The value of useless information

There are many situations in which individuals have a choice of whether or notto observe eventual outcomes. In these instances, individuals often prefer to remainignorant. These contexts are outside the scope of analysis of the standard vonNeumann-Morgenstern (vNM) expected utility model, which does not distinguishbetween lotteries for which the agent sees the final outcome and those for which hedoes not. I develop a simple model that admits preferences for making an observationor for remaining in doubt. I then use this model to analyze the connectionbetween preferences of this nature and risk-attitude. This framework accommodatesa wide array of behavioral patterns that violate the vNM model, and thatmay not seem related, prima facie. For instance, it admits self-handicapping, inwhich an agent chooses to impair his own performance. It also accommodatesa status quo bias without having recourse to framing effects, or to an explicitdefinition of reference points. In a political economy context, voters have strictincentives to shield themselves from information. In settings with other-regardingpreferences, this model predicts observed behavior that seems inconsistent witheither altruism or self-interested behavior.