Reference functions and balanced concessions in bargaining

In bargaining, agents expect their concessions to be reciprocated. Using the 'reference function' concept of Thomson (1981), this paper constructs a class of solutions the outcomes of which lead to balanced concessions by agents as prescribed by the reference function adopted. The Kalai/Smorodinsky solution arises as a special case. Another solution in this class, which depends on the entire feasible set, is generated by using the centre of gravity as the reference function.

Interpretations of corruption in intercultural bargaining

There is a fine line in business negotiations between being perceived as corrupt and having proper engagement with the natural tension and excitement of the business bargaining process. Combining literature review and experiential observation we provide a framework that will assist global business managers to more successfully negotiate cross-cultural business transactions. We identify some archetypal underpinnings of bargaining in a business context and question the established perceptions of corruption in intercultural business dealings. We conclude that different cultural systems produce variations of negotiating behaviour that need to be judged with a deeper local knowledge to avoid simply transferring inappropriate labels.

Bargaining in the shadow of the Law - using utility functions to support legal negotiation

Most dispute resolution is settled by negotiation rather than litigation. However, such bargaining often occurs in the shadow of the law. To help support interest-based negotiation, we explore the use of utility functions to support negotiation analysis. We discuss in detail a utility function we have developed in the area of family-law mediation. This function is currently being used as the basis of an online dispute resolution system.

Weakest collective rationality and the Nash bargaining solution

We propose a new axiom, weakest collective rationality (WCR) which is weaker than both weak Pareto optimality (WPO) in Nash’s (Econometrica 18:155–162, 1950) original characterization and strong individual rationality (SIR) in Roth’s (Math Oper Res 2:64–65, 1977) characterization of the Nash bargaining solution. We then characterize the Nash solution by symmetry (SYM), scale invariance (SI), independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and our weakest collective rationality (WCR) axiom.

Distributive justice and the Nash bargaining solution

Suppes-Sen dominance or SS-proofness (SSP) is a commonly accepted criterion of impartiality in distributive justice. Mariotti (Review of Economic Studies, 66, 733–741, 1999) characterized the Nash bargaining solution using Nash’s (Econometrica, 18, 155–162, 1950) scale invariance (SI) axiom and SSP. In this article, we introduce equity dominance (E-dominance). Using the intersection of SS-dominance and E-dominance requirements, we obtain a weaker version of SSP (WSSP). In addition, we consider α − SSP, where α measures the degree of minimum acceptable inequity aversion; α − SSP is weaker than weak Pareto optimality (WPO) when α = 1. We then show that it is still possible to characterize the Nash solution using WSSP and SI only or using α -SSP, SI, and individual rationality (IR) only for any a Î [0,1)[01). Using the union of SS-dominance and E-dominance requirements, we obtain a stronger version of SSP (SSSP). It turns out that there is no bargaining solution that satisfies SSSP and SI, but the Egalitarian solution turns out to be the unique solution satisfying SSSP.

The honeymoon killer : plea bargaining and intimate femicide : a response to Watson

In October 2003, US citizen Christina Thomas died while scuba diving on Queensland’s Great Barrier Reef. Following over five years of delays, her husband David Watson accepted a plea bargain to which he pleaded guilty to manslaughter on the basis of criminal negligence. Watson was initially sentenced to four and a half years imprisonment, suspended after 12 months, however this was later increased on appeal to suspension after 18 months. Using Watson as a framework for analysis, this article examines some of the limitations of an inefficient justice system, with a particular focus on the private nature of the plea bargaining process, and the potentially favourable representations and sentencing of men who kill a female intimate partner. The authors argue that the need to respond to court inefficiency and under-resourcing in the criminal courts creates pressures that can result in a desire for increased efficiency being prioritised above other justice concerns, and this allows for existing flaws within the operation of the criminal justice system to be exacerbated, and excused.

Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions: a simple Nash program

This article proposes a simple Nash program. Both our axiomatic characterization and our noncooperative procedure consider each distinct asymmetric and symmetric Nash solution. Our noncooperative procedure is a generalization of the simplest known sequential Nash demand game analyzed by Rubinstein etal. (1992). We then provide the simplest known axiomatic characterization of the class of asymmetric Nash solutions, in which we use only Nash's crucial Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom and an asymmetric modification of the well-known Midpoint Domination axiom.

How sensitive are bargaining outcomes to changes in disagreement payoffs?

We use a human-subjects experiment to investigate how bargaining outcomes are affected by changes in bargainers’ disagreement payoffs. Subjects bargain against changing opponents, with randomly drawn asymmetric disagreement outcomes that vary over plays of the game, and with complete information about disagreement payoffs and the cake size. We find that subjects only respond about half as much as theoretically predicted to changes in their own disagreement payoff and to changes in their opponent’s disagreement payoff. This effect is observed in a standard Nash demand game and a related unstructured bargaining game, in both early and late rounds, and is robust to moderate changes in stake sizes. We show theoretically that standard models of expected utility maximisation are unable to account for this under-responsiveness, even when generalised to allow for risk aversion. We also show that quantal-response equilibrium has, at best, mixed success in characterising our results. However, a simple model of other-regarding preferences can explain our main results.