing refers to thephenomenon whereby behaving (un)ethically decreases the likelihood of doing so againat a later time. Moral consistency describes the opposite pattern - engaging in(un)ethical behavior increases the likelihood of doing so later on. Three studies supportthe hypothesis that individuals' ethical mindset (i.e., outcome-based versus rule-based)moderates the impact of an initial (un)ethical act on the likelihood of behaving ethicallyin a subsequent occasion. More specifically, an outcome-based mindset facilitates moralbalancing and a rule-based mindset facilitates moral consistency.

A foundation for strategic agenda voting

We offer complete characterizations of the equilibrium outcomesof two prominent agenda voting institutions that are widely used in the democraticworld: the amendment, also known as the Anglo-American procedure,and the successive, or equivalently the Euro-Latin procedure. Our axiomaticapproach provides a proper understanding of these voting institutions, and allowscomparisons between them, and with other voting procedures.